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
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SEARCHING FOR PLACE: UKRAINIAN REFUGEE MIGRATION
TO CANADA AFTER WORLD WAR II.

By



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A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1984

DEDICATION

For my parents, Maria and Danylo,
my sister, Nadia,
and my uncle, Jaroslav Opyriuk.

ABSTRACT

Exploring the historical dimensions of the migration of Ukrainian refugees to Canada after World War II, the dissertation discusses the attitudinal changes precipitated within this involuntarily displaced population resulting from the activities of a deliberately implanted Ukrainian nationalist cadre. A major finding of this study was its localization of migrant attribute changes in the enclavic space of the Displaced Persons (DPs) camps of Western Europe. The place-seeking behaviour of these Ukrainian refugees often clashed with the place-keeping attitudes of Ukrainians in the areas of temporary asylum and eventual resettlement, such as Canada. The dissertation focusses on the geographical impact of this immigration of Ukrainian political refugees into Canada, particularly on how it fragmented pre-existing spatial and social patterns extant among the antecedently established Ukrainian population living there. The thesis concludes by suggesting the need for geographers to begin studying the refugee experience, calling for a re-evaluation of the ethnic and immigration history of Ukrainians in Canada in which emphasis would be placed on the critical role played by state elites in shaping a minority's sense of ethnic belonging, and by bringing attention to the process and consequences of refugee migrant attribute changes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to many people. In particular I wish to thank Professor Leszek Kosinski for his understanding, patience and firmness. These are the qualities of a good supervisor, which he has been.

The members of my Supervising Committee, Dr. R.G. Ironside, Dr. O. Sitwell, Dr. N. Seifried, and Dr. Wayne McVey demonstrated their good will and support on many occasions. I thank them for their constructive criticisms.

Dr. John Rogge, a geographer well acquainted with contemporary refugee situations, provided a welcome external review of the dissertation.

The untimely death of Dr. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, a member of the Supervising Committee, deprived me of particularly valuable counsel.

The research required travel across Canada, the USA and Western Europe. Many people opened their doors to me, and frankly described their personal experiences. Sincere thanks are due all of them for their long sufferance and candor. Their names are listed alphabetically in Appendix One, Lists 1 and 2.

I wish to particularly acknowledge my debt to the following: Mr. and Mrs. G.R.B. Panchuk, Mr. and Mrs. S.W. Frolick, Mrs. Ann (Crapleve) Smith, Mr. A.J. Yaremovich and Mrs. Anne Wasylyshen. Without their help, it is likely that no reconstruction of the Ukrainian Canadian aspects of this study would have been possible.

The support of many friends made this project possible. The friendliness and companionship of Debbie, Jacques and Andre Litalien, Dave Mason and Megan Stephenson, Carol Ann Courneya, Bill Daly, Dr. Rene Barendregt, Bernie and Margaret Mullen, Martin LaVoie, Rusty Surowy, Andriy and Marusia Bandera, Steve and Jan Rivers, Mr. and Mrs. S. Boyechko, Mr. and Mrs. M. Zubryckyj, Irka, Michael and Anna Walsh, Volodymyr and Olya Lyczmanenko, Dr. Robert and Julia Starling is something I will always be grateful for.

The questionnaire survey connected with this study would not have been possible without the dedicated and knowledgeable assistance of Debbie and Jacques Litalien. Processing of the results was facilitated by Dr. Yarema Kelebay of McGill University.

Others who deserve credit for their suggestions and assistance over the past years are Mr. and Mrs. M. Andrievsky, Rev. P.J. Ambrosie, S.J., Dr. Y. Boshyk, Mr. Dacre Cole, Mr. and Mrs. M. Carynnyk, Mr. and Mrs. Barry Daciw, Mr. Wasyl Didiuk, Ms. Marg Eckenfelder, Mr. and Mrs. I. Eliashevsky, Neil and Joan Fiertel, Mr. Robert S. Gordon, Ms. Paula Groenburg, Dr. O. Gerus, Ms. Jean Hein, Ms. Stella Hryniuk, Mr. Z. Hluszok, Mr. J. Kolasky, Bohdan and Diana Kordan, Mr. and Mrs. E. Kurdydyk, Dr. S.M. Kushnir, Mr. S. Kuzmyn, Dr. Michael Lanphier, Mr. Marco Levytsky, Dr. and Mrs. George Lovell, Mr. and Mrs. Y. Luhovy, Dr. M.R. Lupul, Dr. and Mrs. Hugh Macdonald and family, Dr. P.R. Magosci, Dr. M. Marunchak, Dr. W. Makar, Dr. R. Malaschuk, Mr. and

Mrs. Fernando Monte, Dr. M. Maleckyj, Mr. and Mrs. Petro Melnycky, Ms. Anne McCarthy, Mr. Myron Momryk, Mr. Jules Nadeau, the O'Brien family, Mr. and Mrs. S. Pawluk, Dr. and Mrs. Richard Pierce, Dr. W. Roman Petryshyn, Mr. W. Pluard, Dr. Chris Rogerson, Mr. Roman Senkus, Dr. Ostap Sokolsky, members of the Ukrainian Canadian Club of Kingston, Dr. and Mrs. W. Vreeken, Ms. Jane Watson, Senator Paul Yuzyk, Mr. Myroslav Yurkevich, Mr. and Mrs. C. Zelenko and Mr. Z. Zwarycz.

Various academic and research institutions have supported this research either by providing logistic support or data. I acknowledge with thanks the assistance received from the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine, the Ukrainian National Federation, the P. Mohyla Institute, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, the Archives Section of the Department of External Affairs, the Public Record Office, the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Society, "Oseredok", the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, the Ukrainian Canadian Committte, the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, and the Federation of Ukrainians in Great Britain. The staff of these organizations deserve particular mention for their patience and help.

Financial assistance was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the Central and

East European Studies Society of Alberta, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation, the Prometheus Research Institute, the Ucrainica Research Foundation, the St. John's Institute, the Brotherhood of Veterans of the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army, the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at The University of Toronto, the British Council, the Department of Geography at the University of Alberta, and the Ukrainian Cultural Center of Los Angeles.

I am particularly indebted to the following individuals for their advice and patience - Dr. Peter Goheen, Dr. Robert Harney, and Rev. J.C.E. Riotte.

Technical and cartographic assistance was provided by the staff of the Department of Geography at The University of Alberta in Edmonton. I would especially like to thank Stephanie Kucharyshyn, Geoff Lester, Inge Wilson and Michael Fisher. Randy Pakan and Jack Chesterman prepared the photographic plates. Brenda Lee Bronzan and Sharon Fowler helped type sections of the thesis. Markian Kowaliuk provided technical expertise during the production of the final version of this dissertation. Fran Metcalfe has assisted the research effort all along, particularly with respect to the survey questionnaire. The staff of the University Map Collection helped me locate many smaller rural communities where Ukrainians once settled and established their organizations; many of these places no longer exist which

made this chore a far from easy one. The fruits of their labour will soon appear as an historical atlas of Ukrainians in Canada, the first such publication. Peter Matilainen was a patient source of information on the intricacies of producing the final draft of this dissertation while Ms. Khrystia Kohut of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies helped edit a "first draft" of this dissertation.

Finally, for Ann, who has always been there.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABN	Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations
AUGB	Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain
AUUC	Association of United Ukrainian Canadians
AAF	Association To Aid the Fatherland
BUC	Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics
CCG	Control Commission for Germany
CCP	Canadian Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CIUS	Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
CRM	Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Victims of War (a.k.a. Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Refugees)
CUC	Co-Ordinating Ukrainian Committee
CURB	Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau
DEA	Department of External Affairs (Canada)
DPS	Displaced Persons
EVWs	European Voluntary Workers
FO	Foreign Office (Great Britain)
FUGB	Federation of Ukrainians in Great Britain
HO	Home Office (Great Britain)
IGCR	Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
IRO	International Refugee Organization
LVU	League for the Liberation of Ukraine
MHSO	Multicultural History Society of Ontario
ODUM	Organization of Democratic Ukrainian Youth
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

OUNr Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-
 Revolutionaries,
 (the *Banderivtsi*).
 OUNS Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Solidarists,
 (the *Melnykivtsi*).
 PAC Publics Archives of Canada
 PCIRO Preparatory Commission of the International
 Refugee Organization
 POW Prisoner-of-War
 PRO Public Record Office (Great Britain)
 RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force
 RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
 SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
 SEP Surrendered Enemy Personnel
 SUM Ukrainian Youth Association
 SUZERO Association of Ukrainian Victims of Russian
 Communist Terror
 UCC Ukrainian Canadian Committee
 UCRF Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund
 UCSA Ukrainian Canadian Servicemens' Association
 UCVA Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Association
 UHO United Hetman Organization, (the *Hetmantsi*).
 UHVR Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council
 UIS Ukrainian Information Service
 ULFTA Ukrainian Labour and Farmer Temple Association
 (later the AUUC).
 ULA Ukrainian Liberation Army

UN	United Nations
UNA	Ukrainian National Army
UNDO	Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNF	Ukrainian National Federation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRada	Ukrainian National Council
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNYA	Ukrainian National Youth Association
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
URDP	Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party
USRL	Ukrainian Self Reliance League
UUARC	United Ukrainian American Relief Committee
UWL	Ukrainian Workers' League
UWVA	Ukrainian War Veterans' Association
WBA	Workers' Benevolent Association
WO	War Office (Great Britain)

Note on Abbreviations:

The abbreviations listed above were used consistently throughout the text. When other forms were found, for example, the use of "D.P." for Displaced Persons, the version listed was used (e.g. DPs).

A refugee is a man who votes with his feet.

Lenin.

We were friends, and have become strangers to each other. But this is as it ought to be and we do not want either to conceal or obscure the fact, as if we had to be ashamed of it. We are two ships, each of which has its goal and its course; we may, to be sure, cross one another in our paths, and celebrate a feast together as we did before, -and then the gallant ships lay quietly in one harbour and in one sunshine, so that it might have been thought they were already at their goal, and that they had one goal. But then the almighty strength of our tasks forced us apart once more into different seas and into different zones, and perhaps we shall never see one another again,--or perhaps we may see one another, but not know one another again; the different seas and suns have altered us! That we had to become strangers to one another is the law to which we are *subject*: just by that shall we become more sacred to one another! Just by that shall the thought of our former friendship become holier! There is probably some immense, invisible curve and stellar orbit in which our courses and goals, so widely different, may be *comprehended* as small stages of the way, -let us raise ourselves to this thought! But our life is too short, and our power of vision too limited for us to be more than friends in the sense of that sublime possibility. And so we will *believe* in our stellar friendship, though we should have to be terrestrial enemies to one another.

Nietzsche

THE UKRAINIAN REFUGEE EXPERIENCE: AN OVERVIEW

*We have no abiding city
but we seek one to come.*

Hebrews 13, 14.

Introduction: A Gathering Together

According to plan they gathered together at Toronto in the spring of 1949.¹ So assembled, they formed a small but disciplined cohort, each member of which had proven an unflinching loyalty to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Revolutionaries (*OUNr*), known as the *Banderivtsi*.²



What they had shared drew them together and kept them united. They all came from the western regions of Ukraine (Figure 1.1), were members of the Uniate (Greek) Catholic faith, spoke Ukrainian and held in common many social and cultural beliefs. No matter how binding such ties, their cohesiveness essentially reflected common political experiences. Each of them had spent most of the previous two decades in conspiratorial activity against the Polish occupation of their homeland - Western Ukraine (Figure 1.2).³ Those caught had endured incarceration as political prisoners. During this same period they had witnessed the dissolution of the once-powerful *OUN* into militantly antagonistic factions, their own and the smaller, largely emigre-based Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists -

Figure 1.1 Regions of Ukraine.



Source: Kubiśovyc and Zukowskyi. MAP OF UKRAINE (1977)

Regions of Ukraine

-  Territory claimed by the Western Ukrainian Republic, 1918-1919
-  Territory under the administration of the Ukrainian Central Rada, 1917

0 100 200 km

Figure 1.2 Inter-war Western Ukraine.



Sources: Ethnogeographic Setting (Magocsi, GALICIA xii)
Interwar Galicia (Magocsi, GALICIA 1983 p 177)

Inter-war Western Ukraine

--- International boundary 1984

..... International boundary 1920-1939

■ Territory claimed by Western Ukrainian Republic, 1918-1919

0 50 100 km

Solidarists (*OUNs*) known as the *Melnykivtsi*. After the invasion of Soviet territories by the German *Wehrmacht* on June 22, 1941, the *OUNr* proclamation of an *Act of Renewal of an Independent Ukrainian State* (Lviv, June 30, 1941) only resulted in the further decimation of their ranks. For the *Banderivtsi* in particular the war brought executions, deportations and internment in such infamous Nazi concentration camps as Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, Dachau and Sachsenhausen.⁴ In spite of such setbacks they persisted in their fight for an independent Ukraine, swelling the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*UPA*) which fought the German occupation authorities from the autumn of 1942 and continued battling the Soviets until the early 1950s.⁵


The Shared Refugee Experience

A more general if no less traumatic experience provided a common background for those attending the Toronto conclave. Virtually all of them had been among the 2.5 to 3.0 million Ukrainians dislodged from their home areas during World War II.⁶ The majority of these Displaced Persons (*DPS*) had not been, of course, either members, nor necessarily even sympathetic to the Ukrainian nationalist movement. At first the refugee population was quite heterogeneous. The *DPS* came from a variety of regional, religious and political backgrounds and the reasons they had come to be clustered in the *DP* camps of Western Europe also varied.

One thing they held in common was that most had never planned to migrate. Few, however, had much choice about trekking west. Many ended up in Germany or Austria only after having been press-ganged into the service of the Third Reich as slave labourers, known as *Ostarbeiter* or East Workers.⁷ This was particularly the case for those who had been removed from Eastern Ukraine, territories organized by the Germans during WW II into a *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* from what had previously been the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,⁸ (Figure 1.3). Then there were the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian Prisoners-of-War (POWs), encircled by the *Wehrmacht* during its *Blitzkrieg* against the Soviet Red Army.⁹

Not all Ukrainian *DPs* were from the eastern regions of Ukraine. Voluntary workers from Western Ukraine had gone to work in Germany and Austria hoping to find a better life there than existed in the *Generalgouvernement*. Some were students attending institutions in Western Europe when the war left them cut off from home. Others were political emigres of long standing, bearers of Nansen Passports¹⁰ who had left Ukraine after the unsuccessful liberation struggles of 1917-1921.¹¹ Still others had fled west, either independently or as evacuees alongside the retreating Germans. There were among this group many Western Ukrainians who could recall the first Soviet occupation of their region, between September of 1939 and late June of 1941. They had no desire to repeat that experience.

Figure 1.3 Germany's political and military zones of authority in occupied Eastern Europe.



German Political and Military Zones of Authority in occupied Eastern Europe

----- International boundary
—— Zone boundary

Sources: Reitlinger, THE HOUSE BUILT ON SAND (1960)
Cooper, THE PHANTOM WAR (1979)

▲▲▲ Greatest extent of } Central front, November 1941
Southern front, November 1942

0 250 500 km

A rather unique group were soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army (UNA), under the command of Major General Pavlo Shandruk. In the main, these men found themselves, by late spring of 1945 interned near Rimini, Italy under the control of the British military. While some were survivors of the 14th *Waffen Panzer-Grenadier Division der SS (Galicia Nr.1)*¹² other Ukrainian military formations and even some civilians had attached themselves to this division near the war's end. Many of these were Volhynians and Eastern Ukrainians, former members of the Ukrainian Liberation Army (ULA). Only a small percentage of those retreating west among the DP population could be classified outright as collaborators.

With hindsight it seems obvious that once these Ukrainians found themselves sheltering alongside some 30 million other homeless Europeans Poles, Yugoslavs, Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Cossacks, expelled Germans and even refugees from Allied countries, their collective fate would become inextricably intertwined with that of these other homeless peoples. Resolution of the "refugee problem" awaited not their own decision-making about where they might go but rather the outcome of complex international bargaining involving not a little controversy.¹³ Having found temporary asylum in refugee camps these Ukrainians simultaneously became captives to the choices their hosts would make about their eventual disposition. Few Ukrainians caught up in this displacement

as yet realized that their recently begun exile would forever separate them from what had been familiar to them - their families, friends and villages in Ukraine.

Not all who found themselves in Western Europe, however, were there unwillingly, bereft of foresight or plan. Members of both *OUN* factions had been ordered to head west by their superiors. These *OUN* cadres came to be based in or near the *DP* camps where the majority of the Ukrainian refugees had found sanctuary. This was no coincidence.

The purpose of this placement and how it came about cannot be explained with a single reply. Obviously some nationalists had been swept along with the overall refugee population flowing west during the final months of WW II.¹⁴ Such individuals found themselves cut off from their area of origin with no immediate prospect of a return there. Others, freed from *Nazi* concentration camps, found their Organization's cell structure so badly disrupted by the exigencies of war that re-establishing contacts with former compatriots was all but impossible. They turned their attentions towards first locating other nationalists and then reconstituting the covert and hierarchical structure of their Organization.

A number of *OUN* members had retreated west in order to avoid capture by the Soviets. If they had remained behind and been publicly identified as Ukrainian nationalists their fate would have been immediate death or long imprisonment. Some faced with a choice of either moving or staying behind

had tried to join *UPA*. However this body could not absorb, train or equip all those volunteering to join it. A rigorous selection was made. Those not chosen were dispersed, either by being ordered to return to their homes, there to remain implaced as covert supporters of the insurgency, or instructed to seek safety abroad.

The picked group that was specifically sent west had as its mission the formation abroad of "the second anti-Bolshevik front." Here again, little personal decision-making was involved. The cadres were selected and then ordered west. Most complied with their assignments. That they were very carefully chosen shall become apparent.

Their task in the West was to establish networks of support for the *OUN*, the *UPA* and their political command, the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (*UHVR*). Relatively safe source areas of logistic support were thought to exist within those *DP* camps where Ukrainians had found shelter. Here the *OUN* cadres came to begin the difficult task of mobilizing support for the ongoing struggle. To do so, they quickly realized, would first require welding together the heterogeneous Ukrainian population they found inhabiting the refugee camps. One member of *OUNS* noted:

What was the task of the Organization in the *DP* camps? Basically, our duty was to revive the Ukrainian spirit, to guide those who had been crushed by the enemies of our people back into our fold, to inspire them so that they would not be

crushed again. We tried to bring people into our movement, even though not necessarily into the Organization itself.¹⁵

There were other reasons for the dispatch of these cadres. It was expected that they would proselytize on behalf of the Ukrainian liberation movement and by being living witnesses to such a struggle, perhaps inspire Western support. While so doing they were also to re-establish the links which had previously connected the nationalists in Ukraine with sympathizers abroad in countries like Canada and the United States of America. The war had severed these important ties, leaving both sides only partially aware of what had occurred during the intervening years.

Those *OUN* members who were sent west felt their mission was a relatively temporary absence from the homeland, a hiatus to be stoically endured. Certainly many believed that the contemporary tribulations their movement was experiencing heralded the onset of a final stage in the Ukrainian struggle for an independent nation-state. For that end they were prepared to endure.

No such restoration ever came about. As time and space continued to separate the *OUN* activists from their comrades-in-arms in Ukraine, those on the outside came to realize that they would share a common fate with other Ukrainian *DPs*, namely a lengthy exile. The psychological and political strains this placed upon them were to have repercussions throughout the movement, as future

fragmentation of the *OUN* would prove. Yet, at first, by dint of resiliency and organizational discipline, these nationalists managed to adapt to their new situation in the *DP* camps. An account of how they did so, becoming a predominant authority within these enclaves, with profound consequences for the other inhabitants, forms the core of this study. It will be argued, in fact, that these "militant refugees" (e.g. *OUN* cadres) decisively affected not only the duration of this population's refugee experience, but played a definite role in manipulating the spatial patterns of the emigration in the various countries of resettlement.

Conclusions

The dissertation is organized into 8 chapters. Chapter 1 has provided a brief historical overview of the refugee migration being examined and indicated some of the more relevant processes and events which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 approaches the study of involuntary population migration by first considering the field of population geography as it has been delineated in some of the classic papers of the discipline. The insights so derived are then applied to the refugee experience. This chapter concludes by suggesting five basic research questions pertaining to the comparative study of voluntary and involuntary population migrations. Resolving these questions becomes the task of succeeding chapters. Chapter 3 discusses the research methods that were applied to this

case study, making the point that no single technique would have provided sufficient data for the required in-depth analysis. Only by combining the collection of personal reminiscences with survey research and archival study was the student able to explore this particular refugee experience and posit answers to the previous chapter's hypotheses. Chapter 4 establishes the parameters and nature of Ukrainian society in Canada *before* World War II. In effect it outlines the nature of the receiving population, allowing for the explanation of the geographical impact of the post-WW II immigration. Particular attention is given to this population's sense of ethnic belonging, and to the way in which its identification with Ukrainian issues was molded through the intervention of the Canadian state. That the spatial and social patterns evident among this pre-WW II Ukrainian population in Canada were affected by government interventions is also emphasized. Chapter 5 considers what might be termed the "intervening area" between Ukraine and Canada, respectively the areas of origin and destination for these displaced persons. It takes the novel position of arguing that this particular phase in the refugee experience was pivotal in shaping the attitudes of the majority of the refugees, for in these niches a captive population, exposed to the indoctrination techniques of "militant refugees" became convinced that they would find an acceptable "place utility" only in the areas they had originally been forced to vacate. Their conviction fueled a process of

place-seeking behaviour among the refugees, who would continue for many years thereafter to compulsively seek a return *home*. Chapter 6 examines the nature of the interaction between the refugee "newcomers" and the "oldtimers" in Canada. It traces how attitudinal differences over the nature of "being Ukrainian" - and what this might mean in terms of accepting Canada as a *place* where Ukrainian needs could be met - precipitated social and spatial fragmentation among the organized Ukrainian population of Canada. The long-term consequences of this migration event are indicated in the Epilogue which underscores the critical importance of appreciating the qualitative attributes of a migrating population and particularly how these are changed during the refugee experience. It accents the point that the political history of one particular ethnic immigrant group in Canada - the Ukrainians - was decisively affected not only by the interventionist policies of the state, but also significantly altered by the migratory experiences of various subgroups of this population. Likely, similar conclusions would apply to other ethnic and immigrant groups in Canada. The dissertation ends by asserting the need for such re-evaluations of the population and historical geographies of Canada's increasingly relevant ethnic minorities.

Notes

1. *Declaration of the Temporary Central Organizing Bureau of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine*, (1. 5. 49), published in *Homin Ukrainy*. Additional information is found in R. Rakhmanny's unpublished, "Notes On The Formation of the Periodical *Homin Ukrainy* and the Organization, League for the Liberation of Ukraine in Toronto, Canada."

Oral evidence was acquired from a number of individuals, including:

W. Bezchlibnyk, (30.6.81) and 1. 7. 81);
 I. Eliashevsky, (11.2.82);
 S. W. Frolick, (1.7.81 and 10.1.83 and 14.12.83 to 24. 12. 83 and 4. 1. 84 to 6. 1. 84);
 W. Klish, (21.6.83);
 O. Kushnir, (5.4.82);
 V. Makar, (23.3.82);
 R. Malaschuk, (25.3.82);
 A. Matla, (23.3.82);
 R. Olynyk, (14.6.83);
 W. Solonynka, (23.3.82); and
 B. Stebelsky, (17.3.82).

2. The classic work on Ukrainian nationalism remains John A. Armstrong, (1963). Also see Alexander Motyl, (1980). Stepan Bandera and Col. Andriy Melnyk were two leaders in the *OUN* before the 1940 split. The factions they came to head were popularly known after their surnames.

Approximately 60% of those interviewed had been members of one of the Ukrainian nationalist formations before, during or just after WW II. Some of the more useful interviews included the following:

S. Izyk, (21.5.82);
 Z. Knysh, (10.3.82);
 B. Kordiuk, (13.7.82);
 J. Kosak, (21.7.82);
 V. Lenyk, (9.7.82);
 I. Majstrenkjo, (9.7.82);
 J. Makoweckyj, (12.7.82);
 R. Malaschuk, (25.3.82);
 M. Marunchak, (31.5.82);
 T. Maryglad, (1.4.82);
 S. Mudryk, (13.7.82);
 K. Mykytczuk, (15.4.82 and 23.4.82);
 R. Paladiychuk, (22.3.82 and 4.4.82);
 S. Rosocha, (4.5.82);
 Y. Serbyn, (30.6.81);
 L. Shankowsky, (3.9.81);
 E. Shtendera, (7.9.81);
 S. Stetsko, (9.7.82); and
 Y. Stetsko, (14.7.82).

A decription of the activities of the Ukrainian nationalists in *DP* camps was presented by Myroslav Yurkevich, (1983).

British Foreign Office appreciations of the split that occurred within the *OUN* can be found in the following files: *FO* 371/29480, (6. 5. 41), and *FO* 371/29532, (8. 5. 41).

War Office (*WO*) comments are found in *WO* 208 1734, (July, 1940), titled, *Ukrainian Nationalist Activities Sponsored by Nazi Germany*.

3. Numerous works deal with Ukrainian and Polish relations in the inter-war period. Rarely cited, but of particular utility, is Robert Sullivant, (1948); Stephan Horak, (1961) is a consonant work. Good overviews are found in C.A. Macartney (1934), A. W. Palmer, (1972) and Joseph Rothschild, (1974).

The Polish position is well argued in M. Felinski, (1931). Intriguingly he suggested that even the word "Ukrainian" was a relatively recent invention. He also presents statistics on *OUN* "sabotage" in *Malopolska*. The Polish Research Centre, London, produced a monograph *Eastern Poland* which made similar claims, asserting that the term "Ukrainian" connotated political affiliation and not national or ethnic identity. It suggested that most inhabitants of Eastern Galicia should properly be called *Ruthenians*. The implication was that the majority of these people were not in sympathy with "Ukrainians".

British interest in Ukrainian and Polish relations, given existing German and Soviet efforts in

the region, was persistent and extensive. Relevant Foreign Office files include the following:

FO 371/14827;

FO 181/979;

FO 181/978;

FO 371/14828;

FO 371/17793;

FO 371/18321;

FO 371/21676;

FO 371/21810;

FO 371/22295;

FO 371/22461;

FO 371/22893;

FO 371/23056;

FO 371/23103;

FO 371/23138;

FO 371/23677;

FO 371/24473;

FO 371/26721;

FO 371/29532;

FO 371/30840;

FO 371/31437;

FO 371/31590;

FO 371/39012;

See also, *WO 208/1734.*

Canadian views are recorded in Department of External Affairs files, such as *DEA 266-40,*

(February, 1941) and *DEA* 58-H (s), (29.9.45). The biased attitudes these commentaries often reveal is well illustrated in *FO* 371/23138, (23.10.39) and *FO* 371/24473, (4.3.40). The former notes:

I think we must bear in mind that most even of the Ukrainian leaders (a) are only just emerging from the status of "semi-intellectual" and (b) have a decidedly oriental kink in their brains.

The next file made the following point:

The Ukrainians are rogues and bores - an awful combination.

A popular account of several regions experiencing difficulties with ethnic minorities in Europe before WW II is found in Bernard Newman, (1938).

4. The material destruction experienced in Ukraine during World War II is discussed in *"DP" Operations. Report of the Central Headquarters For Germany, UNRRA*, (1946). Bohdan Wytwycky (1980) and Ihor Kamenetsky, (1961) discuss demographic and material losses in Ukraine as a result of WWII.

Ukrainian nationalists interviewed who had been inmates of German concentration camps, included:

O. Eliashevsky, (28.4.82);
 S. Izyk, (21.5.82);
 M. Kril, (12.2.82);
 V. Lenyk, (9.7.82);
 R. Malaschuk, (25.3.82); and

Y. Stetsko, (14.7.82).

5. No definitive English-language treatment of the UPA is yet available. Useful works include Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, (1972), Enrique Martinez Codo, (1962) and M. Bojcun, (1976).

Veterans of the UPA who were interviewed included:

S. Babiak, (22.4.82);
 P. Cymbalisty, (15.6.82);
 M. Fedak, (9.3.82);
 I. Firman, (30.4.82);
 V. Makar, (23.3.82);
 I. Mychalchuk, (19.9.81);
 K. Mykytczuk, (15.4.82 and 23.4.82); and
 E. Shtendera, (7.9.81).

Public awareness of continuing Ukrainian resistance is evident in newspaper reports of the time, e.g. "6,000 Ukrainians Flee Reds; Resistance Army Units Approaching US Zone." *Globe and Mail*, (1.10.47).

FO 371/66357, dated 27.10.47 discusses penetrations of the American Zones of Germany and Austria by UPA. DEA 2514-40C contains a letter to Norman Robertson from the Canadian Ambassador to Poland, (25.1.45) about activities of Ukrainian "bands" in Western Ukraine. PAC MG 28 v. 9 Vol. 17 concerns the report of *The Times* correspondent in Prague, who noted the "complete breakdown of the Polish government's authority" in those areas where Ukrainian partisans

were active. It also notes that some local Jews, when questioned about the nationalists, expressed no animosity towards either the *Banderivtsi* or the UPA.

6. A "Top Secret" British document WO 219/3806 (16.8. 44) estimated there were at least 9 million refugees comprising some 20 different nationalities in Europe. Bohdan Panchuk, (10.6.45) figured the total number of Ukrainians to be closer to 4.5 million, likely an exaggerated assessment, (DEA 2514-40). Other sources, such as Proudfoot (1956), Schechtmann (1946), and Vernant (1953) provide contradictory statistics. The figure accepted here is Stebelsky's (1983) calculation, which suggests that during WW II there was a net migration of some 2.5 to 3.0 million Ukrainians. Of these about 250,000 were left in the British, American and French Zones of Germany, and Austria in late 1946 after forcible repatriation had taken its toll.
7. German occupation policy in Eastern Europe has received extensive scholarly attention. Among the better studies are Gerald Reitlinger, (1966), Alexander Dallin, (1957), David Littlejohn, (1972), Wilfried Strik-Strikfelt, (1970), George Fischer, (1952), and John S. Stephan, (1978).
8. Historical and contemporary analyses of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic can be found in Yaroslav Bilinsky, (1964), Robert S. Sullivant, (1962), Borys Lewtyzkyj, (1984), Juriy Borys, (1980), and James E.

Mace, (1983).

9. Interviews conducted with former Red Army soldiers included:
 Y. Bulat, (8.4.82); M. Czich, (18.9.81); W. Litwinow, (29.4.82); P. Makohon, (24.4.82); A. Maksymluk, (12.5.82); and A. Sosna, (16.4.82).
10. Dr. Fridtjof Nansen was the first Commissioner of the High Commission for Refugees, established under League of Nations auspices in 1921. After a conference held in Geneva, Switzerland in July of 1922, sixteen governments agreed to recognize as valid travel documents and **laissez passer** the identity papers the Nansen organization had distributed. These became popularly known as Nansen Passports. For further information on Nansen and the inter-war refugee issues, see Paul Tabori, (1972).
11. The Ukrainian struggle for independence between 1917 and 1921 is well described in Taras Hunczak, (1977), John S. Reshetar, (1952), Oleh S. Fedyshyn, (1971) and Michael Palij, (1976).
12. The Ukrainian Division "Galicia" has been portrayed as a criminal formation, which allegedly took part in the execution of Jews, the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising (1944) and related war crimes. For information on this Ukrainian military unit see Roger Tory Bender and Hugh Page Taylor, (1975), Wasyl Veryha, (1980), and Wolf-Dietrich Heike, (1970).

Veterans of the Division who were interviewed included:

L. Babenko (21.4.82);
 S. Babiak, (22.4.82);
 P. Cymbalitsky, (15.6.82);
 F. Cymbaluk, (9.4.82);
 J. Kruzelecky, (24.4.82);
 M. Maletsky, (9.3.82);
 M. Shebech, (23.3.82); and
 O. Sokolsky, (3.12.81).

Ukrainian Canadians who assisted the Division during its internment near Rimini, Italy, and later in the United Kingdom and Canada, who were interviewed, include:

M. Kapusta, (10.5.82);
 G.R.B. Panchuk, (5.5.81 and 24.7.81 and 4.1.83);
 G. Salsky, (16.9.81);
 A. Smith, (20.5.82/29.11.82);
 P. Smylski, (25.3.82); and
 A.J. Yaremovich, (1.12.82/27.1.83).

Documentary evidence on the Ukrainian Division "Galicia" is extensive. Archival material consulted in this study included the following files:

Department of External Affairs (Canada)

6980-GR-40 (21.2.47);
 82-96-40C, (25.4.47);
 82-96-40, (25.4.47);

232-L-40C, (9.10.47);

232-L-40, (13.4.50);

232-L-40, (9.8.50);

10268-40, (25.10.50);

Foreign Office (Great Britain)

FO 371/47902, (24.7.45);

FO 47903, (27.7.45)

FO 47904, (1.8.45)

FO 57750, (27.2.46)

FO 57691, (4.4.46)

FO 57828, (14.5.46)

FO 56715, (16.5.46)

FO 56791, (22.5.46)

FO 56717, (17.8.46)

FO 47906, (15.9.46)

FO 66730, (11.2.47)

FO 66354, (21.2.47)

FO 66604, (24.2.47)

FO 31590, (26.2.47)

FO 31540, (27.2.47)

FO 31540, (28.2.47)

FO 66657, (14.3.47)

FO 66710, (9.4.47)

FO 66356, (9.4.47)

FO 66660, (10.4.47)

FO 31590, (23.4.47)

FO 66161, (10.5.47)

FO 66162, (1.10.47)

FO 66773, (1.10.47)

FO 66357, (24.11.47)

FO 71662 (3.3.48)

FO 71663 (30.6.48)

FO 87430 (29.8.50)

FO 94811 (18.10.51)

Archival material in the **G.R.B. Panchuk Collection** (Archives of Ontario, Toronto) includes the following material, categorized by dates, (17.12.46), (27.3.47), (4.4.47), (7.5.47), (30.5.47), (6.6.47), (17.6.47), (24.6.47), (8.7.47), (10.7.47), (17.7.47), (24.7.47), (10.10.47), (1.12.47), (23.1.48), (11.2.48), (1.3.48), (8.3.48), (9.4.48), (28.4.48), (4.5.48), (12.5.48), (14.9.48), (31.5.48), (29.6.48), (17.7.48), (19.7.48), (30.8.48), (3.9.48), (28.10.48), (21.12.48), (18.1.49), (9.3.49), (14.3.49), (6.7.49).

Material in the **Public Archives of Canada** (Ottawa),

MG 28 v.9 Vol. 15, (21.6.47);

MG 28 v.9 Vol. 15, (9.7.47);

MG 28 v.9 Vol. 15, (16.7.47);

MG 30E 350, (29.7.47);

MG 28 v.9 Vol. 16, (30.12.47);

MG 28 v.9 Vol. 17, (8.10.47);

MG 28 v.9 Vol. 15, (9.7.48);

MG 28 v.9 Vol. 17, (8.2.51);

Some of this material has been discussed by Myron

Momryk, (1983).

The private collection of Mr. Eustace Wasylyshen, (Winnipeg) contains correspondence dated (11.11.49) and (18.8.50).

War Office (Great Britain) files include, *WO* 204 440, (1.8.45) and *WO* 204 440, (20.8.45).

A newspaper article, "The Ukrainian Division 'Galicia': War Criminals in Canada? " by L.Y. Luciuk and M. Yurkevich, (1983) discusses these documents and the controversy regarding the supposed presence of Ukrainian war criminals in Canada.

None of the documents referred to above substantiate the claim that the Ukrainian Division "Galicia" participated in any war crimes.

13. The standard reference works on international organizations charged with overseeing the post-WW II refugee problem are (for *UNRRA*) George Woodbridge, (1950), and (for *IRO* and the *UNHCR* respectively) Louise W. Holborn, (1956) and (1975).

An unsympathetic treatment of the *DPS* can be found in Ira A. Hirschmann, (1949).

In *DEA* 8116-40 there is a letter from a Canadian nurse, Miss Claire V. Tait, to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, (21.11.45), critical of the proposed immigration of "Eukrainians" into Canada.

14. For example, W. Kachnycz, (16.5.82) was forcibly evacuated by the retreating Germans.

15. Interview with R. Malaschuk, (25.3.82).

CHAPTER TWO - THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

It is not so much the visibly conspicuous element of men, their physical bodies, which change the face of the earth and are geographically significant, but rather mens' minds or their knowledge, and these are not a visible landscape element.

Glen Trewartha, *The Case For Population Geography*

Introduction

Research in contemporary population geography has begun on the simple patterns of population distribution (Jones, 1981). This new approach also seeks to explain the behavioural factors underlying migratory movements, and not simply the consequences of such population redistributions. In keeping with this recent approach, this thesis concentrates on interpreting the spatio-temporal consequences of the arrival of Ukrainian *DPS* in Canada upon the antecedently established Ukrainian population of Canada. The study is process-oriented and emphasis has been given to those causal mechanisms deemed to be most appropriate in understanding the phenomena under analysis.

Before formulating the research framework, it is first necessary to consider the literature on migration in the fields of population geography and refugee studies.

The Case For Population Geography Revisited

Scant attention was given to the study of population within Anglo-American geography prior to Trewartha's (1953) cogent admonition to the discipline. Pointing out that even Hartshorne's (1939) rather prescriptive monograph, *The Nature of Geography* neglected the study of population as a systematic sub-division of the field, Trewartha (1953:79) argued that the prevailing division of the discipline into the study either of the physical or cultural landscape was to blame for the omission of population geography. Bemoaning this slighting of what he believed was "the pivotal topical study within our field" Trewartha persuasively reasoned for a three-fold organization of geography, one in which man, the physical earth and the works of man would each compose an equal portion of the discipline.

Trewartha was particularly exercised with the interpretation of those geographers who restricted the content of human geography to the study of only the visible evidence of mankind's occupation of the land and use of the physical environment. Such a narrow definition enjoyed a wide-spread acceptance in the field. For example, the eminent cultural geographer, Carl Sauer wrote in *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, (Volume 6, 1966:222) that:

[Geography] is concerned with those works of man that are inscribed into the earth's surface and give to it characteristic expression.

For Trewartha the discipline had to accept a much broader mandate. While its central theme might well be the study of "areal differentiation" population was the dynamic element of place, and should provide a focus for all geographic inquiry.

Trewartha's ideas, according to Zelinsky, (1966:3), gained only limited acceptance within the discipline. Certainly, however, as Jones, (1981:6), suggested, Trewartha had been able to make a "powerful case" for his beliefs by stating them during a presidential address to the Association of American Geographers, (Trewartha, 1953:6). That he had an impact is evidenced by the fact that other formative statements followed. Hooson (1960:12) elaborated upon Trewartha's suggestions for Canadian geographers. His idea was the geography should foremost be concerned "with the problem of the uneven distribution of population over the earth." He also cautioned fellow practitioners of the discipline that the term "population" must never be taken in the restricted sense accorded to it by statisticians. Rather it should be considered as being synonymous with "Man". The geographer's task, in Hooson's understanding, was to come to an understanding of the distribution of spatial patterns of human social groupings on the earth's surface.

Lukerman (1964:167), followed suit, elaborating on these viewpoints by adding that geographers should not simply describe areal patterns, but also seek the subjective meanings of these patterns as well. He noted that beliefs

underlie mens' actions, and give "character" to places. The discipline would therefore have to concern itself with the study of places and how and why they acquired their distinctiveness. The basic geographic question was formulated as being, "Why is the world or why do we see the world as being divided up into places?" (Lukerman, 1964:167).

While Zelinsky, (1966:5) noted his reservations concerning Trewartha's ability to restructure the discipline, he did adopt many of the latter's positions. Arguing that population geography should indeed assume the status of a major branch within the field, he also provided his own definition of what its subject matter should be:

[Population geography is] the science that deals with the ways in which the geographic character of places is formed by, and in turn reacts upon, a set of population phenomena that vary within it and through both space and time as they follow their own behavioural laws, inter-acting one with another and with numerous non-demographic phenomena, (Zelinsky, 1966:3)

So described, the field should investigate not only the 'where' or location of people and things on the earth's surface but through searching for the "inter-relatedness of elements" through time and space also seek understanding of how places come to be endowed with their often unique "personalities." Thus not only answering 'where' but

providing explanation of 'why there' becomes an essential task of the geographer. In these opinions Zelinsky echoed Lukerman's conviction that it was insufficient to simply "place" phenomena. Geography's subject matter should also be the assessment of the interaction of age and area, of period and place, if it was to be complete.

Since these pioneering works appeared, considerable interest in population phenomena emerged among geographers. This expansion was buoyed by a willingness on the part of many academics to draw upon the findings of researchers in other fields. Population geography, in keeping with many other sub-sections of the discipline, was and remains enriched by this inter-disciplinary collaboration. Since, as Zelinsky (1966:3), remarked, the "boundaries between academic disciplines are administrative conveniences, not barricades" this development was welcomed by geographers. That other disciplines, such as sociology, have benefitted in return is seen, for example, in the writings of Eichenbaum (1975). That population geography has now become safely entrenched within the discipline is indicated by the increase in the number of publications and courses relating to this field, (Hansen and Kosinski, 1973).

Despite promising trends of this type, however, it appears that many of Trewartha's most basic contentions regarding the nature of population geography were forgotten or overlooked. He warned against the tendency many geographers exhibited of treating human beings exclusively

in quantitative terms. Trewartha, (1953:74) noted that geographers had focussed rather exclusively on the numerical rather than the qualitative aspects of populations.

What did Trewartha mean when he wrote about population qualities? Essentially, he felt that any population possessed two basic qualities, its physical traits and what he labelled its "cultural characteristics." The latter were, he noted, often intangible. This, however, made them no less significant. The geographer who ignored the "customs, habits, prejudices, degree of enterprise and different kinds of loyalties and allegiances" was committing a fundamental mistake, (Trewartha, 1953:97). Even though such population traits were not usually captured in official census materials, Trewartha insisted they must not be forgotten in geographic analyses.

Despite his caveats, this is precisely what occurred. Trewartha, (1953:97) had recognized that the effort required to "catch" such dynamic population qualities required a substantive investment of an investigator's efforts, resources and time. Analyses of the sort he advocated demanded the combination of available statistical data with the findings of archival searches and even first-hand observation. Accepting such intensive commitments to the exploration of a research theme was something many social scientists might be loathe to do, especially given the ready availability of census data.

That geographers did not follow through with all of Trewartha's recommendations is apparent from even a cursory review of the literature in population geography. It is here argued that the discipline is the poorer for it. Many well respected students of population have underscored the intrinsic problems with enumeration data, even in more developed countries. These warnings should have cautioned those who would rely exclusively, or even largely, upon such information in their studies. Yet works based on official census data crowd the field. This is perhaps understandable, given the ready availability of such material. Yet, as a respected voice in the discipline, Wilbur Zelinsky noted, there can be no theoretical justification for confining analyses to those human characteristics which appear in census data alone.

Trewartha, (1953:74) made another point that seems to have been equally lost. He suggested that the geographical importance of man was not exclusively derived from the "visibly conspicuous element of men" but that it was their knowledge (or perception) which achieved geographical significance through modification of the face of the earth. Obviously, mens' perceptions comprise no visible feature of any landscape, yet it is what men believe about the world that inspires them to act. This, in turn, determines the nature of existing cultural landscapes. Exclusive concern with only the tangible elements of the cultural landscape, Trewartha felt, had to be avoided if it occurred to the

neglect of studies dealing with the mental processes that act to create, sustain or modify spatial patterns. Explaining the beliefs people hold about different places should attract geographers, since even when peoples' attitudes were found to be erroneous such attitudes might still play an influential role in imparting character to places. Trewartha thus recognized that the character of all places is emergent, for as populations change or move the value systems associated with them are likewise affected. The consequences of these processes can then be detected in the visible cultural landscapes. As White (1980: 6) noted, migration should therefore be regarded as an important catalyst of "regional change."

Such considerations, concluded Trewartha, (1953:97) make the study of population qualities by geographers "a fructuous field."

The Behavioural Approach To Migration Study

Paralleling the increase in studies within population geography, there has also occurred a growth in analysis of the spatio-temporal processes of migration, (DeJong, 1981). The reasons for this were noted by Eichenbaum (1975:21):

Human population redistribution over space is one of the most fundamental processes interactant in international political entanglements, national, regional or urban economic development, and social and cultural change.

While the study of migration has also been enriched through inter-disciplinary co-operation, a definition of precisely what is meant by the term remains unclear (Lewis, 1982). As both White (1982) and Zelinsky (1983) have noted, there is also no robust theory of migration.

Possibly one of the reasons for this is that there appear to exist two differing philosophical approaches to the study of migration phenomena. White (1980:6) has categorized these as the objective and cognitive philosophies. The cognitive approach to migration seeks to appreciate the human perception of origin and destination places, intervening obstacles and opportunities, and personal factors in terms of the decision-making process that precludes movement or a staying in place. The objective philosophy entails the empirical measurement of the characteristics of the physical or cultural landscape that prompt or impede population mobility. Those utilizing this approach do not generally pay attention to the way in which potential migrants view the environment in which they are nestled.

As White suggests, a synthesis of these two approaches seems to provide the most rounded and acceptable methodological perspective required for studies of migration phenomena. Such a combined strategem recognizes the existence of a perceptual dimension in the migration process, while also recognizing the relevance of an impinging environment. The perceptual environment defines the space of which people are aware and within which their decision to

move or not is seen as a voluntary choice, whose ultimate purpose is to achieve the best location in which needs can be met. The impinging environment is that which effectively limits the freedom of actors as to where they might move. In this thesis, an underlying assumption is that while most of the migrants studied were impelled to move, after the original **push** it was their perceptions about the places they found themselves in (e.g. areas of first asylum) or might move to (e.g. areas of resettlement), which assumed critical significance. While receiving countries' quotas may have determined how many Ukrainian refugees were admitted, it was these migrants' perceptions of where they had been or were and their attitudes about where they might yet move, which determined the spatial and social consequences of their migration. As will be elaborated upon in Chapter 5, it was within the "midway-to-nowhere" of the Displaced Persons (DP) camps that the most critical elements of this process can be located.

While the definition of what migration entails might remain the subject of debate, the study of migration phenomena does not seem to have been overly retarded by this definitional quandary. Some writings in this area of study have even come to be regarded as "classics." Prominent among these are the works of the geographer Ravenstein (1885;1889) which appear to have retained pride of place. His so-called "laws of migration", later codified by Lee (1965), are often cited even though they had since been elucidated and

modified by the contributions of other theoreticians such as Eisenstadt (1954), DeJong (1981), Petersen (1958), Mangalam *et.al.*, (1968;1970) and White (1980).

What has come to be called the "behavioural approach" to the study of migration was particularly well served by another geographer, Wolpert (1964;1965). His introduction of the concept of "place utility" to migration analysis was a major contribution, as evidenced in the frequent use made of this construct.

Wolpert suggested that place utility was essentially an expression of an individual's (or groups') satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a place. This subjective evaluation was based on the past or expected rewards accruing to the individual or group remaining in situ. Alternate locales are viewed in terms of the known attributes of the place of residence. Potential migration destination places can have only an conceptualized place utility, for they have not usually been directly experienced. At best, the individual may have partial information about the characteristics of such places as culled from news reports, letters from preceeding emigrants, and the like. Despite the limited validity of information about other places, however, it is a critical factor in influencing the decision-making process of potential migrants about whether to move or not, substituting as it does for direct experience. This "information flow" (even if the information available is incomplete or erroneous) guides potential migrants to new

locations and is important in shaping not only the direction and intensity of the flow but in determining which places will attract migrants, and it thus influences who will settle there. In other words, the flow of migrants from one place to another may be a reflection of subjective place utility evaluations, (White and Woods, 1980). What happens when the information flow is severed, or even deliberately biased? Can the movement of populations between places be manipulated through the alteration of migrating individuals' attributes, particularly their attitudes towards different places?

Only recently have geographers begun examining how particular changes in population distribution affect the organization of human society, and attendant spatial patterns. That such inquiry opens up significant new areas of investigation for geographers is also now being recognized in the literature (Lewis, 1982).

To fully appreciate this point, it is necessary to describe what the basic range of questions are that must be asked concerning any particular migration event. These have been stated by the geographers, (White and Woods, 1980:1), as follows,

1. Why does migration occur?
2. Who migrates?
3. What are the patterns of origins and destinations and of the flows between them?
4. What are the effects of migration on the areas,

communities or societies that the migrants come from?

5. What are the effects of migration on the areas, communities or societies of destination?

As Lee noted, migration causation needs to be examined within a framework of factors associated with the areas of origin, destination, the intervening obstacles and the migrants themselves. It is appropriate to add to this Stouffer's (1940) observations concerning "intervening opportunities." In his view, there was no necessary relationship between mobility and distance. Instead, the number of persons going a given distance would be directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities. Regretably, Stouffer does not seem to have considered "opportunities" in other than a materialistic sense, the error of which, at least with respect to refugee populations, will become clearer in succeeding chapters.

Traditionally, geographers examining migration have concentrated on the patterns of spatial flow between areas of origin and destination. They have seen in this interaction between places, a vindication of the concept of "areal differentiation." Yet it is apparent that the movement of human populations has spatial manifestations other than through the relatively transitory nature of migration flows. Population redistribution can have profound effects on the whole spatial patterning of human activity in the migrants' places of origin and destination. The evolving

repercussions of the migration process may be evident long after the movement portion of the migration process has taken place, yet be inextricably bound up with the migration experience itself. Any map of population distribution in Canada, for example, shows the consequences of past immigrations, patterns of internal movement, and natural population growth. Such processes are continuously transforming the distribution and composition of Canadian populations. If a specific population quality, such as ethnic identity, is added to such a map it becomes obvious that past immigrations have played a pre-eminent role in sustaining or creating distinct areas of ethno-cultural identification within this country.

This discussion suggests why the migration process is relevant, and particularly why it is necessary to examine a population's qualities. No migration relocates only **numbers** of people. Every individual moving from one place to another has certain attributes - sex, age, family status, occupation, educational attainment, intelligence, social, political and cultural attitudes, language and religious affiliation. Migration not only redistributes numbers of people, it also relocates these attributes. Since collectivity and interaction are intrinsic to the migration process (Mangalam *et.al.*, 1968), migration often ends up relocating groups sharing political, cultural, religious or social attitudes. This engenders new spatial patterns in the countries of migrant destination while sometimes also

markedly diminishing the presence of such groups in their areas of origin. There is always a restructuring of the spatial patterns of a number of demographic variables. When movement is involuntary, the prospects for groups of similarly-minded people, or those sharing specific traits, relocating together and at approximately the same time is increased.

The structural changes so generated have been labelled "the geographical impacts of migration," (White and Woods, 1980:2). They are basically changes in the distribution and organization of human activities brought about by population movements. Obviously the **scale** of these changes will be dependent upon the **volume** of the migration, upon how many people leave one area and resettle in another. The **type** of changes brought about will largely depend upon the **attributes** of the migrants. Students of migration phenomena must therefore concern themselves not only with who is migrating, but why. This leads to questions about the nature of those who remain behind while others move. One is thus lead back to Trewartha's (1953) contention that investigations must reveal information about the quality of the migrating population, most particularly about what has been referred to as the motives in their heads, (Davis, 1945).

Equally relevant to analyses of migration events is appreciation of the fact that not all migrant attributes are fixed and immutable. While some, such as sex, obviously are,

others, like age, follow a known course. Several others, however, can change simply because the individual has undergone a migratory movement. This is because those involved in migratory movements must come to grips with the consequences of their actions, a process affecting their social and cognitive worlds, (Hansen and Oliver-Smith, 1982).

In the past, many social scientists paid little attention to the consequences of human shifts of location in physical and social space, (Jackson, 1969). However, at least one sociologist, (Eisenstadt, 1954:19), did observe that migration is,

...a physical transition of an individual or group from one society to another. This transition usually involves abandoning one social setting and entering another and different one.

This, he asserted, would be reflected in modifications in the behaviour of migrants.

Petersen also (1958) recognized this fact, which lead him to revise Fairchild's (1925) elegant, but simplistic notion that all migrations could be explained as the result of a basic **PUSH-PULL** process. He argued that it was important to realize that not only was Fairchild's assumption about man being basically a sedentary creature incorrect, but that students of migration must recognize that there were types of "activating agents" motivating population relocations. In his typology, migrations were described as being either of an innovative or conservative

type. Some groups, he suggested, moved in order to achieve the new. Others moved in response to changes occurring in their areas of origin, which threatened the life-style they were accustomed to or preferred. This latter group, moving in order to retain what it had, could be termed conservative. Significantly, Petersen noted that such conservative migrants were those who moved geographically in order to remain where they had been in all other respects. This conclusion is pregnant with significance for students of the refugee migration experience, as discussed below.

Eventually, Wolpert (1965) modified his earlier observations on the migration phenomenon, to conceive of it as a behavioural process, occurring in response to environmental stress. The process thus becomes one of adjustment, taking place whenever individuals or groups come to believe that their needs can be more satisfactorily met in some other place. As noted above, cognition assumes a crucial role in the decision-making that preceeds human mobility (DeJong, 1981). Regretably Wolpert did not consider refugee migration in his studies. Still his elucidation does suggest important questions about this type of migratory behaviour. Refugee migrations do not take place because change occurs in the delineation of those variables associated with the area of origin which are valued, or because new information about other places becomes available which makes them inviting. Rather, this type of migration is fundamentally an involuntary response to stress. Movement takes place when

individuals and groups find the place they inhabit has been rendered intolerable. The volume of refugee movements increases in direct proportion to the severity of the impinging stress. While some try to adopt and remain, others may revolt and attempt to re-establish the previous order, to regain what has been lost. For most, as the circumstances become increasingly trying, there will come a threshold after which an active search for information about other places to which they can depart, begins. The goal is to find a location where the desired way of life can be secured. Migration takes place soon after the searchers come to believe they have located just such a place. In some cases, of course, the decision-making process is virtually eradicated by the external pressures to move.

How will such refugee migrants perceive those places in which they find temporary asylum? Or the places to which they may eventually be resettled? Can such individuals or groups achieve the same level of satisfaction with such places as voluntary migrants of similar backgrounds who preceeded them there? If migrant attributes are altered through their introduction into new social and environmental settings, does a similar process affect involuntarily displaced people?

Since people react to stress, obstacles and opportunities in different ways, not everyone leaves the place of origin, nor do those who depart leave at the same time. Refugee waves therefore contain distinct sub-groups,

what Kunz (1973:137-139) referred to as "vintage groups." These may coalesce during certain periods of the refugee experience (e.g. during the refugee camp phase) only to subsequently reappear (e.g. in the places of resettlement). The fragmentation of refugee populations, indeed of all immigrant groups, would seem to be almost inevitable.

Through the creation or alteration of the underlying patterns of human political, cultural, social or economic diversity, the migration process prompts further movements of people. This can provoke future turmoil, and a propensity on the part of some to migrate yet again. Appreciating the impacts of migration therefore necessitates treating those involved not as inanimate bodies moving through space and time, but as human beings (Mangalam *et.al.*, 1968). Since those moving are altered by their migration experience, the places they come to are also changed. Population redistribution must therefore be regarded as a pre-eminent agent of areal differentiation, making this phenomenon a proper concern for geographic inquiry.

The Migration Of Refugees

While a considerable body of literature exists dealing with internal migration, once the scale of analysis is shifted to the international level far less theoretical material can be found. Even more poorly treated are the impelled flows of refugees, despite the indisputable prevalence of this form of international population

mobility. Not only have theorists all but ignored refugee migrations (Eichenbaum, 1975:21) but, until recently, there were few systematic investigations of the refugee experience (Stein and Tomasi, 1981:6). Even in Canada, which has a documentable history as a country of resettlement for refugee groups, there are surprisingly few studies even of such relevant themes as the economic or social adjustment of refugees after resettlement, (Weiermair, 1971:5-6).

Geographers have been noticeably absent from the emerging, inter-disciplinary field of refugee studies, (Rogge, 1977:186). Even a casual perusal of the titles of papers published in the *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* during those years when refugees abounded throughout the world (e.g. 1936 to 1965) produces less than a dozen titles directly bearing on refugee populations and their relocation. Two of these were by a geographer, a distinguished student of the refugee experience, Malcolm Proudfoot (1950;1953).

Examination of recent texts in population geography reveals a similar neglect. Perusal of the books written by Beajeau-Garnier (1966), Clarke (1965), Jones (1981), Trewartha (1972), and White and Woods (1980), reveals virtually no mention of refugee phenomena, excepting only passing or descriptive comments.

What makes this surprising is the obvious relevance of refugee population phenomena in the contemporary world. Impelled population migration now surpasses all other forms

of international population movement (e.g. labour migration), both in volume and impact. No inhabited continent has been left unaffected. Given the growth of consciousness of ideological and ethnic differences around the world, coupled with the interventionist behaviour of the superpowers, it is highly unlikely that there will be any appreciable decline in the scale of refugee migrations in the near future. Indeed, they are more likely to increase. Examination of the refugee experience and associated population movements by geographers seems long overdue. This point is underscored when the relevant statistics are examined.

These figures speak for themselves. Between 1913 and 1968, an estimated 71 million people were forced to move from their homes, 55 million in the years between 1935 and 1955 alone. In other words, ten million more people have become refugees than the total of all those who took part in the much-studied trans-oceanic migrations of 1820 to 1930 (Davis, 1974). The twentieth century has rightly been described as "the century of the homeless man," (Beyer, 1981:26). Geographers seem not to have heard.

What makes this doubly astonishing are the implicit geographical dimensions of the refugee experience. Not only do refugees move from one place to another, which should at least have qualified them for study under the rubric of migration research, but the involuntary nature of their redistribution would seem to endow their decision-making and

patterns of movement with characteristics different from those associated with normal migratory movements.

Even the definition most commonly used to describe refugees, namely that provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1950), is replete with implications about the geographical dimension of the refugee experience:

[A refugee is] any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or, who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his formal habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience is unwilling to return to it.

This definition makes clear that the traits of an individual or group are often sufficient to bring upon them refugee status, and that personal or group decision-making making are also not irrelevant to this process.

Tabori (1972:23-24) has provided a less legalistic interpretation of refugee status, one which also underlines some of the geographic aspects to the refugee experience:

An exile is a person compelled to leave or remain

outside his country of origin on account of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion; a person who considers his exile temporary (even though it may last a lifetime), hopes to return to his fatherland when circumstances permit - but [is] unable or unwilling to do so as long as the factors that made him an exile persist.

Another effort made to categorize refugees was provided by Strotzka (1960), whose typology suggested that there were five different categories of refugee status, and by Broder (1949) who developed what he termed a "Traumatic Index" to describe the processes most likely to modify refugee migrants' attributes and behaviours.

Despite these early efforts, concerted scholarly attention is only now being brought to bear on the refugee experience. Such research does not readily "fit" into the separate categories now dividing academic disciplines, so there is no ready-made field of study (Stein and Tomasi, 1981:6). This situation does provide a vacuum into which geographers may add their own discipline's insights. The need is especially acute since, until recently, refugee phenomena were often regarded as unique events. Examination of such phenomena from a broad historical and geographic perspective may lead to the development of a theory of refugee migration, which recognizes that refugee phenomena have their own identifiable patterns of behaviour and sets

of causalities (Stein,1981:320-321). The attempt to prepare and then test such a model of refugee migration against both historical and contemporary examples of refugee situations is now being made (Kunz,1973;1981).

One of the more useful attempts at surveying and categorizing the refugee experience was Keller's (1975) delineation. He identified the following components to the refugee experience,

- perception of threat
- decision to flee
- period of extreme danger and flight
- reaching safety
- camp behaviour
- repatriation, settlement or resettlement
- early and late stages of resettlement
- adjustment and acculturation
- residual stages and changes in behaviour caused by the experience

Although essentially a descriptive construct it has proven useful in organizing several of the chapters of this thesis.

Kunz,(1973:131), suggested a "kinetic model of refugee flight." According to him, "an inner, self-propelling force" was absent in refugee situations. The movements of such people could therefore be compared to that of billiard balls which, one forced to relocate, were governed by what he termed the kinetic factors of inertia, friction, and the

vectors of the outside forces applied to them. While he recognized that refugees should be regarded as a distinct social type, distinguishable from voluntary migrants, this model seems inadequate. For one, there seems to be little reason for suggesting that all refugees are devoid of inner direction, as Kunz did. He also neglected to do more than mention that, during the so-called "midway-to-nowhere" stage of the *DP* camps, refugee migrant behaviour can be modified, affecting immigrant outcomes in countries of asylum and resettlement.

Subsequently, Kunz (1981) adjusted his model to include refugee value systems and the behavioural modifications that take place as a consequence of the refugee experience. His earlier emphasis on the kinetic quality of refugee movement was significantly diminished, to be replaced with concern over the psychological, social, and political effects of displacement trauma.

In its attempt to be complete Kunz's elaboration became too complex to be easily operationalized. Despite this drawback, it does underscore the need for investigation of such issues as those of refugee identification and marginality, attitudes towards flight and homeland, and descriptions of the ideological-national orientation of refugees abroad. As well, Kunz also wrote of the need for measuring the migrating refugee populations' compatibility with the receiving society, while also determining whether the latter's policies were assimilationist,

integrationist, or tolerant. Each of these themes will be addressed in this thesis.

Geography And The Study Of Refugee Migrations

As already noted, geographers can begin to play an important role in the emerging field of refugee studies, given their discipline's long founded interest in migration phenomena. This section suggests some of the more relevant geographical questions that need to be explored by students of the discipline interested in conducting research in this area.

Since the **PUSH** factor is the dominating activating agent in refugee migrations the decision-making process of most refugees is usually very circumscribed. An external, impinging environment perceived to be threatening, if not actively hostile to their interests or even very existence, forces most refugees into flight, usually in directions away from the danger but otherwise not always rationally selected in terms of subsequent habitability. When the refugee arrives at some place of asylum both the where of this place, and how long the stay there, will often as not be outside the individual's control. Usually, little prior information about such a place was available; the refugee thus brings only the most rudimentary appreciation of such places along from the area of origin. Eventually, this new area of asylum will come to have its own place utility for the refugee. Some may find such locations acceptable or even

attractive, while others may wish to move further, either to distance themselves from the zone of threat, or to locate in more appealing environs. A similar process occurs when the refugee is offered the prospect of resettlement. This situation is, however, complicated when there exists a possibility for return migration to the area of origin. If refugees come to believe that their choices are limited to either movement away from the "homeland," with all of the cultural, social, and other implications this choice portends, or a near-future move back "home" then their place utility attitudes and perceptions will be significantly affected. The choice then becomes to move onwards, into the "unknown", or to stay a while longer sheltering in a refugee camp (whose place utility has become known), in the hopes of returning to the true home (which was well known, and is fondly remembered as the place no one voluntarily elected to leave).

According to Stein, (1981:323-324) "perhaps the most poorly analyzed part" of the refugee experience is that portion of it which takes place in the refugee camps. Given that geographers have traditionally concerned themselves with spatial patterns of flow between interacting places, the pooling of refugee migrants in such camps provides a unique analytical opportunity.

The refugee camp experience is often one of considerable duration. If all migrants, both voluntary and involuntary, undergo attribute changes because they have

experienced a move which has introduced them into new social and physical settings, then what happens to those who move under traumatic circumstances and relocate not once, but at least twice (e.g. into a refugee camp and, later, into a country of resettlement)? How is the process of selectivity affected when individual and even group decision-making is severely circumscribed and information about other places limited or biased?

Murphy (1955) provided a description of refugee camps in the immediate post-WW II period, observing that these places had the following characteristics,

- segregation from the host population
- the need to share facilities
- the lack of privacy
- overcrowding and limited, restricted areas within which to conduct the whole compass of daily life
- a growing sense of despondency

His delineation was utilized in formulating the study's research questionnaire; the refugee population here examined being asked to provide its collective observations on *DP* camp characteristics such as those listed above. Tabulated results are to be found in Chapter 5.

Even with the intervening obstacles (opportunities?) placed before them in the camps, the refugees under study were able to re-create within these enclavic spaces structures known to them from their area of origin. The refugee camps, in effect, became increasingly attractive places for

their inhabitants. When the option of further movement, which necessitated yet another reconstruction of lifeworld appeared many were hesitant to leave. The duration of the refugee experience was accordingly extended by the refugees themselves while they debated the suitability of other possible areas of resettlement. Both the intensity and direction of onward migration were thus affected. Such processes are not normally associated with voluntary migrations. As has been noted above, it was also within these niches that those whom Vernant (1953) called "militant refugees" were able to use their influence over the masses of the displaced to suggest to them why, when, and where they should move, and what they should do once so relocated. This, as will be described, was to have significant spatial and social consequences in the areas of asylum and resettlement. Obviously the processes analyzed in this case study will have broader implications for studies of other historical and contemporary refugee migrations.

When admitted to countries of resettlement refugees often have little initial choice about where to locate, when they are let in, or what the receiving society in which they find themselves is like. In this instance most Ukrainian *DPS* were to find themselves in central Canada (Ontario and Quebec), where most remained. The previously settled Ukrainian population of Canada was generally concentrated in western Canada (the Prairie provinces). In consequence of its experiences in Canada this ethnic minority had developed

a place utility appreciation of Canada markedly different from that brought here by the *DPS*. What interaction there was between the two populations ended up alienating both groups, engendering a range of spatial and social consequences. As will be described, their basic confrontation was over the question of whether Canada was truly the place where Ukrainians could find satisfaction of their needs as a group (e.g. did Canada have a positive place utility for Ukrainians) or instead only a temporary staging-area, a jump-off point from which to proceed back to the place all Ukrainians should seek, namely an independent Ukrainian homeland. Since neither population succeeded in converting the other to its perception the gulf between them remained unbridged. This was to have grave consequences for all those calling themselves Ukrainians in Canada.

The Research Questions

From the historical overview presented in Chapter One, and the review of relevant literature in geography, migration and refugee studies presented in this chapter, the following research questions are derived,

[] Does the nature of the refugee experience precipitate changes in the attributes of the migrating population?

[] What agents of migrant attribute change can be isolated?

[] Where and when do migrant attributes change?

[]Can refugee migration be distinguished from other forms of migration?

[]If migrant attribute-changes do occur will these be evidenced in spatial and social patterns found within refugee and immigrant populations in the areas of asylum and resettlement?

Conclusions

Fundamentally, this dissertation brings a geographic perspective to the analysis of a historical refugee migration. It is the study of an interaction between two distinct places, Canada and Ukraine. It interprets how these two areas have become linked over time by a movement of people between them, a flow that has been predominantly uni-directional and often interrupted, yet which has admitted to the receiving territory (Canada) a population that has established distinctive cultural landscapes here. As this process continued through time both places, Ukraine and Canada, have been transformed.

When population flows between the two have been circumscribed by state fiat or international crisis the Ukrainian populations in both places have been denied the critical circulation of information which provides potential migrants with some appreciation of possible destination areas. Simultaneously, the separated populations were exposed to the exigencies of life in their respective areas.

The transformations this wrought upon them went undescribed - neither population knew the changes that had occurred in the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the other. When they again interacted the consequences were shattering. The ethnic space of Ukrainians in Canada was irrevocably transformed as ostensibly similar people came to understand just how dissimilar they had become. Through this process this last influx of Ukrainian migrants into Canada imparted a new character to this country's Ukrainian population and their places, one which was fundamentally a reflection of the latter's refugee experience.

CHAPTER THREE - THE RESEARCH METHODS

Personal as well as geographical knowledge is a form of sequent occupance.

David Lowenthal, *Geography, Existence and Imagination*

Introduction

Prior to this study the Ukrainian refugee experience of the immediate post-World War II period was virtually ignored.' Although this situation has recently been rectified the topic remains far from exhausted. A review of the research methods employed in this investigation will reveal some of the reasons for the earlier neglect and delineate the contributions this inquiry makes, particularly in laying the groundwork for further studies.

Generally, any research programme has three stages to pass through. First there is the need to collect data, ensuring that no important sources are overlooked. Next, the gathered materials must be organized and described. Finally, an analysis of this material provides an explanation of the theme being considered.

In common with other social scientists, human geographers have two prime sources of information - documentation and fieldwork. Documentation can be classified into primary and secondary sources. The former includes original documents, such as the correspondence of government departments, organizational memoranda, and personal diaries.

Secondary sources are those produced by persons who may have consulted primary material and then written about it. Books and newspaper articles generally fall into this category.

Fieldwork involves two principal activities holding interviews and direct observation. The latter technique is most successfully used in analyses of contemporary events or processes.

Conducting interviews with people is almost always a rich and instructive source of information, some of it unavailable elsewhere. Interviews can be restricted to a limited number of individuals who were significantly involved in the situation under study (e.g. leaders of movements) or carried out on a more extensive basis. In the latter case the observations gathered, cumulatively, provide an overview of the attitudes of a large number of people to some shared experience.

In this study both primary and secondary sources of documentary evidence are utilized, and interviews were conducted with not only with the principal actors involved in refugee aid, and a larger group of individuals who were themselves affected by the refugee experience, both *DPS* and members of the receiving Ukrainian communities in Canada.

Impeding the exploration of the Ukrainian refugee experience until the present were a complex host of factors. Primary sources of documentation are commonly found in the archives of governments. The Ukrainian *DPS*, now and then, enjoyed no such representation. Consequently, no one

repository can be located within which the range of relevant documents are to be found. Soviet repositories, undoubtedly a rich vein of information remain sealed to Western researchers. The material generated from behind the Iron Curtain relating to the post-WW II Ukrainian refugees is propagandistic. Ostensibly for reasons of security, archives of the major Ukrainian political groups active in exile are closed. This leaves only two potential sources for information, the archives of governments which were interested in the post-war *DPS*, and those of individuals who played some role in ameliorating the plight of these refugees. Both of these sources have been consulted.

There remain obstacles to study, nevertheless. The archives of governments which monitored the so-called *Ukrainian Question* before, during and after WWII, countries such as Great Britain and Canada, often contain material that is only peripheral to the refugee experience. Useful information is often scattered throughout their holdings, requiring a painstaking retrieval effort. Even in the latter case, perusal of available records is done under certain restrictions. Commonly, there exists a rule which prohibits examination of any material that was deposited within the last thirty years. Given this "thirty year rule" the initiation of data location and collection for this thesis, begun in mid-1979, was opportune (Table 3.1). Regretably, not all government documents are to be found in such public collections. Especially sensitive materials are often

Table 3.1 Public archives consulted.

<u>Archive</u>	<u>Contents</u>	<u>Period of Research</u>
1. Public Record Office (PRO), London, England	British Foreign Office (FO), Home Office (HO) and War Office (WO) materials on the "Ukrainian Question", including some files on Ukrainian refugees, CURB, the UCC and UCRF. Total of 8,000 documents xeroxed. *	May to June, 1979; July, 1982
2. Hoover Institution on War Revolution and Peace Stanford University California.	Ukrainian DP camp newspapers. Archives on Ukrainian and other DPs. Library materials. 100 pages xeroxed. *	July to August, 1980
3. Library, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, U.S.A.	Library materials in the area of East European and Soviet Studies. No copies made.	August, 1980
4. "The Gordon Richard Bohdan Panchuk Collection" Montreal, Quebec and Toronto, Ontario	Organizational records of CURB, UCRF, material on AUCB, FUGB, UCC and USCA/UCVA. Extensive correspondence with Ukrainian DPs and Ukrainians in Canada and United States of America. Personal diaries. Total extent of collection - 120 linear feet. Approximately 8,000 pages from this xeroxed; * collection deposited in Archives of Ontario, 1981.	September, 1980 to November, 1983.
5. Archives of Ontario and Multicultural History Society of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario.	Depository for oral history tapes and "The G.R.B. Panchuk Collection", papers of the Ukrainian National Federation and various Ukrainian organizations and individuals.	October 1980 to January 1984.
6. Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Ottawa Ontario.	Papers of V.J. Kaye, Tracy Philipps, the UCC C.R.B. Panchuk**, USCA/UCVA, UCRF and individual * Ukrainian Canadians. Xeroxed total of 2,000 pages.	October 1980 to November 1981.
7. Department of External Affairs Archives, Ottawa	Canadian policy on Ukrainian refugees and Ukrainians in Canada. Xeroxed total of 1,000 pages. *	November to December, 1981.

Table 3.1 Continued

8.	Russian Research Institute Harvard University, Cambridge Massachusetts, U.S.A.	Archives of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. 50 pages copied. *	July, 1981
9.	Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre, "Oseredok" Winnipeg, Manitoba.	Papers of Ukrainian Canadians, UCC and UCRF - extensive DP materials. 500 pages copied. *	November, 1981
10.	United Nations Archives, New York, N.Y.	Selected UNRRA and IRO archives. 100 pages copied. *	January, 1983.
11.	University of Saskatchewan Archives and Saskatoon Archives.	George Simpson Papers. 300 pages copied. *	May, 1984

* These xeroxed materials are in the possession of the researcher.

** The portion of the Panchuk Collection contained in PAC was placed on microfilm.
A copy was made available to the researcher courtesy of Mr. Panchuk.

"weeded" out of the files before they are turned over to such institutions as the Public Record Office (*PRO*) or Public Archives of Canada (*PAC*). Other pertinent files, containing particularly sensitive material, remain closed until well into the next century.²

Establishing the validity and then assessing the accuracy of primary and secondary sources of information are chores which face any researcher. The task is particularly onerous whenever secondary sources are involved. Newspaper accounts, books, and even the recollections of those who were involved in the events under study may provide a useful impression of the context and chronology of events. Yet some secondary sources seem to be more reliable than others. Testimonies of participants can provide insights into the decision-making processes of organizations and pressure groups that would not readily be apparent in primary documents. However, this secondary category of material is also notorious for its biases and incompleteness. Given these inherent problems, the use of such sources in this thesis has been carefully controlled. Generally such materials were used only in helping to clarify an argument, rather than forming the basis of one.

The constraints described clarify some of the difficulties which faced others who may have previously wanted to attempt research on the topic of Ukrainian refugees after WW II. The existence of these problems necessitated finding and making use of primary documentary

material not shackled by the regulations prevailing in public or official repositories.

Fortunately, the researcher was able to secure exclusive (but time-limited) access to the organizational records of the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, (CURB). This collection has been described elsewhere (Luciuk et.al., 1982). In brief it may be stated that this one store of archival material is the most comprehensive collection of correspondence, memoranda, reports, photographs and diary materials pertaining to the Ukrainian *DPS* and Ukrainian Canadian efforts to help them available anywhere. This material, now housed in the Archives of Ontario (Toronto) under the title *The Gordon Richard Bohdan Panchuk Collection* has been relied upon extensively in this study. The authenticity of documents found in this collection is indisputable.

Other primary and secondary sources of information were eventually located and employed. These have been summarized in Table 3.2. It is worthwhile noting that many of these sources had never before been made available for scholarly examination.

Midway through the research phase of this study a report titled *Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons" : A Selected Bibliography and Guide To Research With Special Reference To the Ukrainians* was released under the imprint of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS).³ Many of the repositories it lists as containing relevant

Table 3.2 Private organizational and individual archives consulted

<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
1. Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, (London, England)	Materials pertaining to the AUCB's formative period (1945-1951), CURB and UCRF. Totalling some 10,000 pages on microfiche.
2. Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (Toronto, Ontario)	Minutes of meetings between 1950 and 1959. Total of 100 pages. Annual and National Executive conference minutes.
3. Theodore Danyliw Papers (London, England)	Correspondence and organizational records of the AUCB. Total of 100 pages.
4. P. Danyliuk Papers (Winnipeg, Manitoba)	Material on the Ukrainian National Federation. Total of 20 pages.
5. I. Eliashevsky Papers (Toronto, Ontario)	Materials on Ukrainian DP camp life and OUNr. Total of 100 pages.
6. S.W. Frollick Papers (Toronto, Ontario)	Material on CURB, <u>Homin Ukrainy</u> and LVU. Total of 60 pages.
7. J. Makowecyjk Papers (Munich, Germany)	Material on OUNs. Total of 25 pages
8. S. Naklowycz Papers (Vienna, Austria)	Ukrainian Relief Committee in Austria.
9. R. Olynyk-Rakhmanny Papers (Montreal, Quebec)	Material on <u>Homin Ukrainy</u> , OUNr and LVU.
10. Rev. S. Sawchuk Papers (Winnipeg, Manitoba)	Material on Ukrainian Canadian Committee. Total of 25 pages.
11. W. Skorochoid Papers (Hamilton, Ontario)	Material on Ukrainian DP immigration. Total of 50 pages.
12. A. Smith (Crapleve) Papers (Winnipeg, Manitoba)	Material on CURB and UCRF. Total of 200 pages.
13. Ukrainian Canadian Committee (Winnipeg, Manitoba)	Material on the UCC and UCRF. Total of 100 pages.
14. Ukrainian National Federation (Toronto, Ontario)	Organizational records of the UNF.

Table 3.2 Continued

15. A.J. Yaremovich Papers (Winnipeg, Manitoba) CURB, UCRF. Personal diaries for 1947 and 1948.
16. J. Yuzyk Papers (Winnipeg, Manitoba) UCSA Photo-album.
17. A. Wasylyshen Papers (Winnipeg, Manitoba) UCRF correspondence and reports, 1949-1951.

Notes:

* Total pages are estimates of the number of documents xeroxed and now in possession of researcher.

** The personal archives of M. Karasevich (Winnipeg, Manitoba) and H. Kozicky (Calgary, Alberta) were also examined, but no copies of their contents were made.

*** In 1978 the researcher initiated a series of discussions between The Multicultural History Society of Ontario and the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine which will result in the latter depositing its files with the Archives of Ontario.

**** See list of abbreviations.

documentation on Ukrainian refugees were visited prior to the appearance of this bibliography. Its utility as a research tool is unfortunately limited by a number of inexplicable omissions.

Ukrainian serials published by the *DPS*, were examined in the library of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, California.

A number of memoirs about *DP* camp life were published soon after the war's end. A partial listing of these can be found in the bibliography mentioned above (Boshyk and Balan, 1982). Other Ukrainian refugee publications, such as those listed in the recently published report by Petryshyn and Chomiak, (1984), were examined, but like *DP* newspapers, they do not figure prominently in this work. English-language descriptions of *DP* camp life, such as Hulme's (1953) *The Wild Place* or Klemme's (1949) scorching *The Inside Story of UNRRA* were read. However interesting they might be, such books contained very little material directly relevant to the analysis of the Ukrainian refugee situation. Their objectivity can also be contested. Accordingly, they too have been sparingly utilized.

Official histories proved to be more useful, although here again, specific references to Ukrainian refugees were surprisingly limited. For example, Holborn's (1956) book on *IRO* includes only 24 minor references to the Ukrainians, while according at least 100 to Jews, 73 for Polish refugees and 51 to the Russians. Even in Vernant's (1953) seminal

study, Ukrainians fare only somewhat better, with over 50 references, as compared with some 150 references to Polish refugees, 112 for the Russians and around 80 for Jews. This slighting of the Ukrainian dimension to the post-WW II DP problem is remarkable when it is remembered that Ukrainians constituted, if not the largest, then certainly the second-largest ethnic group found among the refugees. Woodbridge's (1950) history of *UNRRA* makes clear that the total number of persons describing themselves as Ukrainians grew steadily from December 1945 to June 1947. His assertion was that Ukrainians formed at least 17% of the total refugee population. Obviously official histories and their attendant statistics can have only a limited utility for the researcher trying to reconstruct the size of the Ukrainian DP population.

The question of forcible repatriation has become a focus of controversy. Epstein, (1973), Bethell, (1974), Huxley-Blythe, (1964), Tolstoy, (1978) and Elliott, (1982) have all drawn attention to the issue or revived interest in it. The latter noted that:

In terms of nationality Soviet citizens abroad bound for repatriation included disproportionately large numbers of non-Russians. Several factors accounted for this. First Moscow discriminated against minorities. In the purges, for instance, they suffered more on the average than the Russian... in the South the [German] army had less

control over occupation policy and consequently Nazi manhunters netted hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians.

Elliott also pointed out that among those being repatriated to the USSR, Ukrainians "formed the largest contingent." Most of them, he added, "had not collaborated with the Nazis," a point that bears repeating.⁴

Fieldwork for this study was limited to interviewing, direct observation being impossible. Two types of interviews were held. In-depth discussions were arranged with several individuals who played prominent roles in Ukrainian Canadian relief and refugee resettlement operations between 1945 and 1952. Among those singled out for such intensive sessions were Bohdan Panchuk, Stanley W. Frolick, Anthony J. Yaremovich and Ann Smith (Crapleve).⁵ Each of these persons was met on more than one occasion and interviewed at length. An offshot of this particular effort was the recent publication of *Heroes Of Their Day: The Reminiscences of Bohdan Panchuk*⁶. A similar project dealing with the activities of S.W. Frolick is currently underway.

Extensive interviewing with Ukrainian DPS was conducted across Canada, although particularly concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, where the majority of post-WW II immigrants settled. A small number of interviews were held with prominent Ukrainian refugees in the USA, Austria, West Germany and Great Britain. The purpose of these meetings was to discover the attitudes of the DPS with respect to their

refugee experience, and particularly to gather their recollections on the *DP* camp period.

Most interviews were tape recorded, later to be deposited in the Archives of Ontario (Toronto) through the good offices of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario (*MHSO*). The oral history collection so gathered forms the largest accumulation pertaining to the post-WW II Ukrainian refugee experience known to exist. A total of 132 interviews were held, 116 of these with *DPS*, the remainder with those Ukrainian Canadians who were involved in helping them, [Appendix 1, List 1].

Since the conclusion of the research phase of this study, the investigator found employment with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies' *Oral History Project*. Between October of 1982 and May of 1984, a total of 73 additional interviews were gathered, primarily in western Canada. Approximately 25 of these were with *DPS*, while the remainder were held with Ukrainian Canadians. These provided interesting information on the reaction of the receiving population to the post-war immigrants. Tapes of all *CIUS* Oral History Project interviews are on deposit with the *CIUS* at The University of Alberta, Edmonton, [Appendix 1, List 2]. A research report on this effort is currently in preparation. It will be published in 1985.

Are any means available for testing the veracity of the interviewees' observations? Obviously such testimony is potentially although not necessarily a fountain of errors.

Many individuals forget facts, confuse details, prefer to distance themselves from certain events, and even deliberately attempt to conceal aspects of their past. Care must always be taken to ensure that especially controversial statements are not accepted before they can be checked against available documentary evidence or the recollections of others. Whenever such procedures were required during the course of this research they were employed. Verification revealed no major distortions of the record although, repeatedly, political antagonists expressed especially critical opinions about each other. Such statements, while recorded during the course of individual interviews, do not find much place in this thesis.

There can, of course, be no firm guarantee that distortions did not creep into these pages through evidence gathered during interviews. An encouraging discovery, however, suggests that any such misrepresentations are minimal. In 1947, a young academic, Richard Pierce, travelled extensively throughout the American Zone of Occupied Germany, meeting Ukrainian *DPS* and recording their descriptions of the nationalist liberation struggle. Among others, he met a soldier of the *UPA* who had recently arrived in the West, being one of the members of the group who were involved in the guerilla action which came to be known as *The Great Raid*. The notes Mr. Pierce kept of his conversation with this insurgent were made available to the student in late 1982.

Fortuitously, the same UPA veteran was one of those interviewed in early 1982.⁷ A comparison of the notes kept by two independent interviewers, 35 years apart, revealed an exact correspondence between what was said in 1947 and 1982. Obviously, the individual in question either retained an excellent memory of what he had experienced or was an accomplished liar. It seems more logical to instead conclude that he, and most of the other Ukrainian refugees interviewed, were reasonably precise in recollecting their experiences. Many *DPS* were eager to ensure that their story is not forgotten. Still, the technique of oral history used *alone* might well have resulted in a partially distorted description of the historical events with which this dissertation is concerned. This methodology seems to be most appropriately employed to complement other techniques; in the study of refugee populations an over-reliance on this method of inquiry should be avoided, given the often tendentious quality of some reminiscences.

These caveats against oral history notwithstanding it is one of this thesis's premises that the majority of the accounts recorded during interviews are not deliberate falsifications of the historical record. While care must be taken when using this method, it is still a highly fruitful one. A complete, annotated list of all the interviews conducted during this research is found in Appendix One, Lists 1 and 2.

Another research tool was used. Social scientists have long accepted survey research as a method of inquiry (Babbie, 1975). Yet refugee populations have not often been the targets of such procedures, even after resettlement. Weiernair's (1971) research is a relatively uncommon exception and even his examination (of post-1956 Hungarian refugees settling in Canada) is rather limited.

In fact, application of survey research methods to a refugee population (accompanied by interviewing) was tried in a major way only once before. Between 1945 and 1954, the *Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System* was responsible for the systematic interviewing of some 2,000 refugees from the Soviet Union.⁸

These 2,000 filled in a general questionnaire (Schedule A), after which 350 were selected to complete a more detailed, topical survey (Schedule B). A cross-section from the total group were then chosen for interviewing (Schedule C). Only a small number of these refugees were actually Ukrainian, and the themes being investigated related largely to experiences under Soviet rule. Western Ukrainians were also deliberately excluded from the study, although a few dozen were accidentally interviewed. Still, the results were significant, as several acclaimed books, monographs and dozens of papers prove (e.g. Bauer and Inkeles, 1959; Bauer, Inkeles and Kluckhohn, 1956). A guide to the materials gathered during the *Harvard Project* is available (Balzer, 1980). For this study, the results of these American

investigations are chiefly useful for describing the Eastern Ukrainian experience, and relations between them and Western Ukrainians both during and after WW II.

Given the paucity of statistical information about the Ukrainian *DPS*, and the complete lack of any data regarding these peoples' attitudes about their experience, a survey questionnaire was formulated, approved and then distributed across Canada, starting in the late spring of 1981. Preceding this mailing, a pre-test version was sent to Ukrainians in the Edmonton, Alberta area (June, 1980). At that time, fifty questionnaires were sent out, to 29 men and 21 women, drawn randomly from a list of 94 names of former *DPS*, compiled after consultations with local Ukrainian community members. Prior to this distribution, a small article on the survey's aims and sponsorship was placed in a local newspaper, *Ukrainian News*, (Edmonton).

An addressed, stamped return envelope was included with each questionnaire. Despite this, and a follow-up letter, only 22 of the questionnaires were completed and returned to the investigator by the requested date.

One immediate finding of this pre-test was that several of the questions posed were deemed to be "threatening." While these might appear innocuous enough to most researchers, they were considered menacing by many in the targeted population. For example, most respondents were very reluctant to provide complete or accurate information about where they were born, when, or how they came to be in the *DP*

camps. Most were fearful that, by identifying themselves (even though the questionnaire guaranteed anonymity) they might expose relatives remaining in Ukraine to Soviet coercion. The credentials of the student and the attempt to publicize the provenance and purpose of the study did little to dispel this fear.

Such considerations necessitated a restructuring of the proposed questionnaire. This was done during the late fall and winter of 1980-1981. The version that resulted was then submitted to the Supervising Committee for comment. Its recommendations were incorporated into the final questionnaire design. This lengthened the survey, and reintroduced some questions deemed "threatening" by many who eventually received it, (e.g. birthplace). The questionnaire finally mailed out across Canada was a twelve page, Ukrainian-language form, divided into four major sections, [See Appendix 2]. The first section sought information on the respondent's background. The second concentrated on organizational affiliations before, and during World War II. The third concentrated on the immediate post-war period, particularly on the *DP* camp phase of the refugee experience. Respondents were asked to detail how they moved from place to place, came to be in a *DP* camp and why and when they emigrated. The attitudes of the respondents about conditions prevailing within the *DP* camps were given particular attention. Those who did not spend time in a *DP* camp were asked to record their migration route. A concluding section

dealt with the refugees' experiences and affiliations after their arrival in Canada.

Introducing the survey was a statement outlining its purposes and sponsorship. The final two pages were an "open ended" forum within which participants were invited to add any comments they felt relevant. A total of 351 persons made use of this section. Overwhelmingly, their replies indicate a measure of satisfaction in learning that scholarly work on the Ukrainian *DP* experience was being carried out.

The test population was strictly limited to Ukrainians who had migrated into Canada as refugees soon after World War II. A sampling frame of just under 4,500 persons was prepared by drawing upon the membership lists of the major post-WW II organizations, subscription lists of newspapers which cater to this population, and parish records. Some 300 personal letters were sent across Canada to known community leaders and activists, explaining the project and requesting their co-operation in achieving its aims. Such individuals were also asked to prepare lists of possible recipients in their areas. The response to such requests for aid were generally favourable.

As names and addresses, (and any other information provided) were gathered, they were recorded on 3" X 5" index cards, colour-coded to indicate the province or region of Canada where potential participants resided. For example, the four provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and British Columbia were assigned pink coloured index cards,

Quebec addresses were recorded on green cards and those in Ontario on white cards (blue for the Ottawa area). Whenever organizational or religious affiliation was known, this information was recorded on the reverse side of the appropriate card.

Once a master list of approximately 4,200 names was ready, a random, coin-toss method was used to select the 2,000 individuals who would receive questionnaires. Eight, unequally sized mailings were made between March and June of 1981, from Montreal, Quebec and Kingston, Ontario. Respondents were asked to use the self-addressed, stamped envelopes included with each questionnaire. All returns were collected at the Department of Geography, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. Responses came in between April and December of 1981.

Most participants complied with the request that they complete and return their questionnaire within 2 to 3 weeks of receiving it. A follow-up card was sent to each participant about seven days after the original mailing, thanking those who had already sent in their questionnaire, and reminding those who had not about the requested completion date.

As each questionnaire was mailed out, it was stamped to indicate the day, month and year by which it should be returned. The same stamp was used to record this information on the appropriate index card. This provided a check against repeat mailings to the same address. Even so, a total of six

households accidentally received more than one copy of the questionnaire.

Of a total of 2,000 questionnaires mailed out, 1,078 were returned. Not all could be used. Some had been incompletely filled out, others returned from countries to which no questionnaires were mailed (!), such as the United Kingdom or the USA. Thirty nine had been received by Ukrainians living in Canada who had not been refugees.

After sorting and reviewing the returns, a total of 898 questionnaires were found to be sufficiently well completed to use. After coding, the data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), a procedure which took place during 1982-1983. If the estimate of approximately 34,000 Ukrainian refugees having immigrated to Canada between 1945 and 1952 is accurate,' then one in seventeen of these persons received a questionnaire, and one in thirty four replied. The response rate for this survey is 54% when the total number of returns is tallied, and 45% when only those used in the analysis are counted. This is deemed to have been a very good response rate.

The survey's success can be attributed to several factors. It certainly prompted a lively debate among those receiving it. This publicity helped create an atmosphere of interest within the receiving population. Recipients were motivated to consider whether to reply. In this sense, even the "negative" attitudes of some helped promote the study's objectives.

Returns came primarily from the province where most post-WW II Ukrainian immigrants had settled, namely Ontario from which just over 60% of responses were collected. The other provinces were represented as follows: Alberta, (14%), Quebec, (10%), Manitoba, (6%), British Columbia, (5%), and Saskatchewan, (5%). With the exception of the Maritime provinces and the Territories, respondents sent in questionnaires from across Canada.

The Ukrainian Canadian press carried a number of reports dealing with the survey, its aims and the investigator responsible for it. Some of these are tabulated below (Table 3.3). Substantiating the legitimacy and provenance of the survey was a press release distributed through the good offices of Senator Paul Yuzyk which helped convince the skeptical that the study was not, somehow, the work of Soviet *agents-provocateurs*.

Generally, most Ukrainians in Canada with whom the student came into contact had a positive response to the questionnaire. Many Ukrainian *DPS* felt that the academic community had ignored their experience, just as after WW II many of them felt the West was ignoring their warnings about Soviet intentions. The present effort was therefore welcomed.

Measuring the non-response bias, that is understanding why some of those receiving questionnaires did not complete or return them, was accomplished during the fieldwork portion of this study. About 20% of those who were

Table 3.3 Selected references to the Research Questionnaire
in the Ukrainian language press

<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. America	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	July 10, 1980
2. Fatherland	Toronto, Ontario	August 10, 1980 February, 1981
3. Our Aim	Toronto, Ontario	March 4, 1981
4. New Pathway	Toronto, Ontario	no date available
5. Ukrainian Echo	Toronto, Ontario	September 10, 1981 February 18, 1981 April 8, 1981
6. <u>Homin Ukrainy</u>	Toronto, Ontario	July 23, 1980 April 15, 1981 May 27, 1981
7. Ukrainian Thought	London, England	no date available
8. Ukrainian Voice	Winnipeg, Manitoba	December 3, 1980 April 15, 1981 July 7, 1982
9. Free Word	Toronto, Ontario	February 21, 1981

- Notes:
- Several Ukrainian organizations, notably the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (LVU), the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) and the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) identified the sponsor of the research and urged their membership to support the study.
 - All these newspapers are published in Ukrainian, with the exception of 5.

interviewed had received questionnaires but chosen not to reply. They were asked to detail their reasons for not doing so.

Predominantly, their criticism reflected a genuine concern about who was undertaking the research and why. Interestingly enough once they met the researcher, most of these persons were quite candid in providing even intimate details about their experiences. Clearly an important sub-group of this post-war population could not have been reached through the use of a survey alone. Personal contact was found to be an essential requisite to analysis of a refugee population.

Surprisingly, only a few people complained about the length of the questionnaire. The general attitude was that a detailed questionnaire was essential in order to thoroughly explore their refugee experience.

One of the most interesting criticisms was that the survey had a "Western Ukrainian" bias. This feeling was most often expressed by Eastern Ukrainians. Upon reflection, the researcher admits that such a prejudice did, inadvertantly, enter into the questionnaire's design. For example, while Western Ukraine's regions were given prominence (e.g. Volhynia, Bukovyna), the distinct areas of Eastern Ukraine (e.g. Poltava) were ignored. Many Ukrainians felt this was a deliberate slighting of their regional affiliations. Given the friction that existed between these regionally defined populations in many of the refugee camps, the survey's

apparent bias annoyed some Eastern Ukrainians. Since most postwar immigrants were Western Ukrainians, however, this error was more embarrassing than it was a serious impediment to the survey questionnaire's success. Still, it must be recognized that a few Eastern Ukrainians, insulted by this completely unintentional oversight, may have refused to involve themselves in the survey research.

Survivors of the Great Famine in Ukraine (1932-33)¹⁰ were among the most reticent to participate in this research, particularly with respect to the questionnaire. The genocidal campaign waged by the Soviets against Ukrainians in this period undeniably marked survivors with an abiding mistrust of state intrusion in their lives. Paradoxically, the fact that the questionnaire was printed, and had a professional appearance, led some to believe that it had to be sponsored either by a government agency or the Soviet Union. This suspicion hampered research efforts. As some mentioned during interviews, "No student could afford to send us such questionnaires."

Given the aforementioned difficulties it is difficult to precisely state how many Eastern Ukrainians replied to the questionnaire. Just over 9% of those indicated that they were born in Eastern Ukraine. More, nearly 23% gave their religious affiliation as Ukrainian Orthodox, the faith most commonly found among Eastern Ukrainians. Since many Volhynians and Bukovynians were also Orthodox believers, this is not a full-proof method of estimating Eastern

Ukrainian respondents to the survey. And a large number of persons, totalling 16.5% of the sample, refused to give birthplace information. Most, but not all of these individuals were likely from Eastern Ukraine.

Examining individual returns, leads to the conclusion that approximately 20% of the respondents were from Eastern Ukraine. Since many Eastern Ukrainians had, in the DP camps, falsified biographical details of their pasts to indicate a Western Ukrainian birthplace, the reluctance to admit contradictory personal histories to an unknown researcher complicates this aspect of the survey.

Only a minute group, a half dozen individuals at most, sent in deliberately spoiled or antagonistically completed returns. The most caustic of the comments found came from an unidentified respondent in the Toronto area. His remark, scrawled on page 1 of the questionnaire was *This Is Not For The University Of Alberta! This Is For The University Of The K.G.B.!*

When individuals were met during the fieldwork who had received but not completed a questionnaire, they were asked to comment on their reasons for not having done so. One Western Ukrainian nationalist remarked:

I fled Ukraine because of the persecution I experienced there. I was always being brought in and interrogated. Constant questioning about who I was, where I came from, what I was doing, when, where and why! I hated that. I came to Canada to be

free of it. I fled incessant questioning about my personal life and beliefs, so obviously I don't now want to be interrogated again. I don't have to put up with it here in Canada! Why should I respond to a questionnaire that arrives in the mail and asks me details about my experience that I never revealed even under interrogation? How do I know where the answers will end up? '1

Tabulated results of the questionnaire are included throughout the text. A fuller description of the survey and its results will be published at a later date.

Other sources were consulted for information. Correspondence was maintained with several Ukrainian Canadians and *DPS* who were able to provide the researcher with a near-continuous feedback on observations made in the field or on conclusions drawn from archival sources. Other individuals, such as Wasyl Burianyk, a prominent member of the Ukrainian Self Reliance League (USRL), were encouraged to write down their recollections.¹² Such material, while sometimes of only background use to this study, has been preserved by being deposited in the Archives of Ontario. These holdings will eventually provide grist for other scholars' mills.

In keeping with a time-honoured geographic tradition, the researcher dutifully maintained a note book. In its pages, a running description of the events and people encountered during the course of the research and analysis

phases of this study were kept. Inferences about the patterns and processes being discovered were recorded. Some of these ideas, which may have appeared trivial at the time they were written down, later proved useful. Upon leaving active field work behind, these daily records proved to be a cogent reminder of the limitations of the study, and a foundation for possible lines of interpretation. In effect, these field diaries recorded both the setting and the observer. In that sense they are an indicator of the progress of this study through time.

It was only at the conclusion of the analytical phase of this thesis work that Lofland's (1971) pertinent observations on the value of good note-taking were read:

For better or worse, the human mind forgets massively and quickly. The people under study forget massively and quickly too. In articulating and understanding their world, it is necessary to have some means to overcome forgetting. Writing is such a device. Without the sustained writing down of what has gone on, the observer is in hardly a better position to analyze and comprehend the workings of a world than are the members themselves. Writing, in the form of continued notes with which the forgotten past can be summoned into the present, is an absolutely necessary if not sufficient condition for comprehending the objects of observation. Aside from getting along in the

setting, the fundamental concrete task of the observer is taking field notes. Whether or not he performs this task is perhaps the most important determinant of later bringing off a qualitative analysis. Field notes provide the observer's *raison d'etre*. If he is not doing them, he might as well not be in the setting.¹³

During the summer of 1982 a refugee camp housing many Eastern European refugees was visited, near Traiskirchen, Austria. Accompanying as guide was Dr. Sergius Naklowycz, a Ukrainian refugee who just after WW II was forcibly abducted by Soviet agents and sent to languish in the infamous *Gulag Archipelego*. Only after a number of years was he released and allowed to return to Austria.¹⁴ His insights on the nature of exile and the refugee camp experience did much to strengthen the researcher's convictions about the critical influence exerted on the displaced during their stay in such environments.

Subsequently, as chairman of the Ukrainian Refugee Aid Committee in Kingston, Ontario, the student worked with several Ukrainian refugees from Poland. This first hand experience of the satisfactions and perils of trying to integrate people of different backgrounds and experiences was invaluable in sensitizing the student to the importance of considering the context in which the attitudes of people are shaped and the factors responsible. It was difficult to avoid feeling empathy for the refugees, and almost equally

hard avoiding an appreciation of the receiving community's frustration. Eventually a situation developed much like that which occurred across Canada just after WW II, with a reinvigorated factionalism seemingly being the most durable impact of the immigration. This direct experience clarified some of the student's ideas about the processes that occur during the refugee experience, and underscored the hypothesis that such events are recurring phenomena, amenable to interpretation not simply as unique events.

It happens everywhere that people say and do things that they would later prefer forgotten. The observer necessarily violates this preference, for it is his duty to record and remember what others might want forgotten. To emerge from the comfortable cloister of the academic refuge, bringing out the accumulated evidence and observations, is to compromise many local loyalties and intimacies. Hopefully the end result, the first scholarly account of the Ukrainian *DP* experience and its consequences for Ukrainian Canadian society, will mollify those who might otherwise protest the explicit detailing of events and characters contained in this dissertation.

The student shares one intimate link to the events here being analyzed. Both his parents, and most of their friends, trace their roots back to Western Ukraine and vividly recall how they were forced to abandon their homeland in the face of Soviet aggression. Their experiences formed the stuff upon which this researcher was raised. Though modified by

his Canadian environment this background has still left its own distinct imprint upon him. Doubtless if his personal circumstances had been different, this work would never have been attempted.

An extensive data bank was accumulated through the course of this research. Previously inaccessible or "lost" archives were found and their preservation assured. Substantial oral evidence was also gathered. Considerable use of this material was made throughout the dissertation, as its numerous and extensive footnotes reveal. A not inconsiderable amount remains to be further utilized by other students. While leading geographers to the field of refugee studies this research has also signalled to other scholars that ample information is now available on the Ukrainian refugee experience. Paths for such perusal have been indicated.

Notes

1. Fundamentally, the inaccessibility of some of the most pertinent archival collections stymied scholarly analysis of the post-WW II Ukrainian refugee experience. Otherwise, published English-language materials are neither exhaustive, nor scholarly. Anthony Hynka, M.P., spoke out twice on Ukrainian *DPS* in the Canadian House of Commons, (9.4.46/31.5.48). A report prepared by The Senate of Canada, *Proceedings of*

the *Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour*, (Ottawa, 1947) offers the contrasting positions of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, (AUUC) and the UCC on the *DPS*. Dr. M.I. Mandryka's, *Ukrainian Refugees*, (1946), is also useful. Only recently was an academic conference held on the theme of Ukrainian refugees after WW II, *The DP Experience: Ukrainian Refugees After World War II A Conference*. (University of Toronto, 1983).

Permission was sought to examine *OUNr* archives while the researcher was in Munich, West Germany. This was denied. Some *OUNS* archives were viewed and copied onto microfiche from the private archive of Dr. J. Makoweckyj, in Munich. A significant portion of the archives of the Association of Ukrainians In Great Britain (*AUGB*) archives were copied onto microfiche in the summer of 1982. These are now deposited in the archives of The University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta. An annotated guide to this material was prepared in March, 1984 by the student. A copy of this is available at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. No *OUNr* material pertaining to the League of the Liberation of Ukraine (*LVU*) was examined, other than some correspondence between the **Rezident** and members during 1947-1948. A small collection of *OUNS* materials pertaining to Austria were accidentally uncovered at the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational

Institute "Oseredok", in Winnipeg. Finally, some *OUNr* material pertaining to daily conditions in the *DP* camps was located, for the period late 1945-1947. These bi-weekly reports, prepared by the Security Services of the *Banderivtsi* are in the process of being translated for publication.

2. Major public archives hold to this "thirty year rule." Thus little material dated after 1951 was seen by the researcher. Study of materials which are released annually should help further explain some of the conclusions reached in this work. A helpful finding aid to British documents was *The Second World War. A Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office* (London, 1972).

As an example of the type of material which have been lost or deliberately "weeded" out of official archives, it is worth noting that the Tracy Philipps file at the *DEA* has apparently been "destroyed." What remains in the *PAC* on Philipps is not generally available for research purposes.

3. Yury Boshyk and Boris Balan, (1982).
4. Mark Elliott, (1982):96-97.
5. Interviews with S.W.Frolick, (1.7.81/14.12.83 to 24.12.83/4.1.84 to 6.1.84); G.R.B. Panchuk, (5.5.81/24.7.81/4.1.83); Ann (Crapleve) Smith, (20.5.82/29.11.82) and A.J. Yaremovich, (1.12.82/27.1.83).
6. L.Y. Luciuk, (1983).

7. Interview with M. Fedak, (9.3.82).

8. See M. M. Balzer, (1980).

9. The number of Ukrainians who arrived in Canada after WW II is not precisely known. Panchuk, (28.2.51) reported to the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF) that 50,000 *DPS* had resettled in Canada, a population he categorized as follows,

Official Refugees (UNRRA/IGCR/IRO)----80%

Members of the Polish and other allied forces ---10%

Old Emigres of Western Europe ---- 7%

Divisia ---- 3%

M. Marunchak, (1982):571, suggests that the "third immigration" brought over 40,000 Ukrainian *DPS* into Canada.

W. Darcovich and P. Yuzyk, (1980):552 estimated that 26,805 *DPS* came to Canada between 1947 and 1952.

Dr. V.J. Kaye's estimate of 33,667 *DPS* arriving in Canada between 1946 and 1952 is regarded as being a close approximation. See PAC MG 31 D69 Vol.16, undated.

10. Some witnesses to the Great Famine in Ukraine (1932-33) who were interviewed included,

Y. Bulat, (8.4.82);

M. Hawrysh, (5.4.82);

P. Makohon, (24.4.82);

M. Mucha, (26.3.82);

P. Swyrydenko, (17.5.82).

11. Interview held in Toronto. Anonymous. Recorded in

researcher's diary, (19.12.83).

12. Interview with W. Burianyk, (30.5.82).

13. John Lofland, *Analyzing Social Settings* as cited in
E.R. Babbie, (1975):101-108.

14. Interview with S. Naklowycz, (6.7.82).

CHAPTER FOUR - UKRAINIANS IN CANADA BEFORE WORLD WAR II

No average Englishman understands Volhynians or Podolias, which he probably thinks are exotic garden flowers or tropical diseases! One has to write in a way geographically understood of-the-peepul.

Tracy Philipps, (1950)

Introduction

Understanding the geographical impacts of migration requires determining why a move is taking place, who is relocating, how many are doing so and where they are going. Describing the nature of the receiving population is relevant because it is within this host society that the consequences of a population redistribution can be traced.

This chapter outlines spatial and social patterns characterizing Ukrainians in Canada prior to the Second World War. It contends that political processes and organizations dominated by an Anglo-Celtic state elite within Canada effectively shaped the Ukrainian minority's demographic characteristics, distribution, and attitudes about their place in Canadian society. Controlling immigration policy, this state elite enjoyed the capability of determining who would be admitted to Canada, when, and why. As a result Ukrainians in Canada remained predominantly a rural folk, usually to be found in the prairie provinces, until well into the inter-war period. Most also remained

uneasily aware of the fact that other Canadians harboured abiding suspicions about the reliability of Ukrainians as citizens of the Dominion and subjects of the British Empire.

So intimidated did the Ukrainian Canadians become that when, unwittingly, Canadian-born Ukrainian soldiers first stumbled upon the Ukrainian Displaced Persons (*DPS*) in Western Europe during mid-1944, they were hesitant to come to the latter's aid. A lively debate broke out within the ranks of the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemens' Association (*UCSA*) on just this issue.' While those favouring action prevailed, and went on to form the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (*CURB*), anxiety about the reactions of the Canadian government and public persisted for some time.

Those supporting *CURB* insisted there was nothing to worry about. They argued, with some justification, that Ukrainian Canadians had amply proven their loyalty to Canada during WW II, particularly through their high rate of voluntary enlistment. These veterans felt that, having demonstrated their reliability, they could now make demands on the Canadian system in defence of the Ukrainian *DPS*, particularly since they were careful to phrase these claims politely and base them on humanitarian and democratic principles.

Their enterprise had its self-interested side as well. Within a short time of their first encounters with the *DPS* the Ukrainian Canadians came to believe that the only practical and long-term solution to the "refugee problem"

was resettlement, wherever possible. The alternative was repatriation of the *DPS* to territories under Soviet control, according to the terms of the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945. Most *DPS* strenuously resisted this policy which was also protested by *CURB*.² Among themselves the Ukrainian Canadians hoped that a substantial immigration of Ukrainian *DPS* into Canada would strengthen their position within Canadian society, if simply by increasing the numbers of Ukrainians living there. The influx was also expected to "revive" what was often described as a moribund Ukrainian Canadian population, one that had collectively run out of novel ideas and approaches to articulating its existence within this country. Having a large population of Ukrainians to again draw upon for immigration into Canada was something none of them had anticipated, but they came to think of it as a stroke of good fortune. Such an immigration of Ukrainians would only strengthen the minority's position in Canada, so the *DPS* came to be thought of as a prize, to be eagerly grasped and relocated.

Before this could be accomplished, however, it was understood that those Canadian authorities charged with formulating and overseeing the implementation of Canadian immigration laws, had to be convinced of the suitability of these Ukrainian *DPS* as immigrants for Canada. *CURB*'s workers and supporters therefore deliberately set out to portray the Ukrainian *DPS* in the best possible light, forgoing accuracy of description in their effort to substantiate the claim

that these refugees were precisely the type of immigrant best suited to meet Canadian needs. Having themselves endured years of discrimination because of their suspect loyalties, these Ukrainian Canadians therefore obfuscated the political roots of the post-WW II Ukrainian refugee experience. They also ignored its consequences within the affected *DP* population. Their fear was that if the authorities became aware of the political attitudes of many *DPS* they would be less inclined to allow them into Canada.

Whether Ukrainian Canadian lobbying efforts or other pressures finally persuaded the Canadian state to admit a selected number of Ukrainian *DPS* is a moot point. What is significant is that *CURB* reports, virtually the only source of information reaching most Ukrainian Canadians which described the *DP* population, inaccurately sketched out this groups' attributes. With the possible exception of a few executive officers in the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (*UCC*) and the closely affiliated Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (*UCRF*), the Ukrainian public in Canada knew very little about the actual state of affairs prevailing in the *DP* camps. To have alerted them to the facts might have also signalled Canadian officials about the way in which Ukrainian Canadians were misrepresenting the attributes of the *DPS*. So those who may have known about the political attitudes of many of the Ukrainian refugees kept quiet about their privileged information.

Yet this adumbration was the basis upon which Ukrainian Canadians were rallied in aid and defence of their compatriots in the *DP* camps. Never being given accurate information about who the *DPS* were and what they wanted, the Ukrainian public in Canada expected immigrants who would be much like themselves. They did know that most *DPS* were from Western Ukraine, were Uniate Catholics and anti-communist. These traits were well represented already in the Ukrainian population of Canada. Few suspected the attribute changes that had taken place within this refugee population. Consequently, the receiving body was quite unprepared to cope with an immigration of which the majority were either members of, or supported, a particular nationalist faction, especially one that had no existing counterpart in Canada. Most could not appreciate why these *DPS* felt so little attachment to the country they were resettled in, but seemed to pine for their vacated area of origin. By the time *CURB*'s operatives overseas had reassessed their earlier opinions of the *DPS*, and begun transmitting caveats to Canada, the Ukrainian *DPS* were already arriving there. By then it was too late for anyone to prevent their immigration, or for the receiving population to ready itself. An interaction was beginning, whose unintended, unexpected, and divisive shocks would be felt throughout the Ukrainian population of Canada, with repercussions evident to the present day.

On Being Ukrainian In Canada

Identifying oneself as a Ukrainian while residing in Canada has sometimes proven to be an unfortunate pairing of choices. Why this should interest the human geographer is suggested in the literature on ethnicity.

According to Barth's (1969) classic study on ethnic affiliation, it is the maintenance of an ethnic group's boundary and not the "cultural stuff" it encloses which defines the group. While overt signs or features that can signal identity, such things as language, houseform or the folk-arts, may be useful indicators of affiliation, they change with time and in different environments (Yancey *et.al.*, 1976). No prediction regarding which features will be exhibited by ethnic actors in any given situation or time is therefore possible, even if a catalogue of all the "objective" or visible cultural traits associated with that ethnic group were available.³ Barth therefore advocated investigation of an ethnic group's "basic value orientations" by which he meant those standards by which members of these groups evaluated each other, and the criteria by which they expect others to judge them. Locating the boundary of any ethnic group requires the delineation of this basic value orientation. If it is kept inviolate, an ethnic group's integrity is preserved. If not, the group's members become exposed to assimilatory pressures and their particular social unit may disappear.

For purposes of social interaction, ethnic actors assign varying grades of importance to the visible cultural traits which signal but do not actually compose, the boundary of their group. Often dissimilar individuals or groups appear to inhabit a similar ethnic space. This is understandable only if it is remembered that it is the declaration of membership in one particular ethnic group formation which demonstrates how these individuals or groups are willing to be judged.

Categorization necessarily brings with it the placing of some people into a general group of outsiders. A consequent narrowing of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest follows. The self-ascriptive and exclusive nature of ethnic affiliation thus leaves open the possibility of a negative judgement being rendered about those so involved.

In any majority-minority situation, there is always a trace of rejection of the group that stands apart. When a host population is formed by a majority that is indisposed toward a minority's basic value orientation can it somehow impose on that group its own rubric? Can the latter maintain its essential boundary if the majority's antipathy is directed against it through the bureaucratic and security organs of the state?

When people find that the ethnic identity they display is experientially unrewarding in those situations where they try to make it relevant, what happens? Obviously, some will

disavow it. Others seek to accomodate their group's visible cultural attributes to conform with the societal context in which they find themselves. Since it is the maintenance of the group's boundary and not what it encloses that is critical, dissembling tactics may actually serve to protect and preserve ethnic identity.

In this thesis the basic value orientation of the Ukrainian ethnic group in Canada is considered to be its enduring concern over the fate of Ukraine. Regardless of the internal differentiation apparent within the organized Ukrainian Canadian population on political, class, religious, or regional lines, their existence as a separate group has been predicated upon this attachment to the ancestral area of origin. Since this sentiment was often construed as being alien, if not inimical to Canadian norms, the ethnic minority was sporadically exposed to a variety of external pressures, their purpose being the dissolution of the minority group's boundary, namely its homeward-oriented attitude. Several specific instances of inveterate meddling with the structure of Ukrainian Canadian life in Canada will be described below, demonstrating why this population was left cautious about exhibiting any qualities or traits which might be misconstrued as injudicious. Most Ukrainians in Canada before WW II, or their immediate predecessors, had voluntarily migrated to Canada in search of something more than the mere subsistence allowed them on Ukrainian lands; few had any interest in returning to Ukrainian territories

in Eastern Europe. However, given the unhappy conditions prevailing there, about which they could read in the half-dozen or so national Ukrainian newspapers published in Canada, many Ukrainian Canadians not only kept abreast of developments "at home" but retained an interest in the course of events. Doubtless if Ukraine had enjoyed territorial integrity and independence this attention would have been far less intense, barring external threats to that nation-state. Most Ukrainians would likely have willingly integrated into Canadian society. Since this was not the case they continued maintaining an earnest watchfulness over continental Ukrainian affairs, continuing to wonder if some opportunity would arise for their homeland to secure its independence. This pre-occupation made the Canadian state elite uneasy, a situation that would be particularly exacerbated during times of crisis in the international political system (e.g. the two World Wars). Consequently the minority was irrevocably affected in its composition, geographical distribution and attitudes, as the majority's political actors strove to recast the Ukrainians into conformity with what they perceived to be acceptable standards of behaviour and norms for those living in Canada.

An Early Intervention - Shaping Geographical Boundaries Among Ukrainians In Canada.

Ukrainian immigration to Canada began, officially, in 1891.⁴ From an unpretentious beginning (only 0.01% of the

total immigration for that year), the influx grew until, by 1897, just over 18% of the total immigration (3,966 individuals) were Ukrainian. This was the peak year for Ukrainian immigration into Canada before World War I as a percentage of the total. Figure 4.1 illustrates the spatial pattern of these Ukrainian immigrants between 1896 and 1905. Between 1906 and 1914 a previously small Ukrainian population in Ontario and Quebec increased in size (Figure 4.2). In absolute numbers the greatest inflow came in 1913, when 22,413 Ukrainians settled in Canada, representing 5.6% of the total.⁵ In 1920 circumscribed immigration again began although between that year and 1924 Ukrainians constituted less than 1% of the total permitted in Canada during each calendar year. The passing of The Railways Agreement in September of 1925 improved the situation for continental immigration (Gulka-Tiechko, 1983). Just over 16,000 Ukrainians arrived in 1928 (9.6% of the total), making this the peak year during the inter-war period. The Great Depression, followed by the worsening international political situation which foreshadowed World War II, again limited international migration flows. While Ukrainians comprised nearly 11% of the total immigration into Canada in 1938, this apparently high percentage actually translates into less than 2,000 people.⁶

Total immigration statistics for Ukrainians arriving in Canada between 1896 and 1939 are shown in Table 4.1. Summing up, some 171,000 Ukrainians arrived in Canada before World

Figure 4.1 Geographical distribution of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada, 1896-1905




Figure 4.2 Geographical distribution of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada, 1906-1914.




Table 4.1 Total Ukrainian immigration to Canada from
overseas for calendar and fiscal years
1896-1939

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>
1896	616	1915-1919	3
1897	3,966	1920	478
1898	4,728	1921	93
1899	6,806	1922	38
1900 *	4,817	1923	816
1900-1901 **	5,338	1924	49
1901-1902 **	7,110	1925	2,196
1902-1903 **	10,141	1926	9,468
1903 ***	2,165	1927	10,836
1904	7,978	1928	16,039
1905	8,084	1929	10,973
1906	7,696	1930	8,045
1907	17,611	1931	503
1908	8,727	1932	438
1909	4,018	1933	378
1910	6,714	1934	563
1911	13,398	1935	476
1912	20,281	1936	801
1913	22,363	1937	1,206
1914	6,661	1938	1,880
		1939	1,753

Source: Statistical Compendium, Series 50.62-77:513-514.

* Six months total, January to June.

** Fiscal years 1900-01 to 1902-03, July to June.

*** Six months total, July to December.

War I, while between 1920 and 1939, a total of about 68,000 would be admitted.

Most of those coming to Canada before World War II were from the western regions of Ukrainian ethnographic territory in Europe, areas known as Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovyna, Lemkyvshchyna and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathian Ukraine). Before WW I these lands had been controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the latter's dissolution in 1918 a geopolitical realignment occurred in Eastern and Central Europe; Galicia, Volhynia and Lemkyvshchyna passed under Poland's control, Bukovyna was taken by Romania, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was incorporated into the "successor state" of Czechoslovakia; later this slice of Ukrainian territory was forcibly incorporated into Hungary. Few Ukrainians migrating to Canada before WW I, or after, came from the largest portion of Ukrainian land, which had been subject to the Tsar's rule until 1917, and subsequently came under the hegemony of the Soviet Union.

Mass emigration of Ukrainian peasants from Eastern Europe to Canada before WW I conformed with the immigration policies of the Liberal government of Sir Wilfred Laurier and his Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton.⁷ Its unabashed purpose was to colonize the empty Canadian prairie frontier with suitable stock. To that end a very specific type of immigrant was required and actively sought out in Eastern and Central Europe. Little attention was paid to ensuring that these immigrants would find some type of

support system to ameliorate the difficult conditions they were exposed to on the prairies. This oversight caused no small amount of hardship, as the accounts of these Ukrainian Canadian "pioneers" attest.* Succinctly put, these immigrants were brought into Canada to be exploited for their labour; no philanthropic reasons were involved.

Table 4.2 which provides data on Ukrainian immigration into Canada from overseas for two periods, 1897-1903 and 1903-1914, by sex and occupational groupings, confirms that the type of population being lured to Canada was predominantly male, and composed of members of the farming class or unskilled labourers. Only just before WW I were female domestics actively sought. Table 4.3 details the provincial distribution of Ukrainian immigrants from overseas in Canada between 1896 and 1914. Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta were the major recipients of Ukrainian settlers, as might be expected given the framework of the immigration policy. The geographical distribution of Ukrainian immigrants in Canada for 1896-1905 and 1906-1914 is shown on Figures 4.3 and 4.4. The first illustrates that by 1901 there was as yet only a fledgling Ukrainian population in Ontario and Quebec. As well, Canada's Ukrainian population was predominantly rural at this point in time, a situation that changed slightly by 1911. The Ukrainian population in Ontario and Quebec had grown by that year. As Figure 4.4 shows Ukrainians in these two provinces were to be found largely in urban communities.

Table 4.2 Ukrainian Immigration to Canada from overseas by occupational Groupings and sex, for calendar and fiscal years 1897-1903 and 1903-1914

Period or Year	Farming Class		Unskilled Workers		Skilled Workers		Clerks and Trades		Miners		Female Ser- vants		Other Classes		Total					
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Children	Children	Male	Female						
1897-1903	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182
1903-14	38,196	8,195	11,175	47,653	4,457	4,628	1,401	392	363	45	24	31	612	71	96	6,604	108	725	920	125,696
1897-1903	-----	7,410	-----	-----	2,454	-----	-----	30	---	---	13	---	-----	8	---	29	---	32,962	---	42,906

Source: Statistical Compendium, Series 50. 163-182; 524

Table 4.3 Total Ukrainian Immigration to Canada from overseas and all countries for calendar and fiscal years 1896-1914

Year	Atlantic Provinces bec	Que- bec	Ontario	Overseas			British Columbia	Total*	All countries				British Columbia	Total†
				Mani- toba	Saskat- chewan	Alberta			Que- bec	Ontario	Mani- toba	Saskat- chewan	Alberta	
1896	--	--	--	11	--	--	--	616	--	--	11	--	--	616
1897	--	--	--	1,582	--	--	--	3,966	--	--	1,582	--	--	3,966
1898	--	4	--	3,838	422	--	5	4,728	--	4	3,838	422	--	5,478
1899	--	5	1	3,018	2,254	--	--	6,806	--	5	3,018	2,254	--	6,806
1900	5	--	4	2,281	1,431	--	--	4,817	5	1	2,281	1,431	--	4,817
1900-01***	--	7	4	2,062	1,388	--	--	5,338	--	4	2,062	1,388	--	5,338
1901-02***	18	5	40	2,932	1,613	--	14	7,110	7	4	2,932	1,613	--	7,110
1902-03***	80	73	67	6,408	2,371	--	3	10,141	18	5	6,408	2,371	--	10,141
1903**	44	75	39	1,042	960	--	5	2,165	44	75	1,042	960	--	2,165
1904	158	722	199	5,375	1,503	--	21	7,978	158	722	5,375	1,503	--	7,978
1905	65	985	424	5,492	1,103	--	15	8,084	65	985	5,492	1,103	--	8,084
1906	253	1,348	723	4,072	867	391	42	7,696	253	1,348	4,072	867	391	7,696
1907	362	3,874	2,187	8,761	1,324	1,063	130	17,611	362	3,874	8,761	1,324	1,063	17,611
1908	312	1,501	1,235	4,134	874	591	80	8,727	312	1,513	4,187	909	625	8,887
1909	97	740	684	1,417	580	427	73	4,018	97	763	1,428	581	433	4,072
1910	103	1,701	1,350	2,017	698	710	135	6,714	103	1,774	2,026	698	710	6,808
1911	218	3,507	2,686	4,452	1,388	975	172	13,398	218	3,523	4,468	1,396	975	13,446
1912	371	6,003	4,367	6,267	1,713	1,344	216	20,281	371	6,006	6,270	1,713	1,344	20,292
1913	280	7,154	5,292	6,104	1,642	1,634	257	22,363	280	7,170	6,115	1,644	1,638	22,413
1914	97	1,377	1,534	1,860	824	897	72	6,661	98	1,383	1,866	841	907	6,712


Source: Statistical Compendium, Series 50.62-77: 514

* Includes Yukon, Northwest Territories and not specified.

** Six months total, July to December.

*** Fiscal years 1900-01 to 1902-03, July to June.

Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Ukrainians in Canada, 1901 and 1911.



While successful in populating the Canadian West, this immigration policy also soon raised an intense xenophobic reaction. Detractors maintained that Canadian lands were becoming ever more "alien" as continental immigration continued, debasing the nation's integrity in the process. For example, the *Alberta Tribune* on February 4, 1889 quoted a French Canadian priest, Father Morin, as opining that:

...as for the Galicians, I have not met one single person in the whole of the Northwest who is sympathetic towards them. They are from the point of view of civilization, ten times lower than the Indians.'

Such criticisms incited a prolonged national debate on Canadian immigration policy. What particularly alarmed those who argued that Canada was British and should remain English was the rapid growth of large bloc settlements throughout the West. These, spreading out from the area around Star, Alberta (where the first Ukrainian colony was set up in 1892), seemed to herald the creation of what one geographer has since described as a "virtual Canadian Ukraine," (Lehr, 1977). How had this spatial pattern come to take hold in Canada?

From the start of their immigration Ukrainian pioneers accorded great importance to locating in close proximity to others with similar religious, regional, or even village backgrounds. This chain migration resulted in the replication of many spatial and social patterns within


Canada that were familiar to Ukrainians from the countryside of Western Ukraine. Even though the Ukrainians in Canada were no longer able to cluster into village communities, having been dispersed on homesteads, they strove to forge regional expressions of the patterns they had known in Eastern Europe. After years of mass immigration this created a distinctive Ukrainian cultural landscape in western Canada, the residue of which can still be readily detected, in the place names of many Canadian communities.¹⁰

For those directing the development of the Canadian state, this trend was startling, for it had not been foreseen. These immigrants had come from a variety of East European countries, under a number of different ethnic labels, so their affinity for locating near each other and building up nearly homogeneous ethnic regions in Canada was a process no official had anticipated. The size that these units were mushrooming to was also alarming. No toleration of Canadian space being taken over by an ethnic group would be permitted by a state elite which had selected these immigrants only because of their apparent willingness to occupy and till the land.

So the government intervened. Unable and perhaps unwilling to completely disperse the bloc settlements, since they did provide a measure of mutual help to immigrants who fell into desperate straits, the government instead opted for establishing alternate, in a sense competing, settlement nodes for incoming immigrants. These were placed in

locations which were environmentally similar to those already chosen by Ukrainian settlers, but spread across the Prairies. To such places Ukrainian immigrants who followed the original pioneer settlers were directed. The results of this deliberate colonization policy are evident in the spatial distribution of Ukrainians in Canada, as portrayed in Figure 4.5 which shows the distribution of Ukrainians in Canada for the years 1900, 1905 and 1914. As Driedger (1983) has pointed out Ukrainians in this pioneer period inhabited a belt anchored in the east by the urban centre of Winnipeg and in the west by the industrial centre of Edmonton. Ukrainians were heavily concentrated north of the line between these two centres with the wheatlands lying to the south and the aspen-poplar tree line to the north. Although they still occupied considerable acreage in western Canada, in the form of a arch stretching from Winnipeg in the east to Edmonton in the west (closely paralleling the broad transition zone between aspen parkland and the southern fringes of the Canadian boreal forest) there no longer existed any one territorial base within which a Ukrainian would dominate, possibly achieving some form of local autonomy or a population base from which to articulate political demands. While there were many Ukrainians in Canada before WW I, any influence in Canadian affairs which they may have been able to attain, if clustered in an area of their own, was eliminated and never again allowed to reappear. The means employed were simple. The Ukrainians

Figure 4.5 Spatial growth of Ukrainian bloc settlements in Canada, 1900, 1905 and 1914.



were scattered across the Prairies. By so doing the government not only dealt with the potentially serious consequences of allowing another ethnic group to dominate in a particular region, it simultaneously squelched (or at least delayed) the likelihood of this population drawing together to form some type of united political force.

Thus, between 1896 and 1905, it was the Canadian state which established the basic spatial framework into which subsequent Ukrainian immigration was fit (Lehr, 1977). In so doing it also set a framework within which Ukrainian organizational development within Canada took place. If not the cause of the factionalism evident in the organizational life of Ukrainian Canadian society prior to WW II, this initial dispersal of Ukrainians certainly did not make interaction within this population easy. Another lasting consequence of this policy of settling rural areas with Ukrainian farmers is evidenced in comparing the Ukrainian with the general Canadian rates of urbanization. In 1901, nearly 97% of Canada's Ukrainians were found in rural settings, a percentage which decreased to 70.5% in 1931, 66% in 1941, and just under 50% by 1951. The Canadian population was only 63% rural in 1901, had slipped to 46% by 1931, 45.7% by 1941, and 38% in 1951.' From within this rural Ukrainian Canadian setting, however, there would emerge the major organizations that come to dominate Ukrainian Canadian society before WW II, and all of the individuals who were subsequently involved in the relief and refugee resettlement

operations of the post-war years. What Ukrainian settlers in Canada had not been able to achieve through geographical proximity, they sought to achieve by erecting nation-wide organizational structures.

After WW I, Ukrainian immigration to Canada remained limited. The government was committed to first securing employment for its returning veterans, while an economic recession just after the war limited the incentives for inducing further immigration. Significantly, there was also a lingering suspicion that Ukrainians were disloyal to the Dominion.

Such doubts had provoked, during WW I, and for several years thereafter, the state's internal security forces to classify many Ukrainian immigrants as "enemy aliens." Ukrainians so labelled were interned or subjected to surveillance. In total, 8,759 men, women, and children met this fate between 1914 and 1920, while a further 88,000 individuals were compelled by law to periodically report to their local police or security authorities.¹² Twenty four internment camps were established across the Dominion and kept operating until 1920. While actual Prisoners-of-War (POWs) did occupy some of the places in these camps, the majority of their unfortunate inhabitants were innocent immigrants whose only offence was having come from territories controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire before WW I. A sizeable minority, if not the largest ethnic group in these camps, were Ukrainians.

While the Internment Operations of 1914-1920 have recently attracted scholarly attention, the question remains as to why officialdom was unable to distinguish between *POWs* and innocuous settlers. The camps' population was divided into "first class" and "second class" internees, the majority of the latter being those detained inside Canada. These prisoners were then sent to the more difficult camps in the internment system (e.g. Spirit Lake, Quebec), while *POWs* were kept in the southern regions of Canada (e.g. Fort Henry, Kingston, Ontario).

The internees seem to have been conscious of the injustice done them. The term "Ukrainian" was being used in Canada well before WW I. For example, the masthead of the influential Ukrainian Canadian newspaper *Ukrainian Voice*, (Winnipeg) carried this identification from 1910.¹³ By 1916, Canadian census takers in western Canada reported that 36,103 persons had identified themselves as Ukrainians. At least several thousand would have done so for the national census in 1911.¹⁴ Even maps of Ukraine had appeared on the front pages of Canadian newspapers, both during the period of the Eastern front campaign, the Bolshevik Revolution and through the period of the Ukrainian liberation struggles of 1917-1921.¹⁵ Yet no official seems to have recognized that few Ukrainians in Canada had any sympathy for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Why then were these Ukrainian Canadians kept interned, under surveillance or otherwise penalized?

A particularly devastating blow against the Ukrainian minority was the passing of *The War Times Election Act* (1917). It disenfranchised all immigrants to Canada who had arrived since March 31, 1902.¹⁶ This decree must have affected at least 36,000 Ukrainians in Canada, roughly one in five. Its lasting impact is difficult to ascertain, although even some Canadian newspapers protested such a harsh action. For example, the *Daily British Whig* (Kingston, Ontario), editorialized on September 7, 1917:

It is quite probable that if this proposal becomes law the alleged 'foreigners' and hitherto 'naturalized Canadians' will bear their reproach meekly, but they will have sown in their hearts the seeds of a bitterness that can never be extinguished. The man whose honour has been mistrusted and who has been singled out for national humiliation, will remember it and sooner or later it will have to be atoned for.¹⁷

Only the fact that they did not openly rebel against this injustice seems to have kept the Unionist Borden government from acting on the many petitions it received urging the enforced mass deportation of Ukrainians from Canada.

The inter-war immigration of Ukrainians to Canada occurred largely under the auspices of *The Railways Agreement* signed between the Canadian government and the two national railway companies, the CPR and the CNR, in 1925. It

remained in force until August, 1930, and it was during these few years that the majority of the inter-war Ukrainian immigrants were brought into the country. Some 55,000 arrived between 1925 and 1930, out of the total of 68,000 Ukrainian inter-war immigrants.

Essentially, the unavailability of sufficient numbers of "preferred" immigrants of British, American, and northwest European stock forced the government to concede to the two railway companies the right to seek suitable immigrants from the "non-preferred" source areas of Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁸ Table 4.4 shows Ukrainian immigration from overseas by province of destination for the period 1928 to 1939, while Table 4.5, provides data for the same population by sex and occupational groupings. As before WW I, so too during the inter-war period, most Ukrainian immigrants located in the three Prairie provinces, (Figure 4.6). Their influx strengthened the pre-existing spatial pattern of Ukrainian settlement in Canada, while increasing the fledgling Ukrainian population of central Canada.

Nativist rhetoric against additional continental immigration was vehement. As one example, Bishop George Exton Lloyd, of the Anglican Church of Saskatchewan, conducted a widely publicized campaign against such settlers. His letter to the *Star Phoenix* (Saskatoon) on April 24, 1928 is typical of the backlash against Ukrainian immigration then being expressed:

We have already been warned that the Germans,

Table 4.4 Ukrainian immigration to Canada from overseas by province of destination, calendar years, 1928-1939

<u>Year</u>	<u>Atlantic Provinces</u>	<u>Que- bec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Mani- toba</u>	<u>Saskat- chewan</u>	<u>Alberta</u>	<u>British Columbia</u>	<u>Total</u>
1928	27	256	776	11,524	1,724	1,687	45	16,039
1929	8	342	1,033	7,406	940	1,180	64	10,973
1930	18	399	840	5,379	563	789	57	8,045
1931	7	40	132	80	102	121	21	503
1932	--	49	105	49	88	134	13	438
1933	8	37	127	36	65	97	8	378
1934	15	66	242	43	79	99	19	563
1935	1	58	159	121	46	75	16	476
1936	--	50	216	296	85	125	29	801
1937	4	108	311	400	118	227	38	1,206
1938	9	172	384	480	254	550	31	1,880
1939	3	76	272	382	294	710	16	1,753


Source: Statistical Compendium, Series 50.62-77:513-514.

Table 4.5 Ukrainian immigration to Canada from overseas by occupational groupings and sex, for calendar and fiscal years 1928-1939

Period or Year	Farming Class		Unskilled Workers		Skilled Workers		Clerks and Trades		Miners		Female Ser- vants		Other Classes		Chil- Total dren
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Chil- dren	Female	Male	Female	
1928	11,697	386	13	--	16	1	--	--	--	--	--	1,818	6	608	692
1929	4,786	848	30	1	23	1	--	--	--	--	3	1,621	12	957	1,190
1930	3,263	606	33	--	17	--	1	--	--	--	--	1,626	13	689	1,900
1931	3	8	3	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	19	1	197	246
1932	3	1	2	--	4	--	--	1	--	--	--	5	2	173	238
1933	4	4	1	--	2	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	154	200
1934	8	5	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	2	226	299
1935	33	24	2	3	7	--	1	--	--	--	--	6	1	226	299
1936	105	96	1	2	4	1	1	--	--	--	--	8	2	150	185
1937	156	140	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	14	7	161	213
1938	316	268	--	2	3	--	--	--	--	--	--	29	8	261	296
1939	349	292	--	1	4	--	--	--	--	--	--	70	8	314	382
			--	--	1	--	--	--	1	1	1	51	8	208	195
															1,753

Source: Statistical Compendium, Series 50, 163-182: 524

Figure 4.6 Geographical distribution of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada, 1920-1939.



Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians, and Mennonites are coming in floods. Will those Canadians who object to the heading of this letter, **Mongrel Canada** please ask the Premier (WLMK) why He [sic] gave these two railways the liberty to denationalize the country?'¹⁹

Public outcries against immigration, coupled with declining economic circumstances, prompted a reassessment of immigration policies. By 1928, the Canadian parliament accepted the recommendations of a Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization, which severely restricted the total immigration which would thereafter be allowed into Canada (Gulka-Tiechko, 1983). Ukrainian Canadian reaction was understandably a mixture of dismay and outrage. As a Ukrainian language newspaper, the *Canadian Ukrainian* noted:

So it is. When Ukrainians came here and cleared the trees, pulled stones, built towns and roads, they were desirable, but now that most of the hard work is already done, they don't want to admit those they now consider undesirable.²⁰

Such appeals received a cool reception from other Canadians. No changes to immigration policies were made to placate Ukrainian citizens' feelings. Indeed, when Ukrainian Canadian concern over the difficult conditions prevailing in their homeland were made public, the ire some Canadians felt towards them surfaced. For example, after one Ukrainian demonstration in Winnipeg, during early February of 1929, the

Toronto *Globe* printed an account of the event which described it as un-Canadian:

The protest shows, above all things, that the petitioners are Ukrainians still, although they have taken an oath as Canadians and Britishers. Their first sympathies are with their own people; Canada is secondary. To them Canada is merely a country to be exploited for their own gain. It has proved to be a good country for them and should be at the command of their friends also. They recognize no obligation to conform with the wishes of the Canadians and other British people who opened the way for them to benefit, but propose to use the political strength which has fallen to them to compel their benefactors to accede to their demands.

This same editorial then went on to reaffirm that Canada:

...is a British country, and must remain British, and the European immigrants have no moral right to protest against a policy designed to this end.²¹

There was one significant difference between the inter-war immigrants and those who had settled in Canada before WW I. Within the former group there were several hundred veterans of the unsuccessful Ukrainian military and political struggles for independence between 1917 and 1921. These individuals were to provide the impetus behind the formation of several prominent Ukrainian Canadian

organizations established during the inter-war period, such as the Ukrainian War Veterans Association (*UWVA*), which laid the bases for the emergence of the Ukrainian National Federation (*UNF*) in 1932²² and the United Hetman Organization (*UHO*), established by 1934.

Despite their ideological differences these two groups shared with other major Ukrainian Canadian organizations established just after WW I - the Ukrainian Labour and Farmer Temple Association (*ULFTA*)²³, the Ukrainian Self Reliance League, (*USRL*) and the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (*BUC*), both a geographical *milieu*, centred in the Prairies and an abiding interest with respect to Ukrainian affairs in Europe. This sharing of geographical space in Canada is clearly evidenced when maps showing the distribution of Ukrainian Canada organizations' branches and parishes are prepared. Figure 4.7 compares the spatial distribution of Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Greek Orthodox populations in Canada in 1937. Predictably, Ukrainian organizational and church life remained concentrated in the three Prairie provinces. Figure 4.8, which illustrates the distribution of *USRL* branches in 1939 underscores this point. Likewise, the *Hetmantsi* (of the inter-war immigration) were also largely to be found in western Canada (Figure 4.9). This particular group tended to be closely identified with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Canada, whose parishes and missions as of 1941 are shown in Figure 4.10. Even though a slow dispersal of Ukrainians

Figure 4.7 Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Greek Orthodox populations of Canada, 1937.





Figure 4.9 Branches of the United Hetman Organization in Canada, 1937-1938.




Branches of the UHO in Canada, 1937-1938.

Sources: FOR UKRAINE: The Tour of Honourable Danylo Skoriopadsky to the United States of America and Canada, Fall 1937-Spring 1938 (Edmonton 1938) and M. Marunchak, THE UKRAINIAN CANADIANS: A HISTORY (1982) pp. 393-394

Note: Haler (Saak) is not shown on the map

Figure 4.10 Ukrainian Greek Catholic churches and missions in Canada, 1941.



throughout Canada did take place, this ethnic group remained largely concentrated in Western Canada prior to the Second World War.

As for these organizations' commitment to European issues involving Ukrainians, none of them considered this inappropriate, although the *USRL* pursued a torturous course of attempting to present itself as a strictly Canadian body, free of all links or obligations to Ukrainian organizations overseas. This may have been one consequence of the fact that many of its leading members had personally experienced difficulties during the World War I internment operations (e.g. J. Stetchishin). With the exception of the *ULFTA*, which maintained a pro-Soviet line from its inception up to its contemporary guise as the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (*AUUC*), all the other Ukrainian Canadian organizations opposed the imposition of Soviet rule over Eastern Ukraine, and deplored the trying conditions faced by Ukrainians in the dismembered western regions of Ukraine.

Despite this basic adhesion to Ukrainian affairs, each of the aforementioned Ukrainian Canadian groups was also very careful to continuously articulate steadfast loyalty to the Dominion and the British Empire, the *USRL* being perhaps the most diligent in this respect. Repeatedly each group, even the *ULFTA*, proclaimed itself to be Canadian in allegiance, asserting that interest in Ukraine was motivated by humanitarian and democratic concerns over the state of affairs in Eastern Europe. Surely, they argued, no one would

deny them the right to hope that Eastern European lands would also come to be governed by the same principles of freedom and democracy as they had found in their adopted land?

Indeed, it became something of a contentious issue among the various Ukrainian Canadian organizations as to which of them was indeed the most genuinely Canadian in its orientation. The constant reproach of the *USRL* against organizations like the *UNF* and *UHO* were that they were contaminated by their "living ties" with political movements overseas. Yet all of these national Ukrainian organizations also decried the *ULFTA* as a tool of the Soviets. While it unmistakably had links to the USSR the *ULFTA* was more than merely a tool of the Soviets. It reflected the concerns of many working class Ukrainian Canadians about conditions inside Canada and Ukraine. Its advocates often proclaimed that their group was actually the only truly Canadian Ukrainian organization, given its commitment to "progressive" platforms whose realization would benefit everyone, and not just members of a specific ethnic group. This component of "internationalism" was to stand the *ULFTA* and later the *AUCC* in good stead, attracting as it did the support of many non-Ukrainian fellow-travellers.

Seemingly unceasing internecine arguments are the stuff of which inter-war Ukrainian Canadian history largely consists. Although each organization was simultaneously schooling its own youth and cadres, to ensure continuity and

viability for the future, they could find no unity of opinion about how to promote their common concerns inside Canada. So intense and vitriolic did their debates become that, up to the outbreak of WW II, there was no unity among Ukrainian Canadians in deed or avowed purpose. They remained uncertain about their status within Canada, divided amongst themselves and unable to achieve the status commensurate with the size of their population in Canada. Possibly they were simply unsure about where their primary allegiance was truly owed. The fact of their spatial distribution across Canada, coupled with limited recourse to personal forms of transportation and even a dearth of educated cadres, helped keep the Ukrainians in Canada ignorant about each other and disunited. As time passed, personal animosities were exacerbated and the gulf between the various organizations increased.

As the likelihood of another war became obvious, those organizations which had maintained links to the nationalist movement in Ukraine became more furtive in their activities. Most Ukrainian Canadians, however, publicly proclaimed their unswerving loyalty to the Dominion, agreed to conform to Canada's laws and norms, hoping to ensure that their hard-won foothold in Canada would not again be jeopardized, as it was during the internment operations. However precarious their situation in Canada might be, they wanted to remain here. While they may have entered, and won the right to stay, their disposition revealed that as a

population they had been cowed.

As *Ukrainian News*, (Edmonton) proclaimed, on the very eve of the war:

We Canadian Ukrainians, as loyal subjects of Canada, await the command of our government and together with other Canadian patriots stand on guard for our foster-land Canada and the whole British Empire. All our service is for the King, for Canada, and for the whole British Empire!

Forging The Desired Ukrainian Type

Just prior to World War II, things may have appeared to have assumed a more positive turn insofar as Ukrainian Canadians were concerned. While immigration remained limited, the various organizations were, they felt, finally beginning to enjoy a certain measure of attention and access to government decision-makers. Conversations were arranged with no less a personage than the Prime Minister of Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie King.²⁴ Some Ukrainian Canadians had even been able to confer with the exalted British Foreign Office (FO) on *The Ukrainian Question*.²⁵ Organized Ukrainian Canadians supposed, incorrectly as it turned out, that these pow-wows could be interpreted as signs of their increasing acceptance within Canadian society. The facts were quite different. The Prime Minister met Wasyl Burianyk²⁶ only because the latter was a WW I Ukrainian Canadian veteran, a known Liberal Party booster and, primarily, due to the Prime

Minister's reluctance to unduly antagonize the many Ukrainian voters in his Saskatchewan riding.²⁷ His expression of "personal sympathy" for the plight of Ukrainians in Eastern Europe cannot be taken seriously, since it never resulted in a concrete policy. His words were politically suave, and nothing more.

Likewise, Volodymyr Kossar's²⁸ polite hearing at the *FO* was only brought about after the British noted that he came bearing the personal recommendation of the Premier of Saskatchewan.²⁹ Since Kossar had also recently visited the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, in which Hitler was supposed to have some interest, the *FO* was also sought to supplement its own sources of intelligence with the first-hand observations of a Ukrainian Canadian.

As for the dozens of memoranda sent into Ottawa, London, or Washington during the inter-war period by Ukrainians living in North America, most of them lobbying for an intervention on behalf of their oppressed compatriots in Eastern Europe, such missives were rarely replied to, while their contents were routinely disparged.³⁰ If anything, they only served to further remind their recipients that there were many unassimilated Ukrainians living in North America who persisted in identifying themselves with European issues. There was, on these grounds some reason for concern, despite the professions of loyalty with which such supplications were usually festooned.

Appeals for justice, despite being couched in the language of democratic liberalism, fell before an unsympathetic audience for reasons of state. No Western government was willing to take up the cudgel for Ukrainians, when such action could plunge Europe into another war. For most Western states, with the exception of revisionist powers like Germany and Italy, the issue of an independent Ukraine was irrelevant; Canada, and to an extent, even the United Kingdom, considered the Ukrainian question as essentially a continental European matter. Avoiding any entanglement in this question became a hallmark of Western policies during the inter-war era and, indeed, after WW II, even though the potential of stirring up trouble for the Soviets and *Nazis* by exploiting the irredentism of Ukrainians in Galicia was considered by the British.³¹


In the meantime, the concerns of Ukrainian Canadian citizens about their relatives and friends still living in Ukraine were largely ignored by the Canadian government, which steadfastly clung to its policy of avoiding friction with other regimes on the Ukrainian issue in Europe. Early in WW II both the Polish and French governments had protested against the activities of certain Ukrainian Canadians and their organizations.³² Such denunciations, particularly emanating from friendly powers, and implying that there were Ukrainians in Canada who had ties to militantly nationalistic and reputedly pro-German circles were, just before WW II, sufficient grounds for Ottawa to

increase its surveillance of this ethnic group. There was even talk of establishing a pro-Allied Ukrainian centre in Canada, composed of Ukrainian exiles from France. The contemporary leaders of the Ukrainian Canadian population were deemed unequal to the task of forming a counter-point to those Ukrainians in Europe who were supposed to be siding with the *Nazis*.

Once hostilities erupted, the government moved swiftly to curb any outbreak of treason among Ukrainians in Canada. Its inter-war experience and observations had led the government to conclude that members of the *ULFTA* were disloyal. Accordingly, this organization, the Canadian Communist Party (*CCP*)³³ and a number of other ethnic organizations were declared illegal by order-in-council (PC 2667) on June 4, 1940. Their leaders were immediately liable to arrest and internment, while properties and material wealth were confiscated. The extent of the *ULFTA*'s holdings, and those halls which were specifically sold to rival Ukrainian Canadian organizations, is illustrated in Figure 4.11. As pointed out above, Ukrainian organizational life in Canada had been concentrated in Western Canada; the *ULFTA* was no exception to this, although as a leading group in the pre-WW II period it did have a number of branches in the urban-industrial centres of Ontario, much like the *USRL*.

Having effectively removed a perceived threat to the Dominion's internal security, the government was now faced with the task of considering what to do with the remaining

Figure 4.11 Ukrainian Labour and Farmer Temple Association halls in Canada, 1941.



majority of Ukrainian Canadians.

At first, it was resolved that this group could be monitored by the existing police and security forces, and that all that was required was the creation, in Ottawa, "of some kind of centre of information" which could be used to keep the Ukrainians informed about how they were expected to behave through the course of the current crisis. It could be staffed with one or two "reliable" Ukrainian Canadians who could perform such a task "for the duration."

After deliberation, it was decided that this was an insufficient strategy for dealing with the third largest ethnic group in Canada, particularly one that was so heavily involved in some of Canada's more strategic economic activities. There was a nagging fear that the obvious disunity within the Ukrainian Canadian population left it open to the machinations of Axis or Soviet agents, who might penetrate the bickering organizations and therein foment troubles for the Canadian war effort. Nearly 250,000 Ukrainians could be found in Canada in 1939. Such a population, if it became prey to subversive forces, could wreck havoc as a "fifth column" within Canada on an extensive scale.

Short of repeating the Internment Operations of 1914-1920, which would have been difficult and likely more contested, the government had only one realistic option.³⁴ It would impose unity upon the discordant Ukrainian Canadian population by establishing a structure encompassing all of

the major Ukrainian Canadian organizations, and so constituted as to make it virtually impossible for external foes to penetrate without being detected. Such a body would also ensure Ukrainian Canadian compliance with the Dominion's war aims. Such a united body, it was assumed, would reach into every niche of the organized Ukrainian Canadian population, there to spread the message the government wanted this populace to hear.

The fact that hostilities were raging, and the British Empire was being roundly defeated on nearly every front by the Germans, made delicacy of manoeuvre a lesser consideration than expediency of action.

As if in anticipation of some sort of official intervention in their affairs, a voluntary merger of several Ukrainian Canadian organizations took place on February 3, 1940. On that date, a Representative Committee of Ukrainians in Canada was formed.³⁵ How truly unrepresentative it was is revealed in the fact that only the *UNF* and *BUC* joined it. How anxious even this meagre public expression of loyalty made other Ukrainian Canadian organizations feel can be seen in the fact that less than a week later, a Central Committee of Ukrainians in Canada was announced (February 7).³⁶ Its adherents were the *USRL*, *UHO* and the Ukrainian Workers' League (*UWL*), a rather strange group of bedfellows.

Beyond these two consolidations, the Ukrainian Canadians seemed unwilling, or unable, to progress. Despite Dr. Vladimir J. Kaye's³⁷ blandishments, during a tour of

western Canada in which he stressed the need for Ukrainian Canadians to form one united group, his appeals were not acted upon. Still, he did force "everybody who counts in Ukrainian Canadian life" to consider the consequences. Essentially, his argument was that if the Ukrainians of Canada willingly formed a single organization, their exhibition of patriotism would not be overlooked by the authorities at the peace negotiations that were sure to follow the war's end. Loyalty demonstrated now, he tantalizingly suggested, might later stand Ukrainian Canadians in good stead, for they could parlay that earned influence into political action when the status of Ukraine was discussed after the war.³⁸ Since, in mid-1940, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Hungary were all in the enemy camp, and Poland and Czechoslovakia destroyed, Ukrainian Canadians had some grounds for believing that, just as after WW I, there might be an opportunity for Ukrainians to achieve independence. Ukrainian Canadian contributions made during the war might, some of them believed, be traded back for critical influence after the war.

Whether their consideration of this possibility would have lead the Ukrainian Canadians to voluntarily settle their differences and unite will never be known. The pressure of war events did not allow for leisurely contemplation. Under rather abstruse circumstances, a meeting was called in Winnipeg, and a Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) was created between November 7 and 9, 1940.³⁹

None of the participants who huddled together in the Fort Garry Hotel during these two days of secret meetings left a detailed account of the negotiations which preceeded this organization's birth. They themselves do not seem to have accorded this event the importance that has since been ascribed to it by some chroniclers of Ukrainian Canadian history.

This "umbrella organization" encompassed the *UNF*, *USRL*, *BUC*, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches of Canada and the *UWL*. Reverend Wasyl Kushnir, a monseigneur in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church became the first President of the *UCC*, while Rev. Semen Sawchuk, of the Orthodox church, was appointed Vice-President.⁴⁰ The *UNF*'s V. Kossar, and J.W. Arsenych of the *USRL* were also given executive posts.

While a medley of individuals were involved in creating the *UCC*, among them Professor Watson Kirkconnell, Professor George Simpson, and the already mentioned Professor V.J. Kaye, it was the enigmatic Englishman, Tracy Philipps, whose personal role seems to have been pivotal.⁴¹ He arrived in Canada at the beginning of the war, although his precise mandate was never made clear. Bringing with him the belief that at least half of the war would be won in the mines, factories, and shipyards of North America, where the "heavy labour" force tended to be of Slavic extraction (and most of them Ukrainians), he argued that ensuring the reliability of these workers was essential to the war effort. Since Canada,

he felt, was the "only real and proper ground" for Ukrainians settled there they would have to be (to use his analogy) "attracted to the magnet of Canada, like steel filings from the outer edge to our centre." There government policies, properly applied, would ensure that this "foreign born" population remained loyal.

While Philipps' intriguing career, before, during and after WW II cannot occupy attention here, it is important to note that his basic conviction, and what motivated him to strive for the creation of the *UCC*, was that "nearly all of the disturbing divisions in the Eastern European groups in Canada do not have their roots in the New World but in the Old."⁴² To combat this, he suggested the "Canadianization" of these immigrants. What this meant, essentially, was that ethnic groups should be coached to conform to the tenets of Canadian society. They should dispense with the boundary separating them from other citizens of the Dominion. Interestingly enough, Philipps seems to have had no doubt about some Ukrainian Canadians, like Dr. Kaye or Bohdan Panchuk. Possibly he felt that their educational attainments, or the fact of being born in Canada, were sufficient guarantees of their proper integration. Of the fruits of Philipps' labours, the most lasting was the *UCC*. Rather bluntly, he admitted this in a report filed with his government overseers:

Unification of New Canadians and elimination of their discords. In constructive diplomacy as in

bone ailments there are two main methods. The first method is the most spectacular. It often requires other operations to follow. It is rapid, drastic and aggressive. One attacks the foreign element which has entered the body politic. In the realm of diplomacy it takes the form of threat and direct action. It is a regrettable wartime technique extended to the realm of the civilian. This, in effect, is the only method which, in the time allowed, could be used to unite the half dozen discordant groups of Ukrainians in Canada. This is the least satisfactory method. In these cases the permanence of the cure depends on the period and quality of subsequent nursing. It is by this less desirable method that the Ukrainians of Canada were got united within a week of the writer's first contact with them.⁴³

Before the *UCC* had a chance to become effective, or even assess how to do so, the international political scene had dramatically changed. On June 22, 1941, Hitler's legions invaded his fellow dictator's domains. Nearly overnight, Stalin became an ally of Great Britain and the Dominions. The government of Canada, caught surprised by this reversal of alignments, was now faced with the ticklish situation of having to decide on what policy to follow towards the *UCC*, a body it had only recently created. The *UCC* was unmistakably anti-Soviet, which could no longer, at least openly, be

tolerated. Meanwhile the *ULFTA*, which had followed a pro-Soviet line, had been declared illegal. Should it now be permitted to revive? Lester B. Pearson admitted to the government's discomfiture in a letter he sent to Mr. Pickersgill, of the Department of External Affairs, on October 12, 1941. It was true, he wrote:

...Russia did not enter this war to help us but to defend herself; true also that the sudden discovery by communists in Canada that the war is not imperialistic, but holy, is somewhat nauseating, yet the fact remained that the Soviets were now "fighting on our side."⁴⁴ The *UCC* could expect no more official coddling, none of the nursing that Philipps insisted such a new birth required. While, with some sense of decency, the *UCC* was not forced to disband, this baby of the government was rather suddenly discarded as a bastard. It would never again seriously influence the government's policies.

Pro-Soviet Ukrainians and their fellow-travellers were quick to take advantage of the *UCC*'s discomfiture. They regrouped and launched their own brand of offensive against their opponents. First, they created an Association To Aid The Fatherland (whose fatherland was that, wondered Philipps). Next they set up two new, Ukrainian-language newspapers *Ukrainian Life* in Toronto (26.7.41) and *Ukrainian Word* in Winnipeg (20.1.43).⁴⁵ These press organs lost little time in publishing critical articles about the *UCC*. For example, the February 12, 1942, issue of *Ukrainian Life* carried

a sarcastic article titled *By Whom and Why Was The UCC Given Birth?*, written by an "uncle." The piece seems to have particularly amused the *DEA*'s Norman Robertson.⁴⁶

The campaign against *UCC* and its constituent organizations took on other forms. Raids were made against former *ULFTA* halls that had been taken over by the government in 1940 and subsequently sold to other Ukrainian Canadian organizations. One such attack was made against a *UNF*-owned hall at 300 Bathurst Street in Toronto.⁴⁷ The eventual return of many of these properties to their original owners, who came to be known by the name of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (*AUUC*), was yet another blow to the prestige of the *UCC*. The abuse it was subjected to even included attacks mounted by the USSR, which then (and now) closely followed events in the Ukrainian Canadian community. In its Radio Bulletin #2690 from Moscow the Soviets denounced the *UCC* as a "Quisling clique" and warned these "Fascists" to "take their dirty hands off Ukraine" and its good name.⁴⁸

Understandably, leading supporters and executive members of the *UCC* were incensed by these attacks on their organization. More stunning was the Canadian governments apparent unwillingness to block the campaign the "communists" were waging against the *UCC* with such effect.⁴⁹

Adding to their anxiety was the revival of government monitoring of their organizations by agencies like the *RCMP*. Reports prepared by this security force, which employed

informers within the population to ensure accuracy of collected data , reveal fascinating glimpses of the bitter personal and ideological rivalries that divided the *UCC's* constituent organizations and their leaders during this hiatus. Canadian officials, reviewing these files, could only have wondered why more Ukrainian Canadians did not emulate the behaviour of men like Dr. Kaye. He certainly appealed to his controllers. Not only had he changed his name, to make it easier for those around him to pronounce , but he was not interested in "parochial" Ukrainian issues. Further proof of his good sense was that he had married an Englishwoman, and was happy to farm and carry on with the quiet life of the academic and civil servant. Even more importantly, as one *RCMP* informant noted:

[Kaye] is a good Canadian who would never leave Canada for any Ukraine, however free. ⁵⁰

What could be more desirable? As another Canadian official declared, what the government most desired was that Ukrainian Canadians start thinking "Canadian" (sic!). In other words:

We want them to think in the terms of Canada and not in the lands of their birth or origin. ⁵¹

The "wisest course" for Ukrainian Canadians, another judged, was that they "forget about their European hopes and ambitions and concentrate upon taking advantage of their Canadian citizenship." ⁵² In fact, some of them were about to do just that.

Unintended Consequences - From UCSA To CURB

Through impressive support for the War Savings Certificates and four Victory Loan campaigns,⁵³ as well as their exemplary support of the Canadian armed forces during WW II, Ukrainian Canadians demonstrated their loyalty to Canada. Some 35,000 Ukrainian Canadians joined up, a refutation of allegations printed in newspapers, as for example, the March 5, and March 6, 1942 issues of the *Edmonton Bulletin*. These letters to the editor had asserted that Ukrainians in Canada were avoiding service, demonstrating hostility to "all British traditions" and should be considered unreliable. Therefore they should be carefully supervised by a special "Loyal Legion" recruited from United Empire Loyalist stock; this background presumably carrying with it the certainty of fealty to the Dominion. As for Ukrainian Canadian complaints about how badly Ukrainians in Europe were being treated, one writer asserted that most Canadians could not care less, and did not appreciate being asked to "fight, a la Mr. Hlynka, for the dear old Ukraine."⁵⁴

While Peter Lazarowich replied to these letters, denouncing their prejudice and inaccuracy as "morbid flights of the imagination" and "vile and pernicious" he did betray a lingering sense of hesitation about the status of Ukrainians in Canada. He wrote that it was understandable why some Ukrainians were hesitant about enlisting:

...no man with any self-respect will wish to risk

his life for a country in which he is being continuously treated and looked down upon as an enemy alien, in spite of everything he might do to prove his loyalty.⁵⁵

Obviously, there were still many Ukrainian Canadians who had misgivings about how they were perceived in Canadian society.

One Ukrainian Canadian who enlisted for active service and went overseas with the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) was the 24 year old Gordon Richard Bohdan Panchuk.⁵⁶ Shortly after his arrival in England he contacted the small colony of Ukrainians living in Manchester, which until the arrival of Ukrainian Canadian servicemen was virtually the only organized Ukrainian population in the United Kingdom.⁵⁷ Panchuk's pleasure at this encounter was typical of the joy other Ukrainian Canadian soldiers felt after finding an organized Ukrainian community in the U.K. In his diary on that date, he wrote:

Who would have thought that it could be so that far out in England we would find our own colony, just like a bit of home.⁵⁸

Of course, it was not home. To compensate, the Ukrainian Canadian soldiers created UCSA, shortly after a group of them had partaken in a convivial "First Get-Together" in Manchester, on January 7, 1943. UCSA's rapid growth thereafter is a fitting testimony to the need these troops had for a place of their own, both within the

Canadian armed forces and in the U.K.

Such an organization required a staff and quarters. Accordingly, rented accommodations were found at 218 Sussex Gardens, (Paddington), London and an Executive, of which Panchuk became the first President, was elected. In what came to be popularly known as "The London Club" UCSA flourished and a war-time camaraderie smothered much of the friction which might otherwise have been transplanted from Canada. At first Ukrainian Canadians of different religious, political, and regional backgrounds intermingled with little friction in this Club. As one UCSA member wrote: "it was a very unusual set-up."⁵⁹

The unforeseen emergence of UCSA in London provided the UCC with a *raison d'etre*. It now bent its efforts towards supporting the UCSA in London, widely publicizing this fact as additional proof of its loyalty to the Allied war effort. Undeniably, without the UCC's active support, the London Club would not have prospered as it did. The extent to which the UCC regarded itself as the sponsor of the UCSA and its London Club is evident in the published proceedings of the first All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainian Canadians Congress, held between June 22 and 24, 1943 in Winnipeg.⁶⁰ At this meeting few issues other than support of UCSA were discussed.

UCSA's spirit of voluntary co-operation persisted until nearly the war's end.⁶¹ While its history remains to be written, neither this task nor a delineation of the

activities of its successor, the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Association (UCVA) is possible here. It is important to note however, that almost the same personnel who maintained UCSA later dedicated their energies to CURB. UCSA, in effect, bequeathed a founding impetus and material wealth to CURB as it was concluding its London-based activities.

Ukrainian Canadian Refugee Relief Operations

Shortly after Hitler's **Fortress Europe** was pierced at the Normandy beaches, Panchuk was transferred to the continent. Soon he began encountering "thousands and thousands of Ukrainian slave labourers" whom, he noted in his diary, were "making their way westwards."⁶² The presence of Ukrainians in distress did not surprise Panchuk. Ukrainians, he wrote, were always "the scapegoats" and who were now being "kicked around like a football."⁶³ Tellingly, he also recorded that it was his personal view that Ukrainians as an ethnic group were "always" being discriminated against. Was this a conscious admission of what he thought about the status of Ukrainian Canadians?

Panchuk posed himself another question. Could Ukrainian Canadians do anything to relieve the plight of these refugees? Obviously the *DPS* themselves were barely capable of doing anything to ameliorate their situation. They did not, he wrote, "know what to do, what their rights are, and where and who to turn to."⁶⁴ Perhaps it was up to the

Ukrainian Canadians to guide them to safety.

Other Ukrainian Canadian soldiers were also encountering *DPS*. They attempted to help by providing emergency relief supplies of food and clothing, and intervening locally with military authorities in order to assist the Ukrainian *DPS* however possible.⁶⁵ These initial efforts were, however, piecemeal and insufficient. The issues facing Ukrainian *DPS* were intricate and the scale of the problem so great that only a sustained, well sponsored effort could relieve their plight. Having no other organization to turn to - and not being aware of the machinations behind the *UCC*'s formation Panchuk sought the *UCC*'s aid and advice. His first letter was only the beginning of what was to become a voluminous correspondence, spanning nearly 10 years. Its survival, as noted in Chapter Three, makes a reconstruction and analysis of the Ukrainian post-WW II refugee experience possible.

In one of the first reports Panchuk sent to the *UCC*, he suggested that there were nearly 4.5 million refugees in Western Europe. "Most" of them, he claimed, were Ukrainians.⁶⁶ This population he categorized as follows,

Old Refugees.....	100,000
Refugees (mostly slave labourers forcibly evacuated into Germany).....	1,650,000
Forcibly evacuated	(1943-1945)
.....	2,500,000
Political Refugees (who sought refuge)....	250,000

The scale of the Ukrainian refugee problem being what it was, Panchuk urged the *UCC* to "get cracking."

Initiating the type of relief work required for coping, even in part, with the Ukrainian *DP* problem was no simple matter. The *UCC* realized this even if Panchuk and his comrades did not. Considerable aversion to the immigration of Ukrainian *DPS* into Canada was already manifesting itself. For example, the *Edmonton Journal* of February 12, 1945 ran an article entitled "Admission of Ukrainian Quislings to Canada." In it Ukrainian Canadian organizations were criticized for trying to pressure the government to admit Ukrainian refugees. This article asserted that:

The admission of these *Nazi* zealots to Canada would be nothing less than a national disaster. They could not more be expected to be loyal citizens of this country than they were of their own.⁶⁷

Panchuk also faced criticism from an unexpected quarter. The *UCSA*'s National Executive, meeting in London on February 18, 1945 sent him a letter insinuating that his work on behalf of refugees was "of a nature contrary to *UCSA* policy." His continuing contacts with what were euphemistically called "civilian personnel on the continent" they claimed bordered on the precarious insofar as "International Politics" was concerned. Before he brought *UCSA* into disrepute Panchuk was urged to desist from doing more for the *DPS*.

Rather than accept this reprimand Panchuk tendered his resignation. Since there was no one to replace him the offer was refused. Still many *UCSA* Executive members remained fearful of the repercussions Ukrainians might face over their involvement with the *DPS*. As Peter Worobetz wrote to Panchuk:

After all, Gordon, you realize that we are being watched by people, not all of whom are sympathetic to our general viewpoint.⁶⁸

Of course, not all Ukrainian Canadians shared this foreboding. The Rev. Michael Horoshko, Greek Catholic chaplain of *UCSA*, used the platform afforded him during a *UCSA* "Padre's Hour" to instruct returning service personnel about their duties in Canada. They were urged to "stick together" in order to resist the racist and assimilationist pressures still facing Ukrainians in Canada. Ukrainian Canadian veterans would also have to work hard to reinforce their ethnic group's "distinctiveness" - just as English, Irish and Scottish Canadians did. Furthermore, it was their duty to see to it that the Ukrainian Question received more attention than it was getting back in Canada. Their sacrifices during the war had earned them the right to expect no less. The Reverend went on to point out that the veterans had to combat those who made disparaging remarks about the Ukrainian refugees and went so far as to forbid them to identify themselves as Ukrainians. "The powers that be," Horoshko argued, would have to be challenged.⁶⁹

Ukrainian Canadian servicemen in Canada were mobilized to do just that. As *UCVA* was slowly set up in Canada, *UCSA* disbanded in London. *CURB* operations were initiated simultaneously (beginning around mid-September, 1945), imparting to the archival record a certain element of uncertainty about when one organization ceased to exist and the other began.

CURB's purposes were defined as follows:

1. To consolidate relief activities of the Ukrainian relief committees and institutions.
2. To act on behalf of these for the material and moral support of all Ukrainian refugees and *DPS*.
3. To co-operate with *UNRRA*.
4. To help reunite families.
5. To inform all interested and give advice.⁷⁰

Just as *UCSA* before it (although not *UCVA*) *CURB*'s official sponsor was the *UCC*, through its affiliated organization, the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (*UCRF*).⁷¹ By the second *UCC* National Congress, held in Toronto between June 4 and 6, 1946, little else was discussed other than how Ukrainian Canadians might help the *DPS*. It was quickly resolved that the *UCC* should continue to exist, even though the war was over. Ukrainian Canadian involvement overseas thus again gave to the *UCC* a *raison d'etre*.⁷² This was something neither the *UCC*'s progenitors, nor its executors, had foreseen.

Despite the expectations of the Ukrainian Canadian veterans, and the *UCC*, official reaction to the creation of

the *UCRF* was guarded and lukewarm. When the proposal was originally made, its merits were vigorously debated within the *DEA*.⁷³ While Canadian officials claimed that they were "absolutely certain of the loyalty of the *UCC* to Canada" they also felt that a functioning *UCRF* might well "prove to be a source of considerable embarrassment to the Canadian government."⁷⁴ It was best, the *DEA*'s Norman Robertson advised, that "the *UCC* be persuaded to abandon this project." Mr. Dana Wilgress, of the Canadian Embassy in Moscow, concurred. He noted that the Soviets had, by late 1944, already begun taking punitive measures against Ukrainian nationalist partisans inside what he termed "liberated Poland" (sic). Some 20,000 Ukrainian insurgents had "been shot" and he was sure this was only a temporary measure; the USSR was just biding its time before stamping out Ukrainian resistance more completely. Any official Canadian sanction for the *UCRF* was therefore to be avoided, likely as it was to be misconstrued as government sympathy and relief for "enemy agents."⁷⁵

To its credit, the *UCC* persisted in lobbying the government for permission to establish its fund. Finally, in January of 1945, General L.R. LaFleche, Director of the Department of National War Services, allowed the *UCRF* to be formed.

Even so, the official constraints on its operations were considerable. First, it was not allowed to employ the word "refugee" in its title. Accordingly, the body created

was known as the Ukrainian Canadian *Relief* Fund. Secondly, the total amount the *UCRF* could gather was limited. All such funds were also to be handled through a chartered Canadian bank account. The gathered monies would also be administered by the Canadian Red Cross. Finally, any Ukrainian could apply for and receive support from the *UCRF*'s coffers. Theoretically, so reasoned the *DEA*'s bureaucrats, even Soviet Ukrainians could be succoured by funds collected by the *UCC* in Canada.

Despite these handicaps, the *UCRF* began an extensive fund-raising campaign. This met with considerable success. By January 1, 1946, a total of \$75,000 had been collected, the ceiling first imposed by the Canadian government. Yet funds kept coming in, unsurprisingly given that the *UCRF* had mailed out 40,000 letters of appeal. Soon over \$106,000 had been gathered. Keeping to its agreement, *UCRF* transferred \$75,000 to the Canadian Red Cross on December 22, 1945.⁷⁶ Subsequently, its President, the Rev. W. Kushnir, who was also the head of the *UCC*, left for London, (Plate 4.1). His mission was to personally inspect *CURB* operations in London, and then travel onto the continent, to visit *DP* camps housing Ukrainians. This would be the first tour of these centres by a Ukrainian Canadian civilian.

Regardless of its obvious popular appeal and success, the operations of the *UCRF* continued to worry the *DEA*. As late as mid-May of 1945 one official proposed that the *UCRF* be shut down, its use of accumulated funds be "blocked" and



Plate 4.1 Joe Romanow and Reverend Wasyl Kushnir,
President of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee,
in London, England, 1945.

its mandate revoked.''

An even more striking glimpse of the official perception of Ukrainian Canadians just after the war can be found in a transcript kept of discussions held between Stanley Knowles, M.P., and the Foreign Commissar of Ukraine, Mr. M. Manuilsky, at an evening session of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. Knowles answered Soviet complaints about the anti-Soviet pronouncements of Ukrainians in Canada not by defending his fellow citizens' freedom of speech, but by agreeing with the Soviets. He indicated that he too deplored the "divisions among our Ukrainian people in Canada and anti-Soviet utterances." He went on to add that this was not just his personal feeling but that "in this instance" he also spoke about the view "of the Government." He then cautioned his "good friend" Manuilsky about the counter-productivity of making such complaints public:

I do hope this discussion between us will not get back there,[to Canada] because if it does it will just make the people saying the things my honourable friend deplores feel they are heroes and carry on with it. But I can assure him, not only the Government, but all **responsible**,[emphasis added] parties in Canada, do deplore very much the things to which he referred to tonight.''

Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian Ambassador to the USA, wrote that he felt Knowles had, "handled the situation

admirably" and what was even better, in a manner which had "greatly amused" the Soviet delegates.⁷⁹ No doubt it had, for if the Canadian government was willing to be so oblivious to the legitimate protests of certain citizens, the Soviets had no reason to believe their ongoing repatriation efforts would be blocked.

By March 15, 1946 Panchuk, realizing that the refugee problem required years and not just months to solve decided that he had done his "fair amount" and should return to Canada. Although he could not think of anyone capable of replacing him, by mid-May of that year he was back in Saskatoon. His parting promise to his fellow *CURB* workers was that, once he got back to Canada, he would do everything in his power to ensure that they received more support from the *UCC* and *UCRF*.

Into the now vacant position of Director of *CURB* there stepped Stanley W. Frolick.⁸⁰ Another Canadian-born Ukrainian, he had the rather unique experience of having lived and studied in Western Ukraine between 1932 and 1941. Upon returning to Canada he became active in the youth association of the *UNF*, the only nationalistic Ukrainian Canadian organization active at that time. At war's end he went overseas to begin working for the Control Commission for Germany (*CCG*). However his "keen interest" in *CURB* caught Panchuk's attention, which disposed him to ask Frolick to join *CURB* as its General Secretary, (Plate 4.2).



Plate 4.2 Members of the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemens' Association (UCSA), and the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB), in London, England, 1945.

From left to right: G.R.B. Panchuk, Peter Smylski, Joseph Romanow, George Kluchevsky, S.W. Frolick.

During his tenure in that post, and as Director of *CURB* (May, 1946 to October, 1947) Frolick seems to have played a positive role. *CURB* sponsored protests against forcible repatriation did have some influence on Allied policies, as was noted in the files of both the British and Canadian governments.⁸¹ One startling, if unforeseen, effect of *CURB* and *UCC* protests to the Canadian government was that when *DEA* officials searched their records for material on the Yalta Agreement they made a surprising discovery. The gist of it is apparent in a letter, stamped **Secret** and addressed to the Prime Minister from H.H. Wrong, the High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom:

In your letter of March 18th regarding the repatriation of Soviet nationals it was stated that it was your understanding that an agreement on this matter had been signed at Yalta specifically on behalf of Canada and other Commonwealth Governments. We have made a careful review of the documents on the Yalta Conference and have found no suggestion that this agreement on repatriation of Soviet nationals was signed specifically on behalf of Canada or other Commonwealth Governments. I would be grateful to learn whether you have any further information on this point.⁸²

The facts of the matter were not clarified until a few months had passed. Mr. G. Riddell, Canadian Consul General in New York, received a letter marked **Personal and Secret**:

You will remember that Mr. Eden signed this Agreement at Yalta "on behalf of the Government of Canada" and that our Division was blissfully unaware that Canada was a signatory to this Agreement until a few months ago.⁸³

Despite Frolick's good efforts, there were those in Canada and in London who were distinctly uncomfortable about what he was doing inside *CURB*. He had, these detractors argued, become closely associated with the preparation and distribution of *Ukrainian Information Service (UIS)* materials. These, it was suggested, were "political" tracts which could provoke a negative reaction on the part of the Western governments, given their markedly anti-Soviet tone. Others disagreed with the provenance of the *UIS* reports, feeling that these were biased in favour of the *OUNr*. Obviously, members of the *UNF* were particularly incensed by this. Then there were simply those who refused to accept that the *Banderivtsi* represented the major political movement within the emigration. While Frolick, by June, 1946 had been forced to yield to these sporadic, but often intense, attacks on the *UIS*, and discontinue its publication, his insistence on its relevance had undeniably weakened his position. Ironically, Panchuk, Rev. Kushnir and Dr. Gallan had all once agreed on the need for a *UIS*, a fact that was rather conveniently forgotten later.

Other reports about Frolick's political attitudes and activities were filtering back to Canada. Detailing the

complex machinations which lead up to his removal has no place here. What is clear is that, as early as mid-1946, there were those in the *UCC* who suspected his motives for working in *CURB* and were plotting to remove him from that post.

The final blows rained down throughout September, October and November of 1946. A letter from the *UCC*'s Secretary, Mr. A. Zaharychuk, initiated the attack.⁸⁴ *CURB*'s financial statements, it was stated, were "not clear" to those in Winnipeg. The letter added that Frolick should expect the arrival of Mr. and Mrs. Panchuk, Anthony J. Yaremovich and Ann Crapleve, in about a month's time.⁸⁵ Their precise roles were not specified. Indeed, the letter seemed to suggest that they would all be moving directly onto the continent. Frolick was given no reason to be apprehensive. As for the complaints about *CURB*'s finances, he also felt no reason for concern. Matters of accounting were strictly under the supervision of *CURB*'s Treasurer, George Kluchevsky and not a function of the Director.⁸⁶

The group that arrived in London in mid-October, 1946 was formally constituted as the Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Victims of War (*CRM*) - although its shoulder flashes read **Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Refugees**.⁸⁷ Yet it did not move directly onto the continent. Instead Panchuk began what amounted to a formal investigation of *CURB*'s activities during the period Frolick had been Director. The process was a lively one, marked by a

heated exchange of telegrams and letters between Winnipeg and London, as the *CRM* strove to assume control over *CURB* and Frolick resisted. Eventually, and predictably, Frolick was forced to concede. Unceremoniously ordered (by Rev. Kushnir) to "conform to Panchuk's orders," he chose instead to resign.⁸⁸ By October 19, Panchuk had cabled the *UCC* that "Everything settled satisfactorily."⁸⁹

No available archival or oral evidence confirms, or refutes, the suggestion that Panchuk was told **before** he left for London to there make his first priority the removal of Frolick. However, soon after his arrival that is what happened. Those in Winnipeg who had wanted to rid themselves of Frolick were not displeased. One of them wrote that Frolick had "too tightly co-operated with one political section amongst the Ukrainian refugees on the continent" grounds enough for dismissal.⁹⁰

Panchuk went on to further substantiate this allegation by amassing concrete evidence against Frolick. In this he was aided by Dmytro Andrievsky, a high-ranking supporter of the *Melnykivtsi*, (Plate 4.3). In a **Confidential** letter sent to the *UCC* on October 20, 1946, he mentioned that the day before he mailed three memoranda, printed in the *CURB* building, whose contents he deemed "suspect." In this letter he enclosed letterhead paper which he had found in Frolick's desk, bearing the title *General Secretary, Foreign Affairs, Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council*. Panchuk claimed that mail had been sent from the *CURB* address (218 Sussex



Plate 4.3 Dmytro Andrievsky, Danylo Skoropadsky, and
G.R.B. Panchuk, London, England, 1945.

Gardens, London) on this same stationery, a situation that was fraught with risks for the Ukrainian Canadians if the authorities should suspect that refugee relief operations were somehow being used as a "front" for political activities. Obviously, concluded Panchuk, even though he had only been in the U.K. for one week:

...there are reasons for believing that there's a lot of conspiratorial activity here, about which we know nothing and probably won't find out.'¹

The UCC replied to these reports by noting that it had long been aware of Frolick's connections "in some way" with the *Banderivtsi* but was grateful for the fruits of Panchuk's detective work, since they now had definite proof of the allegations. Dr. T. Datskiw added that the material that Panchuk sent along was all the evidence needed to replace Frolick since the two positions (being CURB's Director and a representative of the UHVR) were "mutually exclusive."²

At the 3rd Conference of CURB's workers and various representatives of Ukrainian relief committees on the continent, (Paris, October 30 to November 3, 1946) Frolick attempted to defend his record, and particularly to prove that he had been appointed Director of CURB by the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee's Executive Director, Dr. Walter Gallan.³ Although the truth of this was not denied, and other representatives present affirmed the fact, Frolick was effectively denied the floor.⁴ So rejected, he left Paris to (illegally) meet with OUNr members in Munich. Upon

his return to London, Panchuk presented him with his notice of dismissal. Left with no recourse, Frolick left England to return to Canada. He was never subsequently allowed to present his case to the *UCC*, despite Rev. Kushnir's assurances that he would be given such an opportunity. The *UNF* listened but firmly rebuked him for supporting the *DUNr* position. By 1946, this organization had begun to follow the political line set out by the *Melnykivtsi* so there was no chance of Frolick finding a sympathetic audience there. His commitment to the *UHVR* and *DUNr* had made him a pariah in the eyes of many Ukrainian Canadians.

As if these impediments were not severe enough, his position was being further undercut from abroad by what Panchuk wrote. For example, Panchuk wrote in a letter to Dr. Kaye, (28.11.46):

As you will soon learn Frolick is on his way to Canada...It is rather a long and unfortunate story and I do not want to talk about it any more than I absolutely have to.

Briefly, ever since Frolick came Overseas last fall we have never been too comfortable about his activities. Over and above his very personal feelings [failings?], of which many could be listed, he made the mistake of always mixing politics into everything he said or did. Bad as that was for our services club and even worse for Relief Bureau such actions take on an even more

detrimentally clear (sic) because his politics were very narrowly restricted to one party, namely *Banderivtsi* (*OUN*). This we knew long ago although we kept it to ourselves hoping that in case of necessity he would be sincere and broadminded enough to take a more impartial attitude to his work. Unfortunately we were lead astray in our beliefs. In spite of many warnings and the sincere advice that I tried to give him before I left for Canada this Spring, no sooner had I left when he offered himself to a political (narrow party politics) to the limit, using all the facilities of the relief bureau for his purpose...I will send you some material and information, copies...of which already forwarded to the Committee in Winnipeg. The thing has reached such a state that it scares us to think what might have happened if we had not come when we did. Not only was he sending out political propaganda... but we have definite proof now that at the same time, when he was holding the position in the Bureau...he also accepted the position of representative of the general secretary for foreign affairs in the United Kingdom of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (*UHVR*) in the name of Sviatoslav Bojarsky...I know for a fact that reprecautions (sic) will still come to us and I know that he managed to alienate many good friends

in England by such work.

The details of all are available in Winnipeg but I only thought I would write you this in confidence because I understand (from second-hand sources) that you were prepared to obtain a position for him in government circles, something in the field of immigration or perhaps at least prepared to recommend him...Although I would like to see him settle and get a good job, I am only afraid that there is a possibility that if he gets anything at all that will take him Overseas, our Ukrainian cause or such may suffer much more than it already has...(TP knows a little).

Incidentally, this same sort of thing has cropped up in every relief committee on the Continent and for that reason we must take a firm stand on where relief ends and where politics begin...All this is submitted so that you do not back a horse which may be running a losing race.'⁵

Less capable and determined men might have given up in the face of such obstructions. As will become clear in a succeeding chapter, Frolick was not so easily thwarted.

Ukrainian Canadians Describe The *DPS*

Before Panchuk returned to Europe with the *CRM*, he and other former *UCSA* members had begun lobbying the Canadian government about its immigration policies, hoping to relax

these enough to permit an inflow of Ukrainian *DPS* into this country.

One of the first major public demonstrations to that end was a rally held on March 31, 1946 at Massey Hall in Toronto. Attending were some 1,200 people, including Premier George Drew and Professor Watson Kirkconnell. According to the *Toronto Evening Telegram* it was the speech of Captain Michael Lucyk which electrified the crowd. Recently returned from overseas, he was able to provide a first-hand account about the *DPS*, describe the conditions they were living in, and characterize this population. The description he gave was typical of the way in which Ukrainian Canadians (at first) described the *DPS*.

He started out by cataloguing the types of sufferings the Ukrainian refugees had undergone. Then he spoke about why they did now wish to return to the USSR. It was emphasized that it was their social and religious beliefs which put them at risk under a communist regime. Yet, it was claimed, these were traits admired by most Canadian, believers as they supposedly were in the concepts of political democracy and freedom of conscience. It was because of their belief in this democratic way of life, so familiar to Canadians, that these Ukrainians were now homeless, destitute and in need of assistance. Many Canadian citizens were already helping ameliorate the refugees' plight, by contributing to relief funds. Could nothing more be done, however? After all, the military authorities

charged with overseeing the *DP* camps readily admitted that the Ukrainian refugees "were the finest of all the *DPS*." Lucyk argued this was an excellent, or at least sufficient reason for allowing such refugees into Canada.

Premier Drew did not address the question of *DP* immigration, likely disappointing those who had hoped for some policy statement on this subject. Instead he spoke to another question which had excited chronic concern among Ukrainians in Canada, namely the subject of their loyalty to the Dominion. Drew started off by noting that his very presence at this rally should be understood as a "formal gesture" from a government grateful to the Ukrainian Canadians for their war efforts. They had now proven that they had become "loyal citizens of Canada," and "true Canadians." Reassuring as these phrases and words may have been, they could only have discouraged those who had been hoping that Drew would announce a sympathetic immigration policy.' "

The Ukrainian Canadians did not give up lobbying. The premier occasion for them was when a *UCC* group was invited to make a submission before the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, in Ottawa on May 29, 1946.' " Accompanied by the Revs. Kushnir and Sawchuk, Anthony Hlynka, M.P., and John R. Solomon, M.L.A., Panchuk presented a brief in favour of Ukrainian *DP* immigration. Extolling the many virtues of these potential immigrants he did everything possible to negate the contrary description

provided by *ULFTA* supporters, who were also present. These men labelled the *DPS* as "fascists" "war criminals," and members of a "Ukrainian Rebellion Army" (sic!). Canada, they argued, had no more room for settlers and, even if it had, most *DPS* were unqualified by background, temperament or experience to be farmers.

The *UCC* delegation retorted forcefully, if the transcript kept of this meeting is accurate. They described the political background to this involuntary population migration, and reaffirmed their statements about the qualities of the Ukrainian *DPS* which they felt would enrich Canada by adding people who were hardworking, Christian, liberal-minded, and democratic.

While the fact remains that, on the very same day that these representations were being heard in one corner of Ottawa, the Honourable James Glen, Minister of Mines and Resources, was announcing a relaxed immigration policy in another, the *UCC* supporters proclaimed that this meeting was a great triumph for their committee. What is little known is that they had a decided advantage over their antagonists having engaged in pre-meeting lobbying.'*

Regardless of how it was done, the announcement of a more favourable immigration policy was a definite propaganda triumph for the *UCC*. It could now claim credit for beating the "communists" before a formal tribunal of the Canadian government. As well, the Committee now appeared as a champion of the rights of the refugees, many of whom had

relatives in Canada. Its appeals, based on the principles of democracy seem even to have mollified a few officials. As Dr. Kaye wrote to his wife about the Senate meeting

In *RCAF* uniform [Panchuk] described what he had seen in Europe and Senators had tears in their eyes. He was the hero of the day.''

Between late 1945 and 1947, the Ukrainian Canadians who were actively petitioning the Canadian government for a favourable immigration policy developed what can almost be described as a "standard portrayal" of who the Ukrainian *DPS* were, and particularly about the traits which characterized them. This list of attributes was circulated widely. For example, just before Panchuk left for London in October of 1946, he sent it to the Diplomatic Division (sic) of the *DEA*. The Ukrainian *DPS* were,

1. All Western minded.
2. They have experienced the Eastern System.
3. They are the fittest Survivors (morally and psychologically).
4. They crave education.
5. Many Graduated and Qualified Professionals.
6. Deeply Religious.
7. Most Resourceful, Systematic, Organized.
8. Highly Industrious.
9. No Ukrainian Quislings or German Collaborators.'''

No official representative of the Canadian government

challenged this description of the *DPS*, at least publicly.

The Ukrainian Canadians tried to give urgency to their lobbying efforts by arguing that other potential countries of resettlement were already "creaming off" the most desirable immigrants; this was doubly unfortunate since it often meant that *DPS* with relatives in Canada were migrating to other countries, breaking up family units in the process. Their final point was that there were a great many "Statesmen" among the *DP* population. Their addition to the Canadian system would enhance this country's ability to resist communist penetration

Soon after the *CRM* returned to the continent, however, its members began to reconsider their earlier attitudes about the *DPS*. By December 21, 1946 Panchuk had almost entirely changed his mind about what impact the *DPS* would have on Ukrainian Canadian society. A letter he wrote makes this clear:

As far as our own people on the continent are concerned, things are not what they were when the war ended or when I was there before. They are certainly not what Dr. Kushnir saw and remembers. For one reason or another there has been a noticeable **DETERIORATION** in type and character. The camps are now full of ' politicians ' who are forever playing politics and games of God knows what instead of getting down to earth and realizing their true position, **THAT THEY ARE DISPLACED**

PERSONS AND NOT WANTED BY ANY COUNTRY EXCEPT PERHAPS THE USSR. Instead of rolling up their sleeves and getting down to work, and learning something and making something of themselves, they find politics, black marketeering, and even banditry, looting, stealing, beating up those they don't like, etc.etc.etc. more 'entertaining.' This should never be spoken of or quoted publicly. We must defend the PRINCIPLE OF THE REFUGEES AND DPs...AND VICTIMS OF WAR but, in actual fact, God forbid and protect us if some of these parasitic bandits ever get into Canada.'''

In actual fact, what Panchuk described late in 1946 was a phenomenon that he, the Rev. Kushnir and a few others had begun to appreciate as early as late in 1945, although they preferred to ignore these signs for fear of the repercussions on Ukrainian Canadian public opinion, and, more importantly, on their chances of influencing Canadian immigration policies. By late 1946 their option to avoid the obvious had disappeared, since in most DP camps political activities were unmistakably evident. Certainly the officials charged with supervising the DPs were well aware of the political sentiments of their charges. Panchuk, and his fellow CRM members, were to be lectured on several occasions about the "detrimental" effects this open manifestation of nationalist attitudes was having on Allied policies towards the DPs. Even those Ukrainians who only visited London or

the continent for brief periods (e.g. Rev. Kushnir and Anthony Hlynka) were not spared such upbraidings. For example, Sir George Rendell spoke to Panchuk in this vein on December 13, while later Sir Herbert Emerson enunciated similar "fatherly advice." "Talk of politics," insisted the British, had to be dampened, a task they largely entrusted to the CRM, for anti-Soviet manifestations within the DP camps were "most embarrassing."¹⁰²

Faced with this chore, Panchuk and his co-workers redoubled their efforts to start moving Ukrainian DPs out of the camps and into any countries of resettlement willing to accept them (e.g. Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil). For them the task seemed "immeasurable" and one that "never gets smaller" yet they worked hard to locate and exploit any routes out of the refugee camps that might open up.

At this point the Ukrainian Canadians ran into a fundamental difficulty with the DPs. Few of the latter were, as yet, willing to leave Western Europe and disperse to the countries of North and South America or Australasia. In their view, Western Europe was geographically "close" to Ukraine, or at least near enough to enable a prompt return should some opportunity arise for so doing. Many firmly hoped that hostilities would soon erupt between East and West, and during such a conflagration, they would be able to resume their interrupted struggle for an independent Ukraine.

The authorities, for their part, saw no prospect for such a development. Indeed they were doing everything possible to avoid war with the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances the presence of so many militantly anti-communist refugees, clustered in camps close to the borders of Iron Curtain countries, was a serious irritant to stable relations with the Soviets. The latter, for their part, maintained a steady stream of complaints about the refugees. The only solution, in the view of Western decision-makers was to move the *DPS* out of Europe.

How could the Ukrainian Canadians convince the *DPS* to abandon their hope of being able to return to Ukraine and instead opt for resettlement elsewhere? This became the essential question facing the *CRM*. They were all the more pressured because, now, they began to appreciate that the longer Ukrainians remained in the camps, the more completely they would be transformed into what Panchuk came to call "dangerous political animals."

There was also the question of how these *DPS* would act in Canada once they had relocated there. Panchuk voiced fears on this score in a letter he sent to a former *UCSA* compatriot:

...with the 'danger' (it won't be much of an asset) of the new immigrants coming, UNLESS WE ALL FIND A COMMON AND SOLID FOUNDATION, our goose in Canada is cooked. And if our goose is cooked in Canada, it's the end for our people wherever they may be,

because to date and at the present time Canada is the only country that can produce and that possesses SOME QUALITY [of Ukrainians]. Maybe they [the UCC] will 'cold shoulder' our efforts in Winnipeg...they are not harming us (we have nothing to loose), but they are cutting their own throats.¹⁰³

The more visits they paid to DP camps, the more discouraged the CRM's members became about the charged political atmosphere they found in such places. Whom could they blame? Perhaps, they reasoned, if they could place the responsibility for the politicization of the DP camps' inhabitants on some particular cause, then they would still be able to convince immigration officials that the majority of the refugees still remained suitable candidates for entry. To accomplish this the Ukrainian Canadians needed to prove that the political activities and disturbances evident within the DP camps were not the fault of the majority of the DPs.

At first Panchuk, when visiting the *Lysenko* DP camp near Hannover (British Zone of Occupation in Germany) insisted that internal troubles in this camp could be traced to the work of "obviously 'planted' elements, 'implaced there by a 'foreign power.'"¹⁰⁴ He noted that between 75% and 90% of the discord found there was deliberately inspired by the USSR. The purpose of this Soviet effort was to upset the Western Allies with the DPs, leaving them unsympathetic to

the *DPS* and more inclined to repatriate these troublesome people back to the USSR.

Panchuk, at first, was quite unwilling to believe that Ukrainians, left undisturbed, would allow such a "scandalous" state of affairs. His "own people," he wrote to Anthony Yaremovich, would naturally have pulled together, if they had only been allowed to live in "strictly Ukrainian environment." The shocking divisiveness rampant in many *DP* camps was the work of foreigners, out to besmirch the reputation of Ukrainians.

Later, Panchuk changed his mind, deciding that it was actually one political group, specifically the *Banderivtsi*, who were to blame for the troubles found in Ukrainian-populated *DP* camps. He was honest enough to admit that the general population was flocking to the *OUNr*, yet he was unwilling to attribute this to a genuine support for the political ideology of this movement. Instead he suggested that many *DPS* were attracted to the *OUNr* only because it was craftily manipulating the *UPA*'s reputation for its own ends. Although he had no concrete proof, Panchuk asserted that the *UPA* was a national liberation movement, and not the tool of any particular political faction. Accordingly, he found the support the *OUNr* enjoyed, particularly among youth in the *DP* camps, alarming.¹⁰⁵ Given his desire to see the *DPS* emigrate, he therefore had little choice but to oppose the *OUNr* since it was this same movement which was most steadfastly opposed to a dispersal of the refugees, and

critical of Ukrainian Canadian attitudes. Panchuk's recognition of this is evident in a letter he sent to his long-time confederate, Tracy Philipps. In it he referred to the *Banderivtsi* as follows:

...there may be some first class, Soviet agents and provocateurs, [among them] but in all such things it is very difficult to tell. My own personal feelings are that the whole action [against resettlement] is stupid and not serious and does not bring anybody good, but there is no way you can prevent young children from playing soldier.

Our attitude to the whole thing is negatively (sic) because we have our own firm opinion on "political methods" which according to their way of thinking are of course too "Canadianized" and "Pro-British." Some even go so far as to "accuse" us of endeavouring to make Ukraine a British Colony (which, actually in my humble opinion might be a good idea). Actually...I think it is all a silly game in which I personally have no first hand interest or concern, believing tha here and now is neither the place nor the time for such narrow party politics and being interested only and solely in the relief and social welfare of the unfortunate War Victims who have suffered most as a result of this war.' 0 6

By the end of 1947, however, Panchuk had had just about enough of the Ukrainian *DPS*. He had steadily become much more interested in the problems connected with the resettlement of "civilianized" former Surrendered Enemy Personnel (*SEP*) and recent *POWs* of the Ukrainian Division "Galicia" in the United Kingdom.

For this, and other reasons, he left *CURB* by late 1947 thereafter becoming the 2nd President of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (*AUGB*).¹⁰⁷ He maintained this post until he was deposed, at a general convention of the *AUGB* that took place in London on March 12-13, 1949.¹⁰⁸ After that his anger at the *Banderivtsi* and their new allies, the *Hetmantsi*, knew no bounds. From then on he would do everything possible to limit their influence, both in Great Britain and, after 1951, back in Canada. His conviction became that the main reason he had been rejected by the nationalists was that he was perceived by them to be a "Britanophil" and possibly "an agent for the British and American authorities" or a "member of the British Intelligence Service" - accusations he labelled "pitifull."¹⁰⁹

While such allegations were probably incorrect, it was indicative of *DP* sentiments that they found Panchuk (and most of the other Ukrainian Canadians) remote, especially because of their professed allegiance to British (or Canadian) norms. For the *DPS*, these were alien standards, largely inapplicable to the situation in which they found

themselves, and certainly at variance with the tenets of the Ukrainian nationalists among them, [Appendix Three - Document #4]. Indeed the partial assimilation of Ukrainians in Canada had so altered the latter's value system that they were left with a different sense of "ethnic belonging" than that characterizing the *DPS*. Having no experience of Canadian conditions, the *DPS* found Ukrainian Canadian professions of loyalty to Canadian standards queer, while Ukrainian Canadians reciprocated in kind, failing to appreciate the nature of the *DP* experience and its consequences on the population involved.

It could be argued that Panchuk was only one individual, that his encounter with the *DPS* was somehow atypical. It is therefore worthwhile briefly comparing his experience with that of the other *CRM* members.

A Shared Ukrainian Canadian Viewpoint

Effective upon Panchuk's resignation as Director of *CURB*, Anthony J. Yaremovich assumed this vacated post. Shortly after he returned to relief work on the continent. There he also reported finding "very intense" political activity in the *DP* camps, and "considerable friction." His dismay increased when he discovered that the *DPS* were not anxious to emigrate. As he recorded it the *DPS* leaders within the camps (regardless of their political stripe) were using as:

...a slogan that the only resettlement scheme upon

which the *DPS* may depend is when it becomes possible to return home [Ukraine].¹¹⁰

This expectation was, he observed, keeping the *DPS* "in a state of suspense."

Not only were the *DPS* being troublesome in this respect but Yaremovich was now also finding himself burdened with the difficult task of explaining to the Allied authorities why many refugees seemed reluctant to resettle. Obviously, opined Yaremovich, this *DP* resistance to relocation had to be broken down. The only cure he could think of was that Ukrainian Canadians establish a "sound Press and recognized Ethnic organizations."¹¹¹ Until this was done the *DP* press would continue to feed refugees' hopes about a Third World War, which placed a "terrific nervous strain" upon the population, which was having a deleterious effect upon them.¹¹²

After a little less than a year, Yaremovich returned to Canada, leaving the continued operation of Ukrainian Canadian relief and resettlement efforts in the capable hands of Ann Crapleve. She retained this office until mid-March of 1949, when Mr. and Mrs. Eustace Wasylyshen arrived from Winnipeg, he to take over as Director of the *UCRF*'s work on the continent. Crapleve remained to assist. Later, in mid-1950, when the Wasylyshens were withdrawn, Crapleve was again left alone as Director. She continued with this work until late 1951, when all Ukrainian Canadian efforts on behalf of the *DPS* finally drew to a close.

While overseas, Crapleve's attitudes shifted along the same continuum as had those of the others. Never interested in the intricacies of Ukrainian politics, she had started off with an enthusiasm for her tasks typical of all *CURB*'s workers. Later, she developed a more realistic assessment, which did not overlook those refugee traits which were decidedly unpalatable to the average Ukrainian Canadian. Still, her observations had their intrinsic originality, possibly because of all those involved, she was the least inclined to support one political faction against another.¹¹³ She was also the only *CRM* member to point out that Ukrainians in the camps were "not a voluntary immigration." She cautioned that this fact must never be overlooked.¹¹⁴ Possibly if her advice had been taken, the more traumatic consequences this refugee resettlement induced in Canada could have been avoided, or at least ameliorated.

At any rate, by late 1947, Crapleve was so accustomed to the political intrigues typical of Ukrainian *DP* camps that she refused to trust *DP* camp committees with distribution of relief supplies sent over from Canada. As she wrote:

When one spends a certain period of time in the Zone he becomes aware of the intense party competition which finds its reflection in the camp life itself. There is a definite effort made by the various groups to elect the camp executive, the net result of such an action is that members of the party in power are favoured wherever possible. This

makes the camp executive an unreliable body for any responsible action. Where the camps are located near the headquarters of Ukrainian political parties, the party strife is quite often acute. Camps which are located far away from political centres are as a rule very orderly and there is harmony among the members of the various political groups.¹¹⁵

The quality of news circulating among the *DPS* also concerned Crapleve. She noted that:

Every one of the [*DP*] papers is affiliated with a Ukrainian political party.¹¹⁶

Because of this the *DPS* read only what their the political groups wanted them to. An important consequence was that anti-emigration sentiment was propagated in *DP* camps across the British Zone of Germany.

She was aware of the intense "undercover fight" that was being waged within the *DP* camps between contesting political groups. So endemic had this become that "politics permeated even the religious field."¹¹⁷ This annoyed the authorities, and reflected unfavourably on all Ukrainians, giving them "a bad name."¹¹⁸ This situation was particularly troubling since this *DP* behaviour was spoiling the reputation Ukrainian Canadians had built up for themselves, as conscientious, patriotic, and reliable citizens. If their enthusiastic description of the *DPS* were now proven false, they might themselves again become suspect. Therefore,

Crapleve argued, everything possible must be done to ensure that the *DPS* did not damage the credibility of Ukrainian Canadians in the eyes of the British, Canadian, or American governments.

Later, the Wasylyshens echoed similar sentiments in their own reports to Winnipeg.

By 1947, and likely before, those who occupied the front ranks of Ukrainian Canadian relief and refugee resettlement operations, were spent. Their inapt original descriptions of the *DPS* had been replaced with more malcontent appraisals of the refugees' traits. All agreed that the trouble was rooted in the experience these Ukrainians underwent inside the *DP* camps. They tended to place the blame for this on the Ukrainian nationalists.

For their part, the Ukrainian refugees came to reject Ukrainian Canadian paternalism. They openly, and defiantly, proclaimed that their intention was to continue doing everything possible to bring them back to their true destination, which they saw as being Ukraine.

For Ukrainian Canadians, and the authorities charged with overseeing the refugee camps, this was an unrealistic and annoying *DP* trait. It seemed to portend increasing international tensions or, at the very least, to involve the Western Powers in maintaining a troublesome population in *DP* camps for an indefinite length of time. This was something the authorities were unwilling to do. In their view, the camps would have to be cleared as quickly as possible,

preferably through resettlement abroad.

When it became obvious that no imminent change in the international political scene would allow for return migration, the *DP* press and its nationalist overseers came to realize the inevitability of resettlement, regardless of their wishes. Even so, they continued to believe that at some future point they would be able to get back to Ukraine. This conviction was to have spatial and social consequences in every country of resettlement to which these Ukrainian *DPS* moved. Well before most *DPS* managed to get to Canada, however, the Ukrainian Canadians who had spent a lengthy time working among them were sending back revised reports dealing with the nature of the *DPS*. A letter Panchuk sent in 1949 succinctly puts this new Ukrainian Canadian perception as follows:

ALL refugees and *DPS*, whatever their nationality, consider themselves POLITICAL REFUGEES (although many of them are far from that) and therefore feel that their prime and most important duty and mission as "emigres" is to carry on political work and activities, for the liberation of, and their own ultimate return to, their native land...THE MAJORITY, however, are really and in actual fact ECONOMIC REFUGEES as most people who have had to deal with them... have learned, as I did. Most of them have always been in search of a place to live where they will be better off...

The so-called "political refugees" have often and at every opportunity IMPOSED and forced their influence on the economic refugees and the real and actual WAR VICTIMS, and thus "coloured" all refugees and *DPS*...''

This was perhaps the most cogent description of the post-WW II Ukrainian refugee experience offered by any Ukrainian Canadian . While several aspects of Panchuk's appreciation are debatable, he was correct in distinguishing two general groups within the overall *DP* population, namely the minority who acted as agents of attribute change and the larger refugee population, whose political and social attitudes were transformed after their exposure to the former. While it is untrue that most Ukrainian *DPS* had always been in search of a better place to live, it was accurate to note that, once they had been exposed to the militant nationalists, many would begin to articulate political demands oriented around the irredentist platform of the nationalists. This attitude persisted for many years. Many of the Ukrainian refugees, as a result of their *DP* camp experiences, became people who moved onwards only because of the hope that by so doing they would be able to remain where they had been in all other respects. They constitute, in other words, a classic example of Petersen's (1958) "conservative migration."

Panchuk also described several other qualities of the Ukrainian refugee population. Many different regional,

religious and political backgrounds were represented in the DP camps. The *DPS* did not form a homogeneous population. Not all of the sub-groups would, he felt, readily integrate into the Ukrainian Canadian population. Certainly some of these elements were neither expected, nor would they be welcomed by the receiving population and its communities.

More importantly, Panchuk realized that a militant minority within the overall refugee population had managed to seize control over the majority, which it was efficiently schooling in its own tenets. While rejecting the perception of this minority, Panchuk dared not ignore its importance, for as he noted, the majority of *DPS* were now enthralled by the *Banderivtsi*, for better or worse.

For Ukrainian Canadians, the status achieved by *Banderivtsi* and Ukrainian nationalists in general was an unforeseen and undesirable development. They felt it was intolerable that the *OUNr* would attempt to transplant itself into Canada, there to attempt to wrest control over their organizations, much as it was being claimed they had already done across Western Europe.¹²⁰

Ukrainian Canadians in Europe did send belated warnings back to Canada. Yet before these messages were received and fully digested by the more influential Ukrainian Canadians, the *DPS* were already arriving among them. The general Ukrainian Canadian public, knowing no better, remained optimistic and expected considerable and positive developments within Ukrainian Canadian life to occur as a result of

this "third immigration." They had yet to realize that their lifeworld was about to be shattered.

Conclusions

This chapter has described how and why Ukrainians came to be in Canada before 1939, the size, geographical distribution, organizational structures and attitudes this population exhibited about its status within Canada. Fundamentally, the way Ukrainians in Canada felt about themselves reflected their experience with Canada's state elites - since they formed a significant ethnic minority, particularly within Western Canada, they had not been ignored by the government. The uneven interaction between officials who acted either with hostility or indifference to Ukrainian Canadian aspirations had left this population believing that it had to repeatedly articulate its gratitude for being in Canada, its loyalty to this state, and desire to remain in this country. This chapter has established not only the geographical but also the social and political environment into which the post-WW II Ukrainian refugees would be relocated. This immigration, of Ukrainian *DPS*, added new spatial and social patterns to the Ukrainian population of Canada, while prompting changes in antecedently established ones. Compared in size to the pre-WW II population, the post-war immigration was relatively small, yet its introduction fundamentally realigned Ukrainian Canadian organizational life, and challenged the status quo that had

emerged before the war. This impact can be traced to the modification of the migrating refugee populations' attributes, a process located in the *DP* camp phase of their refugee experience, and discussed further in Chapter 5. That chapter will also examine who these Ukrainian refugees were, what they believed in, and the traits and patterns of organizational behaviour and structure they would transplant with them into Canada. By so doing it will seek to explain the effects of the refugee experience on the Ukrainian *DPS*, laying a basis for the examination of the impact of this immigration on Ukrainian Canadian space.

Notes

1. *UCSA* depended upon the *UCC* for its financial upkeep, as was noted in *FO* 371/36974, (25.8.43). The British were also aware that, for the Soviets, the *UCC* "is not at all bien vu."

The controversial letter Panchuk received was sent from London (18.2.45). It does not appear to have survived. Nevertheless related correspondence provides an indication of the nature of the argument. See, for example Panchuk to P. Worobetz, (27.2.45); Johnny Yuzyk to Panchuk, (10.3.45) and P. Worobetz to Panchuk, (11.4.45).

Interviews with J. Yuzyk, (28.11.82) and P. Worobetz, (21.8.83).

2. See *FO* 371/56716, (29.5.46) "Repatriation of Soviet Citizens." The Yalta Agreement was signed on February 11, 1945. Differences between British and American opinion on the fate of post-war Eastern Europe can be detected in Winston Churchill's correspondence with President T. Roosevelt (e.g. *FO* 371/47584, (27.3.45).

The volume of the forcible repatriation was estimated, (14.8.46), as being 11,000-12,000 people per day, (*FO* 371/46811). According to *FO* 371/47906, (7.9.45), by September 1st, a total of 5,115,709 persons had been repatriated to the USSR. Of this number 3,969,656 were already "returned to their homes" while 1,146,053 were reported to be in Soviet transit camps. Of the total number repatriated, 2,229,552 had been "liberated" and then returned to the Soviets by the Western Allies. Of the latter, 1,855,910 had been handed over between May 23 and September 1, 1945. As *FO* 371/47907, (October, 1945) noted:

At one point in the process of repatriation the Russians asked us to slow down as they could not cope with the flow.

Protests emanating from the *DP* camps against forcible repatriation were recorded in the following files, *PAC* MG 28 v.9 Vol. 17, (29.9.45); *FO* 371/47908, (12.11.45); *FO* 371/56791, (5.1.46); *PAC* MG 28 v.9 Vol.15, (26.3.46) and a letter from Panchuk, (26.3.46).

Protests from Ukrainians in Canada and London can be found in *UCC* files, (e.g. A. Zaharychuk to the *Winnipeg Free Press*, 24 February, 1945); *CURB* to Rhys Davis, M.P., *PAC* MG 28 v.9, Vol. 15, (17.9.45) and *CURB* to Rhys Davis, M.P., *FO* 371/56791, (25.2.46). Co-signing one *CURB* memorandum were S.W.Frolick and Dr. Walter Gallan, *FO* 371/58470, (10.8.46). Frolick was listed as *CURB*'s Director.

Others also petitioned the government against repatriation. *DEA* 82-96-40, (21.1.46) contains the protest of The Baptist Federation of Canada to Prime Minister Mackenzie King; *PAC* MG 28 v.9 Vol.17 (April, 1946) contains a letter from Tracy Philipps; *FO* 371/56791 (8.3.46) notes the concerns of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers).

Official responses can be found in *FO* 371/47909, (5.11.45). Mr. J.W. Holmes, of the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom wrote to Thomas Brimelow (*FO* 371/47909 on 5.11.45, apologizing for taking up the latter's time over the issue of repatriation but adding that it had become "a subject we cannot ignore in Canada."

Other Canadian government ruminations on this issue are to be found in *DEA* 8296-40, (16.11.45). The government's response to the *UCC* is found in *FO* 371/56791, (1.2.46).

Soviet repatriation officers were sometimes mistreated by the *DPS*, as the correspondence in *FO* 371/47901, (2.7.46) notes. Their reaction was to blame the British for sheltering anti-Soviet groups. See *FO* 371/56718, (19.11.46).

Soviet insistence on the repatriation of everyone they considered to be a "Soviet national" can be found in *WO*/ 32 11119, (August, 1945) and *FO* 371/47906, (6.9.45).

The brutal treatment accorded to repatriates was described by various British observers , for example *FO* 371/43382, (4.12.44), *FO* 371/47904, (3.8.45) and *WO* 32/11119, (January, 1945).

The British military's perception of the Soviet refugees was confused . See, for example, *WO* 170/ 4988, (War Diary, May, 1945, 8th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) or *WO* 170/4461, (War Diary, May, 1945, HQ 36 Infantry Brigade).

The kidnapping of *DPS* was often noted, e.g., the *CURB* document, (9.1.46).

Another tactic employed by the Soviets to attract individuals back into their Zone was to have acquaintances write back to *DPS* still in the camps extolling the virtues of life under the Soviets. For example, in *DEA* 228-Z(S), there is a letter which reads, in part:

Several months have gone by since the time I

returned from the English Zone of Occupation in Austria to my native village...I have not forgotten about you...I wish, women, that I had returned earlier but for a long time I listened in the camp to the insolent lies about the Soviet Union. You surely were witness to how camp leaders said that in the Soviet Union I, as the daughter of a priest, could particularly expect a dire fate. They convinced me in this...with what disgust I think now about those lowly fascists! With still more vexation I think now how you women still believe those good-for-nothings...Let me tell you about myself... I immediately felt a friendly and warm attitude towards me on the part of the Soviet administration. Happily I rode up to my home...My father is occupying the duties of a priest. According to the Soviet Constitution, as is well known, in the USSR there exists freedom of religion. ...I work as a teacher of the German language...They treat me in a responsible manner...the education of the young generation [is my duty]. By the example of my life you may convince yourselves that in the Soviet country of repatriates, no one is persecuted. On the contrary, the state helps in everything. Therefore, my dear friends, be more decisive.

Stop believing the enemy propaganda and return to your homeland in Ukraine.

3. F. Barth, (1969).
4. V.J.Kaye, (1964) and M. Marunchak, (1982:23-27).
5. W. Darcovich and P. Yuzyk. eds. *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980. Hereafter referred to as the *Statistical Compendium*. See Series 50.62-77:514.
6. *Statistical Compendium*, Series 50.62-77:513.
7. For a scholarly account of Sifton, see D. J. Hall, (1981).
8. See, for example, W. Pawluk, (1943); V. Lysenko, (1947); H. Pinuta, (1978); M. Kostash, (1977); H. Potrebenko, (1977); W. A. Czumer, (1981).
9. Cited in L.Y. Luciuk, (1980:3).
10. J. D. Rudnytsky, (1957).
11. M. Marunchak, (1982:355-356), L. Driedger, (1980) and *Statistical Compendium*, Section 22.
12. Sir William Otter, (1921). Reprinted in V.J. Kaye, (1983:74-94). See also, L.Y. Luciuk, (1980); F.R. Swyripa and J.H. Thompson, (1983); S. Hryniuk, (1980). One of the few surviving internees, Mykola Sakaliuk was interviewed, (14.2.78).

The destruction of Canadian government files pertaining to the Internment Operations is discussed by Peter Melnycky, (1983:23-24). It would seem a number of

relevant files were deliberately destroyed in the early 1970s. Why remains a mystery.

Similar operations were carried out in the USA. These are described in William B. Glidden, (1973).

13. The first issue of *Ukrainian Voice* appeared in Winnipeg on March 14, 1910. Its editor was Wasyl Kudryk.
14. *Statistical Compendium*:17-25.
15. *The Daily British Whig*, Kingston, (9.3.18):1.
16. The actual law is reprinted in F.R. Swyripa and J.H. Thompson, (1983:187-189). It is discussed by J.H. Thompson, (1983) and J.A. Boudreau, (1965).
17. Cited in L.Y. Luciuk, (1980:33). See also *The Daily British Whig* Kingston, (4.5.17).
18. M. Gulka-Tiechko, (1938:27-28).
19. *Star Phoenix*, Saskatoon, (24.4.28).
20. *Canadian Ukrainian*, Winnipeg, (16.1.29). This newspaper, sponsored by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church in Canada, was originally known as the *Canadian Ruthenian*, an appellation changed in April, 1919.
21. *The Globe*, Toronto, (8.2.29).
22. The Ukrainian Canadian War Veterans' Association was founded on January 23, 1928 in Winnipeg. It came to have a total of at least 24 branches across Canada, as follows,
 British Columbia - Vancouver
 Alberta - Edmonton, Calgary
 Saskatchewan - Hafford, Bienfait, Kenora, Moose Jaw,

Regina, Saskatoon, Secretan .

Manitoba - Winnipeg, Flin Flon, The Pas

Ontario - Windsor, Hamilton, Kirkland Lake, Port Arthur, Fort William, Toronto, Sudbury, Timmins, St. Catharines

Quebec - Montreal, Royan-Noranda.

Source: *Golden Jubilee Book of the Ukrainian War Veterans' Association* (Toronto, 1978).

For material on Danylo Skoropadsky's visit to Canada, and the UHO, see the *Edmonton Bulletin* (18.12.37), pp. 1-2; (20.12.37), page 11 and (23.12.37), page 2. Negative reactions to Skoropadsky's visit were also noted, e.g. *Edmonton Bulletin* (3.1.38), page 1.

23. J. Kolasky, (1979).

24. FO 371/23138, (13.7.39). Mr. S.L. Holmes to C.W.Dixon.

25. FO 371/23056, (21.7.39).

26. Interview with W. Burianyk, (30.5.82).

27. FO 371/23138, (13.7.39).

28. Volodymyr Kossar, (1890-1970) an inter-war immigrant from Western Ukraine was a founding member of the UWVA. He became the first President of UNF, and later the 2nd Vice-President of the UCC. His personal archives are in the keeping of his son, and remain closed to researchers.

29. FO 371/23056, (21.7.39)

30. Petitions to government officials were numerous. For

example, see *FO* 371/23138, (23.12.38); *FO* 371/23677, (1939) and *FO* 371/21807, (3.4.38).

The *FO* was visited by a number of Ukrainian Canadians on different occasions, all with respect to Ukrainian issues. For example, Dr. V.J.Kaye and Mr. S. Davidovich presented a memorandum on 11 October, 1938 about the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine. In *FO* 371/23138, (8.9.39) British reaction to Danylo Skoropadsky and Dr. Vladimir de Korostovetz's talk with Brigadier General Sir M. Osborne is noted.

British observations on the various Ukrainian information bureaus based in London before WW II can be located in *FO* 371/23677, (15.2.39); *FO* 371/24473, (4.3.40); *FO* 371 /32961, (July, 1942) and *WO* 208/1734, (date?).

Protests received by the British regarding Ukrainian activities in England and the Dominions are recorded in such as *FO* 371/19662, (9.3.36), titled "Anti-Polish Activities of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad" and *FO* 317/24473, (June, 1946). Canadian concerns are expressed in *FO* 371/29532, (9.9.41). Here Norman Robertson recorded that Ukrainian Canadians were "becoming very troublesome."

31. As *FO* 371/22295, (1938) makes clear, the British were quite reluctant to encourage any Ukrainian movement of national emancipation, however just this cause might be. There was considerable deliberation over policy,

although it was roundly agreed that no offence must be given to any friendly European power. Yet, as the British were discovering just prior to the war's outbreak, various European leaders, such as General Mannerheim of Finland, considered that the the Ukrainian issue "would shortly become one of the chief factors in the political situation in Eastern Europe," (FO 371/21676, December 6, 1938).

Awareness of the nature of Western Ukraine as a "piedmont" of the nationalist movement is evidenced in FO 371/21810, (17.12.38); FO 371/23056, (June-July, 1938) and FO 371/39012, (24.1.44).

The ill effects of Polish intransigence on relations with the Ukrainian minority are recorded as British opinion in FO 371/23138, (6.7.39).

The Soviet attitude on the Ukrainian question was noted in FO 371/23677, (24.12.38). The British Embassy in Moscow wrote that the Soviets claimed they were not afraid of the "horn blowing of Ukrainian emigres," adding that this was only what they pretended. In fact, there was "little doubt" as the Foreign Office's L. Collier was informed, that the Soviets were "seriously perturbed." Another British file (FO 371/23506, 6 February, 1939) noted that the loss of Ukraine would be "fatal" to the Soviet Union.

On conditions in Eastern Ukraine, there were fewer reports. FO 371/22461, (14.1.39) observed that

Ukrainian nationalism was weakly established there, and that the Soviet government's control was so pervasive that the population was "atomized." While this same file predicted that Hitler would expand west before launching any blows against the USSR through Ukraine, concern over German intentions in Ukraine was persistent. See *WO* 208/1734, (5.8.40).

After the invasion of Poland, and the announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact (1939), British strategists began considering whether the Ukrainians could be used to advance Britain's interests. As Mr. R.M.A. Hankey of the Foreign Office observed, (26.1.40):

Personally, I agree with the attitude (wait and see). If the Ukraine goes off at half cock, before we are ready, the whole thing may fizzle out, or if it succeeds, the Germans will just take over the whole Ukraine. Unless I am wrong, we don't want a Ukrainian revolt before 1941 summer; then we will use it to down the Russians and Germans together. Meanwhile we can help the Poles and Ukrainians on tactfully towards an agreement, as we are doing.

I am against any guarantees myself. We tried that in 1920-1924 and could not enforce it. East Galicia is outside our beat and always will be.

With the war's end, *FO* officials became cynical and ironic in their comments on the Ukrainian minority's future, (e.g. *FO* 371/31590, July 18, 1945). Thomas Brimelow minuted:

Yes. Publicly, the troubles of the Ukrainians now reunited at last in their own state, are at an end. Any manifestations of discontent will in future be the work not of Ukrainian patriots, but of fascist brats, black reactionaries and enemies of the people. Thanks to the brotherly protection of the Great Russian people, this centuries-old problem has now found a complete and just solution, and the enclosed minutes on past [indecipherable] can be consigned to the limbo of forgotten things.

32. The Polish Embassy protested the proposed travel of Wasyl Swystun to London, where he was slated to become Director of the Ukrainian National Information *FO* 371/24473, (June, 1940). It is little known that Swystun, although a leading member of the *USRL*, maintained correspondence with Col. Konovalets, the *DUN*'s first leader.
33. Accounts dealing with the Canadian Communist Party include I. Avakumovic, (1975); L.R. Betcherman, (1981); N. Penner, (1977); D. Avery, (1979); and Ian Angus, (1981). The only specific discussion of the Ukrainian Canadian dimension of this question is found in O.T.

Martynowych, (1976). A. Bilecki, W. Repka and M. Sago, (1972) present a sympathetic account of the Workers' Benevolent Association, (WBA).

34. *FO* 371/26721, (16.1.41) discussed the possibility of establishing a "Ukrainian Centre" in Canada, independent of the indigenous Ukrainian population. It was to serve as a counter-foil to any "Quisling" regime the Axis Powers might try to establish among the Ukrainians under their control. Another reason they felt it was necessary to transplant Ukrainian emigres from France to Canada to do such political work was because, "All of the Ukrainian leaders in Canada may be considered as second rate people..."

No action was taken on the proposal, possibly because the *FO* was never convinced that there was "much evidence" of Axis influence among the Ukrainians of North America. As one official minuted on a file cover: "I have not seen one [Ukrainian organization] which did not profess complete faith in the Allied victory."

Ottawa's interest in Ukrainian Canadians, and plans to establish "some kind of a centre of information" to deal with them are mentioned in Kaye's letter to Tracy Philipps, *PAC* MG 30 E350, (14.8.40).

35. On the concern within Ukrainian Canadian circles about the possibility of a repetition of the WW I internment operations, see *PAC* MG 30 E350, File 14, (25-31.8.41) where M. Petrowsky mentions some *UCC* members' "fear of

the barbed wire fence."

36. M. Marunchak, (1982::549-550) and *PAC* MG 28 v.9 Vol.1, (1.11.40).
37. M. Marunchak, (1982:549-550).
38. Vladimir J. Kaye (Kysilewsky) was born in 1896 in Western Ukraine. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Vienna in 1924, subsequently emigrating to Canada. Prior to the outbreak of WW II he ran a Ukrainian Bureau in London, while continuing with his studies. Several of his books on Ukrainians in Canada have become standard reference works. These are listed in the bibliography. His archives remain closed in the *PAC* (Ottawa).
39. *PAC* MG 30 E350, (11.8.40), Dr. Kaye to T. Philipps. On the need for Ukrainian Canadians to unite, Kaye wrote: "If they don't realize that [they must unite] events will pass over their head with all the consequences." Despite his role in bringing about the *UCC*, Kaye refused to become its first Secretary General (Kaye to T.Philipps, (1.6.41)).
40. M. Marunchak, (1982:550-553), also *PAC* MG 30 E350, File 4, (November, 1940). On the *UCC*'s need for continued attention and support, see *PAC* MG 30 E350, Vol. 2, (13.1.41).

The *Winnipeg Free Press* carried a front page article about the formation of the *UCC*, titled "All For One-One For All" (27.11.40).

The Rev. Dr. Wasyl Kushnir (1893-1979) was a Ukrainian Catholic priest, President of the UCC and BUC, as well as a leading member of the UCRF. His personal papers remain unavailable. The Rev. S. Sawchuk was interviewed, (5.12.82). His extensive archival collection is also unavailable for research purposes.

41. Dr. Watson Kirkconnell, (1895-1977), was an authoritative student of Ukrainian literature, a prolific writer on Ukrainian Canadian themes (see bibliography) a militant anti-communist, and later President of Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia. His papers have recently been catalogued and are now available for researchers at Acadia University. They were not examined.

Prof. George Simpson, a member of the teaching staff at the University of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon), specialized in East European studies. Among his publications the *Atlas on Ukraine* was widely distributed. His papers are on deposit with the archives of the University of Saskatchewan. A cursory review of these materials was made in April, 1984.

For Tracy Philipps's "personal dossier" see PAC MG 30 E350, Vols. 1 and 2 (undated). He apparently served in Italy, Africa, Palestine, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia, at stages in his career, becoming Deputy Governor of British East Africa, as well as working with Lawrence of Arabia during WW I. Between 1920 and

1923 he was the British Commissioner for South Russia under Dr. Nansen (Herbert Hoover was the American counterpart). Philipps also visited Ukraine during the Great Famine of 1932-33. Some of his interest in Ukrainian matters was likely the result of his having married the Ukrainian pianist, Lubka Kolessa. Philipps died in England in 1959.

Danylo Skoropadsky and his aide, Dr. V. de Korostovetz, inquired at the *FO* with respect to Philipps' credentials. R. Makins replied on 29.1.41, (*FO* 371/26721) that Philipps "has no connexion with the *FO* and the press reports to which you refer are therefore quite unfounded." Postal Censorship intercepted some of Skoropadsky's mail with *UHO* followers in Canada, such as Dr. T. Datskiw, (*FO* 371/26721), dated 25.2.41. Skoropadsky urged a full investigation be made to determine on what authority Philipps was acting as an arbitrator of Ukrainian Canadian affairs.

Whether Philipps was informed about such inquiries is unknown. Certainly, he had nothing positive to say about the *Hetmantsi*. For example, in *PAC* MG 30 E350, (30.6.41) he noted that:

...the most suitable place for Korostovetz...to exercise his talents would be in internment.

He also opined that the Hetman's followers in Canada were "to put it mildly, very unCanadian." Both he and

Prof. Kirkconnell seemed to have feared that the *Hetmantsi* would be the first to "bolt" from the UCC unless they were carefully watched. UHO was described as being an organization that "draws Ukrainian Canadians back to the political intrigues of continental Europe."

Philipps' basic tenets are recorded in several documents, for example, see PAC MG 30 E350, (Memorandum For the Deputy Minister and For the Committee). This same file contains such other relevant documents as his letter to Sir Gerald Campbell, (14.3.41); his thoughts on "Hemisphere Defence" (9.5.41) and his observations on the status of the Ukrainians in North America (28.5.41/28.6.41).

42. PAC MG 30 E350, (27.9.41)

43. PAC MG 30 E350, (November-December, 1941). This paragraph is found on page 5 of a report titled "Subject: Tour in Western Canada, (File 16).

In File 19, see the Deputy Minister of the Department of National War Services' letter to Philipps congratulating him on his work with the Ukrainians. In part, it noted:

You did a very excellent job for us...and you were largely instrumental in having a Canadian Ukrainian Committee created in Winnipeg. The Committee is representative of every element in the Ukrainian population in Canada. I believe

this is the first time in the history of this country when they all got together in one organization..." (15.4.41).

Kaye wrote to Philipps to commend him - "...you at last succeeded in getting them to bury the hatchet...", (1.6.41).

Philipps' subsequent efforts require analysis. Some of the more pertinent documentation is as follows, *PAC MG 30 E350*, (25.2.41); (24.7.41); (10.1.42); (25.6.42); (26.12.42); (14.6.43); (27.8.43); (22.9.43); (23.9.43); and (30.9.43). In his "Report on the Reorganization of the Nationalities Branch, Department of National War Services" (*PAC RG 26*, Vol. 13, dated 12.6.44) Philipps outlined how opposition to his efforts in Canada had affected his plans. This took a toll on men like Kaye. *PAC MG 30 E350*, contains Philipps' reference to the former's breakdown and withdrawal from service, (1.10.43).

Philipps was himself purged from the service of the Canadian government, largely through the efforts of John Grierson of the Wartime Information Board (now the National Film Board). See the former's condemnatory description of Philipps' work in *PAC MG 30 E350*, (23.10.43).

44. *DEA* 11327-40, (12.10.41).
45. *DEA* 2514-40C, (11.9.41), *PAC* RG 26, Vol. 1, (17.7.42/10.11.42) and *PAC* MG E350, (22.5.43) are relevant. *PAC* MG 30 E350, (17.12.41) contains a letter from R.R. Tait, the Director of Criminal Investigations, in which The Ukrainian Society For Aiding The Fatherland is described as "...truly...a front organization of the Communists, operating in the Ukrainan-speaking field." The Constitution of the Ukrainian Association To Aid The Fatherland was dated July 26, 1941, and signed by Michael Mutzak and Anthony Holowchak.
46. See *PAC* RG 26, Vol. 9, (22.1.42). The *DEA*'s Norman Robertson wrote to Prof. Simpson:

The "uncle" to whom the translator refers has apparently very strong feelings about the Canadian Ukrainian Committee, although, as I think you will agree, the story is not without humour.
47. See the *UNF* protest to the Minister of Justice in Ottawa, (18.10.42), *PAC* MG 30 E350, and Dr. Kaye's letter to T. Philipps , (23.10.42).
48. *FO* 371/36974, (15.5.43).
49. W. Burianyk's letter to Prof. Simpson, (3.6.42) in *PAC* MG 30 E350. The pro-communist movements' anti-UCC campaign is also discussed in *DEA* 3846-A-40-C, (11.5.43).

50. PAC MG 30 E350, (29.7.41) contains some of Special Constable, (RCMP), Michael Petrowsky's reports.
51. PAC MG 30 E350, File 6, (May, 1941).
52. PAC MG 30 E350, (13.11.42), Judge T.C. Davis, Deputy Minister to Major General L.R. LaFleche regarding the Committee on Co-Operation in Canadian Citizenship. PAC MG 30 E350, (8.7.43) contains Mr. J.W. DaFoe's (Editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press*) letter to T. Philipps.
53. M. Marunchak, (1982:558-559). PAC RG 26 Vol.1, (14.11.41), contains a letter from the UNF's Toronto Branch which reported to Prof. Kirkconnell that 99% of its 600 members had already purchased war bonds.
54. Anthony Hlynka, (1905-1957), was M.P., (Social Credit) for Vegreville, Alberta, and the second Ukrainian Canadian to be elected to Parliament. See S. Hlynka, (1982). The relevant letters appear in the *Edmonton Bulletin*, (6-7.3.42).
55. Peter Lazarowich was a USRL supporter, a lawyer, and also active in the UCC. His retort is found in the *Edmonton Bulletin*, (9.3.42).

For another declaration of Ukrainian Canadian loyalty to the British Commonwealth, see the *Edmonton Journal*, (27.3.39) in which Mr. M. Dorosh of the UNF declared that 200,000 Ukrainians were "ready to fight for Britain." Lazarowich stressed this point again, as was noted in the *Edmonton Bulletin* (18.5.39), page 11. Even the ULFTA pledged its support of the Dominion (see the

Edmonton Bulletin (25.5.39), page 10). It issued a statement which read, in part,

Events during the past few weeks demonstrated the need for unity of the Canadian people in order to preserve their democratic rights and institutions. To maintain this unity has been one of the principal tasks of the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association.

We endorse the action taken against Nazi and pro-Nazi organizations and individuals as fifth column and subversive elements...But it is shocking and tragic to learn that there are certain elements in this country who are trying to cover up their shaded past of pro-Naziism by insinuations and direct attacks upon the *ULFTA* in certain localities as a pro-Nazi organization.

We categorically declare that our organization, being cultural in character only,[sic!] has made its position very clear by being always progressive, anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi. Therefore, we consider that any move to attack our association...is a direct attempt...to create disunity and disruption among the Ukrainian people of Canada, especially in this critical period.

As an educational and cultural organization of the Canadian Ukrainians we stand shoulder to shoulder with all freedom-loving Canadians in common desire to maintain democratic freedom, equality and justice for all the people.

56. L.Y. Luciuk, (1983).

Philipps wrote about Panchuk "...he is not a politically minded persons and for this you will like and appreciate him...". The British were reasonably well informed about his background. FO 371/36974, (15.9.43) discusses his education at the P. Mohyla Institute in Saskatoon, described as being:

...the training ground for most of the Ukrainian intellectuals in Canada.

As for a self-description of his own role, Panchuk's diary entry on the 3.9.44 noted:

I like the work I have always done and my father did before me, the work for the Ukrainian people.

57. W. R. Petryshyn, (1980).

See also "How It Happened", (7.1.43) and "The Story of the Ukrainian Bureau in London, England," (October, 1949).

58. Panchuk diary, (14.12.42).

59. Johnny Yuzyk to Panchuk, (29.1.45.).

60. Proceedings of the first All-Canadian National Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Winnipeg, June 22-24,

1943.

61. Panchuk to Messrs. Kohut, Wojcichowski and Hewus, (29.7.44) made clear that *UCSA* "had been permitted and approved by the Canadian military authorities." Other correspondence reveals the gradual introduction into *UCSA*'s operations of Canadian-spawned antagonisms. See, for example, L. Wojchichowsky to Panchuk, (30.6.44); Panchuk to Ann Crapleve, (20.8.44); P. Worobetz to Panchuk, (8.5.45); Panchuk to A.J. Yaremovich, (27.5.45); Panchuk to J. Yuzyk, (28.2.45); Ukrainian Canadian Ex-Servicemens' Committee to Panchuk, (18.7.45); Panchuk to this Committee, (1.8.45/7.11.45). On the difficulties *UCVA* was experiencing in Canada see Panchuk's letters of (10.5.46), (14.4.45), (21.5.45). A telling account of how the *UCC* regarded *UCVA* was made by Captain John Karasevich in a letter sent to Panchuk, (28.3.47):

All Organizations of *UCC* are strongly on guard against the *UCVA*, taking the credit for the solution of the refugee problem...

while:

...rumours are floating around that *UCVA* was going to become just another political group in Canada and this is certainly not desired by the existing organizations.

J. Yuzyk wrote: (17.7.47),

I am getting the impression that some of our

well meaning people are going to keep you in Europe indefinitely (sort of in storage) because they are afraid of youthful leadership; they have certainly done nothing to help *UCVA* become a real organization and the only man who can help us build *UCVA* up and that is you, they feel that the best move is to keep you in Europe (sort of out of the way)...the older leaders hate to see you getting so popular and also powerful...I'd hate to see you get the old run around by some of our scheming friends.

62. Panchuk diary, (15.4.45). In a letter he wrote to Dr. Walter Gallan, (*UUARC*) on June 10, 1945, "The Situation With Regard To Ukrainian Refugees," Panchuk noted:

A very large percentage [of the Ukrainian *DPS*] have lost, are losing and will continue to loose their identity as Ukrainians... Nothing is done in Ukrainian for them. It is as if there were no such people. Yet they are the greatest majority of the forced slave labour that are now refugees.

What was required, suggested Panchuk, was mobilization of the Ukrainians in North America, to provide these *DPS* with adequate representation by "somebody who is not forever trying to make them into Poles or into Russians or into Hungarians or Romanians, but who will just leave them for what they are - Ukrainians."

It was the "duty" Panchuk pronounced, for Ukrainians in Canada and the USA to dispatch "missionaries" to help save the *DPS*.

63. *DEA* 2514-40, (10.6.45).

64. *Ibid*.

65. Interview with M. Lucyk, (15.3.82).

66. *PAC MG* 28 v.9, Vol.15, (10.6.45).

67. *The Edmonton Journal*, (7.2.45).

68. Interview with P. Worobetz, (21.8.83).

69. *UCSA Padre's Hour*, London, England, (25.11.45).

70. "Statement Submitted By B.Panchuk In Connection With Administrative and Financial Statement of *CURB*," (undated). This memorandum noted that:

[I] always felt that the *CURB* was merely a continuation of the *UCSA*. The premises were the same, the assets were common, and the staff and personnel were almost identical. I bore common responsibility for both the *UCSA* of which I was President and for the *CURB* of which I have been appointed Director.

The British view on *CURB* can be found in *FO* 371/66355, (5.5.47):

We take quite a good view of *CURB*, which has very influential friends in Canada and elsewhere. Although it is anti-Soviet, it is not blatantly so, and so far as we are aware, it confines its activities to relief and

resettlement.

Despite this positive description, the *FO* was unwilling to officially recognize *CURB*, (*FO* 371/56711, 25.2.46). There was no objection however, to allowing *CURB* to exist.

71. *PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol.7*, (1.6.46) contains the *Report and Outline of the Achievements of the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund for the period February 15, 1945 to June 1, 1946*.
72. Proceedings of the second All-Canadian National Congress of Ukrainian Canadians Congress, June 4-6, 1946, Toronto.
73. *DEA 2514-40C*, (15.5.45).
74. *DEA 2514-40*, (15.11.44).
75. *DEA 2514-40*, (October, 1944). *DEA 2514-40C*, (30.5.45) notes that the Soviet Ambassador to Canada, Zaroubin, expressed the view that the *UCRF*'s existence was considered a "question of particular (political) significance."
76. *PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol. 9*, (1.6.46).
77. *DEA 2514-40C*, (15.5.45).
78. *DEA 82-96-40*, (22.12.45).
79. *Ibid*.
80. Interviews with S.W. Frolick, (1.7.81/10.1.83/ 14.12.83 to 24.12.83/4.1.84 to 6.1.84). A complete autobiographical account of Frolick's story is currently in preparation. Upon completion it will form part of

the *MHSO's* Ethnocultural Voices series (Edited and with an introduction by L. Luciuk. For 1985).

According to Panchuk's records, Frolick began working with *CURB* from its inception, and "actioned" much of the real work throughout the balance of 1945 (except December, when Frolick was on the continent). He became a full-time, salaried employee on January 1, 1946, confirmed in a cablegram sent by Rev. Kushnir to Frolick, February 6, 1946.

For additional material see *PAC* MG 28 v.9, Vol.14, (20.9.45).

81. *FO* 371/56791, (8.3.46) and *DEA* 8296-40C, (9.8.46) in which the Acting High Commissioner for Canada in London wrote to the Secretary of State (*DEA*) that:

...the *UCC* representatives in London had not been without influence on recent developments in UK policy towards Ukrainians in the British Zone." The Ukrainian Canadians were also described as being "understanding and sensible."

Another message, in *DEA* 82-96-40, (26.8.46) noted that the *FO* had been asked by the Canadian government whether they required any restraints to be imposed on the *UCC*. The British declined the offer, but welcomed the Acting High Commissioner's suggestion that the *UCC's* role be discussed in Canada:

...so that if opportunities should arise

the Canadian authorities might be able to advise the influential Ukrainians in Canada that the best way to help those Ukrainians who are still left in Germany was to behave reasonably and not force the British authorities into a position which make it difficult for them to help.

82. *DEA* 82-96-40, (20.3.46), H.H.Wrong to Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

83. *Ibid.*

84. Andrew Zaharychuk was a Ukrainian Catholic teacher, a leading member of the *UHO*, prior to which he was a member of the Supreme Command of the *Sitch* Organization (1927), headquartered in Winnipeg. He later became a member of the *UCC* and *UCRF* executives.

85. A.Zaharychuk to S.W.Frolick and G. Panchuk, (20.9.46).

86. George Kluchewsky was a student of theology in Edinburgh just prior to WW II, having arrived there from Western Ukraine. Early in 1946 he agreed to act as *CURB*'s Honourary Treasurer.

87. See, *Canadian Relief Mission To Ukrainian Refugees and DPs in Europe* (undated).

Panchuk wrote to Lieut. Col. Frost, Commissioner of the Canadian Red Cross in London, as early as May of 1946 that he had been offered, effective on the date of his discharge from the *RCAF* (20.6.46), an overseas posting

as *UCRF's* Field Representative.

Panchuk described this opportunity in letters to Kaye, (21.9.46); Kaye and Davidovich, (27.9.46); Hlynka, (28.9.46) and Tracy Philipps, (28.9.46).

Apparently what persuaded him to return to *CURB* were the promises *UCVA* was given by the *UCC* at a "historical" meeting held on September 10, 1946 (no copies of the memorandum issued on this date have survived).

At that gathering, *UCVA* presented the *UCC* with its "Renaissance Plan" which was to revive "our life in Canada." *UCC* did not live up to the promises it apparently made on this occasion.

For more on the *CRM* see *DEA* 6980-GR-40, (1.10.46).

88. Rev. Kushnir to Frolick, (15.10.46). According to Frolick's account he was not given his dismissal notice until 23.11.46, well after the Paris meeting and despite the fact that Panchuk had known of this development for nearly 6 weeks.

89. Panchuk to the *UCC*, (19.10.46).

90. A. Zaharychuk to Panchuk, (18.10.46).

91. Panchuk to the *UCC*, (20.10.46).

92. T. Datskiw to Panchuk, (28.10.46). See also the letter sent by Private J. Ratuszniak to Panchuk, (26.6.46) in which Dmytro Dontsov's continued residence at 218 Sussex Gardens was protested. For related letters see Panchuk to the *UCC*, (17.10.46) and Zaharychuk to

Panchuk (24.10.46).

Dr. Theodore Datskiw was a Ukrainian Catholic who served as an editor for several Ukrainian Canadian newspapers, and was a leading member of the *UHO*. He also an executive member of the *UCC*.

93. O. Tarnavsky, (1971) and M. Kuropas, (1983) describe *UUARC* operations.
94. Protocol, 3rd Conference of Representatives of the Ukrainian Relief Committees of Europe and North America (Paris, 30.10.46 to 3.11.46). From the S.W. Frolick Collection.

On October 14th, 1946 Panchuk advised the *UCC* that Frolick was refusing to accept the *CRM*'s authority, on the grounds that he had no official instructions from the *UCC*. See also Panchuk's report "Meeting of the Relief Team," (18.10.46), his memo to the *UCC* and *UCRF*, (30.11.46) and Panchuk to P. Smylski, (1.1.47).

Frolick retorted to the accusations levelled against him, first by sending a 6 page letter to *UCRF* and *UUARC*, (17.10.46). Panchuk's suggestion that there were problems with the *CURB* accounts was dealt with in this letter (see also G. Kluchevsky to *CURB*, 9.3.47).

The anger Frolick felt towards those who had treated him in this "highly insulting" manner is captured in one paragraph of this letter:

I must congratulate you on your truly Ukrainian handling of business matters, the tart,

truthfullness , honesty and fairness. There is just nothing like it.

He replied to Panchuk in a similar tone, (30.12.46), after arriving back in Canada:

So that is how you keep your part of a gentlemen's agreement? Just before I departed from London you thought of a way of gagging me and preventing me from telling the people over here a few facts which would serve as eye-openers, by making out that you have never done any wrong to me and do not intend to, that we should let by-gones be by-gones, bury the hatchet and be friends "for the good of the cause." What perfidity! No sooner did I return than you start your poisoned-dart-shooting, driving a knife into my back, in the form of your famous auditing report! A masterful bit of intrigue executed by an expert! You do not openly accuse anyone of embezzling Bureau funds, for you might get into trouble doing that, but make sure that the artfully concealed accusation sinks into every readers' mind, by the cunning use of phrases such as "discrepancies," etc. Although, as you admit, the auditing is not complete, you cannot wait to thrust home the dagger! You do all this well knowing that not a penny of the Bureau's money, to the best of our

knowledge, was appropriated by either Kluchevsky, myself or any other of my assistants. On the contrary if not all then certainly most of my own money was spent in or for the Bureau a fact of which I have no doubt you are well aware of.

I just wanted to let you know two things. Firstly, that I am fully aware of your manipulations and reason behind it, and secondly, that although I haven't said anything yet, I might loose self-control and let out a few truthful facts - not fabricated lies and unsavory insinuations, but facts. I'm just bidding my time, waiting for your next move, probably your ' final ' report on the ' auditing,' and if it is the same mud-slinging device as the letter already received I shall have no alternative but to forget the gentlemen's agreement of a truce broken by you already, and tell the public what I know. Let there be no doubt - I know plenty and can reach the ear of the public.

95. Panchuk to Kaye ,(28.11.46).

96. The *Evening Telegram*, Toronto, (1.5.46), "Haven In Canada For Kin Fearing Moscow Ukrainians' Humble Plea."

97. The Senate of Canada, *Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour*, May 29, 1946,

Ottawa.

The pro-communist reaction to the UCC's efforts can be seen in articles such as the one which appeared in *Ukrainian Life* (Toronto) on 19.6.47 titled "Kushnir Defames the Ukrainians of Canada." (page 1).

98. Interview with J. Solomon, (30.11.82).
99. PAC MG 30 E350, (29.5.46).
100. "Notes On Immigration of Ukrainian Refugees and *DPS* to Canada," (8.10.46). Panchuk repeated much the same description in the *CURB* publication, (17.12.46), *Memoranda On the "Divisia Halychyna." A Total of About 9,000 Surrendered Enemy Personnel Now In Rimini, Italy.*
101. Panchuk to Karasevich, (21.12.46).
102. "Report on An Interview With Sir George Rendell, Deputy to Mr. Hector McNeill, who handles Refugee Problems as far as the British Government is Concerned." See also "Report on a Conference With British Foreign Office," (18.11.46) and "Report On a Visit to the War Office," (2.2.46).

The gist of these discussions was that Ukrainian Canadians should calm the *DPS*, and especially silence the "extreme nationalists." Sir George was also concerned about "the danger of Ukrainians from overseas encouraging the Ukrainians in Europe to work for the establishment of a sovereign Ukrainian state, which was quite impracticable, and of course could only be created by armed intervention."

After these deliberations with the British, the CRM reported back to Canada that it had met with Norman Robertson, at "Canada House" finding that he had now "warmed considerably" to the "principle of helping refugees." This the CRM directly attributed to conversations Robertson had with Sir George, (4.12.46).

103. Panchuk to Karasevich, (21.12.46).

104. FO 371/66689, (30.12.46), "Division of Ukrainain DP Camp *Lysenko* at Hannover, Germany into Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox."

Panchuk suggested that those responsible for promoting the friction gained the following advantages:

1. One more camp dissolved, dismembered or sadly weakened and depleted, therefore less threat.
2. A few more thousand *DPS* further disgusted with the life of *DP* camps, therefore encouragement to "volunteer" for repatriation.
3. "Rift" between 2 religious groups will be strengthened.
4. "Rift" bound to have its "beneficial" effects on many other camps.
5. "Rift" impact on Ukrainians elsewhere, helps (it is hoped) to break down their interest in the Relief effort.
6. Catholic versus Protestant struggle exacerbated.
7. Helps to implicate the Vatican which is also

their purpose.

8. Further helps to weaken Greek Catholic church.

105. Panchuk to Yaremovich, (10.3.47).

106. Panchuk to T. Philipps, (19.11.47).

107. Panchuk (31.12.47) to "All Concerned" noted the transfer of responsibilities for Ukrainians in Great Britain from *CURB* to the *AUGB* and that *CURB*'s Director from that date would be Anthony J. Yaremovich. See also *FO* 371/71636, (23.1.48).

Panchuk commented on the reasons for this change in a letter to Lazarovich, (4.10.48).

Kaye was concerned about whether Panchuk could keep the *DPS* in Britain "out of politics." If not, they might use "PAN for their political purposes." See Kaye to Philipps, (7.3.48).

The reasons why Panchuk left the *CRM* to join the *AUGB*, and eventually become its President, are complex. He was annoyed with the *UCC* for having left the *CRM* without any firm plan (22.8.48) which precipitated nearly a year of quarrelling with the American Ukrainians over the breakdown of responsibilities in their joint relief work. The matter seems to have come to a head with Panchuk's letter to W. Gallan, (14.5.47). The ensuing row created ill will between the *UCRF* and *UUARC*, and a number of abrasive letters were exchanged. See Panchuk to John Panchuk , (March, 1947),

Gallan to Panchuk, (25.4.47) in *PAC MG 28 v.9, Vol. 15*, Panchuk to the *UCC*, (2.5.47), in *PAC MG 28 v.9, Vol. 15*, Panchuk to Rev. S. Sawchuk, (9.5.47), Panchuk to *UUARC*, (10.5.47), Gallan to Panchuk, (23.6.47), Panchuk to Prof. Simpson, (26.6.47), Zaharychuk to Panchuk, (4.7.47), Panchuk to A. Crapleve and A. Yaremovich, (17.7.47), Panchuk to Rev. Kushnir and John Panchuk, (24.7.47) and Panchuk to Gallan, (24.7.47).

The letter of 2.5.47, (*PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol.15*) made clear that the *CRM* represented "only the *UCC* and the *UCRF*. The Bureau in London is also strictly a Canadian bureau sponsored and operated by the Ukrainians of Canada only".

The *CRM*'s members all returned to Canada by early September, 1947 (Panchuk to P. Wenger, 8.9.47). After discussions here, Panchuk returned to the UK with what he thought were clear instructions on how to collaborate with *UUARC* representatives. In early November, 1947 he met Mr. Smook in Frankfurt, (7-8.11.47). The arrangements he then made did not meet with the *UCC* or *UCRF*'s approval, (J. W. Arsenych and A. Mandryka to Panchuk, 18.11.47). Shortly thereafter Yaremovich and Crapleve were dispatched to London, as Field Representatives directly responsible to the *UCRF*, and not under Panchuk's control, (1.11.47 and 3.11.47). Panchuk's annoyance, (28.11.47) was expressed in several letters he wrote at the time (e.g. Panchuk to

Philipps, 28.11.47).

Accordingly he tendered his resignation (27.11.47), which was accepted by Kushnir, (5.12.47). The matter was subsequently discussed (Panchuk to Karasevich, 2.12.47 and 5.12.47) and Panchuk to John Panchuk, (5.12.47) but the resignation was not withdrawn.

A major reason Panchuk left, he wrote to Philipps, was due to the divergence of opinion over the role Ukrainian Canadians should play amongst the European Voluntary Workers (*EVWS*) being settled in Great Britain (11.12.47). Panchuk favoured a concerted effort, arguing (e.g. Panchuk to G. Luckyj, 2.11.47) that:

Without doubt, England is an important "base," much **more** so than Canada (something I haven't quite been able to sell to our people in Canada) and our work there must be soundly and firmly established.

He repeated much the same belief to Kaye, (19.12.47). While Panchuk promised to help Yaremovich with *CURB*, (12.12.47), difficulties soon arose between them over the question of *CURB*'s relations with the *AUGB*, as Yaremovich reported to Kushnir, (15.12.47). The situation further deteriorated, as evidenced in Panchuk to Yaremovich, (9.9.48), Yaremovich to Panchuk, (26.8.48), Mandryka to the *AUGB*, (3.11.48) and G. Salsky to Yaremovich, (10.11.48).

This situation had much to do with *CURB's* demise, as Bill Byblow wrote to G. Salsky, (Executive Director, *AUGB*) on 8.11.48. Panchuk had apparently transferred some *CURB* funds into the *AUGB's* coffers to help the latter organization get established. This withdrawal, it was claimed, had weakened *CURB*.

A Liquidation Commission was established on November 11, 1948. Ann Crapleve was its Chairman, assisted by Danylo Skoropadsky. It held several meetings, the first on 23.11.48 and arranged for the disposal of remaining *CURB* assets. As Byblow informed the *AUGB* on 9.12.48, *CURB* officially transferred its offices to Bielefeld in the British Zone of Germany with effect from December 11, 1948. The name was also changed from the *CURB* to the *UCRF*.

Annoyed by this course of events, Yaremovich left for Canada. Karasevich offered the post to Panchuk, (18.9.48) but the latter declined. Consequently, Ann Crapelve became Director of the *UCRF's* operations on the continent, until April 1, 1949, when Mr. and Mrs. E. Wasylyshen arrived.

The Wasylyshens, ably assisted by Crapleve, continued distributing relief supplies from Canada, and helping Ukrainian *DPS* with the emigration process for approximately a year. Reports drafted by them for the *UCRF* include dispatches on the following dates (7.3.49), (16.3.49), (28.3.49), (10.4.49), (28.4.49),

(11.1.50), (30.1.50), (28.2.50), (10.4.50), (18.5.50).

Their final report was drafted after they got back to their home in Winnipeg, (2.10.50). A few letters subsequently sent to Ann Crapleve, (who had resumed the post of Director of *UCRF* operations) have survived, e.g. (23.10.50). Crapleve was to remain at this post until 1951, when all Ukrainian Canadian relief and refugee resettlement operations completely ceased.

108. Panchuk wrote extensively about the *coup d'etat* in the *AUGB*. For example, see his letters to A. Crapleve, (15.3.49), Messrs. Frerre, Cholmeley and Nicholson, (16.3.49), the *AUGB*, (1.4.49), Kaye, (16.4.49), Captain Frank Hasson, (3.6.49), P. Wenger, (6.7.49), J. Choma, (22.7.49), T. Philipps, (2.11.49), W. Gallan, (23.10.50) and S. Wytwytsky, (27.10.50).

In his letter to Crapleve, he listed the following reasons for his defeat:

On the whole it was the work of those who:

(a) Oppose the Ukrainian National Council.

(b) Have a personal dislike for Panchuk.

(c) Support Catholics against Orthodox (or vice versa).

(d) Have other political interests.

(e) Are inspired by foreign agents, both communist and others.

(f) Are devoted to the cause of keeping Ukrainians separated and dis-organized so as to

make them weak and are further devoted to the cause of creating doubt and suspicion among the British people with regard to the quality of the foreign workers.

In his letter to Kaye, Panchuk further elaborated on these themes, adding that he was also accused of being "too pro-British" and "not doing enough for the UPA " by those who "worked, while we slept peacefully."

Ukrainian Canadians were repulsed by the turn of events overseas, and condemnatory of the "plotters." For example, see G. Salsky to G. Luckyj, (15.3.49), E. Wasylyshen to the UCC, (23.3.49), found in PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol. 16, and E. Wasylyshen to the UCRF, (10.4.49). Kaye, (12.4.49) and P. Wenger, (20.4.49) expressed their sympathies, while worrying about whether a similar process would soon take hold in Canada.

The FO also noticed, FO 371/77586, (15.4.49), in which the following observation is recorded:

It seems likely that the "pure" Ukrainians resented the domination of the Association by "foreigners" such as Panchuk...[and] felt able to assert their independence now that they are firmly established and not dependent on Canadian advice and support. As the Association is the only officially recognized Ukrainian body in the UK and as it is our policy to avoid supporting break-away organizations, it would probably be

just as well if we quietly dropped Mr.Panchuk.

After being overthrown Panchuk formed a Ukrainian Bureau whose platform included recognition of the Ukrainian National Council, (12.3.49). The Memorandum and Articles of Association - Ukrainian Bureau were readied by the 16.4.49, and its headquarters were listed as 64 Ridgmont Gardens, London. Intriguingly, Panchuk seems to have reverted back to his Ukrainian Canadian background when creating these new groups. For example, he established the framework for "Ukrainian Self Reliance Groups" in the U.K., which were to formally register with his bureau, whose purpose was akin to that of the *UCC* in Canada. These Ukrainian groups were also encouraged to promote the formation of "ANGLO-UKRAINIAN CLUBS" which would help integrate their members into British society. Panchuk himself was to preside over all, rather like the Rev. Kushnir did in Canada. His executive officer at this time was George Salsky.

Once he had this new structure in place (a Federation of Ukrainians in Great Britain, *FUGB*, was also formed; it was a relatively small group, composed largely of *OUNS* supporters and Eastern Ukrainians or Orthodox believers), Panchuk began trying to undermine the *AUGB*'s authority (e.g. 24.10.49 and 12.3.51), while building up his own Bureau's legitimacy. For example, as of 1.9.50 the Bureau was re-organized and became the

official European Office of the UCC (March, 1951). Unfortunately for him, adequate financial aid was not forthcoming from Winnipeg, so he was forced to abandon his plans and move back to Canada, (PAC MG 31 D69, 18.4.50). Even before he had done so, however, the AUGB was mustering a counter-attack to his allegations, and even making a few of its own (e.g. "Communication Regarding The Matter of G.R.B. Panchuk From the AUGB Executive," (28.6.49), in *Ukrainian Thought*, (London). It was suggested, for example, that Panchuk had accepted "commissions" for helping Ukrainian *DPS* emigrate to Canada, (5.7.51), a report that was later reprinted in *Homin Ukrainy* .

As one British specialist on Ukrainian affairs, Mrs. Miller, pointed out, the reasons Panchuk fell into disfavour had much to do with:

...his Liberal views (he is strongly opposed to extremists such as Stetsko and B) because he consistently put the interests of Britain and the British Commonwealth before his allegiance to Ukrainian nationalists.

109. Panchuk to T. Philipps, (19.11.47).

110. A.J.Yaremovich, "Report on a Tour of the American and French Zones of Germany, the French Zone of Austria, and a Brief Visit to British and American Zones of Austria," (30.6.47). Yaremovich made the point that:

In some camps political activity is very intense

and causes considerable friction among the members. Some blame for this can be placed upon the leaders of the respective political groups, but probably one of the chief reasons for the activity is the fact that at the moment the opportunities for resettlement are very limited.

111. Ibid.

112. Yaremovich to Mr. H.W. Herridge, M.P., (Ottawa), on 24.6.48, (PAC MG 28 v.9, Vol.15).

113. Interviews with Ann Smith (Crapleve), (20.5.82) and (29.11.82).

114. A. Crapleve, "Report on the US Area of Control Germany As Submitted by A. Crapleve, Period April to 31 July, 1947," (29.9.47).

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Crapleve to UCRF, (31.1.48).

118. Crapleve to UCRF, (9.1.48).

119. Panchuk to Miss Hanson, Ministry of Labour, London, (30.4.49).

120. E. Wasylyshen to the UCC, PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol.16, (23.3.49).

CHAPTER FIVE - THE DP CAMP ENVIRONMENT: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES

Nobody ever forgets the lager.

Anonymous

Introduction

During, and immediately after World War II, a formidable population displacement took place. Over 30 million European refugees were left homeless in the war's aftermath.¹ Estimates of the total number of Ukrainians vary between 2.5 and 3.0 million. Most of these were persons press-ganged or recruited into the war labour of the Third Reich. Even after forcible repatriation had more than decimated this population, some 250,000 Ukrainians were left in the DP camps of Western Europe (Stebelsky, 1983). From this residual group most of the Ukrainians who were admitted to Canada were drawn.²

Understanding how particular changes in population distribution can affect the human organization of space requires establishing the volume, duration and direction of a population's movement, determining the attributes of the migrants and analyzing what attribute changes occur as a consequence of the populations' mobility and introduction into different environments.

Accordingly, this chapter is divided into several sections which present answers to what are considered to be

the basic questions traditionally associated with geographic studies of migration phenomena. Such questions include: Who were the refugees described as Ukrainians? How many Ukrainian refugees were there? What spatial patterns characterized their distribution throughout Western Europe, and how did these change through time? What were the consequences of their involuntary displacement and introduction into the *DP* camp environment? What directions did their onward movement assume and why? What spatial pattern did their relocation in Canada assume and why? And finally what were the political and social ramifications of this population redistribution on the Ukrainian nationalists within the refugee camps and on the receiving Ukrainian Canadian communities?

In providing replies to these questions, both official sources of information and data derived from this study's survey questionnaire will be utilized.

Identifying Ukrainians Among The *DPS*

As difficult as it may be to believe, the very existence of Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic or nationality group was vigorously debated during most of the immediate post-war period. The matter was raised as early as January of 1945, and continued to be at issue well into 1949. Even after the *AUGB* had been formally incorporated in England, the British Home Office (*HO*) distributed a circular which noted:

Under no circumstances will the word "Ukrainian" be

entered [on registration certificates of aliens claiming to be of Ukrainian origin.]³

Such individuals were to be listed as of "Uncertain" ethnic identity.⁴ Why Ukrainians should have been singled out for such discriminatinary procedures is described below.

A lack of political intelligence can not be given as an excuse to justify how the problem was handled. England's foreign service personnel had gathered surprisingly detailed information about the so-called "Ukrainian Question" before WW II, and continued doing so during the post-war period. Possibly, persistent Soviet complaints about Ukrainian separatist agitation left the British wary about allowing Ukrainians *DPS* much freedom of expression. Yet this does not seem to justify excluding such a category of national or ethnic identification. Thomas Brimelow candidly admitted that it was the difficulties being encountered with the Soviets, which warned off the British on the question of recognizing Ukrainians as a distinct people:

It is against the question for us to recognize the Ukrainians as a race apart, with a claim to asylum, etc. I can think of nothing more certain to cause Anglo-Soviet friction.⁵

British officials on the continent, daily faced with substantial numbers of people claiming Ukrainian identity, were not placated with the dodges of those in Whitehall who were unwilling to face this issue. Determining any given individual's identity was more than simply a routine matter

it was often the first step in deciding whether a person should be sent back to the USSR or not. Consequently, a number of British officials in Western Europe pestered the *FO* for a working definition of what the term "Ukrainian" might mean. One of the first was Hilary Young, attached to the Advance HQ of the Control Commission for Germany. Another official, Cecil King had this to write:

I am rather confused about Ukrainians. We have always told people there is no such nationality - a Ukrainian is a Pole, or a Soviet citizen, or stateless according to his origin... Consequently, [we have] at times pressed for the liquidation of Ukrainian organizations [in the *DP* camps]... Now I see from the correspondence that the Foreign Office think we have been going too far... and ought to allow Ukrainians to organize their own non-political welfare work in the British Zone... We should like above all to know what the Foreign Office mean by a Ukrainian.'

The definitional debate was eventually solved, but in a rather unsatisfactory way. Mr. A.E. Lambert (*FO*) noted that anyone who did not want to be treated as a Pole, Russian or Czechoslovak, and spoke Ukrainian, could be treated as one.⁷ This was hardly an inspired resolution of the *FO*'s conundrum, especially given its reputation as a well informed institution dealing with international affairs. Official reluctance about recognizing the Ukrainians as a

separate ethnic group did not go unnoticed by the *DPS* themselves. Nearly 51% of those surveyed indicated that they had realized the authorities did not regard Ukrainians as a distinct people.

A Related Problem - How Many Ukrainian *DPS* Are There?

The most immediate consequence of this definitional problem was reflected in the difficulties officials had in estimating the total number of Ukrainian refugees.

In this they were not alone. As Panchuk wrote to *CURB* and the *UCRF* in late February, 1946:

It can safely be said here that there isn't a town in Germany where there aren't Ukrainians and in the larger cities there are thousands. It is equally and by the same token safe to say that all estimates of Ukrainian *DPS* in Germany are underestimates. It is humanly impossible to make any sort of count. Thousands are still in hiding under every nationality and every citizenship but Ukrainian. The number of Ukrainians from Eastern (Greater) Ukraine is equal to if not larger than that from Western Ukraine, the only difference being that the Western Ukrainians, knowing that their chances of forceful repatriation is not as great come out into the open.⁸

Years after the war, a prominent European demographer, Eugene Kulischer, attempted a breakdown of Europe's post-war

population of non-returners by nationality. His estimate is provided in Table 5.1.'

Statistical information compiled by *UNRRA* also reflects the difficulties officials experienced trying to calculate a total for Ukrainian *DPS*. Their information does, however, provide a basis for describing the spatial pattern of Ukrainian refugees in Germany and Austria. As Table 5.2 indicates, most Ukrainian *DPS* found shelter in the American and British Zones of Occupation in Germany. The continuing preference shown by Ukrainian refugees for living in American controlled areas can be seen from the *PCIRO* and *IRO* statistics reproduced in Table 5.3. That this concentration was built up over time was confirmed by the survey's respondents. According to them, 42% first found refuge in Germany, a percentage that eventually grew to encompass nearly 92% of all respondents. The total number of Ukrainian *DPS* in Austria, during the same years, declined. Initially, nearly 9% of the respondents had been located there. This figure dropped to just over 4% after individuals began moving out of their first place of asylum to other *DP* camps. As Stebelsky (1983) noted, there was a definite westward shift of the Ukrainian refugee population during the immediate post-war years (1945-1947). Survey respondents confirmed this general observation.

Even after forcible repatriation had substantially depleted the total Ukrainian population of the *DP* camps (particularly the Eastern Ukrainians), a not inconsiderable

Table 5.1 Estimate of the nationalities and numbers of
Irrepatriates in Europe after World War II

<u>Nationality</u>		<u>Number</u>
Russians		40,000
Ukrainians		150,000
Byelorussians		15,000
Ingermanlanders (Finnish extraction)		18,000
Swedes		6,000
Other "Soviet Citizens"		80,000
	SUBTOTAL	309,000
Latvians	}	100,000
Estonians		55,000
Lithuanians		65,000
	All from annexed territories	
	TOTAL	529,000

Source: Based on an estimate compiled by E. Kulischer (13.8.53).

Table 5.2 Ukrainians receiving UNRRA assistance in Austria and Germany

	<u>1945</u>		<u>1946</u>		<u>1947</u>	
	<u>In Camps</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Camps</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Camps</u>	<u>Total</u>
AUSTRIA						8,064
British Zone	3,492	5,634		4,316		
French Zone						
U.S. Zone		4,196		3,047		
GERMANY						101,836
British Zone					30,234	
French Zone	983					
U.S. Zone	9,718				60,774	

Source: I. Stebelsky (1983):5

Table 5.3 Ukrainian DPs receiving PCIRO/IRO assistance

	<u>30 November</u> <u>1947</u>	<u>31 January</u> <u>1948</u>	<u>30 September</u> <u>1948</u>	<u>31 December</u> <u>1949</u>	<u>30 June</u> <u>1950</u>
AUSTRIA	7,156	6,630	6,568	6,645	2,577
British Zone	1,867	1,789			881
French Zone	2,052	2,049			520
U.S. Zone	3,237	2,792			1,176
GERMANY			73,621	46,087	
British Zone	24,700	23,538	21,567	12,983	
French Zone			4,596	552	
U.S. Zone	56,026	54,695	47,458	32,552	
ITALY	319	313	44	155	

Source: Statistical Reports of the International Refugee Office, 1947 to 1950.

Ukrainian population still remained in Western Europe's *DP* camps. According to one emigre source (Dushnyck and Gibbons, 1947), there were at least 342,861 Ukrainian non-returners. The majority of these persons were from the western regions of Ukraine, and not legally subject to *refoulement*. In order to cope with this refugee problem the United Nations established a successor to *UNRRA*, the International Refugee Organization (*IRO*). Although formally still tied to the policy of repatriation, *IRO* in fact more often opted for resettling the remaining refugees in whatever countries were willing to accept them. This process continued until the *DP* camps were virtually drained of all Ukrainians, the exception being those "hard core" cases whose infirmities rendered them unsuitable for immigrant status (insofar as receiving countries were concerned).¹⁰

Despite *IRO*'s resettlement policies, a large concentration of Ukrainian *DPS* was still to be found in the American Zone of Occupation in Germany, closely followed by the British Zone in that same country in 1947. From this source area most Ukrainian emigrants to Canada were drawn.

Emigration was particularly intense during the two year period of 1948 and 1949. According to *IRO* statistics 23.5% and 21.7% of the Ukrainians in their care left the *DP* camps during these two years. The majority of the survey's respondents (54%) indicated that they had migrated into Canada in one of these two years. According to the *Statistical Compendium* somewhere 51% and 60% of the

Ukrainian refugees coming to Canada did so in this same period.''

Likely none of these statistics are entirely accurate. The results of the questionnaire are especially useful in providing inferences about the composition of the post-war Ukrainian immigration to Canada, although even with these data caution is required. Those replying to the question about birthplace tended to have been born in the western regions of Ukraine, in particular from Galicia (58%), Volhynia (4.6%), Bukovyna (2.6%), Lemkyvschyna (1.3%) and Transcarpathian Ukraine (1.2%). Only a relatively small group (9.2%) indicated that their birthplace was in Eastern Ukraine, while 16.5% left this biographical detail unrecorded. Presumably, many of the latter were Eastern Ukrainians, as discussed in Chapter Three.

Ukrainians often shunned living in *DP* camps because of the ever-present danger posed to them there by Soviet repatriation missions and secret police forces. The reality of the threat is vividly portrayed in a letter *CURB* received from an unnamed Allied officer:

In the midst of the "anarchy" which in appearance seems to prevail in the American Zone, Soviet secret agents move about quite frequently. They seek out the Americans and try often to corrupt them. They are very anxious to get hold of Ukrainians and of other "Soviet citizens" who might eventually become "dangerous." I hear of several

specific cases in which Americans carried such people across the demarcation line, with hands and feet bound... Individual Americans secured considerable personal rewards for these kidnappings. The Czechs are also out man-hunting (for Slovaks)...local people are trying to organize their own self-defence ...Personal security is precarious... *UNRRA* is an institution in which heartlessness and corruption is only concealed by hypocrisy. In Salzburg, I saw myself how, on an icy night, *UNRRA* officials...threw out of a barracks camp *DP* women with their children, refugees from the Soviet Zone, clad only in underclothes. Belsen-Bergen are not ended.¹²

The difficulties of estimating how many Ukrainians there were, given these dynamic circumstances, prompted *CURB* to try and provide its own statistics, which Panchuk claimed were "closest to the truth." As of January, 1947, *CURB* figures show that there were 250,000 Ukrainian *DPS*, distributed as follows,

U.S. Zone of Occupation.....70,000

British Zone of Occupation in Germany25,000

French Zone of Occupation in Germany10,000

Austria.....20,000

Italy (not including Ukrainian Division "Galicia")...1,500

Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland, Norway, Spain and Sweden.....23,000 to 80,000.

Later *CURB* even re-evaluated this estimate, adding some 20-30% to the total Ukrainian refugee population in Germany, and nearly doubling that given for Austria.¹³ This information is summarized in Table 5.4.¹⁴

Where Were The Ukrainian *DPS*?

Whereas the aforementioned statistical information provides an areal description of the Ukrainian *DP* population it does little to suggest what type of environment these refugees found themselves in.


Most Ukrainian *DPS* resided in camps officially known as "assembly centres," the majority of which were found in Germany and Austria. While in the immediate weeks after the war's conclusion, these camps were ethnically heterogeneous, in compliance with the military's "standfast" orders, persistent efforts on the part of the various ethnic groups eventually resulted in a situation where many *DP* camps came to be dominated or almost entirely populated by one or another nationality. This was a welcome development, from the point of view of the military government, since *DP*-related incidents of violence decreased with the dissolution of multi-ethnic camps, in which inter-ethnic friction was sometimes intense.¹⁵ Given the intermingling of ethnic groups in Eastern Europe before WW II, and their often strained relations, the re-appearance of this tension in the *DP* camps is not surprising (Figure 5.1). The hostile feelings many Ukrainians harboured about other nationalities

Table 5.4 Ukrainian DPs in Austria and Germany

	<u>March</u> <u>1946</u>	<u>August</u> <u>1947</u>	<u>February</u> <u>1948</u>	<u>January</u> <u>1949</u>	<u>January</u> <u>1950</u>
AUSTRIA					
All Western zones	29,241	26,422	17,786	10,680	3,640
GERMANY					
British Zone	54,580	44,987	35,108	24,923	12,983
French Zone	19,026	9,922	6,130	4,074	2,841
U.S. Zone	104,024	85,646	78,504	56,611	No Data
Total	206,871	167,977	137,528	96,288	No Data

Source: CURB Reports 1948-1949. PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol. 17.

Figure 5.1 Eastern Europe's ethnogeographic setting during the inter-war period.



Source: N. Davies, *GOD'S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND* (1981), 67.

in indicated in Table 5.5 in which questionnaire respondents rank-order other groups in terms of their perceived attitudes towards Ukrainian independence. Obviously, as far as these Ukrainians were concerned, their ethnic group had no friends in the world. Even the Americans, British and Canadians were considered to be (at best) "indifferent" to Ukrainian aspirations.

To cope, Ukrainians deliberately segregated within the *DP* camps, maintaining contacts with other ethnic groups largely through their appointed intermediaries. Later, they attempted to form camps that were as ethnically homogeneous as possible. That such a process took place is evidenced in the survey responses. Nearly 73% of those polled indicated that Ukrainians had deliberately attempted to form their own camps, essentially because the nationalities originally represented in these centres had not lived harmoniously. As this process took place various nationalists were re-assigned among the *DP* camps, to ensure an adequate coverage of these centres by representatives of the nationalist movement, (Plate 5.1).

This was not simply an idiosyncratic response. Many Ukrainians strongly felt that they had been persecuted and discriminated against mainly because of their identification with the Ukrainian ethnic group. The survey results tend to support their claim. Just over 37% of the respondents indicated that they had left their home areas during the war because of a "fear of persecution." Over 11% were

Table 5.5 Perception of other ethnic groups by
Questionnaire respondents

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Degree of Negativity *</u>
1. Poles	76.7%
2. Non-Soviet Russians	76.6%
3. Soviets	72.8%
4. Hungarians	70.5%
5. Jews	57.2%
6. Germans	48.2%

Source: Questionnaire research (Luciuk, 1984).

* Question 14. In your opinion, what attitude did the nationality group listed below have with respect to the Ukrainian question (that is the formation, before World War II, of an independent Ukrainian state)? (Negative/Indifferent/Positive)



Plate 5.1 Relocation of an OUNr member and his family
from Gellendorf DP camp to Damlop Kasserne,
Germany, 1950.

Ostarbeiter and nearly 13.5% had been incarcerated in prisons or concentration camps. Their sense of having been persecuted or discriminated against is also captured in the results of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System (see Chapter Three). In that survey it was found that nearly 80% of the surveyed Soviet refugees had either direct experience of arrest, or had family members who were incarcerated before the war (Elliott, 1982).

Within the *DP* camps, internal administrative duties were soon taken over by the inhabitants themselves. Effectively the *DP* camps eventually became "*DP* Republics," or where Ukrainians were concentrated "Little Ukraines." By late February of 1946, Panchuk was reporting that "every camp" had its own committee consisting of the *DPS* themselves. Where the Ukrainians did not form a majority within a camp, there they formed their own "camp within a camp."¹⁶ So attached did they become to these places that the *UCRF*'s Wasylyshens reported that when Ukrainian *DPS* were finally told they would be relocated, they were:

very much upset by the threatened move, for they have come to feel that this is a Ukrainian village, with its own church, hall, dramatic society, *gymnasia*.¹⁷

Indeed, these *DP* camps did become hearths of intense political, social, cultural, and even religious revival for Ukrainians. Such a *milieu* had a distinct utility of its own, so much so that nearly 68% of the survey's respondents noted

that they deliberately delayed their emigration, believing that they could comfortably await a possible return to Ukraine in these camps.

This attitude, once it became widely known to *UNRRA* and later *IRO* officials, was troubling, since it promised to upset their plans for repatriating or resettling these *DPS* elsewhere. They were perturbed for other reasons as well. The British, for example, were noting that by mid-July, 1947, some *DP* camps had become bases for "various politico-military" groups, who were engaged in cross-border raids, a situation likely to create international political complications.¹⁸ For *UNRRA* workers, the formation within the *DP* camps of Ukrainian communities was sometimes deplored since these "villages" were, often as not, organized around nationalistic tenets, which were usually anti-Soviet and anti-repatriation in tone. Thomas Brimelow (*FO*) recorded his own views on the strains appearing between *UNRRA* officials and the Ukrainians, as follows:

The point of the *UNRRA* complaint... is surely that such organizations as the *UHVR* are working through their agents amongst the Ukrainian *DPS* and stirring up hatred of the USSR, thus thwarting *UNRRA*'s wish to send the *DPS* home...

On this question the interests of *UNRRA* are at one with those of the USSR, which wants no propaganda to be conducted against itself and would like to get back all its *DPS*, lest they do harm

abroad. We must therefore expect *UNRRA* opposition to any non-Soviet organization.¹⁹

UNRRA's personnel were often suspected of harbouring pro-Soviet sentiments. About 57% of the respondents to the questionnaire indicated that they believed *UNRRA* officials were biased against Ukrainians, while some 45% felt that Ukrainians had been the worst-treated of all *DPs*.

That these Ukrainian refugees were not alone in having reservations about *UNRRA* workers' political beliefs is seen in Panchuk's correspondence. He wrote:

UNRRA appointed among the Repatriation Officers some who were notorious for their pro-Communist views and others who readily followed the philo-Communist lead.²⁰

Even after *IRO* replaced *UNRRA* some of these apprehensions remained. Many former *UNRRA* workers had managed to secure positions in *IRO*. These persons, Panchuk claimed, were doing everything possible to impede *CURB*'s work, while their political beliefs made it essential for Ukrainian Canadians on the continent to "tread warily."

Since *UNRRA* and *IRO* both relocated refugees, the Ukrainian *DP* population could only decline, especially after *IRO* began its emigration work. Consequently, no comprehensive list of all the *DP* camps where Ukrainians developed communities of their own is available, although Stebelsky's (1983) inventory is a very commendable effort in this direction.

Available information suggests that, in 1948, there were approximately 20 Ukrainian-populated *DP* camps in Austria, nearly 90 in the British Zone of Germany, some 20 in the French Zone of Germany, and just over 150 in the American Zone of Germany. The data Stebelsky gathered have been mapped, providing an illustration both of the distribution and relative size of various Ukrainian populated *DP* camps throughout West Germany and Austria, (Figure 5.2).

While the existence of these *DP* camps was relatively transitory, many Ukrainians did spend between several months and several years in such places. Few of the survey's respondents spent less than a year (2%), remaining in such centres between three (9%) and four years (10%). Of this group, the majority stayed in the first *DP* camp they listed for nearly two and a half years, while those who went onto a second *DP* camp tended to remain there from one (49%) to two years (after which 69% had departed elsewhere). The extent of the movement that took place between *DP* camps, presumably as Ukrainians attempted to relocate to the centres of Ukrainian *DP* life, is depicted in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. Very few individuals spent time in four or more *DP* camps.

Before ending this section it is worthwhile recollecting the major points made about the spatial patterns characterizing the *DP* population and the changes which occurred in these. Ukrainian *DPS* were primarily concentrated in the American Zone of Occupation in Germany. As time passed, this population shifted westward, away from

Figure 5.2 Ukrainian DP camps in Western Europe.



Source: Ihor Siebelsky UKRAINIAN POPULATION MIGRATION AFTER WORLD WAR II unpublished paper (1983) presented to 'The DP Experience: Ukrainian Refugees After World War II: A Conference' University of Toronto

Figure 5.3 Year of arrival of Ukrainian refugees in DP camps for Questionnaire respondents, 1945-1950.





Figure 5.4 Year of departure of Ukrainian refugees from DP camps for Questionnaire respondents, 1945-1950.



the Soviets, the relocating population settling predominantly in the American and, secondly, the British Zones of Occupation in Germany. Here, presumably, they felt relatively secure. As this process occurred, Ukrainians also attempted to cluster into *DP* camps with other members of their ethnic group. In effect, this created distinct Ukrainian centres throughout Western Europe. In time these were linked by unofficial courier networks, maintained not only by the two *OUN* factions but also by other political, cultural and religious organizations. The Ukrainian populated *DP* camps, in effect, came to constitute their own system, within which available information, physical and human resources circulated. This development presented the Ukrainian nationalists, who as was noted had taken internal control over many of these centres, with a "captive audience," one which they could, with some efficiency, subject to a uniform message. The consequences of this *DP* camp hiatus, what Kunz (1973) referred to as the "midway-to-nowhere" period, will be described below.

Characterizing *DPS* - An Official View

Shortly after the war's end, British officials were already bemoaning the behaviour of the *DPS*, asserting that this was proving to be "one of the most difficult problems facing our authorities."²¹ Although later observers, such as Lieut. General Sir Frederick Morgan might be more sympathetic,²² as late as 1947, the *FO* was still noting


that:

The *DP* Question is one of the least inspiring of post-war problems.^{2 3}

Still, it had to be dealt with, so well before WW II's concluding months, Allied specialists were seconded to the invading armies, to prepare reports on the refugee problem that had been foreseen as early as 1942. For example, special intelligence units of the Supreme Allied Expeditionary Force (*SHAEF*) were attached to the latter's Psychological Warfare Division. Between September 17-20, 1944 one such advance section surveyed a refugee camp near Verdun, which it described as being "fairly typical" of what was being encountered throughout Western Europe. This team's observations are useful for they were made well before the end of the war, although at a time when the tide had clearly turned in favour of the Allies.

One of the first points made was that the refugees were clustered into delapidated camps suffering from great "disrepair." In such places people of all ages (although young men predominated) were clustered. According to this *SHAEF* report, most of the camp inhabitants were simple farmers and workers. How accurate this observation was it is difficult to gauge. The *Statistical Compendium* provides a breakdown of post-WW II Ukrainian immigrants to Canada by occupational groupings (Figure 5.5) which seems to indicate greater heterogeneity, with nearly 27% being farmers, 40% unskilled labourers and 27% skilled workers. Survey

Figure 5.5 Occupational groupings among Ukrainian DP immigrants to Canada, 1947-1952.



respondents provided an even more variegated description of their occupational backgrounds, as Table 5.6 indicates.

The *SHAEF* team made other observations. It noted that within the *DP* camp "the wildest melodrama is commonplace." Rumours abounded, and despite the outwardly stolid visages of many refugees, great inner tensions were building up. These were frequently relieved "by outbursts of animal vitality." Given that most refugees had been exposed to "uprooting of the most violent kind" this psychological condition was understandable, or so these Allied specialists concluded. As far as they could tell, there was also no political leadership active in the camps. That, they opined, would come later, once most refugees had settled and taken care of the more basic problems of finding a place to sleep and enough to eat.²⁴

After the cessation of hostilities another group was sent to the continent to report on the refugees. Known as the InterAllied Psychological Study Group this team, composed of eminent psychologists, sociologists, and welfare workers, was formally constituted under the auspices of *UNRRA*'s European office in June, 1945. Its conclusions were summarized in a report simply titled, *Psychological Problems Of Displaced Persons*. This monograph is perhaps the most astute assessment of the consequences of the post-WW II refugee experience, and certainly surpasses in insight other post-war literature available on this topic.²⁵

Table 5.6 Occupational groupings of Questionnaire respondents

<u>Occupation (Pre-WW II)</u>	<u>Percentage of Total</u>
Professional	21.8
Skilled labourer	18.4
Student	17.6
Unskilled labourer	16.6
Clerical	10.0
Farmer	8.3
Military personnel	1.6
Religious vocation	1.5
Businessman	0.4
Other	4.0

Source: Questionnaire research (Luciuk, 1984).

The report started from the assumption that the moral and psychological disturbances caused by the war far outweighed the physical destruction. Although readily admitting that it would be "extremely difficult" to measure the effects of the refugee experience on the "victims" the compilers of the report set out to do so.

One of their first observations was that most *DPS* were in a state of "regression," precipitated by their severance from all the ties individuals normally enjoy with their families, communities and homelands, and draw on when under stress. Left without this support system, they could not help but be affected by the trauma of their refugee experience. Their plight had been further exacerbated by the scale and intensity of the danger they faced, for the *Nazis* had waged nothing less than a "biological war on population trends."

Many *DPS* were consequently left uncertain about what their fate would be. This caused a "hidden conflict" to emerge between every individual's "primitive need for affection" and the "dread of further rejection by a world which has already shown hostility."

Some refugees compensated for the situation they found themselves in by seeking personal power and influence. By so doing they hoped to regain the status they had lost during the war. Others aligned themselves with groups forming in the *DP* camps, associations which promised some purpose and safety to members.

All of these processes were rooted in the "mass emotions" which dominated the *DP* camps, destroying the need for individuality otherwise normal among human beings:

Many *DPS* come to live in groups bound mainly by the common difficulties of their situation and unduly segregated from their home community, not only by space but in many cases by guilt over real or imagined "collaboration with the enemy." Unless they receive active understanding and co-operation [they] may tend to form small, selfish groups whose main characteristic to the outside observer is their hostility to other groups of the same kind and their unwillingness to co-operate with central authority or with the community as a whole²⁶

Does this observation have relevance to this study? According to 78% of the survey respondents, Ukrainians from the various regions of Ukraine coalesced inside the *DP* camps and began thinking of themselves as one ethnic group, whatever the political differences there might still be between them. As well, in these *DP* camps, Ukrainian organizations similar to those which had prevailed (particularly in Western Ukraine) were re-created (according to 82% of the respondents). While 74% felt that these same groups had competed against each other for control over the *DP* camps, most also indicated that the problem was resolved as a "pecking order" developed throughout the *DP* camp system. While intra-group rivalries were never totally eliminated

(61% noted this fact), the *Banderivtsi* managed to impose their particular type of control over the majority of the camps, instilling their own version of the Ukrainian nationalist worldview in the the other *DP* camp inhabitants. Often this was accomplished through their control over the *DP* camp internal police forces, which maintained order not only inside these centres but also provided protection against Soviet kidnapping expeditions and *provacateurs*. Such camp police forces were run on para-military lines, (Plate 5.2).

While recognizing that there was no discernably "uniform" *DP* psychology, the Study Group did hypothesize that there was one common sentiment which bound most of the refugees together. This they described as **the compulsive need to return home** [emphasis added]. How could this sentiment be identified?

It requires no deep insight into human nature to realise that during the whole of their stay in the assembly centre the feelings, thoughts, and actions of the *DPS* are likely to revolve very steadily round the central theme of when and how they will find their way back to their old or new community and of what it will be like when they get there.²⁷



Plate 5.2 Members of a Ukrainian security police
 detachment in the Falkenburg DP camp,
 Germany, 1946.

Fulfilling Their Mandate: The Role Of The Nationalist Cadres In The *DP* Camps.

As noted in Chapter 1, the *OUNr* (and other Ukrainian nationalist groups) persuasively argued that they, the vanguard of the contemporary Ukrainian liberation movement, would fulfill this "compulsive need to return home" on the part of the *DPS*. Using this as a rallying theme, they were able to influence the way in which Ukrainian *DPS* distributed themselves across Western Europe, how long they stayed there, and both when and where some of them eventually resettled.

To fulfill the mandate given them, the *OUN* cadres had to overcome several formidable obstacles. While Ukrainians formed a large minority within the overall *DP* population of post-war Europe, there were other forces hostile to the recognition of Ukrainians as a distinct people. Such actors strove to deny the existence of such an ethnic category, failing which they tried to minimize official recognition of the numbers involved.

Furthermore, the *DP* camps contained Ukrainians from the various regions of Ukraine. While most Eastern Ukrainians would become the unfortunate victims of forcible repatriation, Galicians, Bukovynians, Volhynians, Carpatho-Ukrainians, Lemkos, and Bessarabians could be found, among whom there hid a residual population of Eastern Ukrainians (who comprised about 30% of the total Ukrainian *DP* population.) Matters were further complicated by

religious differences. Whereas most Volhynians and Eastern Ukrainians were Ukrainian Orthodox believers, Western Ukrainians were generally of the Uniate (Greek) Catholic faith. A small percentage of the *DPS* were Roman Catholics, Baptists and adherents of other Protestant denominations. Finally, an undetermined number of those raised under the Soviet regime had no formal religious upbringing.

Political persuasions also varied. Not only were the refugee camps frequently the scene of internecine competition between the *DUNr* and *DUNS*, but there remained in the diaspora followers of the late Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, supporters of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*UNDO*) that had been active in the inter-war Polish *Sejm* and those favouring the Ukrainian National Government in Exile, to name but a few. Added to this was the appearance in the camps of new political organizations, such as the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (*URDP*), which drew for support on the basis of regional identification, in this case, that of the Eastern Ukrainians.

Such internal differentiation stymied the efforts of those charged with coalescing the Ukrainian *DPS* into a community capable of sustaining an active insurrection. Friction between Eastern and Western Ukrainians erupted as the nationalists attempted to consolidate the *DP* camps under their auspices. These conflicts became so intense that the former derogatively referred to the latter as Poles, provoking a response in kind, as Western Ukrainians branded

their detractors Russians. No unity seemed likely to arise on its own within these refugee camps, yet consolidation was precisely what the *OUN* nationalists were expected to accomplish. How were they to do so?

In their favour the *OUN* cadres had an organizational elan, experience, and reputation built up through years of surreptitious activity under difficult conditions. Operating among enemies they had already proven that they could be moderately successful in advancing their cause, so within the *DP* camps they enjoyed an inherent advantage. They could also harvest the diffuse support their movement had among the majority of Western Ukrainian youth, who had lent them support in the inter-war period.

Yet some of this inherent strength had already been dissipated. Factional infighting during the war alienated some supporters, and when it again reared up in some *DP* camps, the tolerance of Ukrainian refugees who might have backed the nationalist movement was further strained. Also competing appeals for financial support stressed a population already pauperized by the war, producing resentment against what essentially was a war tax.


If unity could not be expected to arise independently, then the *OUN* cadres reasoned it would have to be imposed. Both factions were well qualified to undertake just such an effort. They had disciplined operatives in place, some ties with Ukraine, and a strong sense of belief in their cause. Both factions undertook to quickly redeploy their members in

the West in order to recreate their covert network within and outside the *DP* camp system. By 1948, and probably much earlier, an extensive *OUN* establishment was implanted throughout the emigration, with each faction strenuously competing to establish its hegemony over the non-aligned Ukrainian *DPS* ; the extent of one faction's network, and its members' regional backgrounds are illustrated in Figure 5.6. Given that the *OUNr* was the more powerful of the leading nationalist groups, its system must have been even more pervasive.

To have lasting influence the nationalists realized they would have to do more than simply re-establish their networks. Such efforts might be sufficient to husband their committed members, but would do little to influence the majority of the camp dwellers.

Accordingly a schooling process began. As each *DP* camp gradually evolved from being merely a makeshift assembly centre to a community in microcosm - they came to be remembered as "Little Ukraines" and "Ukrainian *DP* Republics" - both *OUN* factions energetically attempted the takeover of the internal administration of these centres. Once occupying such positions of authority, they could then attempt to rally uncommitted *DPS* to their respective organizations. While superficially the prize they fought for was control of each *DP* camp, the issue was a more fundamental one, involving a struggle for each factions' survival. Converts were required to ensure that the movement would have

Figure 5.6 Network of the OUNs in Austria, 1946-1948.



resources sufficient to persist. It was soon realized that reliance on the small pool of *OUN* cadres who had been positioned in the West alone, left the movement with very little prospect of surviving for any significant length of time.

Eventually, the *Banderivtsi* achieved near-supremacy in most *DP* camps. This was undoubtedly one of the most significant developments of the *DP* camp period and, indeed, of the post-WW II Ukrainian refugee experience, imparting as it did to the general refugee population the appearance of being dominantly *OUNr* in sympathies. In truth the *OUNr* was only one of several competing political factions active within the *DP* camps, although its appeal was widespread and penetrated to the depths of Ukrainian *DP* society.

As a consequence of such nationalist efforts, and particularly because the complex of educational, cultural, social, political, and even religious institutions found in the *DP* camps passed under the control of one or the other nationalist group, most Ukrainian *DPs* who found themselves in these niches - usually for a period of one or more years - came to closely identify with the nationalist movement. While before the war many had been content to culturally distinguish themselves as Ukrainians, after the *DP* experience most began assigning a political significance to this ethnic identification. As one *OUN* r sympathizer described it:

Before World War II the River Zbruch had

geographically served as a demarcation line between two Ukraines, Eastern and Western. This was buried in the *DP* camps. There we all got together, met each other, and educated each other. A schooling, that was the nature of the *DP* experience! ²⁸

Some even concluded that their refugee trauma was directly a consequence of this particular ethnic affiliation. Few who passed through the *DP* camps emerged without believing that they were *political* refugees, even if before the war, they had shown little or no inclination to become active in Ukrainian politics. While many *OUN* members regarded this transformation with a mixture of amusement and disdain, the fact remains that it was largely their work that brought about this attitude change among the *DPS*.

The nature of the *DP* camp experience suggests an answer as to why it was relatively easy for the nationalists to so transform other Ukrainian refugees. Possibly the most characteristic element of the refugee experience is the tremendous uncertainty of a refugee's situation. Each individual is constantly faced with confusing signals about what the future might bring. For Ukrainians after WW II, the most perturbing question facing them was where they would go next. They were aware that, in common with many other Eastern Europeans, they could be forcibly repatriated to the U.S.S.R. under the terms of the now notorious Yalta Agreement. Between 1945 and 1947 this had been the usual fate of those Eastern Ukrainians born or raised in areas

under Soviet rule before September 1, 1939. This impelled population flow to the east was resisted by Ukrainians and other *DPs*, as numerous suicides attest.²⁹ Yet vehement protests had not stopped repatriation. Those who escaped did so only by hiding or by forging their personal identity documents. Many Eastern Ukrainians were saved by Western Ukrainians who coached them in the regional geography, customs and norms of Western Ukraine, reportedly training those subject to screening so well that some were able to recite the prices of common food items in Western Ukrainian villages, draw street maps of the same, and name local personages, such as the village priest. The *OUN*, long practised in the tradecraft of subterfuge, played an important role in helping rescue Eastern Ukrainians in this manner.³⁰

Ironically, those who had fought Poland in the inter-war period could, after WW II, find shelter in the fact that legally they were citizens of Poland and therefore not subject to compulsory repatriation. Yet even these Ukrainians had to be careful. Soviet agents regularly prowled the streets around *DP* camps, abducting anyone unfortunate enough to fall prey. Since Ukrainians were not regarded by the Western Allies as a distinct people³¹, their organizations were actively discouraged or even suppressed. This left them with few organized means for ensuring personal security or making their grievances known to the authorities overseeing the functioning of the *DP* camps.

Ukrainians who could claim Polish citizenship were generally not able to make much use of this fact other than in being able to refuse repatriation to the Soviet Union. The new communist government of Poland was (not surprisingly), disinterested in the return of those same Ukrainians who had fueled an irredentist controversy in territories the Poles considered to be their own. The new regime was already entering into agreements with neighbouring states regarding the transfer of minority ethnic group populations, a process which imposed a measure of ethnic homogeneity throughout Eastern Europe. Ukrainians from that residual slice of Eastern Galicia retained by Poland (most of which had been incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) were transferred to newly acquired areas in the north-west. This step effectively eliminated the population and support base on which UPA counted, choking the insurgency.

No matter where they had been born, or lived before WW II, or even who they claimed to be (or were!) most Ukrainian *DPS* soon came to appreciate that their fate in the refugee camps was, at best, rather precarious.

Showing a brilliant appreciation of these factors, and of the psychology of *DPS*,³² the Ukrainian nationalists counterposed to the refugees' uncertainty and apathy their own brand of certitude. They assured their fellow *DPS* that a return to Ukraine was possible and indeed likely, if only most other Ukrainians rallied in support of the *OUN* and

UPA/UHVR. Once the latter had secured victory everyone would be able to return to their area of origin, leaving behind the inhospitable conditions prevailing in the DP camps of the West. Furthermore, the place they would return to would be even more attractive than what they recalled, since all the enemies of the Ukrainian people would have been purged from there. These were promises held out to a population, involuntarily displaced and searching for the meaning and purpose to the experiences they had undergone and would yet have to endure. Under the conditions prevailing in the DP camps, these promises were virtually irresistible.

Around the refugees' compulsive need to return home both factions of the OUN rallied individuals to their support. If these men and women did not directly join the Organization they nevertheless gave to it their material and moral support. Eventually the majority of the Ukrainian DPs living in refugee camps came to, more or less, adopt the nationalist position as their own. So endemic did their expectation of a return to Ukraine become that it was often remarked that they lived in the camps "sitting on packed suitcases." This description would later be transported to Canada, where it would be used derogatively by those alienated by the DPs' behaviour here.

To promulgate the belief that the OUN formed a vanguard which would route the DPs back to their true destination, the nationalists developed an extensive publications network, which spawned hundreds of newspapers, journals,

booklets, magazines and leaflets during its existence.³³ Controlling the nature of the news reaching the camp inhabitants became an important cornerstone of the nationalist effort in the *DP* camp system.

Although both factions of the *OUN* attracted new members to their ranks there was little time to subject each possible candidate to the rigorous enlistment procedures that had been the rule in the inter-war period. Selectivity was sacrificed to attract a large number of recruits. Thus many of those brought into the *OUNr* and *OUNS* during the *DP* camp period were not of the same calibre as those enlisting their aid. Many who volunteered did so for opportunistic reasons, hoping that by aligning themselves with the obvious power elite in the *DP* camps they would secure personal advantage. Since the *Banderivtsi* attracted more individuals than the *OUNS*, this faction was the more adversely affected by the membership influx that took place within the *DP* camps. Some would later pejoratively refer to these new members as *camp Banderivtsi*.

Neither faction had much choice about whether or not to actively recruit. Only by involving a much broader spectrum of the *DP* population could they hope to mobilize the majority of the *DPS*, most of them young and restless men, already anti-communist but lacking a focus for their energies and a goal towards which to aspire. Since the *OUN* cadres firmly believed that the *DP* camp period was only a transitory phase, they accepted the obvious risks of a rapid

expansion in membership. No doubt they assumed that those found unfit to remain in the Organization could be weeded out after the return to Ukraine they all expected would occur in the near future.

The number of new members brought into the *OUNr* and *OUNs* during this immediate post-WW II period is unknown. It must have been considerable, given both the pervasive influence the nationalists came to enjoy throughout the *DP* camp system and the subsequent salience of nationalist organizations in the diaspora. Eventually these secondary cadres, hatched within the *DP* camps, came to have considerable influence within the nationalist movement, particularly as the spatial and temporal separation from Ukraine continued unabated. All but the most stalwart *OUN* members came to realize that the fate awaiting them was the life of frustration typical of political emigres.

Whether a realistic expectation or not, 44% of those polled indicated that they had sincerely believed that an independent Ukraine would emerge after WW II. Indeed, the majority of the respondents had actively struggled to achieve just such a state of affairs during the war. This is evident in a comparison between the respondents' pre-war and WW II organizational affiliations. For example, when Table 5.7 is compared to Table 5.8 it becomes clear that many individuals who had participated in patriotic but not necessarily militantly nationalistic groups did, subsequently, align themselves with such forces. For

Table 5.7 Organizational affiliations of Questionnaire respondents before WW II.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Percentage of Total</u>
1. Prosvita Society	35.0
2. Youth Organization	27.8
3. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists	21.0
4. Co-Operative Movement	10.2
5. UNDO	2.1
6. Hetman Movement	0.6
7. Other (No Response or No Allegiance)	3.3

Source: Questionnaire research (Luciuk, 1984).

Table 5.8 Organizational affiliations of Questionnaire respondents during and after WW II.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Percentage of Total</u>
1. OUNr	23.2
2. Ukrainian Division "Galicia"	17.1
3. Prisoner-of-War	9.5
4. OUNs	8.2
5. Ukrainian Central Committee	7.8
6. Ukrainian Insurgent Army	7.2
7. Ostarbeiter	4.3
8. Red Army Deserter	3.3
9. Polish Forces	2.9
10. Ostlegion Troops	1.9
11. Bulba-Borovets Partisans	0.9
12. Roland or Nachtigall Batallions	0.8
13. Hiwi (Auxillary Service)	0.6
14. Other No Allegiance or No Response	12.3

Source: Questionnaire research (Luciuk, 1984).

example, while only 21% were members of the *OUN* before the war, during it this percentage grew to just over 31%, while a significant number were also involved with military formations like the Ukrainian Division "Galicia" or the *UPA*. While these categories were not mutually exclusive, the fact remains that it is essentially the same population that is being compared in the prewar and WW II tables. Feeling themselves to be oppressed by the Soviets because of their national, ethnic, or political beliefs, many Ukrainians actively opposed the USSR during WW II, and fled from that power as it became established on Ukrainian territories. Significantly 82% gave as their opinion that they felt "the West" had betrayed the Ukrainians and acquiesced in Soviet hegemony being imposed on their homeland.

How did the *DP* hiatus affect those exposed to it? Overwhelmingly, it was perceived as a negative experience, at least insofar as material comforts and basic necessities were concerned. Some 56% felt that there had been no privacy and significant numbers unfavourably recalled the privations they had endured in the *DP* camps. When asked to comment on the influence of *DP* camp experience upon them, the majority (59%) noted that it was during this phase of the refugee experience that they came to more closely associate themselves with the tenets of Ukrainian nationalism. By way of comparison, only 40% felt that it was their involuntary displacement which enhanced their sense of ethnic belonging to the Ukrainian group. Significantly, those who felt that

the DP camp experience had no influence whatsoever on their political and social affiliations were those men and women who had, well before WW II, already committed themselves to the nationalist movement - that is members of the OUN .

The survey evidence then, corroborates what the archival and oral material also underscored, namely that during the refugee camp period migrant attribute changes occurred. Here many Ukrainians, now DPS came to learn more about the nationalist movement, its ongoing insurgency, and worldview. The nationalists quickly also came to control many aspects of daily life in the DP camps. Their tenets imbued the social, cultural, and political life of these centres. Their over-riding imperative, to secure an independent and united Ukrainian nationstate was incessantly proclaimed to be the goal to which all Ukrainians should aspire, subjugating personal interests to this cause. Gradually, the majority of the DPS came, at least in part, to share these convictions, a fact that was not lost on outside observers. As a FO observer noted, by the spring of 1947, the Ukrainian DPS had "developed a story between them which they now believed after repeating it so often."^{3 4}

What was that story? Partially, it was that the Soviets were persecuting those who had been forced back to Ukraine, even killing them. The OUN used this information to rally DPS to its ranks, promising them a safe, albeit as yet distant return to their home areas, in return for their contemporary solidarity with the Organization. While the

British were correct in observing that many *DPS* came to believe these alarming reports from behind the Iron Curtain, and to repeat them as fact, they were wrong in dismissing such accounts as propaganda. As is now well known the fate of many of those repatriated to the communist-held territories of Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, was grim.

Since many *DPS* came to believe that only a nationalist triumph would allow them a relatively unimpeded opportunity to return home, they lent their material and moral support to the Ukrainian nationalist movement. As noted above, they even came to share in the ideological and philosophical precepts of this movement. This attitudinal change on the part of the majority of the *DPS* was the single-most salient process occurring during the post-WW II Ukrainian refugee experience.

The psychological alteration characterizing many refugees after they had spent some time in *DP* camps was noted by the Study Group. It suggested the following behavioural consequences:

The sense of reality has become enfeebled, and there is a tendency to revel in fantasies about the return home, and about the well-remembered family festivities, which are idealized to an extraordinary extent. Such thoughts tend to lead into a dream world. Thus those who are full of fear escape reality. More and more the mechanism of thinking is dominated by fantasies. Nothing must

get into the way of the world of dreams.³⁵

The desire to return "home" was not a simplistic wish to go back to the same physical landscape that had been vacated under duress. The Study Group cautioned its audience about the deeper significance of this belief:

Their desire is not so much for geographical replacement as for a return to an emotional security which they may or may not as a matter of actual fact, have known. Fact, however, plays a smaller part than fantasy, and there are few irrepatriates to whom fantasies are not an essential factor in maintaining emotional stability...³⁶

How widespread was this belief in a return "home" among Ukrainian *DPS*? Of the respondents, 89% claimed that they would willingly have returned to Ukraine if that land had somehow been set free, even a few years after their relocation in Canada. A sizeable minority, nearly 46%, still retain such a belief. These people, by and large, were to form the nucleus around which such post-WW II organizations as *LVU*, *SUM*, and similar groups were to form in Canada. This attitude, spawned in the *DP* camps, they brought with them to those countries in which they resettled. It prepared them to willingly support those post-WW II organizations in the diaspora which promised to lead them back to Ukraine, and, largely, spurn all others.

How could such a development occur? A slim majority of survey respondents felt that Ukraine would only be freed if the West were willing to support the liberation struggle. Nearly 45% felt that only a Third World War could precipitate such a revision. A strong majority (71%) felt that Ukraine would only attain independence if the Ukrainian people there rose in revolt, aided and abetted from abroad by Ukrainian nationalists. In short, they continued to assign themselves a critical role in the national liberation process, even though they have been separated from events in their home area for several decades.

For Ukrainian Canadians encountering such DP attitudes, it was incomprehensible that the refugees were apparently unwilling to try to settle in Canada, preferring to concern themselves with plotting about how to get "home." Most Ukrainians in Canada had long since abandoned such interests, if they had ever entertained them. Canada was their "home" and they wanted the DPs to feel as they did. As for the DPs' talk of WW III, Kaye had this to say:

They are all banking on the assumption that the war is imminent in a month or two and that they will be the king pins in it. The idea is being fed to them by a very vociferous but politically ignorant and immature *provid* [leadership] and they listen to it.³⁷

Whatever Ukrainian Canadian frustrations may have been, the Ukrainian DPs arriving among them were neither what they

expected, nor often what they wanted. As Panchuk recorded shortly after leading the *CRM* back onto the continent:

Political differences are now quite alive among the Ukrainian *DPS*. Though it is pretty well kept under the surface and is not openly displayed. It is more of a struggle for the minds of the masses of the *DPS* [emphasis added] than a struggle between the political groups. In other words each group is trying to win for itself the support of the non-partisan people.³⁸

Naively, Panchuk and other Ukrainian Canadians still felt at that time that political unity among the *DPS* could be achieved if some "authoritative person from Canada or the USA was there to get the...leaders together and apply some pressure."³⁹ This hope of being able to export the *UCC* model overseas for *DP* consumption was a failure, as shall be explained below.

Patterns of Emigration

Various schemes were suggested about how to best resolve the vexing *DP* problem. They shared a geographical underpinning, although this ranged from proposals of dispersal to those of concentration. An early British view was that *DPS* be established in selected "AREAS" which would resemble ethnic "islands" scattered throughout Germany. These would be self-administered by the refugees, although under Allied control; the advantage was to be found in

placing "racial groups" together instead of mixing them, which only provoked criminal incidents. This scheme had the further advantage of providing the *DPS* with "breathing space" between the time when they had to decide whether or not to return to their "Motherland."⁴⁰

Another suggestion was that the *DPS*, as quickly as possible, should be "scattered" around the world, and as "far and wide" as feasible. There was already too much "dynamite" in Europe, this proposal noted, too many *DPS* "dreaming" about another war. Sending them far abroad would effectively disperse the problem. In the same vein the *FO* entertained the suggestion of using *DPS* to create a Foreign Legion of irrepatriates. This idea seems to have been rejected because of the danger of such units becoming contaminated with political sentiments which might cause the British government difficulty, even though the original suggestion had made clear that no such units would be posted near the borders of their former homelands.⁴¹

Whatever the suggestion, it was clear that the *DP* problem was not one that could be ignored. By itself, it would simply not disappear, and might in fact get worse. Although the eventual resolution of the quandry involved absorbing some *DPS* into the German economy, sending the majority back to the USSR, and dispersing others throughout the "Free World," even this solution was considered imperfect. As the British learned, even relocating *DPS* throughout the West annoyed the Soviets. The simple reason for this was that, as

a British official minuted:

This latter measure is...fraught with danger for them, since the dispersal of anti-Soviet refugees over the whole of Western Europe will make the task of Soviet apologists and propagandists doubly difficult.⁴²

When it did occur, the movement of Ukrainian *DPS* was largely dependent upon the immigration policies of receiving countries. Relatively large-scale Ukrainian emigration from the *DP* camps began in mid-1947, although its peak was not reached much before the latter half of 1949, dropping off thereafter. Intriguingly, as Stebelsky (1983) noted, most Ukrainian *DPS* seem to have spent (on the average) 6 months longer in the *DP* camps than other refugees. Quite probably this reflected their hope that, if only they delayed their emigration a short while longer, they might still have a chance of returning "home," [see Appendix Three - Document 3].

As Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 show, the destination of Ukrainian refugees also changed through time. During the latter half of 1947, and the first 6 months of 1948, most *DPS* moved to other countries in Western Europe. The latter part of 1948 witnessed a shift away from Western European destinations to the countries of North America, of which the USA was the main recipient. South American countries absorbed most Ukrainian *DPS* during the latter part of 1948 and the first 6 months of 1949. After 1949 emigration was

Table 5.9 Immigration of Ukrainian DPs supported by IRO

<u>Destination</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1947</u>	<u>Jan. -Jun. 1948</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1948</u>	<u>Jan. -Jun. 1949</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1949</u>	<u>Jan. -Jun. 1950</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1950</u>	<u>Jan. -Dec. 1951</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1951</u>
Europe	9862	10745	2890	564	174	75	90	159	24559
South America	797	1274	3793	2125	956	105	93	195	9338
North America	1518	3648	4472	9237	12106	8874	8239	11827	59921
Australasia	14	639	1743	6091	6036	3206	1693	364	19786
Ukrainians as % of all refugees	12.9	14.4	9.1	10.0	11.7	12.3	11.0	8.3	11.0

Sources: PCIRO and IRO Monthly Statistical Reports, September, 1947 to December, 1951.

Table 5.10 Immigration of Ukrainian DPs to North America July, 1947 - December 1951.

<u>Destination</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1947</u>	<u>Jan. -Jun. 1948</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1948</u>	<u>Jan. -Jun. 1949</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1949</u>	<u>Jan. -Jun. 1950</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1950</u>	<u>Jan. -Jun. 1951</u>	<u>July -Dec. 1951</u>
United States	231	520	272	6945	11163	7416	7648	10849	45044
Canada	1287	3128	4200	2292	943	1458	591	978	14877

Source: I. Stebelsky (1983):46

largely directed towards North America and Australasia.

Overall, about $1/2$ of the Ukrainian *DPS* emigrating between 1947 and 1951 went to North America, $1/5$ to the countries of Western Europe, $1/6$ to the Australasian area and about $1/12$ to South America. On the latter continent Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela accepted the largest numbers of Ukrainian immigrants.

The spatial flow patterns of this emigration are shown in Figure 5.7

Immigration To Canada

Immigration into Canada of Ukrainian *DPS* was provided for by an order-in-council (6.6.47) which allowed for the immediate admission of 5,000 *DPS* from camps in Europe. Subsequent policy initiatives granted approval for the admission of specified numbers of workers for the lumber and mining industries (e.g. in northern Ontario and adjacent Quebec), for labourers to do work on the farms, in the garment industries, and as household servants. Before each immigrant departed from Europe (unless sponsored by a family or close relatives) they had to sign an agreement promising to fulfill a one or two year contract at a specified job and in a definite place. By so doing, these *DPS* repaid the cost of their transport to Canada. This system also enabled the government to channel these migrants into those centres where it saw a need for their labour or skills, however these might be defined. The potential migrants were, of

Figure 5.7 Resettlement patterns of Ukrainian refugees
after World War II.



course, guaranteed the prevailing wage rates applicable to their skills or trades.

The Canadian Department of Mines and Resources seems to have felt that most of the *DPS* meet their obligations. As a letter to the Minister Mr. Jolliffe made clear:

...the record of the *DPS* in completing their contracts has been remarkably good. It is estimated that approximately 95% of the original contracts have been completed.⁴³

The concentration of *DPS* in certain industries, particularly those exploiting the natural resources of the more remote parts of Canada, is evident in this same report. For example *DPS* occupied 80% of positions in Mines and 65% in Hydro-Electric power generating plants, while 50% of Domestics and 10% of those who had found work with the railway companies or in lumber camps were recent refugees.

Group movements were also permitted, such as schemes which brought several hundred men at a time into Canada for the lumber camps of northern Ontario or the mines around Sudbury, or women as domestics, (Momryk, 1983). Later some of these same men brought over other family members and relatives, a chain migration effect that helped balance the male:female ratio (which was previously skewed towards the male side). This is illustrated in Figure 5.8. It was not until 1949 that something like a demographic balance between the sexes was reached within this immigrant population. The sponsorship of Ukrainian *DPS* from overseas to Canada is

Figure 5.8 Ukrainian DP immigration to Canada by sex,
1946-1952.





Figure 5.9 Sponsorship of Ukrainian DPs immigrating into Canada, 1946-1951.



shown in Figure 5.9. After families had been re-united, largely in 1946 employers rapidly became the single-most important factor in bringing Ukrainian *DPS* to Canada.

The definitional and counting problems already mentioned make any accurate assessment of how many Ukrainians came to Canada after WW II difficult. *IRO* statistics, as reproduced in Table 5.9, indicate that only 14,877 Ukrainians came here between July 1, 1947 and December 31, 1951. Canadian immigration statistics for the same period show 29,201 Ukrainians relocating to this country from overseas, a figure nearly twice as large as the *IRO* total. If the period is broadened, to include the calendar years 1946 and 1953, the total climbs to 32,223. Marunchak (1982) estimated that the total post-WW II Ukrainian immigration to Canada was over 40,000. Throughout this thesis the figure of 35,000 post-war Ukrainian immigrants is considered to be a reasonable estimate.

Who was allowed into Canada, when, and why was a matter debated within the upper echelons of the Canadian government. Before large scale immigration was allowed officials wrangled over precisely what guidelines should be employed in deciding the immigration issue. All seem to have agreed with what Lester B. Pearson called "the basic directive" namely that immigration:

...shall not be used to effect a major change in the racial, religious, or social constitution of the country.⁴⁴

Beyond that, however, there was little unanimity. One suggestion was that immigration should be proportional, that is based on the relative size of Canada's various "racial groups" as they stood in relation to each other in 1941. Mr. H.H. Carter urgently criticized this idea. He argued that it was "inadequate" to base quotas on the present "racial origins of Canadians." Such an approach failed to consider what "our experience" of the various peoples as settlers had been. Carter therefore insisted that a "frankly discriminatory" approach be operationalized. Such a selection process would act in favour of such groups as the English, the Dutch, Scandinavians and the Baltic peoples who "are similar to us in political outlook and mode of living." It would tend to keep other groups, like Italians, out. As for the *DPS*, Carter felt that many of them had become "physically and mentally below par" because of what they had suffered. Canada should, he urged, take the earliest possible action to acquire for itself the most desirable *DPS* as immigrants then forget about the rest. As for Ukrainian *DPS*, he noted that while they were:

...largely industrious, conscientious peasants, very religious and without much initiative...[and] well-liked by the occupation authorities, it seems doubtful that they would prove more valuable as citizens to a country such as Canada than would the Jews or Poles, both of which groups are regarded as the "problem children" of the camps, but who

generally have much more initiative and intelligence than the Ukrainians.⁴⁵

As suggested above, where Ukrainians went in Canada, at first reflected the availability of jobs in this country, as provided by relatives or employers. These could be individual placements, or group resettlements. Organizations like the Canadian National Railways (CNR) had made it known to Panchuk and other Ukrainian Canadians that it was "vitally interested" in seeing a mass immigration of Ukrainian *DPS*. All that was required were that the government again "open the gates."⁴⁶

Other companies, like the DOME mining concern, also made it known that they required labourers. European countries, it was asserted, were trying to keep their own nationals "at home" so the *DP* population should be tapped for requisite labour in Canada.⁴⁷ This was done, although nowhere near the scale of the pre-WWI, or even the inter-war immigration.

Of course, the admission of *DPS*, Ukrainians and otherwise, was also facilitated by the lobbying efforts of various Canadian citizens and groups. Miss Constance Hayward, of the Canadian National Committee on Refugees, effectively argued in favour of a less restrictive immigration policy. In this she was buoyed by the support of other Canadians familiar with the *DPS*. For example, she received a letter from Mr. T.G.M. Davidson, a member of UNRRA Area Team 1068, in which he wrote:

It is my opinion that if Canada is to have a selection of qualified craftsmen and agriculturalists that no time should be lost in having representatives survey the *DP* camps and make their initial selections before it is too late! I know there are three missions now from South American countries surveying the possibilities of placing *DPS* and if these countries open their doors they will have the advantage of first choice. If our government were to start at once their agents could have first choice... Those chosen would become permanent residents and good citizens eternally grateful for the opportunity given them.⁴⁸

That Ukrainian *DPS* were themselves looking for ways and means to get to Canada is well documented in the files of the *UCC* and *UCRF*. Hundreds of letters poured in, seeking advice, consolation, and support. Other *DPS* sought to locate relatives or family members who had migrated to Canada before the outbreak of the war. Regular columns appeared in various Ukrainian newspapers published on the continent and in North America, in which *DPS* searched for their relatives. The February 15, 1946 issue of the newspaper *Visti* (Belgium) is a good example. On pages 5 and 6, the names of 107 relatives are listed. Within Canada the *DPS* publishing these search notices sought relatives in such cities as Toronto (11), Moose Jaw (1), Winnipeg (7) and Hamilton (1).⁴⁹

Of course, throughout this period, *CURB's* workers overseas were doing everything possible to lobby the delegates of various potential countries of resettlement to accept Ukrainian *DPS*. Panchuk wrote to Peter Wenger that unless Canada soon acted to bring in *DPS* the country would lose out to other nations which were drawing away increasing numbers of *DPS*, who had grown discontent after spending years in the camps of Germany and Austria.⁵⁰ The *UCC* was itself not remiss in promoting the idea of *DP* immigration, even to the extent of addressing petitions to the Prime Minister, such as that sent on August 24, 1947, which deplored both the government's "tinkering behaviour" with pro-communist Ukrainians and its "vacilliating and indefinite policy" concerning the admission of Ukrainian *DPS*.⁵¹

What became Canadian policy (if it may be titled that) regarding the admission of *DPS*, was little more than another "creaming" proposition, as the British put it. Canada admitted only those *DPS* its decision-makers had determined would be useful in meeting the country's needs, making only paltry gestures of a humanitarian nature with respect to solving the larger refugee problem. Of course, as Panchuk came to realize, the British were no less calculating in their selection of refugees:

...I have received from private but very dependable sources in Alberta [news] which seems to indicate that there is some form of understanding between

our own Canadian Immigration authorities and the British authorities, to the effect that certain people from the U.K. should **NOT**, repeat **NOT** be admitted to Canada too soon...in order that they might "serve out their dues" to H.M. Government for having brought them over from Germany to the U.K. This, in my opinion, is plain economic exploitation...⁵²

Whether such an "understanding" did indeed exist will likely never be uncovered. However, given the statistics on who was admitted to Canada, the "racial" composition of the *DP* population allowed entry, and the nature of the jobs they were given, it cannot be denied that those responsible for determining immigration quotas had a very clear idea of the type of society they wanted to maintain, or build, and the social and spatial patterns they wished to see prevailing there.

As shown in Figure 5.10, Ukrainian *DPS* coming to Canada between 1947 and 1952 generally settled in Ontario and adjacent Quebec. Less than 30% went to the Prairie Provinces. The vast majority were also placed or eventually located in the major urban and industrial centres, usually after spending a year or two involved in the resource industries of northern Ontario (47%) and Quebec (20%). Less than 1% settled in the Maritimes, and just under 2% in British Columbia. This post-WW II immigrations' settlement pattern was fundamentally different from the distribution of

Figure 5.10 Geographical distribution of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada, 1945-1953.



Ukrainians in Canada before the war, which in turn helped create new Ukrainian organizational patterns in Canada, both by adding a new element and through modification of what had previously existed. This matter will be returned to in Chapter 7.

Total Ukrainian immigration between 1947 and 1952 is shown compared to other selected ethnic and immigrant groups in Figure 5.11. Likely at least some of those classified as Poles, Russians, and Czechoslovaks were Ukrainians by nationality. The spatial distribution of Ukrainian immigrants in Canada between 1945 and 1953 is mapped out in Figure 5.12. As is apparent, Ontario and Quebec attracted the majority of this post-war inflow of Ukrainian *DPS*. While the evidence is, admittedly, fragmentary, it would seem that those who favoured allowing in certain ethnic groups in preference to others, on the basis of past "performance" prevailed.

How did the *DPS* themselves regard the processes and the patterns of their resettlement in Canada? When asked to rank, from most to least important, their reasons for coming to Canada, the survey's respondents provided the following responses (Table 5.11). Predominantly, they were attracted to Canada by the presence of family and friends there, and the existence of an antecedently established Ukrainian population there - one which they presumed would be sympathetic to their plight and supportive of their cause.

Figure 5.11 Ethnic composition of Canada's post-World War II refugee immigration




Figure 5.12 Geographical distribution of Ukrainian DPs in Canada, by province, 1947-1952.




Table 5.11 Questionnaire respondents' reasons
for emigrating to Canada

- Relatives or friends	77.2%
- Only place considered moving to	65.4%
- Existence of a sizeable Ukrainian population in Canada	56.5%
- Wanted to relocate as far from Soviets as possible	51.7%
- Ukrainian Canadians helped me settle here	46.8%
- A sponsor provided work	45.5%
- Nowhere else to go	39.0%

Source: Questionnaire research (Luciuk, 1984).

Many in the sample group immediately settled in the larger Canadian cities, such as Toronto (17%), Montreal (13%), Edmonton (7%) and Winnipeg (6%). When asked to detail why they had, predominantly, selected to live in central Canada (Ontario & Quebec) the sample population gave the following ranked responses, (Table 5.12). While considerations regarding employment played an important role in determining where these post-WW II immigrants were to settle in Canada, deciding on the type of social and political place they were seeking in Canada were also critical variables.

The geographical distribution of this Ukrainian immigration is illustrated in Figure 5.10. As noted previously Ontario and Quebec received the greatest percentage of *DPS*, a consequence of the availability of jobs there, and the efforts of their provincial premiers (eg. George Drew).

Not everyone was in favour of the immigration of any *DPS* to Canada, and in the particular about Ukrainians coming here. For example, the Soviets protested against "Soviet citizens" being "sent" to Canada by the British, lodging one, of many, such complaints mid-May, 1946.⁵³

Some Canadian groups were also opposed. The pro-communist *AUUC* took particular exception to this immigration, as will be described in Chapter Six. The Toronto District Labour Council was likewise against *DP* immigration, although its reasons were rooted in fears about

Table 5.12 Questionnaire respondents' reasons for settling
in Central Canada

- Work could be found there	79.9%
- My family and friend were there	64.9%
- Preference for living in an urban area	59.3%
- Wanted to keep together with those of similar background and experiences	57.8%

Source: Questionnaire research (Luciuk, 1984).

job security for its own members, rather than purely ideological concerns. Members of such organizations as the Canadian Active Services Forces Association also protested to the Prime Minister about existing unemployment and the lack of housing for veterans in Canada. It wanted to make sure that immigration was reduced, or even suspended, until this constituency was satisfied. Its resolution added that there was also reason to fear that "Fascist or Nazi sympathizers" might sneak into Canada among the supposed "non-Communists" of the *DP* camps. That should be prevented, they argued.⁵⁴

One of the rather crude, but probably not unique, anti-immigration messages the Canadian government received during this post-war period came from a Canadian nurse stationed with *UNRRA* Team 307. In part, it read:

Dear Mr. King,

To you, as head of Canada and its people, I would like to present my opinion, as a Canadian and a nurse, of conditions here in Germany...

In this present place of duty...there are six camps of *DPS*...Eukrainians [sic!], Poles, Baltics...[and a] few Hungarians and Russians.

I came here with the idea that all these people were pitiful objects of humanity, needing and deserving all possible help, physical and mental. In many cases I found I am disappointed and I discover that practically all the Balts, and some

of the others, notably Eukrainians, came of their own free will: aided and abetted Germany in her fight ...worked in their factories for good wages... helped to manufacture guns... which helped to kill our own men and those of our allies, whose corpses stand in mute testimony all over this country.

These people merely bet on the wrong horse and regret that it did not win. They now stand around demanding, yes and getting the handout... No good screening has been done...

The point is...where desired destination is indicated, almost always it is to the US or Canada. What I hope and pray for is that these Baltics especially be not allowed in our country. They are red hot Fascists... Opportunities as they are, may they never step on fair Canadian soil.

Is there not a quota for all Europeans? Could it be possible that they would, even a few, be allowed into Canada? I truly hope not... They are extremely Nationalistic and fear and hate their neighbours. This spirit runs like a red thread through all their system of living.⁵⁵

In contrast to such denunciations there were the letters of men like Panchuk, who despite reservations about some of the political traits of the *DPS*, continued to press for their immigration to Canada. He had this to say to Fred

Zaplitny, M.P., about those in Canada who objected to *DP* immigration:

[such people] are doing Canada and Canadian nationhood the greatest injustice that could be done at this time...among the one million odd refugees...there is some of the best and highest quality that could ever be hoped for. Providence has arranged, as never before in history, to have created this greatest number of refugees and *DPS* ever known of. Most countries are now waking up to the fact that the bulk of these people are not just ordinary average people but that among them there are very large numbers of skilled craftsmen, artisans, technicians, intellectuals, professionals...those countries that are bold enough to make decisions and to take immediate action, are going to secure some of the fittest and best qualities now available in the world.⁵⁶

Emigration to Canada and the Nationalists

Long before the children being born in the *DP* camps, or the new cadres recruited there, could be fully incorporated into the nationalist movement, the pressure to emigrate became irresistible. However ominous Soviet security forces may have been to the nationalists in these refugee camps, it was the seemingly mundane process of emigration that actually posed the critical challenge to the movement's continued

viability. The occupation authorities began to insist that all *DPS* either resettle in those countries willing to take them, or return to their homelands. Since, for most Ukrainians, the latter was not a viable option, their *DP* camps began to drain. As this happened, the strength of the nationalists declined. Clearly, their organizations would somehow have to counter this perceived threat of full-scale emigration. But how? What was the nature and purpose of the organizations promoting the resettlement of these displaced persons?

Well before the war's end, international agreements had been reached on ways for dealing with the post-war refugee problem. Since its inception on November 9, 1943, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (*UNRRA*) had used the vast machinery at its disposal to do everything possible to convince or force Europe's displaced millions to return to their areas of origin. For those coming from countries outside the Soviet Empire this posed little problem. For Ukrainians and other East Europeans, the situation was far different. Both military and civilian Allied authorities were to become involved in the forcible repatriation of hundreds of thousands of unwilling people to Soviet controlled territories. Whatever the legal justification for such action, it virtually amounted to acquiescing in a death sentence being imposed on many of those repatriated, who were dealt with harshly, often within minutes of coming under Soviet authority.

After 1947, the International Refugee Organization (*IRO*) offered a more humane alternative by advocating emigration of the remaining *DP* populations to countries willing to receive them. Since the USSR did not take a seat on *IRO*'s governing council this body was able to help refugees relocate, even though it continued to pay lip service to the idea of repatriation. Canada became one such destination place, in part because of the lobbying efforts of Ukrainian Canadians, though, more importantly, because of Canada's labour requirements in certain industries immediately after WW II. Many of the same Ukrainian Canadians, who lobbied in favour of this immigration, were also the first to encounter and describe the Ukrainian *DPS* to the Ukrainian population back in Canada. Since immediately after the war's end, information circulating between Europe and North America was censored and circumscribed, Ukrainians in Canada had few other sources on which to base their ideas about who the Ukrainian refugees were and what their attitudes might be. Through the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, (*CURB*), established by Ukrainian Canadian servicemen in London in mid-September of 1945, some news did begin to get through. Yet this news came filtered through the minds of a very few individuals, who saw what they did through the mental filter of their own Canadian backgrounds and experiences. The result was that a distorted description of the *DPS* was offered to those in Canada, not as interpretation but as fact. As more Ukrainians in Canada personally encountered the *DPS*,

these early *CURB* reports were re-evaluated and, in part, rejected. Eventually an altogether different idea was to emerge within the Ukrainian Canadian population about who the *DPS* were and what they wanted. In consequence the interaction that took place between the *DPS* and the Ukrainian Canadians was significantly different from what had been originally anticipated. The spatial impact of the post-WW II immigrants can be traced to differences between how Ukrainians from overseas and those in Canada regarded what it meant to be a Ukrainian, particularly one outside the ancestral area of origin.

For the *OUN* cadres, an outward migration of Ukrainians from Europe could only have a negative impact on their strength. If finite manpower and material resources were diverted overseas then their ability to sustain the *UPA* would correspondingly decrease. Instructions were therefore issued to key *OUN* members ordering them not to leave the *DP* camps, or at least to delay for as long as possible their departures. Word-of-mouth advice was circulated from *DP* camp to *DP* camp, suggesting that those who left were betraying the Ukrainian cause. Although the evidence is fragmentary it seems this campaign had some effect on the volume and duration of migration flows from the *DP* camps to countries of resettlement,[Appendix 3, Document 1].

The pressure to move on eventually proved to be too powerful to resist. Appeals to committed nationalists could persuade some to remain in Europe longer than they might

have. A few remain there to this day. Others delayed departures for as long as possible. However the discipline and commitment of these few individuals was not typical of the majority of the Ukrainian *DP* population. Many of them had already been involuntary migrants for nearly a decade. It was the rare individual who would voluntarily continue to exist in such circumstances when the chance of finding a normal life beckoned. As *IRO*'s officials increased their efforts to clear the *DP* camps of their inhabitants, and the prospects of returning to Ukraine continued to appear remote, ever greater numbers of *DPS* began departing. By the fall of 1947 most recognized that the time had come for them to move on. In the following three years most would leave Europe.

Possibly by late 1945, and certainly by mid-1946, the strategists of the *OUN* had begun to develop plans to meet just such a contingency. Barring any official recognition of their movement - which they could have translated into a powerful incentive for persuading other *DPS* to remain in the camps - they realized they would have to have ready some means of dealing with massive relocations of Ukrainians to countries outside Western Europe. Since the *OUN* drew at least some of its strength and legitimacy from its dominance within the *DP* population, it had little choice but to relocate along with the onward-migrating population.

This *OUN* salvage operation followed a familiar pattern. As before, the Organization's hierarchy selected and

dispatched overseas its trusted operatives, with instructions to resettle among the *DPs* and continue asserting their influence. To do so they would also have to reconstruct the covert network of the *OUN* in those countries where it had yet to sink roots. For the *Banderivtsi* this essentially meant building a new framework wherever they might go; their Organization had only come into existence in 1940 and enjoyed few contacts overseas at the war's end.

In the jargon of the *OUNr*, this planned allocation of its cadres into the various countries of resettlement was referred to as the *Second Line*. Like those members of *OUN's First Line* - that is those men and women who maintained links to the resistance inside Ukraine this *Second Line* was a chosen group facing a formidable task. Only a handful were dispatched to Canada.⁵⁷ How they came to reconstruct their network there is described in Chapter Six. Initially scattered throughout the country, they were able to contact each other through their *Rezident* here, and, within a few months had brought into being a rudimentary *OUNr* network. By the latter half of 1948 it was well developed, ready to begin influencing the course of Ukrainian Canadian affairs.

Precisely how many *OUN* members, of either faction, were sent to Canada, where and when, remains a matter of conjecture. *OUN* archives are not open for scholarly study.⁵⁸ An additional handicap is the pledge all *OUN* members swore upon their initiation into the movement. This oath obliges individuals not to reveal anything about the *OUN*, even to

discuss whether they were or remained members. While many were willing to relax this prohibition, few were ready or perhaps even able, to discuss the details of *OUN* operations in Canada. The *OUN*'s hierarchical cell structure, originally designed to blunt penetration by hostile forces, remained a semi-effective impediment to academic investigation. Since the *OUNr Second Line* travelled unobtrusively, hidden within the overall refugee immigration to Canada, and carried out its role here discretely, few written records of its deeds or witnesses to these are available. Still, as will be demonstrated later, the scholar can ferret out information, although the process requires persistence and application of a range of research methodologies.

What is certain is that some of those who came together in Toronto in the spring of 1949 were members of the *OUNr*'s *Second Line*. The announcement they made on May 1, 1949 bore the unmistakable imprint of their handicraft, harbinger as it was of a fundamental change in the spatial and social patterns of Ukrainians in Canada. On that day, the League for the Liberation of Ukraine, (*LVU*) was created.

While this development had been foreshadowed with the December 15, 1948 appearance of the first issue of *Homin Ukrainy*, (*Echo of Ukraine*)⁵⁹, the appearance of a newcomers' organization was alarming to many antecedently established Ukrainians in Canada. If post-war immigrants began creating their own organizations and affiliated newspapers then pre-war groupings would not be replenished through an influx

of new members. Furthermore such newcomer organizations seemed to threaten the status quo prevailing in Ukrainian Canadian society. Disappointment and disillusionment soon set in. By the time the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC)⁶⁰ held its third National Congress, in Winnipeg during February of 1950, their focus of attention was not on finding ways of helping Ukrainian *DPs* adjust to life in Canada but rather on planning ways and means for coping with what were perceived as the negative consequences of the Ukrainian *DP* immigration. For the organized pre-WW II Ukrainian Canadian population with very few exceptions the original euphoria about the refugees wore off quickly, all but totally disappearing by early 1950.

The supporters and members of *LVU* and *Homin Ukrainy* responded with characteristic vigour to the hostility directed against them. They boldly promulgated the purpose of their organization, as follows:

To unite and enlist the Ukrainian citizens of Canada as well as Canadians of other nationalities, around the battlefield arena of struggle to liberate Ukraine from the Russian-communist enslavement and to uphold the spirit of loyalty to Canada, defend its independence and its democratic way of life from the direct and indirect attack of Russian imperialism and communist totalitarianism.⁶¹

There was no mistaking their orientation or intentions. *LVU*

members clearly wished to champion in Canada the goals of the Ukrainian liberation movement. While it might be their present base of operations, Canada was not their main concern. For Ukrainian Canadians, who had intently tried to secure an uncontested place for their ethnic group there, this slighting of the land which they had made their home was unconscionable. For them the *DPS* began to look alien in their attitudes and behaviour.

The *LVU* - which became the front organization for the *OUNr* in Canada - did not change its orientation to conform with the expectations of the Ukrainian Canadians. For their part, the *Melnykivtsi* who found a convivial niche within the Ukrainian National Federation likewise did nothing to reach an accord with those amongst whom they had resettled. Indeed, if anything, many *DPS* came to feel that Ukrainian Canadian attachment to this country was proof of the degree to which the latter population had been assimilated. This was something most *DPS* rejected. Accordingly, both the *OUNr* and the *OUNS* reconstituted their networks within Canada, and did everything possible to maintain the intensity and integrity of their respective memberships' commitment to the nationalist platform. They erected a framework of Ukrainian organizations for their youth and women, all to meet various social, cultural, and religious needs. Their hope was that these structures would diminish the physical space separating relocated Ukrainian *DPS* from Ukraine with the "nearness" of shared allegiance to an Organization geared to

fulfilling the *DPS* compulsive need to search for, and return to, a place of their own.

In time, of course, the temporal and spatial gulf separating the emigrants from the population left behind in Ukraine widened and deepened, and opportunities for even limited interaction faded.⁶² Faith in an imminent return to Ukraine had to be replaced with the hope that at some future date such an event would take place. Disillusioned, some members of the movement abandoned or showed less commitment to it. Paradoxically, as the faith of some weakened the ardour with which others expounded the tenets of this cause expanded. The contrast between this core minority and other members of the movement has become more striking with the passing of every year spent in the diaspora.

Whatever their degree of commitment, most of the Organization's members retained at least some attachment to the basic principal of the Ukrainian nationalist credo - the belief that Ukrainians must have their own free nation-state. Few of them would ever come to feel truly settled within Canada, however much they might appreciate the material amenities available here. As one of them succinctly explained,

My body is here but my heart is there!⁶³

This one phrase captures the lasting imprint of the *DP* experience on many of those who experienced it. Their perception of the place they had involuntarily left conditioned their attitudes about the places they were going

to, leaving them with the belief that their true purpose remained a return to the place of origin. This value system would influence their behaviour wherever they relocated, affecting profound changes in the patterns of organization already found in the receiving populations. Simultaneously, new social and spatial patterns were added to such places.

The Ukrainian *DPS* neither formed a random nor a cross-sectional addition to the Ukrainian population they found in Canada. They had come from areas they, and others, perceived as being very different from those they resettled in, and they brought with them attitudes and behaviours characteristic of where they had been and what they had passed through. Since these traits were markedly different from those typical of the corporate outlook of the communities into which they resettled, their talents and energies were bent on recovering what had been lost. This orientation permeated all of their efforts.

Conclusions.

Several aspects of this particular historical migration event attract the geographer's attention. Obviously, most of these refugees had little choice or control over when, why, and where they moved. How can their experience then be understood in the context of the general models of migration utilized by the discipline? These normally stress the element of choice in the decision-making process preceding a migratory movement. What are the refugees' perceptions of

the places they vacate, find asylum in or are resettled to? Are the immigrant experiences of refugees different from those who otherwise seem to share similar regional, religious, cultural, social or ethnic backgrounds? What occurs when two such groups meet in the same country of immigration? Do refugee migrants bring about spatial patterns and social consequences which differ from those associated with populations which voluntarily settle in some place? If so, how and why? Does the refugee experience, or some facet of it, alter the attitudes of the migrating population? Why? What are the agents of such migrant attribute changes? Finally, what factors determine the geographic location, size and composition of immigrant groups in those countries which accept such settlers, whether they be voluntary or involuntary immigrants?

For the *OUN* cadres who in Canada still patiently await a return to the place they believe is their true destination, the pilgrimage they undertook years ago and the watch they still keep have become a long enduring. That some so stolidly keep vigil only exacerbates the rift their immigration into Canada precipitated. Only the passing of time will erode it. Examining the spatial consequences of this process provides the geographer with an unparalleled opportunity to contribute to the analysis of the impact of migration, fulfilling the discipline's mandate of investigating why, in mens' minds, the world is divided up into places.

The *DPS* who did come to Canada brought with them attitudes forged and shaped within the *DP* camps of Western Europe. Many came here believing that they would not long remain, that some opportunity would soon arise which would open up the way for their return to the homeland they had left behind.

These beliefs were unexpected and alienated much Ukrainian Canadian opinion. The arrival of these "newcomers" caused dissent between those previously settled in Canada and the Ukrainians who came after WW II (as 76.7% of the respondents affirmed).

The *DPS* were also aware of another fact about Ukrainian Canadian life. Over 75% of them knew that there had been active opposition to their immigration, primarily from within the ranks of the pro-Soviet Ukrainian Canadian groups, but also from some members of organizations that constituted the *UCC*. This put them on their guard. It narrowed possibilities of co-operation between "oldtimers" and "newcomers". The interactions that would take place between the two populations were, as a result, usually antagonistic, with social and spatial consequences for the Ukrainian population of Canada that persist to the present.

This chapter has described the spatial patterns of Ukrainians in the *DP* camps, as well as tracing the patterns and processes of emigration. Particular attention was paid to the modification of certain of the Ukrainian *DP* population's traits as a result of the influence which

Ukrainian nationalists (particularly the *Banderivtsi*) came to wield. This was found to be localized in the DP camps, imparting to this stage in the refugee experience a pivotal importance. Obviously, the refugee migrant undergoes an experience different from that encountered by voluntary immigrants. In this particular case, this can be demonstrated by the way in which the majority of these Ukrainian refugees came to accept the nationalist worldview, a development which necessitated the alteration of their attitudes about the nature of being Ukrainian. Most Ukrainian *DPS* came to believe, often fervently, that they would find personal satisfaction only after they had returned to their home areas in Ukraine. Consequently, the process of emigration was retarded and, when it finally did take place, many regarded it only as another movement on the way back to the homeland, rather than a permanent resettlement. In terms of the theoretical discussion presented in Chapter 2, it may be said that these refugees came to hold the view that they would find the desirable "place utility" only after they had returned to the land they had been driven from. Unwilling to accept Canada (or any of the other countries of post-WW II refugee resettlement) as "home" they would continue to articulate a homeward-oriented orientation in their social, political, religious and spatial behaviour. Why this would be at variance with the attitudes of Ukrainians who had settled in Canada well before WW II was discussed in Chapter 4. The

latter population had, for the most part, willingly emigrated to Canada and done everything possible to ensure the continued viability of its existence there. Clearly, in this case, Ukrainians who had voluntarily settled in Canada held different, and even opposing attitudes about this country than did those who were to be resettled here after WW II. Refugee immigrants distinguished themselves from voluntary settlers in their perceptions of Canada as a place, and in the behaviour they exhibited. Consequently, future studies of the ethnic and immigration history of Canada must explore and analyze the differences between these two types of migrants. In the following chapter the social, political and spatial consequences of the interaction between the pre-war and post-war Ukrainian immigrant groups in Canada will be examined. This analysis will underline the significant impact that an immigrating refugee population can have on an antecedently settled population, even one sharing apparently similar cultural, religious, regional and socio-economic traits.

Notes

1. G. Beyer, (1981).
2. WO 219/3806, (16.8.44) contains British estimates about the number of refugees likely to be encountered in post-war Europe. FO 898/3H0, (1942) holds the Political Warfare Executive's report on how to exploit Germany's

labour shortage and reliance on foreign workers [Operation "Trojan Horse"]. *FO* 371/42829, (26.6.44) discusses "mass trekking" of displaced people and its likely effects on military operations.

See also, E. L. Homze, (1967), I. Stebelsky, (1983) and Panchuk's letter to Dr. Gallan, (10.6.45) in which he claimed that there were 4.5 million Ukrainian *DPs*, *PAC MG* 28 v.9, Vol. 15.

3. *HO* Circular No. 5, 1949, in *FO* 371/77586, (12.1.49).
4. P. Dean's minutes on *FO* 371/50606, (15.1.45). Similar orders were issued to Canadian troops in Europe. They are found in Department of National Defence War Diaries, 3 Div. *CADF* Files, (26.7.45). In *FO* 371/55782, it is noted that Ukrainians should be considered a "national sub-division," (16.11.45). The cited document, *HO* circular No.5, 1949 was found in *FO* 371/77586, (12.1.49).

The *FO* came to take a rather jaundiced view of Panchuk and his activities in the U.K. After he submitted a memorandum defining Ukrainian nationality (which was intended to help clarify British problems with this subject), C.R.A. Rae minuted:

I cannot help thinking that the main purpose of this memorandum is to request that Mr. Panchuk himself be appointed Ukrainian Ambassador...In fact Mr. Panchuk fulfills (not to everybody's satisfaction) the function already - quite

unofficially, and the Home Office would, I think, throw quite a fit if it ever came to be more than that...

...I do not know how seriously we have to take the question of Ukrainian nationality. Treaty Department will have to advise. But even if, as a historical-sociological argument, Mr. Panchuk's definition is correct, nationality **does** mean "political citizenship" for our purposes, and coming from such a one as Mr. Panchuk, his reliance on the "statehood" of the Ukrainian SSR is an appalling sophistry. If, on these grounds, (in themselves, I believe, fallacious), he wants to use the term Ukrainian citizen, he would have to accept such to be Soviet citizens as well; we may be sure he does not mean that.

We shall have to keep Ukrainians in this country happy, and one can sympathise with their desire not to be classed as Poles or Romanians. It is, though, clearly impossible to call them Ukrainians pure and simple.

5. FO 371/57813, (18.1.46).
6. FO 371/56791, (May, 1946).
7. Ibid., (10.5.46).
8. Panchuk to CURB, UCRF, UUART, (20.2.46).
9. E. Kulischer to R. Feldmesser, (13.8.53) in Archives of

the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System.

10. On *UNRRA* operations see R. G. Wilfong, (1966). Studies on occupation policy, include H. Zink, (1957), F.P. Willis, (1962), and M. Balfour and J. Mair, (1956).
11. The percentage varies depending on which tables are used. Employing Series 50.364-369:552 , it would appear that 60.2% of the Ukrainian refugees arrived in Canada in 1948 and 1949. Use of Series 50.1-10:500 provides a percentage figure of 50.8%.
12. *CURB* files, (9.1.46).
13. Panchuk to *UCC*, (January, 1947). See also the Panchuk *Memorandum on Ukrainian Refugees In Austria*, (1.2.47). In it Panchuk noted that the Ukrainian population was 72% Galician and Volhynian, 3% Bukovynian and 24% Eastern Ukrainian.
14. *PAC* MG 28 v.9 Vol. 17. Miscellaneous *CURB* Reports for 1948-1949.
15. Statistical information on *DP* crimes of violence can be found in *FO* 371/56540, (30.8.46). A British official wrote on the file cover:

The truth is that the whole problem of refugees and *DPS* has reached unmanageable proportions. Large scale overseas resettlement schemes are likely to be very slow in getting going. The best hope for anybody who does not want to die of old age in a camp is to go home, however uncomfortable it may be...

16. Panchuk to UCRF and UCC, (28.2.46) and (12.3.46).
17. E. Wasylyshen, *Report #5*, (20.6.49).
18. FO 371/67435, (15.7.47).
19. FO 371/56793, (24.10.46).
20. Panchuk's, *Report on Refugees and DPs in Germany and Austria*. Visit of Representative To Germany and Austria, Harold Smith, M.C., (20.8.47).

See also PAC MG 28 v.9, Vol. 15, (2.2.47), DEA 9255-40C, (24.10.46), FO 371/56539, (June, 1946) and Panchuk to Yaremovich, (20.10.47).

21. FO 371/674435, (8.10.47).
22. FO 371/46811, (August, 1945).
23. FO 371/57703, (10.3.46).
24. WO 219/3807, (29.9.44).
25. InterAllied Psychological Study Group, *Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons*, (June, 1945). Dr. John Rickman, editor of *The British Journal of Medical Psychology* collated the group's reports; members included Lt. Col. A.M. Meerloo, Dr. E. Popper, several members of the Royal Medical Corps (Directorate of Army Psychology), Dr. E.A. Shils, and UNRRA personnel.
26. Ibid., 24.
27. Ibid., 28.
28. Interview with S. Ishyk, (21.5.82).
29. See M. Elliott, (1982): 1-2, 9, 32, 8, 90, 92, 95-96, 108, 114, 173, 196, 206.

In PAC MG 28 v. 9 Vol. 14, there is a letter written by

Panchuk in which he notes that at the Kiel *DP* camp,
One man absolutely refused to go and was shot
dead by a Russian office.

30. Interview with S. Ishyk, (21.5.82).

Additional material on these forcible repatriations can be found in M. Elliott, (1981), N. Tolstoy, (1977), P. Huxley-Blythe, (1968), N. Bethell, (1974), J. Epstein, (1973) and F. N. Smith, (1970).

Ironically, Canadian officials do not seem to have realized that Canada was a signatory to the Yalta Agreement until late 1946 (*DEA* 82-96-40, dated 20.3.46 and 13.6.46). Ukrainian Canadian protests against repatriation can also be found in this file (e.g. 28.11.45).

31. The problem of identifying who was Ukrainian and how many *DPS* fit this description is treated in, *FO* 371/55782, (16.11.45) and *FO* 371/56791, (1.5.46). The latter document contained the comment by the Political Division's Mr. Hilary Young that the British government still did not "recognize the existence of Ukrainians as a separate race or nationality".

See also Panchuk, (29.12.46) and *FO* 371/71636, (18.8.48).

32. For example, Ivan Z. Holowinsky, (1983).

In *FO* 371/57703 there is a letter from Sir Frederick Morgan, K.C., to Ernest Bevin of the Foreign Office about the psychological state of the *DPS*, (10.3.46).

33. See Roman Ilnytzkyj, (1950) and W.R. Petryshyn and N. Chomiak, (1984).
34. FO 371/66658, (March, 1947).
35. InterAllied Psychological Study Group report, page 19.
36. Ibid., 29.
37. Kaye to Panchuk, (12.4.49).
38. Panchuk to the UCC and CURB, PAC MG 28 v.9, Vol. 17, (30.1.46).
39. Ibid.
40. FO 371/57700, (October, 1945).
41. FO 371/56495, (18.12.46) and FO 371/66696, (May, 1947).
42. FO 371/31590, (11.6.47).
43. PAC RG 26 Vol. 105, (3.11.49). Department of Mines and Resources to Mr. Jolliffee.
44. PAC RG 26 Vol. 105, (17.1.48).
45. DEA 939-40C, (February, 1947).
46. *Report on an Interview with Mr. Guston, Department of Colonialization and Agriculture, Canadian National Railways*, (27.11.46).
47. FO 371/56572, (5.12.46).
48. PAC MG 48 v.9 Vol.6, (26.11.46). Mr. T.G.M. Davidson to Miss Constance Hayward.
49. *Visti*, published by the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Belgium, Brussels, (15.2.46).
50. Panchuk to P. Wenger, (1.7.47).
51. DEA 10268-40, Vol. 1, (30.8.47).
52. Panchuk to P.R. Rhodes, (9.3.49).

53. *FO* 371/56715, (16.5.46).
54. *PAC RG* 26 Vol. 116, (23.6.48).
55. *DEA* 8116-40, (21.11.45).
56. Panchuk to F. Zaplitny, (17.5.47).
57. This conclusion was confirmed by Mr. Yaroslav Stetsko, Munich, West Germany, (14.7.82).
58. Few former members of the *OUNr* or *OUNs* were willing to provide precise details regarding their affiliation, dates of their activities or information about fellow nationalists, for fear of possible reprisals against family members and friends who remain in Ukraine. In some cases taped interviews collected during this research must remain closed during interviewees' lifetimes. Some participants insisted on guarantees of anonymity. Consequently some dates, places and surnames of the interviewees have been deliberately changed by researcher to ensure the privacy of participants.
59. See footnote 1. Also useful are the minutes kept of a meeting (29.1.49) in the offices of the newspaper *Ukrainian Worker* (339 Bathurst Street, Toronto). Document courtesy of R. Olynyk, (Montreal).
60. The Ukrainian Canadian Committee (*UCC*) is discussed in Oleh W. Gerus, (1982), W. Veryha, (1967), and B.S. Kordan, (1981).
61. Statutes of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine and Womens' Association of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine, (Toronto, 1969:95).

62. As the *UPA*'s military resistance faded, during the late 1940s, so too did the *DP* populations' expectations about returning to Ukraine. On the *UPA* and its efforts, see *FO* 371/55618, (21.8.46) and *FO* 371/66357, (27.10.47). Its activities inside post-war Poland are discussed in *FO* 371/66236, (5.3.47) and *FO* 371/71606, (1947).

The relocation of the Ukrainian population in southeastern Poland had much to do with the weakening of *UPA* (see *FO* 371/66355, (27.5.47) and *DEA* 58-H(s), (14.11.45)).

The death of the *UPA*'s Commander-in-Chief Taras Chuprynka (Shukhevych) was noted in *FO* 371/031482, (21.10.50).

63. Recorded in the researcher's diary, (21.5.82).

CHAPTER SIX - THE GEOGRAPHICAL IMPACT OF REFUGEE IMMIGRATION

Should the Ukrainian liberation struggle be unsuccessful in the homeland...then political activities on a grand scale must be transferred to the North American continent. With this in view, a principle of selection of new settlers...must be applied, whereby only the most constructive and best people would migrate there.

- A Ukrainian refugee, (February, 1946)

Introduction

Ukrainian refugees settling in Canada soon nettled those within the Ukrainian Canadian Committee who considered themselves to be arbitrators of the standard for the Ukrainian population here. The ensuing fray irrevocably transformed spatial and social patterns previously discernible within Ukrainian Canadian society.

Essentially this imbroglio reflected differences in perception of Canada as a place. Distinguishing many *DPS* was their place-seeking behaviour. For them, appraisal of Canada was predicated upon a perception of this country's utility as a place of temporary refuge. Their desire remained to return to where they had come from. Measured against this goal, their presence in Canada was regarded by them as almost incidental. While this attitude bore little resemblance to reality it motivated their construction of an organizational system here whose purpose was at first to

husband, and later to perpetuate, the belief that some future migration event awaited them, one that would bring many of them back to the true homeland, Ukraine.

Many Ukrainian Canadians found this characteristic *DP* attitude alarming. Having devoted considerable effort to portraying themselves as loyal and grateful citizens of the Dominion, they deplored any display by Ukrainians in Canada which might suggest to the wider public that Ukrainians still pined for their ancestral area of origin. The Ukrainian Canadian demeanor can be described as a place keeping one. The measure of tolerance accorded to them in Canadian society had, they felt, only been attained after they had largely purged their lexicon of all hints of the desire to vigorously promote Ukrainian causes. They were not about to jeopardize their status within Canada by supporting the *DPS* in their militant preoccupation with issues revolving around the future liberation of Ukraine.

Consequently, the most telling impact of the introduction of Ukrainian *DPS* into Canada was the revival of a polarization within the population, similar to that which had existed prior to WW II. The difference was not on religious grounds, or so much on the basis of organizational affiliation, as it was a reflection of different attitudes about where the "proper" place of Ukrainians in the world was located. Generally, the split parted antecedently established Ukrainians in Canada from those who arrived here after WW II.

While the pre-war population had, for the most part, loosely coalesced within the *UCC*, few of the post-war immigrants were willing to accept its tenets as representative of their own value system. For their part, most Ukrainian Canadians regarded the *DPS*' dogged attachment to values spawned in the places they had come from (and therefore "out of place" in Canada) as alien. While most Ukrainians in Canada came from a common ancestral origin place, there was little else binding them together. Both groups were to discover this, to their mutual dismay.

Analysis of the divisiveness imparted to the Ukrainian Canadian population by the post-war arrivals, provides a basis for explaining how and why new spatial patterns of organization emerged within the Ukrainian domain in Canada. This advent and the reactions it provoked caused a further differentiation of Canada as a place, an outcome which justifies the geographer's study of the migration process as a behavioural phenomenon with spatial consequences.

Several themes will be addressed in this chapter, each of them underscoring the processes which prompted cleavage within the Ukrainian population of Canada after WW II.

After a brief recapitulation of Ukrainian Canadian lobbying efforts on behalf of the *DPS*, attention will be given to the emergence of remorse within this latter population, as encounters between them and the *DPS* became more common. An attempt will be made to show how this pattern of events was not confined to Canada alone, but can be

observed in other countries where *DPS* were resettled after the Second World War. As has been suggested already (Chapter 1) the *Banderivtsi*, with their headquarters established in Munich, West Germany, gradually extended their network throughout the diaspora, first gaining control over those Ukrainian organizations existing in adjacent countries, and later spreading to the United Kingdom and North America. This pattern of events would seem to have become particularly obvious by 1949. At any rate, within Canada, it was on May 1, 1949 that an *OUNr* organization, the League for the Liberation of Ukraine (*LVU*) made its public debut. The *OUNr* was well entrenched at least a year prior to this. This unfolding of the *OUNr* throughout Western Europe, North and South America, and Australasia, seems to have occurred step by step, the product of a deliberate design.

How the Ukrainian scene in Canada was affected is discussed in the concluding sections of this chapter, and again in the Epilogue. The contention is that the spatial manifestations of *DP* ascendancy here were the outcome of a planned transplantation to Canada of an organizational structure (and its attendant behavioural patterns) which were spawned in the inter-war Western Ukraine. This mode was dispersed along with the *DPS* during WW II to be reconstituted wherever these involuntary migrants were relocated. Their reliance upon this style of organization is perhaps understandable. It had survived under adverse conditions before, so few *OUN* leaders saw any reason for

changing the structure of their organization in the emigration. Perhaps they also felt little inclination to do so because of their commitment to returning, in the near future, to Ukraine. It was only living for several years in such places as Canada, when the difference in the nature of the political system here as compared to what they had known before WW II became obvious, which convinced some that a covert network was no longer required. Even so, not everyone agreed that the underground *OUN* structure was inappropriate even in Canada. And so it persisted.

The geographical impacts of this relocation of the nationalist framework into Canada are described in the final section of this chapter. As the introduction of this new form did not go unnoticed, or uncontested, not only was an addition made to the fabric of Ukrainian Canadian society, but the pre-existing configuration was transformed. The fact that those arriving in Canada after the war were involuntary migrants can be used to explain the scale and the nature of the changes within Ukrainian Canadian society that their immigration rendered.

Ukrainian Canadian Lobbying Efforts

Anthony Yaremovich's observation, in September of 1947, that most *DPS* were beginning to readily declare a "very strong desire" to emigrate, and particularly to Canada, confirmed Panchuk's earlier contention that the only viable solution to the Ukrainian refugee problem was massive

resettlement. As early as December, 1946 he had argued that Ukrainian Canadian efforts should focus "NOT ON RELIEF" but on relocating *DPS* to places like Canada. The critical issue, as he saw it, was how best to persuade Canadian officials that the Ukrainians among the *DP* population constituted among the "best" settlers in relation to Canada's requirements.

Panchuk suggested that the *UCC* and *UCRF* use several tactics to achieve this in their lobbying efforts. First of all, they should always "play" on the humanitarian and Christian "angle" when approaching the Canadian public or officials. Appeals framed in such terms would strike a receptive cord among other Canadians. The *DPS* should only be described in flattering phrases, with the emphasis being placed on those qualities that were presumed to be most sought after by Canadian immigration officials. In other words, the Ukrainian refugees should be portrayed as suitable labourers for Canadian industry, as anti-communists, and as a population akin to the Ukrainian group of Canada. Presumably, since the latter population had already demonstrated its utility to the nation during the recent war, and with its solid efforts in helping develop the Prairie West more of the same kind of people would be welcome additions to Canada. Panchuk also instructed his readers in Canada, about how they could use their own population's heterogeneity to advantage. For example, Ukrainian Catholics should always be delegated to lobby

other Canadian Catholic groups. Similarly, UCVA members should be sent to speak to Canadian veterans' organizations.²

There were some things the Ukrainians in Canada should studiously avoid, wrote Panchuk. For example, he strenuously objected to any suggestion that the UCC and UCRF voice as a goal the establishment of "bloc settlements" of Ukrainian *DPS*. That kind of plan would only "frighten" Canadian officials. As he noted:

The real plan, as submitted, that of BLOCK SETTLEMENTS in selected, protected territories, will hardly be acceptable to ANY government, much as it may appeal to us personally. Every government is AFRAID of blocks. Canada itself is more concerned what it will do to LIQUIDATE OR BREAK UP definite blocks of Ukrainians, Mennonites, etc. that already exist, and therefore would be most reluctant if not completely opposed to any suggestion of bloc settlement.³

Obviously some Ukrainian Canadians had well absorbed the lesson Canada's state elites had wanted them to learn about the undesirability of ethnic groups creating their own geographical niches on Canadian soil.

If the *DPS* were not to be clustered together where were they to go? Panchuk, correctly, opined that most *DPS* would have to be placed in Canada's industrial heartland, for this was the only region capable of absorbing the numbers of *DPS*

he felt would arrive.⁴ As it turned out (Chapter 5) the majority of Ukrainian *DPS* eventually did locate in Ontario and Quebec.

Their own experience of censure had convinced many Ukrainian Canadians that the obviously nationalist identification of many *DPS* would find no ready welcome in official Canadian circles. Those Ukrainian Canadians who had the most direct contact with the *DPS* were therefore tasked with purging the refugees of their apparent fixation with politics. Panchuk readily admitted this as being part of his mandate overseas. In one letter, offering "concrete advice" on how refugees should be handled, he pointed out that it was up to Ukrainian Canadians to convince the *DPS* that the "militant and hostile [anti-Soviet] propaganda" they waged inside the *DP* camps was doing them more harm than good. The "minority" responsible, he suggested, was in fact only making a difficult situation worse for their kinsmen by engaging in such activities, for these angered the governing powers. Panchuk wondered why the *DPS* couldn't instead involve themselves in such "legal and most beneficial" enterprises as handicraft production, educational or cultural work.

He was not the only Ukrainian Canadian observer who felt this way. As Dr. Kaye wrote to Panchuk he wanted the *DPS* to understand that they should:

...concentrate their whole attention on RELIEF WORK, on settlement, on emigration and only when

they have achieved that to allow themselves the luxury of politics. Everything they do is watched with a telescopic magnifying glass and is used against them.⁵

By the time such advice was being sent from Canada overseas, many *DPS* were already moving in the opposite direction, and resettling there. As one report noted, by December 31, 1947, a total of 20,201 applications had been received from various Canadian companies for *DP* labourers. From this total, 5,100 had already been placed by February, 1948. A sampling from this list, (Table 6.1), underlines the geographical nexus into which many Ukrainian *DPS* flowed, and the types of occupations they were offered.⁶

Predominantly, these Ukrainian *DPS* went to work in the resource industries of northern Ontario and Quebec. This original placement set the pattern for the distribution of Ukrainian post-WW II immigrants in Canada. Few would relocate to western Canada once their one or two year contracts had expired, and only a residue would remain in northern regions of the country. Most relocated to southern centres in Ontario and Quebec, generally into major urban and industrial centres. There they found not only employment, but, importantly, the satisfaction of being able to locate near other Ukrainian *DPS*. This process eventually resulted in the concentration of these Ukrainian refugees in Ontario, geographically distant from the traditional hearth of this ethnic group in western Canada. This basic spatial

Table 6.1 Selected employment opportunities for Ukrainian DPs
in Canada, 1948

<u>Name of Firm</u>	<u>Jobs Offered</u>	<u>Jobs Filled</u>
The Great Lakes Paper Company Ltd.,	420	420
Kormac Lumber Company	50	50
Canadian Pacific Railways	2,055	175
Kirkland Lake Gold Mines	20	nil
Sigma Mines (Quebec) Ltd.,	35	5
Falconbridge Mines Ltd.,	20	nil
Noranda Mines Ltd.,	200	10
Toronto Brick Company Ltd.,	10	nil
Algoma Steel Co. of Canada Ltd.,	215	nil

Source: Panchuk to Yaremovich (30.4.48) in PAC MG 31 D69.

separation has remained evident to the present.

If, as Dmytro Gerych of Winnipeg wrote to Panchuk:

The refugees are arriving'

what impacts were they having on Ukrainian Canadian society?

News From Canada - Reacting To The *DPS*

Those involved in Ukrainian Canadian refugee relief and resettlement operations often complained about the lack of guidance and information they received from the *UCC* and *UCRF*. As Panchuk noted in a letter to Joseph Choma, of Fort William, Ontario:

There are so few people writing anything about the activities there that we are almost completely lost now and it will not be long before we will feel worse than the *DPS* themselves.*

Soon after the *DPS* began arriving in Canada, and their numbers made them impossible to ignore, Ukrainian Canadians began corresponding much more regularly to the *CRM*'s members. Their letters contain numerous references to the *DPS*, remarks on the nature of these newcomers and the effects they were starting to have on Ukrainian Canadian society. Generally, the observations were negative.

For example, Gerych wrote to Panchuk in September of 1948 to record that among the refugees:

...you can find anything you like, in certain circumstances even more than we need here in Canada. Some brought with them a mania that in Canada they

won't have to work, dollars can be picked up off the streets. But it's not like that, and so they get angry, and a few say they'd even return but where? they themselves don't know. They'd like to go where one can live easily, but there's no *UNRRA* here. True, there are only a few of this type in every hundred, but they damage opinion about the "refugees."

As more *DPS* arrived, other Ukrainians in Canada also wrote about the outcome of this resettlement effort in Canada. Dr. Kaye was a frequent writer. After, in his estimate, some 10,000 Ukrainian *DPS* had arrived, he had this to say about them:

Newcomers try to overcome religious differences, try to break down barriers between Nationalists, Catholics, Orthodox and clash with the "aboriginies." On their debit side is their political division on European lines. There is no room in Canada for bickering about who is greater, Bandera or Melnyk. We are not interested in their differences but we are definitely interested in the fact that their fight is being exploited by communists [whose] papers are printing whole pages of "nationalist scandals."

Kaye also had some positive remarks to make about the *DPS*. In early 1949 he noted one attempt by the newcomers to diffuse the pre-WW II religious antagonisms which still

existed in the Ukrainian Canadian population:

...there is a tendency on the part of the Ukrainian immigrants to transplant their political division to Canadian soil. Perhaps time will rectify these differentiations. The newcomers are reluctant to join existing groups because they don't know their ideology. There is a tendency to remain outside of the existing social life or to form separate groups. Religious differentiation is to most of them a puzzling phenomenon. In one big community in the East a group of immigrants arranged a Christmas Eve celebration and invited a Catholic and an Orthodox priest to be present. The priests did not show up and there was no blessing of the meal. You can see what difficult problems we are facing in Canada, but there are indications that matters can be steered into the right channels with some effort and gentle persuasion.''

After a number of such disenchanted reports had reached Panchuk, he began responding in kind, sprinkling his letters with negative judgements about the *DPS*. For example, in September of 1948 he wrote back to Gerych:

I find your opinion of the refugees and *DPS* coming to Canada very objective and very accurate and it coincides exactly with the opinions I have always [sic!] had of these people. True enough there are many good people among them, but, unfortunately,

there is also a lot of "scum" who have forgotten what work means and who feel that somebody owes them a living. They are deeply disappointed that there is no *UNRRA* in Great Britain; as there are some in Canada who suffer from the same disappointment, and they are anxious to go anywhere they can find milk and honey growing on trees. These people, unfortunately, not only cause a negative reflection on other refugees and *DPS*, but also on those organizations who have always been standing in their defence and on their behalf that in my heart I cannot fully justify. Still that is one of the responsibilities that we must face and carry.^{1 2}

The Second Line: Traces Of A Pattern

While convinced that Ukrainian Canadians had to carry the burden of the Ukrainian *DPS*, the *CRM*'s members did not become actively inimical to their charges until they began to find increasing evidence of the existence of a minority within the *DP* population which seemed determined to achieve pre-eminence within this displaced populace. The most blatant example of this covert activity was Panchuk's loss of the Presidency of the *AUGB*, in mid-March, 1949. Panchuk raged against the "scandalous" election, and the "ultra patriots" who had deposed him. He added that he felt a similar pattern of "takeovers" was occurring across Western

Europe, orchestrated by the *Banderivtsi*. He warned the Ukrainians in Canada to beware lest such behaviour was transplanted into Canada with the *DPS* migrating there.

While this message was sent, few Ukrainian Canadians seem to have realized its import. One of those who did, Peter Wenger, noted that:

We in Canada feel bitterly about it. It is a kick in the pants not only for you, but also indirectly at us.¹³

He added that he was glad of Panchuk's cautionary advice, for it would help protect the Ukrainian Canadian community against the perfidity of "fake Ukrainian patriots." Certainly, he felt, they would not "get away with" a similar plot in Canada. Ukrainian Canadians, he asserted, were now on guard, and would not be readily tricked. He then lamented:

How immature our people are politically, what a small percentage of them are really patriotic *as we understand it!* [emphasis added] We Canadians would like to see an independent Ukraine for the sake of the principle itself. The majority of the *DPS* here seem to have different ideas - they think of an independent Ukraine only in terms of what they might profit personally by it. One sometimes wonders whether our ideas are just a waste of time and whether they are worth bothering about. I suppose though that we will stay and plug away like

fools just because of the "principle."¹⁴

Other Ukrainian Canadians shared this view. While Peter Smylski¹⁵ downplayed the friction that the *DPS* were blamed with introducing into Ukrainian Canadian life, he did suggest that it was up to the Canadian born to steer the *DPS* into acceptable patterns of behaviour. Writing to Panchuk, he observed:

I have been following a bit developments in England. Similarly, things are going here. I have taken the attitude that I, as a Canadian, will stand by and observe. Let the newcomers first find out what they want themselves. Maybe readjusted psychologically and acclimatized - maybe it's natural then and only then can we help. *It's the mentality that counts.* [emphasis added] That may have to be trained. If so, perhaps then we should train them as best we can and if they allow themselves to be trained.¹⁶

That such a development was possible, Smylski opined, could be seen in what had happened to the *UNF*. He wrote that by the war's end "even" this group had "become a good Canadian political organization" "willing to invest money and erect buildings in Canada" a policy this same organization had once "raved against", claiming that establishing a physical base in Canada was a betrayal.¹⁷

Anthony Yaremovich was more blunt in his assessment of the *DPS*. In late 1949 he described the Ukrainian Canadian

political landscape in bleak terms:

The *Banderivtsi-Melnykivtsi* fight is finding itself locking horns on Canadian soil. They certainly are going at each other with typical Ukrainian vigour. No quarter is given by any side. Mr. Kossar is ready to be up in arms at the slightest provocation from the "B" group and they are doing likewise from their side. We who are on the sidelines have quite a bit of fun watching them. There is spying and counterspying and supporting anyone who will support the side in question. It seems that Ukrainians have some years to grow before they start reaching the age of maturity. This is not concealed from other people.'*

Why had so much exasperation arisen among the Ukrainian Canadian population in so relatively short a time span?

The *DUNr*'s Second Line - Transplanting A Mode To Canada

No constituent organization of the *UCC* group provided a convivial niche for the considerable numbers of *Banderivtsi* migrating into Canada. At first these men and women had to rely on creating their own local associations to ensure that they would have structures convivial to their own political views. Thus, in the small towns of northern Ontario, there arose, after 1947, a number of ostensibly cultural organizations (e.g. choir groups) which kept this movement's members together until *LVU* and *SUM* branches were organized.

Such local organizations assured a measure of fraternal support and interaction for the like-minded among the *DPs*. Otherwise most of them would have been left without the group ties they had known in the *DP* camps. While a few managed to join such pre-existing bodies as the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (*BUC*), and the *UNF*, the prejudice within these groups against newcomers often made continued participation impossible. Only the *UNF* provided a welcome niche for a substantial minority within the post-war immigration, namely the *Melnykivtsi*. The consequences of that "open door" policy will be referred to again in the Epilogue. What concerns this discussion is how the *Banderivtsi*, who certainly comprised the largest vintage group within the post-war immigration, organized themselves once in Canada. Particularly, what were the spatial manifestations of this process?

Possibly no account of how the *OUNr* was transplanted into Canada can ever be written. *OUNr* archives remain sealed, and as mentioned previously, many sympathizers are unwilling to discuss in detail the activities of their movement in Canada. What can be deduced, however, is that once the pressure to emigrate from the countries of first refuge intensified, both *OUN* factions developed plans to ensure their own survival in the countries which were receiving Ukrainian *DPs*. The *Banderivtsi*, aware that they would find no pre-existing organization in Canada in which to shelter, were the most indisposed by this turn of events.

To cope, the *OUNr* dispatched trusted members of the movement wherever they were required, to settle down amongst the relocated *DPS* and replicate anew the structure of their organization. In the jargon of the *Banderivtsi* these specially dispatched cadres were known as *The Second Line*. Who they were must remain a mystery, although the fact that such men and women were deliberately sent out from Europe as part of a plan was confirmed by Yaroslav Stetsko.' He himself apparently tried to enter Canada under the pseudonym of Wasyl Dankiw in mid-1949. Whether he planned to stay is unknown.

At least several other high-ranking *OUNr* members would eventually be placed in Canada, to assume authoritative positions in the hierarchy being created directly beneath the Organization's *Rezident*, who arrived in Canada by the end of 1946. Two of the more prominent of these *Second Line* members were sent to Toronto and Winnipeg, respectively. The former eventually became *Rezident*. The fact that these two arrived by late 1948, in time to witness the creation of *Homin Ukrainy* and *LVU*, was no coincidence. Several of those who gathered in Toronto, on May 1, 1949, to announce the formation of *LVU* were certainly trusted *OUNr* members.

How they were aided in their mission of reconstructing the *OUNr* inside Canada is clarified by the archival material and oral testimony of Stanley Frolick.

Canadian-born, yet by reason of his many years in inter-war Western Ukraine, a committed nationalist, Frolick

had run afoul of the Ukrainian Canadian establishment for his advocacy of the *OUN/UPA/UHVR*, (see Chapter 4). After he was purged from *CURB* he returned to Canada, in late 1946. Well before that date, however, Frolick had rebuilt his contacts with the nationalist movement. On December 2, 1945 he was appointed the *Rezident* for the *UHVR* for all of the United Kingdom by Mykola Lebed. His affiliation with this political faction was directly responsible for his dismissal from the position of *CURB*'s Director. As was noted earlier, this was accomplished after Panchuk, and particularly Dmytro Andrievsky²⁰ had undercut Frolick's position by exposing his political allegiance.

Frolick had become particularly exposed to criticism after the Rev. Kushnir - who vaingloriously considered himself a "father of his people" found that his attempt to transpose the *UCC* model to the Ukrainian *DPS* on the continent was rejected by the *Banderivtsi*.²¹

Kushnir conveniently overlooked the fact that the *UCC* itself had been imposed on Ukrainians in Canada when he argued that a similar "organic unity" was exactly what the *DPS* required. Eventually, he helped establish a Co-Ordinating Ukrainian Council (*CUC*), composed of many of the political groups existing among *DPS*, but its structure, which gave each group an equal vote (regardless of their actual size or relevance within the diaspora), alienated the *OUNr*, which felt that its pre-eminence was being deliberately ignored and rejected. Consequently, this

faction of the nationalist movement withdrew from the *CUC*. Kushnir deeply resented this rejection of his "vision" and began doing everything possible to confound the *OUNr* wherever he encountered their activists. An easy target for his wrath was Frolick, an employee of the *UCC*. The removal of Frolick was not hindered by Kushnir's alliance with the *UNF*'s Kossar, whose enmity towards Frolick was based on *UNF*'s stance in favour of the *Melnykivtsi*. Kushnir thus had little trouble disposing of Frolick. Presumably, he must have believed that the latters' activities were blocked for good. In this he was gravely mistaken.

Once back in Canada Frolick had tried to redress the injustice done to him, through speaking with Kushnir, the *UCC* and the *UNF*'s National Executive.²² When this failed, he began to concentrate on building up an *OUNr* network within Canada. Apparently, before he departed for home, Frolick had been designated as the *OUNr*'s *Rezident* for Canada, the first man to ever serve in such a post. By accepting this mantle he not only acquired a unique niche for himself in Ukrainian Canadian history, but served as a personal bridge between North America, Western Europe, and the resistance in Ukraine, the one man whose background and experiences qualified him to understand not only the Ukrainian Canadian attitude but also that of the nationalists. Having lived and worked amongst both populations he had absorbed many of the attitudes and perceptions of both.

Once Frolick had settled in Canada, any member of the *OUNr* emigrating there was assured of at least having one address from which to seek information about how to re-establish contacts with other *Banderivtsi*. As this occurred, with Frolick monitoring the entire process from his home in Toronto, the hierarchical cell structure of the movement was replicated. This development took several years, and Frolick continued monitoring this growth until the early 1950s, by which time he had come to the conclusion that there was no longer a need for a covert network inside Canada. Consequently, he gave up his position as *Rezident*. Well before he made this decision, however, the *OUNr* had in place a dispersed yet disciplined network spanning Canada and attracting to itself increasing numbers of *DPs*, both former *OUNr* members and newly acquired sympathizers. All the while regular contact was maintained with the movement's HQ in Munich. In large measure, this organizational effort was carried out secretly.

The limited amount of correspondence preserved from this early period in the history of *OUNr* in Canada reveals not only the perceptions of the Ukrainian nationalists who were relocated here but something of the impediments they faced during their first years in this country. The issues they were called upon to deal with ranged from mobilizing their membership in aid of Dmytro Dontsov²³ to coping with the on-going machinations of Dmytro Andrievsky, who toured Canada attempting to dissuade Ukrainian Canadians from siding

with the *OUNr*.²⁴

Some of the most interesting correspondence was with a former, high-ranking *UNF* member, Mr. P. Shtepa (Amherstburg, Ontario). Eventually, Shtepa was to become Frolick's "trusted man" for the Windsor, Ontario area.²⁵ The correspondence between these two men underlines the difficulties the *Banderivtsi* had in dealing with local *UCC* organizers, who carried on an hostile campaign against the *OUNr*, claiming that the latter had only introduced dissent within the Ukrainian Canadian population. As Shtepa wrote:

They [the *UCC*] put the entire question as being one of "disunity" or "splitting up" our people. Under such a banner, understandably, they attract the rank and file, even those who might otherwise be sympathetic to Bandera. Who can agree to a splitting up of the community? We have to counter this negative description of our movement by making it known that we are the exponents of a rejuvenation in the nationalist movement, a group that seeks a return to the positions of nationalism as they were laid down by Konovalts and in the ideology of Dontsov. Truth is with us; we have all too many facts which show that Kossar has abandoned nationalism and become nothing more than a co-operator and opportunist.²⁶

Particularly of interest to Shtepa was whether the *OUNr* had devised some definite plan for locating its

supporters in those cities or areas where there already existed Ukrainian populations. If such a blueprint had been drawn up, Shtepa wanted to know about it, since "a few of our own people" carefully inserted into selected Ukrainian Canadian communities could easily "do the trick" when it came to taking over *UNF* branches or even the *UNF* newspaper *New Pathway*.²⁷ All that was required, suggested Shtepa, was a little deft organization and the *Banderivtsi* would quickly be able to capture a ready made Ukrainian Canadian organization, or at least part of it. So, the question he put to his commander was, "is a planned settlement of ours taking place?"²⁸

No clear-cut answer was forthcoming. However, an oblique reference to this question was made in one of the *Rezident's* subsequent letters:

In a few days *Rezident* instructions will be mailed out to all regional sections of the *OUN* in Canada. I'll send you a copy. It will give you an answer to your questions [about] why we should form a new organization and start our own newspaper. As you will see, many of our members now find themselves in the lumber camps. When their contracts end, they'll be settling down in various parts of Canada... Certainly, we'll do whatever we can to ensure that they disperse in a planned way, to the extent possible. In any event, a percentage of our people will end up in Windsor, Ontario.²⁹

The *OUNr*'s structure seems, therefore, to have been built up around a few strategically placed individuals. As increasing numbers of Ukrainian *DPS*, among them *Banderivtsi*, relocated to Canada, the latter turned to their *Rezident* and his lieutenants, who provided instructions on how to contact local *OUNr* leaders. These, in turn informed their regional branches about the new members so that gradually a secret and pyramidal, *OUNr* structure was recreated. While the Organization had little control over where most of the *DPS* originally went in Canada, once these *DPS* had worked off their assisted passage through contract labour, they were free to move wherever they wanted. The Organization instructed some as to where they should go. This was obviously not feasible in every case. Still, there were sufficient human and material resources to provide Frolick, a few months after his own return to Canada, with several able assistants. These *OUNr* activists were directly responsible for husbanding the movement's adherents no matter when they arrived, or where they originally or subsequently located in Canada. The details of how the spatial pattern of the *OUNr* grew in Canada cannot be traced, but it is known that the movement was strongly concentrated in Ontario and adjacent Quebec, where most *DPS* settled. Outlying cells were established in some major western Canadian cities such as Winnipeg, Edmonton, Regina, and Lethbridge.

The initial period of organizational activity presented certain difficulties for the *OUNr*. Aside from Frolick, none of the leading activists had ever been in Canada before. They were basically unfamiliar with the nature of the political system here, and unsure about the nature of Ukrainian Canadian life (although reading the Ukrainian Canadian press in the *DP* camps had provided them with some news about what to expect).

In providing a reliable source of intelligence Frolick played a pivotal role in helping *OUNr* members adjust to Canadian conditions. For example, Mr. S. Kulyk, then working for the Abitibi Power and Paper Co. Ltd., near Minnipuka, Ontario, wrote to Frolick in August of 1947, explaining that while they had never personally met, he had the latter's address from Munich. The problem, he explained, was that he and his fellow Ukrainian workers were faced with some serious problems in the Minnipuka area. They had, for example, no idea about whom to trust, and they suspected the Ukrainian Canadians they were meeting. The latter, reported Kulyk, kept talking about something called the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and recounting what wonderful work it had done on behalf of the *DPS* in Europe. Kulyk wondered about this:

It would be a good idea if you would send us some informed person who could speak to us. En route here we met a number of Ukrainians, for example one group at the Montreal train station. These people

all praised the *UCC*, which they claimed had given refugees so much help and sent so many packages to Europe. But in our group no one even received so much as a handkerchief to blow their nose in from this *UCC*. What's the true situation?

...There are now 116 of us here, Ukrainians who came to Canada from many different *lagers*, yet none of us ever heard about any Ukrainian relief operation from Canada, and none of us ever received any help. If it's possible send someone to us who can explain these things and advise us what to do, what to think, how we should react during such encounters. We are all young men of good character. There are no communists among us. Occasionally someone will come around to visit us, and praise the commune. These are those who have never seen or experienced one. One fellow of this type came around from a local factory. He ended up leaving us with a different perception, saying that he had never realized what a swine Stalin is.³⁰

Other letters from recently immigrated *DPS* carried on in a similar vein. One group complained that its letters to the *OUNr* headquarters in Munich were not being answered. They wanted Frolick to send them the blue & yellow nationalist Ukrainian flag so they could fly it over their camp, letting any visitors know at a glance who they were and what they stood for. The same group asked him to advise

them about what Ukrainian Canadian newspapers they should read. They wanted to keep in touch with the relevant developments but were uncertain which newspaper would provide them with the true facts.³¹

Inevitably, such letters pleaded for "exact" instructions and prompt replies, for many *DPS* reported that they were finding the local Ukrainian populations inimical or indifferent, while their own numbers were continuing to increase through immigration. They needed to create their own ready support structure for those coming in after them, particularly to shield the recent arrivals against hostile influences. As one *DP* described this danger:

I was myself poorly informed at first... This man came around to ask us who we were and what our views were on certain issues; all the while he urged us to join the Ukrainian National Federation...when we asked him about the *OUN*, he told us that there was no such thing, that Ukrainians in Canada had never heard of any such organization. So write and tell me what I should do and what I should tell others of our people to do.³²

A lack of financial resources prevented Frolick from travelling extensively, although he did attempt to answer the many letters that came to him in Toronto. His labours seem to have met with positive results, for, as one *DP* eventually reported, he and his fellow immigrants had

adjusted, although the situation was still "proving hard" because of the contrary attitudes of some Ukrainian Canadians.³³

However settled many of them became, most political refugees still longed for the day when they might be able to return to Ukraine. To that end they first built up their own network in Canada. When the much anticipated opportunity to return home failed to materialize, some grew discouraged. The sentiments many shared are well expressed by one man who wrote about why he felt he must return to Ukraine:

I have to go back. If I stay here in Canada what will have been the purpose of my life? I will have lived and died for nothing. There, in the ranks of the UPA, at least I'll still be of some use.³⁴

At the time the Cold War seemed to presage open conflict between East and West. This bolstered many refugees' expectations about the likelihood of a return to Ukraine. This belief was also encouraged by ideologues of Ukrainian nationalism like Dontsov, who asserted that, in time, the West would "be asking us to go [back]."³⁵ In the meantime, as one of them rather arrogantly reflected, they could at least take comfort in the fact that their arrival in Canada had kept Ukrainian life here from "sinking to the level of the dogs."³⁶

Understandably, few Ukrainian Canadians shared this perception of their population or its accomplishments.

Spreading The Message: The Appearance of *Homin Ukrainy*

Having a covert *OUNr* network in place was satisfying, for it allowed the movement to husband its human and material resources in Canada. Yet it was soon realized that the total number of *OUNr* members residing in Canada was insufficient to provide the considerable support the movement overseas required. To be successful, the *OUNr* would have to attract to itself a larger proportion of the Ukrainian refugee population resettling in Canada. To achieve this the *DPS* arriving there would have to be informed about the *OUNr* and its political positions, as well as the existence of such a force within Canada. The surest way of widely disseminating such information, albeit in a muted form, was by publishing a newspaper, which could be sent through the mails across Canada into every organized community where the *DPS* had located. By so doing the *OUNr* would also be assured that a uniform message would reach each member and supporters, wherever they might live. The decision was therefore made to establish a new Ukrainian-language newspaper within Canada.

According to one version, the birth of this newspaper, *Homin Ukrainy* (Echo of Ukraine) can be traced to a meeting held between several prominent *OUNr* members in Munich, during December of 1946.³⁷ Frolick was illegally in the American Zone of Germany (Munich) at that time, to met with Mykola Lebed, Stepan Bandera, Yaroslav Stetsko, and other prominent Ukrainian nationalists. During their dicussions,

the idea of publishing such a newspaper was first broached, according to Roman Rakhmanny's recollection.³⁸ If this story is accurate, and there seems to be little reason to doubt it, then the major post-WW II Ukrainian newspaper in Canada has distinctly European roots.

At any rate, by the late summer of 1948, sufficient capital had been raised, to allow Frolick to begin publishing the newspaper. The first issue appeared on December 15, 1948; it was printed on the presses of the United Hetman Organization in Toronto.³⁹

Originally, the Editor was supposed to have been Roman Rakhmanny, but events in Europe delayed his departure, so Mr. S. Sosnowsky assumed this post, arriving in Canada in September, 1948.⁴⁰ When Rakhmanny arrived in April, 1949, he took over, retaining this position until the spring of 1951, when ideological differences within the nationalist movement prompted him to break with the *Banderivtsi*. Frolick himself gave up the role of publisher in August, 1949, when the National Executive of LVU formally accepted this responsibility. After this happened *Homin Ukrainy* began appearing as a weekly, instead of a bi-weekly publication. Characterizing this change in administration was not only a new publishing schedule, but also a definite shift in the paper's political orientation. Whereas Frolick had advocated that the paper equally cover the OUNr/UPA/UHVR, once LVU took over, material pertaining to the OUNr came to predominate.

Reaction among Ukrainian Canadians to the appearance of such a newspaper, was predictably hostile or indifferent. The Wasylyshens, pausing on their way to their UCRF posting in Bielefeld, in the British Zone of Germany, attended one meeting in Hamilton, where the major topic discussed was how UCC supporters should react to the new newspaper, essentially to combat its spreading influence.⁴¹

John Hladun,⁴² publisher of an anti-communist tabloid, *The Worker*, was particularly vehement in his denunciation of *Homin Ukrainy* and what it represented:

our right wing totalitarians are publishing their paper here and are using that boy Frolick as their front. They have had quite a few bad breaks lately and in all probability may just peter out. I have made a few moves that will impel them to tow the line or go out of business [?]. What makes me mad is that a group of irresponsible youngsters feel that they can make a living by exploiting the patriotic feelings of our people.⁴³

Competing newspapers, and their respective organizations, such as *New Pathway* (UNF) and the *Ukrainian Life* and *Ukrainian Word* (AUUC) were also condemnatory.

The League For The Liberation of Ukraine Emerges

With a covert network in place, and a newspaper carrying its message to a Ukrainian audience spread across Canada, the *Banderivtsi* next took steps to establish a front

organization for their movement. It was meant, from the beginning, to include not only *OUNr* members, but also those sympathetic to the platform of the revolutionary nationalists. In a declaration published in *Homin Ukrainy* on May 1, 1949, it was announced that a temporary central organizing bureau had been created to publicly promote the aims of a new organization, the League For The Liberation of Ukraine (*LVU*).⁴⁴ The President of the new group was, intriguingly, neither a *DP* nor a Western Ukrainian. Yakiw Nestorenko was in fact an Eastern Ukrainian an inter-war immigrant to Canada, who had been a guerilla during the Ukrainian liberation struggles of the 1917-1921 years. He seems to have been chosen specifically to signal to other Ukrainian Canadians that *LVU* was open to all Ukrainians in Canada, regardless of their regional, political, or religious backgrounds.

However well-intentioned this original gesture may have been, Nestorenko soon found that he did not represent the attitudes or concerns of the majority of the *LVU* membership. Accordingly, he quickly resigned from his post, to be replaced by Dr. Roman Malaschuk.⁴⁵ Since then, the National presidents of *LVU* have always been Western Ukrainians and post-WW II refugees, presumably most of them either *OUNr* members or supporters.

The difference between the original founders of *LVU* and subsequent executives is seen in the fact while the first group included Mr. S. Sosnowsky as Secretary, Stanley

Frolick as 1st Vice-President, and Evhen Dudra, a Ukrainian Canadian, as 2nd Vice-President subsequently only "newcomers" were to be found in the commanding positions within *LVU*.⁴⁶

LVU's manifesto stated its aims plainly. Ukraine, it claimed, had been the first nation to "mount the barricades" in the fight against Bolshevism. This struggle, it asserted, must now begin to involve the Ukrainian Canadians. This population had always shown considerable interest in Ukrainian issues, as proven by the presence of Ukrainian cultural, social and political organizations in Canada. These people must realize that *LVU* was a manifestation of the modern Ukrainian struggle for independence and so adapt to its new methods and forms. The duty of Ukrainians in Canada, in other words, was to rally in support of *LVU*. To that end, Ukrainian Canadians were invited to support *LVU*, which was openly (if perhaps somewhat tongue-in-cheek) described as being the "second line" of this liberation front.⁴⁷

Members of the *OUNr* naturally attached themselves to this new organization. Between 1949 and 1959, 44 branches sprang up across Canada, and 12 more were added between 1960 and 1969.⁴⁸ The first four were all established in 1949, in Hamilton (17 May), Oshawa (15 June), Toronto (8 August) and St. Thomas (24 December); all of these in Ontario, where the greatest concentration of *DPS* was to be found. The lasting significance of this province as the hearth of the post-WW

II immigration can be seen in the map illustrating the spatial distribution and growth of *LVU* branches across Canada (Figure 6.1). A total of 38 were established in Ontario, while only 13 were set up in the three Prairie provinces, with 1 more in Quebec, 4 in British Columbia, leading to a total of 56 across the country.⁴⁹ Of these the largest became those in Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg and Edmonton, each a major urban and industrial centres where *DPS* clustered.

While each of the pre-WW II organizations had been based predominantly in rural western Canada, and seen their greatest growth in the inter-war period, this major post-war structure was clearly formed and centred in central Canada. When Canada's WW II and post-WW II Ukrainian populations are compared (for 1941 and 1951 respectively) this restructuring of the spatial pattern of Ukrainian settlement becomes apparent. In 1941 most Ukrainians in Canada remained a rural folk, clustered in the three Prairie provinces (Figure 6.2). By 1951 the Ukrainian population in Ontario (and to a lesser degree in Quebec) had not only increased, as a result of this refugee immigration, but it was largely concentrated in the urban and industrial centres of these two provinces. Ukrainians in Western Canada retained their rural character, the post-war inflow may account for some of the growth of an urban Ukrainian population in Manitoba, (Figure 6.3). Symbolically, the difference between the two populations was evidenced in the fact that while Winnipeg had been

Figure 6.1 Development of the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine, 1949-1969.






Figure 6.2 Geographical distribution of Ukrainians in Canada, 1941.



Source: STATISTICAL COMPENDIUM Series 211-16 130

Figure 6.3 Geographical distribution of Ukrainians in Canada, 1951.



symbolically considered as "the capital of Ukrainians in Canada" before the war, pride of place was assigned to Toronto by the *DPS*. Decades later the emergence of Edmonton would do little to diminish the ascriptive pre-eminence of Toronto although Winnipeg's status would further suffer. On this very basic level, then, the arrival of Ukrainian refugees segmented Ukrainian space within Canada even further; in all it precipitated the emergence of an entirely new pattern of organizational existence. Social life was splintered largely in accordance with this spatial differentiation, with the interaction between pre- and post-WW II Ukrainians in Canada narrowing accordingly.

In its early years of existence in Canada, *LVU* was not as successful as its founders had hoped it might be in attracting new members. At a National Executive meeting held in Toronto in early July, 1951, Mr. V. Klish⁵⁰ informed Dr. Malaschuk that the organization was still doing poorly in building up a mass following.⁵¹ For example, while there were over 3,000 *DPS* in the Winnipeg area, the local *LVU* branch was relatively small. Furthermore, as was occurring in several cities, friction had developed between *LVU* and *SUM* (Ukrainian Youth Association) branches. This blunted the movement's growth. Such disheartening reports were again echoed at the Third National Conference of the *LVU*, held in Toronto between December 22 and 23, 1951. Delegates were told that even in Toronto, a city where approximately 40,000 Ukrainians lived, the *LVU* branch had only about 100

members.⁵²

Whether *LVU* ever managed to attract as many members as other Ukrainian Canadian organizations is debatable. It certainly had a smaller population to draw upon than the pioneer and inter-war organizations, if the assumption that most pre-WW II Ukrainian Canadians were not interested in joining *LVU* is made. *LVU*'s close identification with the *Banderivtsi*, while attractive to some *DPS*, was repulsive to others. Finally, in Canada, where the daily encounters between nationalists and the nonaligned which had characterized *DP* camp life no longer existed, many *DPS* elected to go their own way, and not support any Ukrainian organizations. Obviously, this choice was not as readily available an option in the *DP* camps.

Still, the *LVU* did attract, and keep in its ranks, a large number of committed Ukrainian activists from among the *DP* population resettled in Canada. According to the records of *LVU*'s National Executive, between 1949 and 1982, the organization enjoyed the support of 5,345 members across Canada.⁵³ If it is assumed that virtually all of these were former *DPS*, that would mean that approximately one in seven of the post-war immigrants joined *LVU*. If, as one ranking *LVU* member suggested, the families of these members, most subscribers to *Homin Ukrainy* and members of *SUM*, are tallied together then upwards of 15,000 Ukrainians in Canada supported *LVU*.⁵⁴ In other words, nearly 1/2 of the post-WW II Ukrainian immigrants to Canada directly supported or were

"sympathizers" of *LVU*. This figure accords the *LVU* the status of being the largest post-WW organization, and at least one of the top five Ukrainian organizations ever to have been active in this country (the other four being the *ULFTA*, *USRL*, *BUC* and *UNF*). Regretably, the precise memberships of most Ukrainian organizations in Canada are unobtainable, so no more definite comparison is possible.

Whatever the actual number of dues paying members may have been, *LVU* was indisputably the pre-eminent post-WW II organization. It easily eclipsed the several other political, regional, and interest-group formations that Ukrainian *DPS* established formed in Canada. Furthermore, its resiliency and *OUNr* underpinnings gave it a proven capacity for achieving set goals, a fact that worried many of its Ukrainian Canadian detractors. Their reactions will now be analyzed.

Impact Of The New Organization


Hostility towards *Homin Ukrainy* and *LVU* took many forms. Editorials in various Ukrainian Canadian newspapers decried their appearance suggesting that they were unnecessary, and only fragmented the community. It was usually, and rather conveniently, forgotten that most Ukrainian Canadian organizations had not been overly receptive to the *DPS*, often denying them the privileges associated with full membership in their own ranks. One of the major exceptions was the *UNF*; the impact of *Melnykivtsi* within this particular

organization will be described in the Epilogue. Suffice to say that many *UNF* members were to come to regret their organization's "open door" policy, (Figure 6.4). The negative judgement about *DPS* was not confined to political quarrels.

Church organizations, for example those connected to the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, had originally been encouraged by the presence of Orthodox believers within the *DP* population. They welcomed them into their parishes, only to find that many of the latter preferred setting up their own organizations, rather than joining pre-existing *USRL* or *SUMK* branches. Groups like the *URDP*, its youth wing, *ODUM* and *SUZHERO* appeared, leaving many Orthodox parishes divided.

For obvious reasons, repugnance with the *DPS* was most marked among the membership of the pro-communist *AUUC*. Even before *DPS* had begun arriving in Canada, its representatives had presented briefs to the government, insinuating, but never proving, that most *DPS* were "war criminals" or "fascists." They continued mouthing these denunciations long after *DPS* had begun arriving in Canada. This hostility to the *DPS* can be explained in many ways. The most obvious reason for their hostility was that the *AUUC* feared an influx of thousands of Ukrainians who had personally experienced Soviet rule. These people obviously came not with praises, but rather with condemnations of the USSR and its political system. This posed the *AUUC* with the difficult

Figure 6.4 Development of the Ukrainian National Federation in Canada, 1932-1969.



chore of having to answer *DP* allegations about conditions of life for Ukrainians still in the "old country." Even worse, some refugees were survivors of the Great Famine in Ukraine (1932-33). During this period, approximately 7 million Ukrainians were starved to death by the Soviet regime which utilized this barbaric method to impose itself upon the resisting Ukrainian population. Genocide had secured Soviet hegemony over Ukraine, providing the communist regime with the opportunity to consolidate its power over a resisting population, a fact those Eastern Ukrainians who had escaped forcible repatriation were living witnesses to.⁵⁵ Their testimony could only damage the *AUUC*. The only counter-tactic pro-Soviet organizations and cadres could adopt was to brand the *DPS* as liars or tools of anti-Soviet groups. In time, however, many *AUUC* members came into contact with *DPS* and formed their own opinions, a process that sapped the pro-communist groups' strength among Ukrainians in Canada.

Still, the *AUUC* enjoyed, just after the war, a well entrenched organizational structure spread across Canada, and published several newspapers which branded the *DPS* as "Nazi sympathizers" or "collaborators." Some undoubtedly believed this erroneous description of the *DPS*. Yet the *AUUC* and its affiliated organizations did not attract more than a tiny handful of members from within this post-WW II immigrant population. Their organization had to rely almost exclusively on the pre-war Ukrainian population of Canada.

Consequently, the *AUUC* was the only Ukrainian Canadian organization in Canada which did not enjoy even minimal benefits, as accrued to other Ukrainian Canadian organizations from a membership increased as a result of *DP* immigration.

The newcomers, predictably, fought back against the propaganda campaign of the *AUUC* and its sympathizers. Newspapers, whether they were *Homin Ukrainy* or *New Pathway*, made clear that the *DPS* were neither traitors nor "Quislings" but, allegedly among the most patriotic Ukrainians to be found. None of the constituent organizations of the *UCC* condoned or repeated *AUUC* accusations against the *DPS*; indeed these organizations all actively opposed such denunciations. This helped keep the *DPS* from being widely denounced in the Canadian press in the same pejorative terms as pro-Soviet spokesmen employed. Still, if only occasionally, hostile descriptions of the Ukrainian refugees did appear.

The *DPS* were themselves the best witnesses to what they had experienced and why they had come to Canada. They stridently challenged the *AUUC* to prove its claims about Ukrainian nationalists having been collaborators. Rev. Semen Izyk, a supporter of the *OUNr*, had this to say about such allegations:

How could anyone seriously call me a fascist or a Nazi? I never lived under a Soviet regime. You can't call me a traitor to a system I never even

experienced, can you? I owed the USSR no loyalty whatsoever.

I was arrested by the Nazis in Western Ukraine and spent the following three years in their concentration camps, notably Gross-Rosen, Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen. Why was I arrested? Simply because I was, and remain, a Ukrainian nationalist. The Nazis were quick to arrest as many nationalists as they could, realizing that we would never co-operate with them if they set out to pillage Ukraine, which is what they did. Does any of this make me a fascist? The Nazis feared Ukrainian nationalism as much as the Soviets still do.⁵⁶

Such pronouncements, and daily encounters with *DPS*, convinced many *AUUC* supporters that their organization had been less than truthful, both about who the *DPS* were, and what conditions were like inside the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The *AUUC* never fully recovered from these revelations. Its debilitation was further hastened by the anti-communist political climate of the Cold War. From its pre-WW II peak, it declined throughout the late 1940s and 1950s until, at present, its significance as an organized Ukrainian Canadian movement is very circumscribed.

Not every encounter between *AUUC* supporters and Ukrainian *DPS* was peaceful. Sporadically, violence erupted, in Canadian towns and cities as far distant from each other

as Kingston, Ontario and Val D'Or, Quebec, Winnipeg, Manitoba and Vancouver, British Columbia, to name but a few.⁵⁷

These skirmishes hurt the *AUUC*, if for no other reason than frightening away those supporters who were reluctant to be beaten up or abused for their participation in *AUUC* functions. One attack which took place against the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Winnipeg so angered a prominent *AUUC* supporter, and *CCP* member, William Kardash,⁵⁸ that he publicly voiced his annoyance through a letter to the *Winnipeg Free Press*. This letter, published on October 22, 1949, prompted Mr. S. Skoblak (a Ukrainian Canadian) to retort. He started off by reminding the newspaper's readership that Kardash was one of the same group of Ukrainians whose *ULFTA* had organized "shock brigades" during the Dirty Thirties, whose purpose had been to disrupt other Ukrainian Canadian organizations' meetings. He referred to one such particular incident in 1933, when a Ukrainian *Prosvita* (Enlightenment) Society meeting on Flora Avenue had been broken up (July 16). Why, wrote Skoblak, should Kardash and his group complain now that they were being treated to a taste of their own medicine? Furthermore, he insisted, the Canadian public had a right to know that the *AUUC* was nothing more than a "political front organization of the Communist Party," albeit one clever enough to exploit Ukrainian culture as a "shield" behind which to cover up its otherwise nefarious political activities.⁵⁹ Violence could

not be condoned, wrote Skoblak, but it was not the *DPS* who should be deported, as Kardash had suggested but:

I think it is the communists who should be...I want to remind Mr. Kardash that he and his cohorts hold their loyalty to the Kremlin and not to Canada...I would remind Kardash to remember the Ukrainian saying which says: **Do not appear in the hot sun with your head smeared with butter**⁶⁰.

Other fights were even more widely reported. One brawl took place in Toronto's Alexandra Park on July 8, 1949. Even the *Globe and Mail* (Toronto) was well enough informed to cover the event, carrying an item which noted that a Canadian citizen had been "terrorized" by Ukrainian *DPS*.

Walter Skorochild⁶¹ wrote in to clarify the matter. First, he pointed out that the scuffle had not been one-sided. In fact it had been provoked by specially trained brawlers, who had their base in the Ukrainian Labor Temple across the road, (300 Bathurst Street). Their deliberate provocation had as its aim inciting *DPS* to violence. After the Canadian public heard that *DPS* were embroiled in such fights, the communists had hoped to point out, with false righteousness, that these episodes were proof that most Ukrainian refugees were hooligans. Skorochild wanted to correct this distortion and to point out that the violence was not the fault of the *DPS*, although the latter were, admittedly, very anti-communist, but rather only part of a communist plot.

He added, in any case, that Torontonians and other Canadians should not criticize the *DPS* for beating up communists. By so doing, they were only "cleansing" the city's streets of "communist bacteria."²

The assertion that the events were being stage-managed by the *AUUC*, was also made by the local *UCVA* Branch, #360.³ At the time it was presided over by Stephan Pawluk, a *UNF* supporter but one of the few Ukrainian Canadians who sympathized with nationalists among the "newcomers."

Possibly the most dramatic, and widely commented on incident in this subterranean war between the pro-communist Ukrainian Canadians and nationalist *DPS*, was the "bombing" of the aforementioned Ukrainian Labor Temple in Toronto. On the evening of October 8, 1950 an explosion on an outside wall of the building caused considerable structural damage, while badly frightening those inside who were attending a childrens' concert. The case remained unsolved, despite a Metropolitan Toronto Police reward of \$1,500.⁴ The *AUUC* insisted that it knew the culprits were Ukrainian *DP* nationalists. Uncritically, the Canadian media seems to have accepted the *AUUC* version of events. Considerable coverage was given to the bombing in the media. For example, Gordon Sinclair intoned over *CFRB* radio in Toronto:

Fascists, Leftwingers, Reds, Rightwingers... What the Devil! Why don't you leave us alone in Canada!⁵

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) followed suit, broadcasting a report to the effect that the incident was arranged by former "Ukrainian SS men" - a ludicrous assertion given that few veterans of the *Dyvizia Halychyna* (Ukrainian Division "Galicia") had as yet even arrived in Canada.

For some Ukrainian Canadian observers, like Stephan Pawluk of the local UCVA branch, or Walter Skorochid, the entire episode could be dismissed as a cleverly manipulated AUUC contrivance.⁶⁶ As Skorochid prosaically put it:

I smell a large and stinking rat, bred in the Labour Temple.⁶⁷

Others, however and even those unsympathetic to the AUUC, felt that the attack had been a genuine one, carried out by Ukrainians recently arrived in Canada. The noted writer on AUUC history, John Kolasky, is of this view.⁶⁸

What remains puzzling is why, if this was an intentional act of aggression, no one was injured. Presumably, either faction of the OUN had members who were well experienced in urban guerilla warfare techniques. If such men had set the explosive charge, the destruction would have been far more extreme. Could it have been that the intention was not to maim or kill, but only to frighten AUUC supporters? Such a dramatic attack, well publicized, was bound to come to the attention of AUUC members across Canada. Such rank and file members, fearing repercussions, might desist from openly supporting the AUUC thereafter.

Research conducted for this work suggests that this was indeed the intended purpose of this attack. As noted above, the *AUUC*'s membership seems to have markedly declined thereafter.⁶⁹

UCRF Efforts Overseas End - An Inside Job?

Well before the Wasylyshens were formally recalled from their posting at Bielefeld in the British Zone of Germany, they had been receiving disquieting news from Canada about changes occurring within the *UCRF* and *UCC* in Winnipeg. Not only had *DPS* begun assuming positions in the secretariats of these two organizations but, by mid-1949, they were reputedly wielding significant influence. Prominent among these new arrivals was Volodymyr Kochan. Shortly after his arrival he became the Executive Director of the *UCC*, a new position created for especially for him, with Rev. Kushnir's blessing.⁷⁰

This infiltration of *DPS* into the inner councils of the *UCC* and *UCRF* alienated many Ukrainian Canadians. Fewer donations began coming into *UCRF* coffers, and a fund-raising campaign designed to ameliorate this situation languished. The peculiar - to Ukrainian Canadians - behaviour of the *DPS* seems to have first amused, but later annoyed many Ukrainian Canadians. One correspondent recounted a humorous situation that a *DP* organizer for the *UCC* had found himself in:

The *UCC* organizers were all *DPS*. They met with quite a bit of hostility from the Ukrainian

Canadians. Everyone expects the organizer to speak in English and to be able to help the people in the community and not the community to lead him by the hand around like a four year old child. One organizer came to Fort William and saw a beautiful pair of pyjamas in one of the store windows. He bought it. The next day he came in there to Pulak's Restaurant for breakfast. The waitress refused to serve him. When the proprietor Mr. Pulak came he found that the man was none other than a *UCC* organizer. He told him to go home and put on decent clothes... Some of the *DPS* pay attention to the Canadian way of life and try to adapt themselves. But others try to show off and as a result make themselves look ridiculous.⁷¹

On their own such observations would have passed into obscurity without ever being recounted if it were not for the fact that, often as not, such Ukrainian Canadian descriptions also contained negative reflections on the *DPS*. This writer, for example, noted that the *Banderivtsi* (the "B" group) had started to organize "their secret services here."⁷² Relations between the *DPS* and the Ukrainian Canadians were consequently sullied.

Only one observer, although reputedly a reliable one, left primary archival material dealing with internal changes in the *UCRF* and *UCC* in the critical years of 1949 and 1950. This was Dr. M. Mandryka.⁷³ He insisted that, during these

years Volodymyr Kochan had allied himself with the *DPS*, particularly what he called a "Hetmanite-Banderite Bloc." The purpose of this cabal, as Mandryka described it, was to take control of the *UCRF* and divert its monies towards projects the *DPS* already in Canada favoured. Although he never expressly stated so, the thrust of his suggestions was that those most likely to benefit from the funds were the same people who were intent on penetrating the *UCRF* and *UCC*. The sooner this group scuttled *UCRF* operations overseas, the more it would gain of the remaining monies.⁷⁴ Such funds would then advance the aims of these persons' organizations in Canada.

This "Hetmanite-Banderite Bloc" was also especially annoyed over the fact that it was Eustace Wasylyshen who had assumed the post of Director of *UCRF* overseas.⁷⁵ Mandryka suggested that this was because they believed Wasylyshen was allied to the *Melnykivtsi*, a charge Mandryka asserted was groundless.

In fact, Wasylyshen was not only allied to the *Melnykivtsi* but a ranking member of its Executive Council (PUN).⁷⁶

Whether the existence of *DUNr* supporters within *UCRF* was coincidence, or part of an orchestrated "takeover" plan is difficult to resolve without access to archives that remain closed. Certainly the circumstantial evidence suggests that the *DUNr* became especially active throughout the diaspora in 1949, the same year in which Panchuk was

deposed, *LVU* was established and, if reports are to be credited, *Banderivtsi* achieved dominance in several Western European centres.

Furthermore, the *UCC*'s Executive Director Kochan did employ two secretaries to assist him, Mr. V. Klish and Mr. Stepan Roshko.⁷⁷ Both were *OUNr* members, and, subsequently, prominent supporters of *LVU*. Also occupying important positions in the *UCC* and *UCRF* were such men as Dr. T. Datskiw, Mr. A. Zaharychuk and Mr. Muchalievsky, all of them *Hetmantsi* of long standing. Once opposed to the *OUNr*, this organization had found a common cause with the *Banderivitsi*, primarily because of their shared opposition to the Ukrainian National Council.

If there was a covert group within the *UCRF* and *UCC* trying to limit the influence of its ideological opponents while simultaneously increasing their own standing the presence of these men certainly did nothing to hinder such a development. Their positions allowed them access to the inner councils of these Ukrainian Canadian groups, ideal positions from which to monitor changing attitudes towards the *DPS*, and take appropriate action.

Given this constellation of forces (and the participation of such men as P. Bashuk, V. Bezchlibnyk, Rev. S. Izyk and I. Bilinsky in the *BUC*)⁷⁸ Mandryka was clearly worried about what would happen to the *UCC* and *UCRF*. He was also pessimistic about Ukrainian Canadian abilities to resist this subversion. With considerable prescience he

wrote Wasylyshen to inform him that he should not expect to remain overseas much beyond July, 1950.⁷⁹ As matters turned out, he erred by only a few months in his appreciation of the situation.

Wasylyshen could only have wondered how such a group had managed to, so readily, insert itself into the very bowels of Ukrainian Canadian society. Mandryka offered one explanation of why this had occurred, leaving the *UCC* "controlled by a clique."⁸⁰ The infiltration's success was due to:

-its brutal aggressiveness and crushing of all dissenting opinions.

-from the very beginning [it was] clear that the drive was on to finish off *UNF*, a push under the leadership of Datskiw, with Banderite help.

-the leader of your organization [Kossar] fell into a Tolstoy-like pacifism; if they beat you on the right, expose the left; he always stood by Kochan, who, in his interests, stood with the clique.

-Datskiw organized the shutting down of my immigration bureau and so got me out of *UCC* ; Kossar didn't defend me; doesn't defend you or the Mission either.⁸¹

So well established had the "Banderite establishment" become by late 1949, that Mandryka asserted it had assumed a control position within Ukrainian Canadian society.⁸² Yet even he did not predict the subsequent course of events.

On December 2, during a joint *UCC/UCRF* meeting in Winnipeg, a vitriolic debate broke out over the value of maintaining the *UCRF* mission overseas. Ranged up against those Ukrainian Canadians supporting a continuation of the mission were those elements whom Mandryka derided. They insisted that *DPS* left in Western Europe needed no more aid, that *UCRF* monies should be retained for use in Canada. The meeting, according to Mandryka's account, was little better than a "street gathering." His wife, executive secretary and a dedicated *UCRF* worker, bore the brunt of the attack, and was deeply disheartened by the criticism.⁸³ She resigned on December 2nd. Instead of her position being given to some other Ukrainian Canadian her duties were taken over by Kochan. His secretary remained the *DUNr's* V. Klish. Effectively, the supposed "clique" that had infiltrated the *UCC* and *UCRF* could now freely determine the fate of the *UCRF* mission overseas. What Mandryka called the "higher circles" in the *UCC* were apparently paralyzed by these developments. Among them there had appeared "an atmosphere of disintegration."⁸⁴

To credit Mandryka's account completely would be to suggest that all of the *UCC's* members remained unaware, or indifferent to these changes in the *UCRF*. This was simply not the case. How the *UCC* reacted will be described below.

Still, the schism separating many *DPS* from the Ukrainian Canadians, was now blatant. Panchuk, back in Canada to attend the third *UCC* National Congress, noted that

by early 1950, the *DPS* "had managed to get under everybody's skin." Most Ukrainian Canadians, he felt, had grown so indifferent to the plight of those refugees still stranded in Europe, that they would do nothing more to help, feeling that those among them already were trouble enough. As he put it, Ukrainians in Canada had "enough" of the *DPS*.⁸⁵ They could now only bewail that there were so many *DPS* resettled within Canada. The impacts of this were also apparent:

The break up into "two camps" is deep and thorough and I am afraid unless things change radically, final and irrevocable. The people don't want it but certain leaders act only on the instructions they receive from Munich and it's hopeless to do anything. There is no rhyme or reason to anything they do. It's orders from above.⁸⁶

As Wasylyshen should have anticipated, having been warned, he was withdrawn from Germany soon after the *UCRF* came under a new management. By the summer of 1950 only Ann Crapleve was left to deal with the remaining *DPS* in Europe and the emigration process as well as continuing to distribute such relief supplies as were forthcoming from Ukrainians in Canada. This work involved her in no "political" activity. Not being of any threat to the *OUNr*, she was, presumably, allowed to continue at her post until late 1951.⁸⁷ With her departure, the Ukrainian Canadian relief and refugee resettlement operations of the immediate post-war period came to a complete halt, never to be resumed. They

had lasted less than six years, (Plate 6.1).

Wasylyshen's withdrawal was not the only outcome of *UCRF's* shake-up. Well before this occurred confidential letters sent to him and the *UCC* by Panchuk were mysteriously leaked to the Ukrainian Canadian press. Apparently, as Wasylyshen wrote to Panchuk, the "leak" was in Winnipeg.⁸⁸ When he tried to trace the matter, to discover the culprit(s), he was gruffly rebuked for even trying by Kochan, who retorted angrily to Wasylyshen's suggestion that there had been an "apparent infiltration of destructive elements in *UCC*."⁸⁹

To conclude, the available evidence suggests, although it does not conclusively prove, that within the very core of the *UCRF*, a group had managed to implant itself. Particularly *DUNr* in sympathies, it seems to have been determined to wrest control over Ukrainian Canadian refugee relief efforts. It did so in order to remove Dmytro Andrievsky and E. Wasylyshen from their posts and possibly in order to gain control over *UCRF* funds which it could then employ for its own ends in Canada. Presumably, this would have been euphemistically called 'helping *DPS* after resettlement.' They were only partially successful. While they removed their ideological opponents, they never seem to have captured Ukrainian Canadian funds for their own purposes. Still, these men were able to cauterize all but the most mundane aspects of the relief work overseas. Even though sufficient funds remained in *UCRF's* account to



Plate 6.1 Ann Crapleve, of the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF), greeting Anne and Eustace Wasylyshen at Bielefeld, Germany, April, 1949.

continue *UCRF* work in Europe, even *Maple* was eventually withdrawn. The *Second Line* had done its work well. In the process it had both established a functioning *OUNr* network in Canada, and purged some Ukrainian Canadian organizations, and certainly those most directly involved with the *DPS*, of their foes. Patterns of organization that previously characterized Ukrainians in Canada were changed. The *UCC* would attempt a rebound, but Ukrainian Canadian affairs would never again be the same.

The *UCC* Rebounds

On the very same day *LVU* was being publicly announced in Canada, John Karasevich was writing to Panchuk to complain that the *UCC* was still "feebly established." His only hope for this organization was that it would be forced to pull tighter together in the face of the threat posed to it by the "Bandera group." Was antipathy towards these newcomers sufficient to salvage the *UCC*? Only the calling of another national Congress could resolve this question. As Yaremovich wrote to the Wasylyshens:

Have been putting pressure on the *UCC* to call a Congress this year to iron out the differences with the different groups. The "B" group is dancing around quite freely.'"

This was precisely what happened. Between February 7 and 9 of 1950, the third *UCC* Congress was held in Winnipeg. Approximately 400 delegates attended, with nearly as many

guests, arriving in that city from across the country. Among them were some 100 supporters of the USSR, over 100 from *BUC* and nearly 90 from the *UNF*. A handful of *UHO*, *UCVA* and *UWO* members also took part.⁹¹

One of the first discussions held at the Congress considered the question of whether *UCC* should even continue to exist. This was agreed upon, although not by everyone. Just as the loyalty question had given impetus to the First Congress, so too the *DP* question had prolonged the *UCC*'s existence beyond 1946. Paradoxically, many *UCC* supporters rallied to defend their Ukrainian *Canadian* ways of organization, against what were perceived to be the negative inroads some *DPS* were making against these Canadian spawned structures. Karasevich's expectations, in that sense, were fulfilled.

Shortly after Anthony Yaremovich's speech dealing with *UCRF* operations, a rancorous debate broke out among the assembled delegates and observers. Budgetary matters were involved but the quarrel seems to have essentially been between some *DPS* attending the Congress and *UCC* supporters. Both Petro Bashuk and Volodymyr Bezchlibnyk, *OUNr* members, had come as delegates of *BUC*. Yet they were prevented from voicing their positions on the *UCRF*. In fact, the tumult was so great that they were forced to leave the hall, amidst jeers and catcalls. As they departed they were further treated to verbal abuse from no less a personage than the Rev. Kushnir, who thundered from the podium against their

"destructive criticism" of a Ukrainian Canadian institution. Kushnir reminded them that they should never presume to instruct Ukrainian Canadians about how to behave. The animosities he had personally witnessed in the DP camps had convinced him about the repugnant political attitudes and activities of some refugees. Kushnir claimed that he had personally "wasted" a great deal of his time and energy in trying to undo the many problems created by politically-minded trouble-makers among the refugees. That such persons would now attempt to disrupt the UCRF and UCC, and tell them how to run Ukrainian Canadian affairs was insulting. Obviously, he exclaimed, it would hereafter be up to Ukrainian Canadians to closely watch the DPs, lest they introduce their cancerous ideas and destructive behaviour into the Ukrainian Canadian corpus. Kushnir claimed that he had already "cleaned up the chaos" in Europe, and prevented some DPs from imposing draconian "order" there. The transplantation of such a mentality and mode of behaviour was abhorrent to Ukrainian Canadians. It would not be permitted to migrate into Canada.'²

Kushnir was too clever to be publicly goaded into denouncing the *Banderivtsi* by name, as he was urged to do by some of those attending the Congress (e.g. Dr. S. Rosocha).'³ Still, his inferences were clear enough. He blamed the *Banderivtsi* for most, if not all, of the problems Ukrainian Canadians had and were experiencing with the DPs. Now the OUNr had been publicly chastened and apparently

routed. The forum this had taken place in ensured that Ukrainians living across Canada would hear about the chastisement from their delegates.

Appearances were deceiving. While the UCC had seemed to hold its own against the perceived threat the OUNr already had its own structure well implanted in Canada, well before this UCC Congress was held. Furthermore, they were not dependent on the UCC for material or human resources, and enjoyed the use of their own newspaper to spread their particular message to adherents and sympathizers. Although formally outside the UCC, they could now survive in isolation. They were to remain there for nearly a decade.

Conclusions

In 1950, Ukrainians in Canada were again a divided population. Any prospects they may have had for organizing into one, at least moderately relevant political pressure group within Canadian society were lost. Until the breach was mended Ukrainian lobbying before the Canadian government on any issues of concern could be safely ignored by the state's decision makers. Had this situation come about by accident, or did the government foresee the likely confrontation between the UCC and the dominating political faction within the DP population, and deliberately admit *Banderivtsi* in order to fragment whatever unity Ukrainians in Canada had found in the UCC? This question shall be explored in the Epilogue. This chapter has underscored the

divisive consequences of the interaction between pre-war and post-WW II Ukrainians residing in Canada, reaffirming the point made in Chapter 5 about the differences between voluntary settlers and refugee immigrants, particularly with respect to their conflicting attitudes about the nature of being Ukrainian and over the question of *where* Ukrainians should find their place in a world divided into places. After the major conclusions drawn from this study are summarized in the following chapter, and related to the research questions posed in Chapter 2, the historical dimension of this fragmentation among the Ukrainians in Canada will be sketched out into the contemporary period. This will emphasize the long-lasting consequences of a refugee immigration. While, arguably, these post-war immigrants have imparted fewer visible indicators of their presence to the Ukrainian Canadian cultural landscape (possibly because they never anticipated remaining in Canada) their social and political impact on the status of Ukrainians in Canada may be regarded as critical.

What is certain is that the impact of this renewed fragmentation within Ukrainian Canadian society was not widely appreciated at the time. Indeed some UCC supporters seem to have gloated over the third Congress's outcome and their apparent victory over the *Banderivtsi*. As Panchuk wrote to his long-time confederate, Tracy Philipps, the Congress:

...was a great success and helped very much further

unite the Ukrainians [sic!] and strengthen their collective activities. The "dissident" element from among the new-arrivals...was also plainly reminded that Canada was NOT Galicia and Winnipeg not Lviv [Lvov] and they must first of all settle down and get acquainted with things before trying to "take over."⁴

If, as Anthony Yaremovich wrote, Ukrainian Canadians thought they were fooling anyone it was only themselves. The soundness of that observation escaped many of them for years to come.⁵

Notes

1. Yaremovich to UCRF, "Report Covering the Period 1st July to August 31st, 1947," (September, 1947).

Panchuk wrote to Kaye, (3.6.47) that:

...90% of the people in the DP camps...would rather immigrate to Canada than any other country...

2. Panchuk to UCC, (17.8.46), PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol.15. This letter refers to the UCC memorandum on bloc settlement. The UCC document in question was not located.
3. Ibid.

PAC MG 30 E350, (16.3.46) contains a letter written by Lieut. Col. R. Morris Wilson of UNRRA HQ (Team 318) in which he suggested that entire DP camps be

transferred to Canada, where the refugees would be geographically closer to relief supplies while also in proximity to the receiving society; their absorption would thus be enhanced. The *DPS* would also begin to feel that, by being in Canada, they had achieved a "bridgehead" which would counter the "stagnation" prevailing in the camps.

The suggestion was apparently raised in the House of Commons by Aruthur L. Smith, M.P., (Calgary West) on 3.4.46, but not otherwise acted upon.

4. Panchuk to *UCC*, (17.8.46), *PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol.15*.

In a letter to A. Crapleve, (28.2.51) he estimated that 50,000 Ukrainians had settled in Canada. This population he categorized as containing the following sub-groups Ukrainians from pre-war Poland (50%), Soviet Ukraine (25%), Rumania [Bukovyna and Bessarabia] (5%), Czechoslovakia [Carpatho-Ukraine] (5%), Nansen Refugees and WW I emigres (3%) People of Ukrainian origin settled in Western Europe before the war (2%).

Kaye's estimate of the size of the post-war immigration can be found in *PAC MG 31 D69 Vol.26*, (undated).

5. Kaye to Panchuk, (28.11.46).

6. Panchuk to Yaremovich, (30.4.48), *PAC MG 31 D69*.

7. D. Gerych to Panchuk, (4.9.48). Dmytro Gerych was a

founding member of the *UWVA* and later active in the *UNF*. Marunchak, (1981:509) contains a photograph of Gerych in the company of the *OUN*'s leader, Col. Evhen Konovalets. See also Panchuk's reply to Gerych (10.9.48).

8. Panchuk to J. Choma, (18.6.48).
9. Gerych to Panchuk, (4.9.48).
10. Kaye to Panchuk, (30.1.49).
11. Kaye to Panchuk, (22.1.49).
12. Panchuk to Gerych, (10.9.48).
13. P. Wenger to Panchuk, (20.4.49).
14. Ibid.
15. Interview with Peter Smylski, (25.3.82).
16. P. Smylski to Panchuk, (24.7.49).
17. Ibid.
18. Yaremovich to Panchuk, (6.11.49).

In an earlier letter, (2.7.49) Yaremovich wrote to the Wasylyshens that:

[the] whole bunch of *DP* organizers... did more to break up the Committee than keep it together. If anyone came in with complaints against *UCC* they agreed with him. Often promised action on matters which are impossible... They do not know Canadian conditions... So all one has around now is trouble.

19. On Stetsko's attempt to enter Canada, see *DEA* 10919-40, (25.4.52).

The Canadian government's attitude towards Stetsko and the *ABN* was generally negative, *DEA* 10919-40, (21.2.51).

Panchuk would come to blame Stetsko and the *OUNr* for his troubles in the *AUGB*. He polemicized against the *ABN* with John F. Stewart (Scottish League for European Freedom) on several occasions, e.g. Panchuk to Stewart, (10.4.49) and Stewart to Panchuk, (16.4.49) and also officially informed the British government about Stetsko's visits to the U.K., Panchuk to Mrs. D. Hughes, Aliens Department of the Home Office, (7.5.50).

His letter to T. Philipps, (17.4.50) is particularly critical about these Ukrainian nationalist groups.

That the British and Canadian governments were also concerned about the possible transplantation into Canada of militant Ukrainian nationalists is evidenced in *FO* 371/77584, (2.2.49) which considers whether a "Ukrainian Military Staff" had already been set up there.

20. Dmytro Andrievsky was a member of the executive of the *Melnykivtsi*. He seems to have attached himself to Ukrainian Canadian overseas operations from *CURB*'s inception, and remained in place thereafter. Why no protest was ever made against his activities on behalf of the *OUNs* during these years is open to conjecture.

Choma to Panchuk, (9.3.46) mentions Andrievsky's tour of Canada, during which he spoke out against the *OUNr*.

In the interview with A. Crapleve, (20.5.82) Andrievsky's curious status with the *UCRF* was discussed. He was listed as a member of the *UCRF* team, drew a small salary, all apparently with the connivance of V. Kossar.

Panchuk to "Dear Fellow Workers," (9.2.46) noted that Andrievsky was on *CURB*'s salary, at 3/week for a period of one month, effective from that date. No reason for this appointment was provided.

Andrievsky subsequently took a part in the 1st Conference of *CURB* and representatives of the continent's Ukrainian Relief Committees, (7-9.2.46), and is again mentioned in Wasylyshen's *4th Report*, (25.5.49) in which his movements are cryptically discussed. It is mentioned that he was "temporarily on our establishment."

Apparently, this leading *OUNs* member was allowed to operate using Ukrainian Canadian efforts as a screen for his own organization's work. No Ukrainian Canadians ever objected to this activity. This makes the accusations levelled against Frolick appear even more discriminatory.

21. At the 1st Conference of *CURB* and representatives of various Ukrainian Relief Committees from the continent,

(7-9.2.46) the Rev. Kushnir pontificated:

...We do not wish to create a mechanical unity. Our aim should be an organical entity... The aims and ideals should be stressed and not the outward form. We do not desire a central agency because it would inevitably have also a political colouring which would close many doors to us. We do not even want a centralized body for relief work, what we have is quite sufficient. The present set-up...is practical. At the moment it is necessary to conceal even the least political activity under the cloak of relief work.

He later added:

Many of them [DPS] will be coming to Canada and we do not want them to bring disunity and dissent with them.

What Kushnir seems to have particularly feared was the *OUNr*'s hegemony in many *DP* camps. To counter it, he vigorously promoted the Co-Ordinating Ukrainain Committee (*CUC*) which theoretically represented all Ukrainian *DPS*. While many minute organizations banded together under this *UCC*-like umbrella organization, the *OUNr* withdrew in protest over the *CUC*'s policy of one vote for each organization, regardless of their respective strengths. The *CUC*, expanded, later came to be known as the Ukrainian National Council. Neither the

Banderivtsi nor the *Hetmantsi* were represented in this group, yet it came to be recognized by the *UCC* as the only "legitimate and legal" Ukrainian government in exile.

See Communicate #1 of the *CUC*, S.W Frolick Collection, (11.9.46) and *FO* 371/94811, (9.2.51). In a letter to Smylski, (25.5.47) Panchuk revealed Ukrainian Canadian plans to create a *UCC* style body in every country, the end purpose of which would be to create a Ukrainian super-structure in the diaspora. It was routinely assumed that Ukrainian Canadians would guide this supra-organization's existence. Such a body was eventually established; it is known as the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. Its current President is Peter Savaryn, who is also Chancellor of The University of Alberta.

On the Rev. Kushnir's visit to *CURB* HQ and the continent, and British concerns over the possible political ramifications, see *FO* 371/56791, (12.2.46) (in which Kushnir assured the *FO* that he would do "nothing to embarrass the Canadian government." *DEA* 6980-GR-40, (2.1.46) and *DEA* 6980-GR-40, (14.2.46).

22. Smylski to Panchuk, (14.2.47). Writing about Frolick, he mentioned that "...his biggest kick was against the *UCC*."

23. On *DUNrF* concerns over how to best aid Dontsov, see P. Shteppa to Frolick,

(9.3.47);(14.3.47);(4.12.47);(9.12.47); Shteppa to Dr. Rousseau, (21.12.47); Frolick to Shteppa, (22.4.48) and Shteppa to Frolick, (28.10.48) and (8.12.48).

24. Shteppa to Frolick, (4.12.47).

25. Shteppa to Frolick, (14.3.47).

26. Shteppa to Frolick, (5.2.48).

27. Shteppa to Frolick, (28.10.48).

28. Shteppa to Frolick, (5.2.48).

29. Frolick to Shteppa, (15.2.48).

30. S. Kulyk to Frolick, (3.8.47).

31. S. Kulyk to Frolick, (.8.8.47).

32. S. Kulyk to Frolick, (19.8.47).

33. S. Kulyk to Frolick, (21.12.48).

34. P. Shteppa to Frolick, (8.4.48). Much the same message was contained in Shteppa to Frolick, (3.5.48). Frolick replied that:

It would be a loss if you died trying to penetrate the border [Iron Curtain]. People will soon be needed for important work. The outbreak of another world war is just a matter of time. When this occurs we'll send our own "task groups" back into Ukraine, just as we did in 1941. And we'll do so whether the Americans and the British agree. Until that time comes, however, you'll have to wait.

35. P. Shteppa to Frolick, (8.4.48).

36. P. Shteppa to Frolick, (18.3.47).

37. Interviews with R. Rakhmanny, (14.6.83), and I. Eliashevsky, (11.2.82).
 38. Ibid.
 39. Interviews with S.W.Frolick, (1.7.81 and 10.1.83 and 14.12.83 to 24.12.82 and 4.1.84 to 6.1.84).
 40. Interview with R. Rakhmanny, (14.6.83). See also the unpublished "Notes on the Formation of *Homin Ukrainy* and the organization, League for the Liberation of Ukraine in Toronto, Canada."
- The possibility of D. Dontsov being the first Editor of this newspaper were discussed in Frolick to Shteppa, (15.2.48 and 5.1.48) and Shteppa to Frolick, (28.10.48).
41. E. Wasylyshen to UCRF, "Report #2", (28.3.49).
 42. John Hladun was originally a member of the *ULFTA* and one of the select group of Ukrainian Canadians sent to the Lenin School in Moscow. In the 1930s he broke with the communist movement and joined Danylo Lobay, Toma Kobzey and others in denouncing the Soviet regime in Ukraine and the activities of the *ULFTA* in Canada.
 43. John Hladun to Panchuk, (22.7.48).
 44. "Declaration of the Temporary Central Organizing Bureau of the League For The Liberation of Ukraine," published in *Homin Ukrainy*, (1.5.49).
 45. Interview with R. Malaschuk, (25.3.82).
 46. Declaration, Op. cit., footnote 44.
 47. Ibid.

48. Statistics provided by Wasyl Didiuk, Secretary of the National Executive, Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine, Toronto, (20.12.82).
49. Ibid.
50. Interview with V. Klish, (21.6.83).
51. Minutes of a National Executive meeting of LVU, (2.7.51). This critique about LVU's low membership was repeated at the 3rd LVU national Congress, held in Toronto, (22-23.12.51).
52. 3rd LVU National Congress, Toronto, (22-23.12.51).
53. W. Didiuk, opt.cit.,
54. Ibid.
55. Several monographs are currently being prepared on the Great Famine, notably by Dr. Robert Conquest, Dr. James Mace, and Mr. M. Carynnyk. Dr. Claude Malhuret comments on Soviet tactics in Afghanistan in relation to events in Ukraine during 1932-1933 in *Report From Afghanistan*, 1983: 2:426-435, *Foreign Affairs*.
56. Interview with Rev. S. Izyk, (21.5.82).
57. J. Kolasky, (1979):157.
58. Interview with W. Kardash, (30.11.82). Other relevant interviews are A. Bilecki, (3.12.82), R. A. Davies, (6.6.83) and A. Lapchuk, (6.10.83). See R. A. Davies, (1943) for a particularly eloquent denunciation of the Ukrainian nationalists in Canada.
59. S. Skoblak to Editor, *Winnipeg Free Press*, PAC MG 28 v.9 Vol.7, (25.10.49).

60. Ibid.
61. Interview with W. Skorochid, (21.3.82).
62. W. Skorochid to the Editor, *Globe and Mail*, Toronto, (8.7.49).
63. M. Zawerucha, (UCVA Branch #360), (9.7.49).
64. See the S.W. Pawluk Collection, (13.10.50), "Our Reference: Circular No. 20/50. Occurrence No: C-3069/50."
65. See the S.W. Skorochid Collection, (10.10.50). W. Skorochid to the Editor, *Globe and Mail*.
66. Interview with S.W. Pawluk, (25.10.81).
67. S.W. Skorochid to Editor, *Globe and Mail*, (10.10.50).
68. Interview with J. Kolasky, (8.5.83).
69. See J. Kolasky, (1979):88-107.
70. The V. Kochan Papers remain closed. They are kept by one of his sons in Long Beach, California. Several Kochan letters were reviewed, courtesy of Dr. O. Gerus, of Winnipeg.

It is possible that Rev. Kushnir invited Mr. Kochan to be Executive Director of the UCC because of his anti-OUN activities while a member of the Polish Sejm and later, in the Front For National Unity.
71. ? to the Wasylyshens, (11.9.49).
72. Ibid.
73. Dr. M.I. Mandryka, (1886-1977), was an editor of *Truth and Liberty*, founder of the Ukrainian Labour Association (Winnipeg), associated with the "Ukrainian

Reading Society *Prosvita*" and in the UCC executive. He authored *Ukrainian Refugees* (1946).

His wife, Anna, was a member of the Ukrainian Canadian Womens' Council and Executive-Secretary of the UCRF.

74. M. Mandryka to E. Wasylyshen, (30.12.49).

75. Mandryka to Wasylyshen, (14.11.49).

76. Interview with Mrs. A. Wasylyshen, (30.11.82).

77. Interview with V. Klish, (21.6.83).

Klish's role is mentioned in Mandryka to Wasylyshen, (14.11.49) and (30.12.49).

78. Interview with P. Bashuk, (24.1.83).

Mr. Bashuk kept daily diary entries during his cross-Canada tours as an organizer of LVU. Unfortunately, these were not made available to the researcher.

Interview with V. Bezchlibnyk, (30.6.81 and 1.7.81).

79. Mandryka to Wasylyshen, (14.11.49).

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Mandryka to Wasylyshen, (7.12.49).

84. Mandryka to Wasylyshen, (29.1.50).

85. Panchuk to Wasylyshen, (3.3.50).

86. Ibid.

87. Interview with A. Smith, (20.5.82).

88. See Wasylyshen to Panchuk, (20.10.49); (undated); (5.1.50).
89. Wasylyshen to Panchuk, (28.10.50).
90. A.J. Yaremovich to E. Wasylyshen, (2.7.49).
91. Proceedings of the third All-Canadian Ukrainian Canadian Committee Congress, Winnipeg, February 7-9, 1950.
92. Ibid.,
93. Interview with Dr. S. Rosocha, (4.5.82).
94. Panchuk to T. Philipps, (18.2.50).
95. Yaremovich to Panchuk, (6.11.49).

CONCLUSIONS

Thoughts about Canada becoming like Switzerland are fantasies. We are not planning to build Ukraine in Canada.

Dr. Roman Malaschuk, (1954).

Despite their saliency, refugee and ethnic phenomena have not notably been studied by geographers. An aim of this dissertation has been to provide elements of a framework which demonstrates how students of geography, the discipline traditionally concerned with areal differentiation, can redress this situation.

This was done by taking as a case study the involuntary migration of an ethnic minority to Canada after WW II, and applying to it concepts developed by population geographers who have studied the behavioural aspects of the migration process.

Geographers, as was discussed in Chapter 2, have usually concerned themselves with the quantitative rather than the qualitative attributes of populations. They have emphasized the determinants of migration flows, rather than their consequences. This thesis has taken a different approach, by focussing on a particular kind of population - an ethnic one - and by examining how a distinct type of migration process - an involuntary one - has altered certain of this same groups' attributes. The attempt to "catch" (Trewartha, 1953) these qualitative aspects of a population required extensive recourse to archival sources, the

gathering of the testimonies of the people involved and a search for suitable statistical data. This effort was detailed in Chapter 2. Despite the amount of work required, it was shown that understanding the relevant process active within refugee populations is only possible through recourse to a combination of these methodologies.

In Chapter 2, a series of research questions were suggested. These were as follows,

[]Does the nature of the refugee experience precipitate changes in the attributes of the migrating population?

[]What agents of migrant attribute change can be isolated?

[]Where and when do migrant attributes change?

[]Can refugee migration be distinguished from other forms of migration?

[]If migrant attribute changes do occur will these be evidenced in spatial and social patterns found within refugee populations in the areas of asylum and resettlement?

With respect to these, the following conclusions were reached. First, it was found that attribute changes among refugee migrants do occur during the refugee experience. Specifically, the attitudes of these involuntarily displaced persons about their places of first asylum and eventual resettlement, are transformed - they come to accept the belief that they must organize in order to return to the

places they were forced to vacate. Consequently, they place less value on the countries in which they may be relocated, preferring to retain a commitment to a homeward-oriented or place-seeking behaviour. This puts them into conflict with voluntary settlers (even those of similar backgrounds) in such areas, the latter exhibiting place-keeping attitudes, a consequence of their experiences in such places. As was emphasized in Chapters 5 and 6, refugee immigrants must therefore be distinguished from voluntary settlers in all studies of immigrant and ethnic history.

Secondly, the agents of attitude change were found to be the Ukrainian nationalists who assumed control over the internal administration of the *DP* camps, and provided leadership for this displaced population during this stage of the refugee experience.

Thirdly, the process of migrant attitude changes about their sense of ethnic belonging and place, was localized in the *DP* camp environment. This discovery is one of pivotal importance to students of the refugee experience, suggesting a largely unexplored area for future research.

For these Ukrainian refugees, the type of *milieu* that was established in these centres closely approximated the social, cultural and political environment that the nationalists had tried but failed to establish on Ukrainian territories. Accordingly, many *DPS* were to develop a strong attachment to these enclaves, which became hearths of Ukrainian cultural, religious, social, and political

revival. Strictly controlled by nationalists the environment in these camps exerted a formative psychological influence over the majority of the Ukrainians who spent many months, and sometimes years, living there. Few had previously enjoyed the opportunity to behave as Ukrainians without fear of a greater or lesser degree of oppression. Obviously, in DP camps organized as "Little Ukraines" a "Ukrainian lifestyle" flourished. This finding suggests that students of the refugee experience should pay particular attention to the refugee camp phase of this phenomena, and especially concern themselves with the role played by leadership cadres among refugees housed in such temporal and spatial enclaves. The influential role played by political refugee groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the freedom fighters among the Afghani refugees in Pakistan in terms of influencing political and social processes in their respective regions is well known. What remains to be explored is how such groups affect the process of resettlement, particularly since the latter implies that the displaced migrant finds some measure of "place utility" satisfaction in a country of resettlement. If refugees are taught to believe that they will only find a convivial niche in which to place themselves *after* they have returned to their original home area, then the likelihood of any resettlement effort being effective is problematical, and the prospect of sustained irredentism heightened.

Fourthly, this study has also highlighted significant differences between voluntary and involuntary migration experiences, which are discernible in the contrasting spatial and social attitudes of the affected migrants. Whereas the former, before moving, have some opportunity to consider the suitability of potential destination places, the latter often have little original choice about whether to move, when, or where. So while voluntary migrants relocate to a place which, after time, they are likely to consider as their own, refugees are not only traumatized by the nature of their displacement, but remain unsure about their future. Their psychological response to this uncertainty has been described as a compulsive need to return home. They organize and husband all available material and human resources to achieve that end. As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, such attitudes can affect the timing of refugees' departures from their camps to countries of resettlement, prompt them to re-locate within the refugee camp system in order to build up enclaves dominated by their own kind and, in this case, even precipitated a westward shift of this Ukrainian population, away from Soviet zones of control and into those occupied by the United States and Great Britain - areas deemed to provide relatively safe niches for Ukrainians.

Lastly, the nature of the refugee experience on those affected can be discerned in their social and spatial patterns, both in the areas of first asylum and eventual

resettlement. As was detailed in Chapter 6, when Ukrainian Canadians encountered the post-war immigrants they found a people who, while outwardly sharing the same cultural, political, regional, and religious backgrounds, were otherwise quite different in terms of their attitudes about Canada and the sense of what "being a Ukrainian" there entailed. While most of the pre-war immigrants had come to believe that Canada could be a place where they, even as Ukrainians, could find a measure of satisfaction, many of the post-war refugees regarded Canada only as an area of temporary refuge, from which they hoped to someday return to Ukraine. The interaction between two groups bearing such different perspectives changed the patterns of organizational activity within one of Canada's larger ethnic groups. In response to the research question about whether the immigration of refugees can have distinct spatial and social consequences the answer would appear to be that such population redistributions do result in the creation or alteration of patterns of human organization.

Why this should be so relates back to the discussion in Chapter 5 about the nature of the *DP* camp environment, and the modification of refugee migrant attitudes that took place there.

The attitude brought to Canada by the *DPS* was, fundamentally, a reflection of their experience within the refugee camps. There, as was demonstrated, a militant minority of political refugees had deliberately imposed on

the larger DP population its own worldview. In the process originally heterogeneous DP camps were transformed into rather homogeneous ethnic enclaves scattered across Western Europe, yet linked to each other by organizational networks and their courier systems and publications. After several years under such conditions many Ukrainian DPs came to value their lifestyle within these enclavic spaces and resisted the pressure brought to bear on them by international authorities to move elsewhere. In a sense, as noted above, they had finally achieved within these DP camps a *milieu* akin to that they idealized as being desirable for Ukrainian ethnographic territories. That they were loathe to abandon these places, or "DP camp republics" is understandable, given that it meant abandoning an environment they had carefully built up to resemble the type of place they longed for, but had failed to achieve in Ukraine. Emigration also meant that they would be further distancing themselves, geographically, from Ukrainian lands in Eastern Europe. These involuntary migrants were, in effect, yet again displaced and forced to move into a *terra incognita*. To cope with this, as was discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, their political leadership stretched its material and human capital to again dispatch into the diaspora its own cadres, hoping to thereby ensure their movements' viability. The introduction of this new component to Canada did not go unnoticed by the previously settled Ukrainians, who resisted it, a process which even further fragmented the social and

spatial patterns of organization prevailing within this population.

The fact that attribute changes take place during refugee migrations has never before been fully explored. Another of the findings of this study was the discovery that this development significantly affects the duration, direction and intensity of the population flows from the areas of temporary asylum to countries of resettlement, while conditioning the attitudes these migrating refugees bring with them. It was also noted that it was not actually the type of displacement that resulted in these attribute changes but the nature of the environment in which the *DPS* subsequently found themselves (e.g. the refugee camps) that mattered. There they became, in effect, a captive population which could be continuously exposed to, and manipulated by, the disciplined and resilient cadres of the *OUN*.

This thesis has also explored the interaction between two places, Ukraine and Canada, through the flow of population between them, another theme traditional to geographic inquiry. It was observed that this movement has been directionally oriented from the former to the latter, resulting in the development within Canada of distinctly Ukrainian cultural landscapes, associated with the Prairie provinces of this country. The reason for this migratory movement has had much to do with conditions prevailing throughout Ukrainian lands in Eastern Europe. The writing of Ukrainian Canadian history has, in fact, almost always been

portrayed in this manner. Difficult conditions there have been described, and posited as being the principal reasons behind Ukrainian immigration to Canada. It is here contended that this is, at best, a partial view. Ukrainians did, most definitely, leave Ukrainian territories in Europe because of trying circumstances in the "old country." Their admission was, however, dependent upon the decision-making of Canadian officials. These gatekeepers not only determined when Ukrainians would be admitted to Canada, but decided on what type of population they wanted, how many of the latter were permitted entry and even where they would settle. This pattern was established before WW I (see Chapter 4) and persisted well after it. In this manner the spatial framework into which pre-war immigrants were allowed to enter was established, with lasting consequences. The Ukrainian cultural landscape in Canada is extensive, and while largely concentrated in rural Western Canada also has its components in the major urban and industrial centres of most Canadian cities. The post-WW II "newcomers" not only added their own spatial and social components to this landscape, but through their political behaviour altered what had existed before their arrival.

Students of the ethnic and immigrant experience in Canada must proceed beyond merely describing how the Canadian state selected, enticed, and placed various immigrants on its territories. A more pertinent question is what influence this same external authority had on these

settlers' "sense of belonging" to their ethnic groups. To what degree was it deliberate policy to manipulate the spatial and social patterns of Ukrainian and other "non-preferred" immigrants from Eastern Europe to meet the perceived needs of the Canadian state? It was argued here that little was left to chance when it came to dealing with these migrants, and when unexpected crises in the international system (e.g. WW I and WW II) erupted, the government was not slow in directly intervening (sometimes heavy-handedly) to ensure that ethnic groups conformed to Canadian needs. To what extent did such interventions shape not only the spatial patterns extant among the Ukrainians in Canada, but their social and political ones as well? This dissertation has suggested that the influence of Canada's state elites on ethnic minorities has been critically significant.

Just as the Ukrainian *DPS* were altered by their experiences inside the refugee camps, so too the Ukrainians in Canada before the war were transformed by the exigencies of their existence in this country. Consequently when the two groups met they did not readily mesh together. Ukrainian ethnic space in Canada was irrevocably transformed. This finding suggests a new way of conceptualizing the Ukrainian Canadian experience. Generally, this has been modelled chronologically, using the terms pioneer, inter-war and post-WW II to organize Ukrainian Canadian history. This thesis suggests that it is the immigration experience of the

Ukrainians that is relevant, not the time frame in which they arrived. A new approach to Ukrainian Canadian history might take as its beginning point a general categorization of this population into voluntary and involuntary components. Following this, the immigration history and settlement experience of this ethnic group must then be nestled within the framework of majority/minority relations if the Canadian dimension of its experience is to be properly understood. Until the critical role played by the state elite and especially the gatekeepers in charge of Canadian immigration policy are fully explained, most accounts of the ethnic experience will be incomplete. If this thesis may be prescriptive, it is suggested that geographers, long concerned with the spatial patterns of migration, would now do well to apply their disciplinary perspective to ethnic phenomena within Canada. The relevance of such studies in a multicultural society is apparent.

Lastly, the conclusions of this study suggest a basic geographic theme of inquiry that has yet to be fully addressed by practitioners of the discipline. If Geography is the science associated with considering why the world is divided into places, its students would be well advised to consider why some people are forced to continue searching for places of their own.

EPILOGUE - THE LONG ENDURING

Experience has shown that the Ukrainians are particularly politically conscious, as compared to other ethnic groups in Canada.

An RCMP officer, (1950).

While this dissertation covered events and processes taking place in the early post-WWII years the patterns spawned then retained and, indeed, increased in saliency with the passing of time. This epilogue sketches out some of the more significant developments.

Ten years passed before the fissure separating LVU from the UCC was bridged. During this decade the two hostile camps effectively if unwittingly cancelled out whatever political relevance each might have achieved within Canada.

The UCC, while it was able to lay some claim to being representative of the majority of the organized Ukrainian Canadian population, obviously did not represent more than a tiny fraction of the post-WW II immigrants. Its pretensions about being able to express the "will of Ukraine" were grandiloquent at best.¹ Confronted with the disciplined cohort of *Banderivtsi* who made up the LVU it reacted testily.

Plainly the LVU spoke for only one faction of the national liberation movement, albeit the pre-eminent one. LVU was bridled in what it could achieve since it did not represent all of the post-war refugees, nor were most of its

members even Canadian citizens much before the mid-1950s.²

For political realists in Ottawa the dilemma faced by these two Ukrainian populations in Canada presented an ideal situation. They found before them a disunited populace, tearing itself apart in a manner quite reminiscent of the pre-war period. The difference was that there was no longer any looming international crisis to compel Canada's state elites to intervene and force unity upon the Ukrainians here. Indeed to have done so after WW II would have been imprudent from the government's point of view. A reconciled Ukrainian population in Canada might have become an effective pressure group, one capable of insisting on the Canadian state becoming more directly involved with Ukrainian affairs in Eastern Europe, something the government had always been loathe to do. As matters stood, the earnest appeals of both groups could now be routinely shuffled aside as irrelevant, un-representative as they were of all Ukrainians in Canada. While care was taken to do so politely, the fact remains that at no time during the 1950s were Ukrainian Canadian suggestions to the government taken seriously or acted upon.³ Unaware of this, Ukrainian Canadians persisted squabbling amongst themselves, mindless of the extent to which they thereby emasculated their own potential.

Within the LVU's ranks some glimmer of an understanding about what was happening seems to have penetrated the ideological blinkers separating them from other Ukrainians

in Canada sooner than was the case in the UCC's ranks. Between May, 1949 and May, 1959, lively debates took place within LVU's ranks, polarizing its adherents into conservative and reform factions. The former stressed that LVU had been established solely for the purpose of freeing Ukraine and that the "first thought" of all its members must remain directed towards that end.⁴ While affirming that this was indeed the principle goal of LVU, the reform faction nevertheless insisted that it was only within the UCC that LVU could efficiently expound its beliefs. In that forum LVU might attract more Ukrainian Canadians to its cause expanding thereby on the relatively small post-war immigrant population it otherwise drew on for support. Finding some common ground for co-operation between LVU and UCC became the reformers' aim.⁵

The matter seems to have first been raised at LVU's 2nd National Congress, held in Toronto on December 24, 1950.⁶ There the conservatives argued that LVU must begin preparing military cadres which could be sent back to Ukraine as soon as the international situation dictated such action. Preparedness for the coming struggle was their theme. While not vigorously disputing such plans, the reformers urged LVU's membership to consider some sort of *rapprochement* with the UCC. They suggested that their own organization was "ghettoized" and therefore enjoyed little if any influence within Ukrainian Canadian circles. They insisted that it was only within the UCC that they could achieve efficacy.

The reformers were not able to carry the day at this congress, although they did wring two interesting concessions from those present. One was the the English name of the organization would thereafter be the *Canadian* League for the Liberation of Ukraine. The other was that LVU's leadership would make tentative approaches to their counter-parts in the UCC, to explore what possibilities there might be for merger.'

Throughout the spring and summer of 1951, the reformers persisted in their efforts to find a solution to the LVU/UCC split. Discussions of an "unofficial character" were held with Rev. Kushnir and Mr. V. Kochan, while within LVU members debated the respective merits of establishing their own "Ukrainian centre" in Canada, or joining the UCC and reforming it from within.⁸ Those advancing the latter proposition suggested that if the LVU's supporters were to "break up" what already existed in Canada, the results would only be counter-productive.'

Matters came to a head at the 3rd LVU National Congress, again held in Toronto, in December, 1951.¹⁰ This time the two groups energetically contested each other's views on the role that LVU should assume within Canada. The conservatives persuasively argued that the UCC had deliberately organized a "boycott" of LVU functions in various cities, (e.g. Oshawa) and insisted that this was typical of a body which sought not to recognize contemporary realities but only to preserve the "status quo" of pre-war

Ukrainian Canadian society.' They reiterated that they had not "ghettoized" themselves, but that this was the consequence of UCC machinations.' They also informed the delegates, that UCC supporters were now going about Canada portraying the LVU as a band of "extremists." Such public denunciations were likely to damage the reputation of the movement, for Canadian opinion of LVU was being deliberately damaged. Most non-Ukrainian Canadians, the LVU's supporters were reminded, looked askance at the pre-occupation of the post-war immigrants with the homeland.' The UCC was deliberately trying to brand the "newcomers" as unreliable in the eyes of the Canadian government and people.

Advocates of compromise with the UCC could not bear up against these conservative arguments. Still, they persisted in trying to convince fellow LVU members that some *modus vivendi* had to be reached with the Ukrainian Canadians. In the isolation LVU found itself, however splendid some might feel it to be, this organization was simply incapable of reaching the masses of the Ukrainian population in Canada. Even if no formal union of LVU with the UCC could as yet be countenanced, possibly (so the reformers urged) individual members might join "sympathetic" Ukrainian Canadian organizations (e.g. the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics). Once so emplaced, they might then find new avenues for approaching the UCC and mending the rift.' At least within Ukrainian Canadian organizations, LVU members could perform valuable services for their movement, namely,

1. Speaking out on Ukrainian issues and particularly on the liberation movement, from the platform of recognized Ukrainian Canadian organizations,
2. Securing decisive influence in such organizations, and
3. Contacting non-Ukrainians, as members of known Ukrainian Canadian formations, to inform the former about the aspirations of Ukrainians for an independent state of their own.¹⁵

An unremitting prejudice on the part of some UCC executive officers, blocked LVU's reformers from achieving most of their goals. The UCC formally recognized the Ukrainian National Council (UNRada) as being the only legitimate and authoritative body for the Ukrainians in the diaspora, consigning as they did so the UHVR to irrelevance.¹⁶ This infuriated LVU supporters, and effectively settled debate within their own ranks as to what their organization's relationship should be with the UCC. There was clearly little room for negotiation with a Ukrainian Canadian structure which refused to recognize what they considered to be UHVR's status as the pre-eminent force within the liberation movement.

The 4th National Congress of LVU confirmed the re-entrenchment of the *Banderivtsi* into a separate camp. Not only was the UCC explicitly denounced, but its Executive Director, V. Kochan, was singled out for reproach. LVU, it was declared, would now concentrate all of its human and material resources on Ukrainian issues, while actively

resisting the UCC's open attempts to monopolize for itself all aspects of Ukrainian Canadian life.¹⁷ If some LVU members felt demoralized by the prospect of the long struggle before them - which a few remarked now looked as if they would take 25 to 30 years to reach fruition - they could at least find comfort in knowing that their offspring would be well brought up and trained to continue the battle for Ukrainian independence. Everyone present was reminded that LVU did not owe its existence to the UCC, nor was the essence of the movement oriented around Canadian-based problems.¹⁸

This became a steady refrain among LVU spokesmen thereafter, even if the question of reaching some type of accord with the UCC did sporadically arise.¹⁹ It was always asserted that LVU's membership must be vigilant lest their organization degenerated into little more than a cultural and educational society, of the type it was stated Ukrainian Canadian groups had become.²⁰ What was termed "Canadianization" had to be vigorously resisted.²¹ When one individual dared suggest that LVU was "stagnating" as a result of its detachment from the mainstream of Ukrainian Canadian life, he was pointedly reminded that LVU was not trying to build Ukraine in Canada, but was solely interested in freeing the homeland that had been left behind.²²

Such militancy could not be perpetuated indefinitely. LVU's members were forced to slowly rebuild their lives in Canada, to buy homes, raise families, continue with their

professions and occupations, and, like it or not, mingle with other Ukrainians in Canada. Eventually these seemingly mundane processes led many local branches of the *LVU* to revive abandoned negotiations with their local *UCC* counterparts. What reformers within the organization had not been able to achieve through reasoned argument, the exigencies of daily life in Canada precipitated as a matter of course. Between February and April of 1959, the *LVU* and *UCC* exchanged formal letters outlining their respective positions with respect to a merger.²³ Exactly what the final terms agreed upon is not known. What is relevant is that, on May 8, 1959, the *LVU* became an accredited organization within the *UCC*, with a status equal to each one of the so-called "Big Five" constituent organizations of the *UCC*.²⁴

By the time this unity had been achieved, however, neither *LVU*, nor the now strengthened *UCC*, were able to do much to influence Canadian policy with respect to the liberation movement in Ukraine. That insurgency had dwindled under the overwhelming force of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. By 1959 it had virtually ceased to exist, and in that same year the leader of the *OUNr*, Stepan Bandera, was assassinated by a Soviet agent in Munich. The so-called "Ukrainian Question" had ceased to occupy the attention of the major players in the international political arena. Whatever chance Ukrainians in Canada may have had to affect some more favourable outcome for their compatriots in Ukraine was squandered. Even though *LVU* became the ascendant

power inside the *UCC* in the years following, this development would have little relevance outside Canada. Indeed, it would seem to be of critical importance only to those die-hards within the pre- and post-WW II Ukrainian population who persisted in criticizing each other's organizations rather than striving for efficacy as a lobbying force.

Intriguingly, events took a different course inside the *UNF*, the major Ukrainian Canadian organization which had prided itself on being a willing receptacle for *DPS*, particularly those who were *Melnykivtsi*. Finding a ready mesh of *UNF* branches across Canada, the "newcomers" joining the federation helped to establish 14 new branches, 9 of these in Ontario.²⁵ When they first arrived, there had been at least 88 active *UNF* branches across Canada. By 1982, this figure had dropped to some 20, the majority of these being found in such larger urban centres as Vancouver, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal. Into these the larger proportion of *OUNS* sympathizers and members had originally integrated themselves. Of those *UNF* branches established after 1945, only one continued functioning up to 1982.²⁶ Consequently, these *DPS* left no distinct spatial impact of their own within Canada, although their presence did prolong the existence of several pre-war branches. The more lasting influence of these political refugees can be detected in tracing the dominance which *Melnykivtsi* achieved within these larger, urban-based branches of the *UNF*.

The dynamics of this process are difficult to delineate without access to *UNF* archives.²⁷ What is known is that the commanding influence the *OUNS* came to hold in the *UNF* was resisted, particularly by some Canadian-born, and inter-war members of this organization. Their revolt publicly erupted on August 21, 1960, when a 2 page, mimeographed letter was sent out across the country to *UNF* branches. This call to *UNF* members started off with a rhetorical question, "What has happened to the *UNF* in Canada?" It then went on to list grievances against the post-war immigrants who had penetrated *UNF*. The organization, it claimed, had to be cleansed of these elements if it were to remain a relevant *Canadian* organization. The problem, the pamphlet proclaimed, was that the post-war group was composed of individuals whose "first loyalty" remained to their "former European organizations."²⁸

The second bulletin of this self-titled Defence Committee of the *UNF* (also known as the Committee for the Rejuvenation of the *UNF*) suggested that a "secret network of *OUN*" had infiltrated the organization so much so that by 1960, it was manipulating conventions in order to ensure that *Melnykivtsi* controlled the *UNF*. Indeed this bulletin claimed that the Dominion Executive, various regional groups, and the newspaper, *New Pathway* were now all *OUNS* controlled.²⁹ This process had to be reversed, claimed the protesters, for the *UNF* had always been a Canadian organization [sic!] which should "never come under the

domination of political parties or organizations outside Canada." In case the public had any doubts, it was told that UNF was a patriotic organization, interested in the Ukrainian cause, but also a body that would aid the liberation struggle only "strictly within Canadian law" and never under any "external compulsion."³⁰

The UNF's Dominion Executive, in fact dominated by Melnykivtsi, reacted bluntly to this challenge. It suspended each member of the Defence Committee, along with the president of the Winnipeg UNF branch, where the revolt was centred. Those punished included Dr. (later Senator) Paul Yuzyk, Michael Pohorecky, Walter Klyukiw, W. Topolnycky and Iwan Hewryk.³¹ While they persisted in their defiance, asserting that there would be "no compromise" with the unscrupulous individuals ruling UNF, their protest faded. The UNF, already well seeded with Melnykivtsi, passed almost entirely into the latter's hands, retaining this colouration to the present. Ironically, those who had so often denounced the Banderivtsi for attempting to surreptitiously gain control of other peoples' organizations had themselves proven to be most skillful in such behaviour.

The impacts of these processes on the status of Ukrainians in Canada were several. As noted at the start of this analysis, the reliability of Ukrainians within the Canadian nation-state had long been suspected. As an RCMP official put it:

Experience has shown that the Ukrainians are

particularly politically conscious, as compared to other ethnic groups...³²

This opinion was not dispelled after World War II. In public pronouncements, such as an editorial appearing in the *Windsor Daily Star* in late April, 1948, Ukrainians were scolded for their "divided loyalties."³³ Before the Canadian Senate, such Ukrainian organizations as the UNF had even been asked, "Why do you build separate halls?"³⁴ And those long-time observers of the Ukrainian Canadian scene, Dr. Kaye and Prof. Watson Kirkconnell had their own caveats to add about the impact of the post-war immigrants:

I personally do not consider the propagation in Canada of European group politics and hatreds a wholesome activity. It only diverts the attention of new Canadians from Canadian problems, retards their acculturation and prevents concentration of focus against the common enemy of their European homeland and their adopted country Canada.³⁵

It was the Canadian government, however, that was to devise the framework into which the post-war immigrants were fit.³⁶ While the DEA's Defence Liason opined that:

I think it was agreed that we should, in general, advise immigrants coming here from Europe to attempt to enter into Canadian life rather than concern themselves with the formation of committees or organizations to perpetuate in Canada the political life of the countries from which they

come...³⁷

this policy was reconsidered by early 1951. The impetus behind this re-evaluation seems to have come from two directions, the traditional one, from England, and a new source, the Americans. In March, 1949, advice had come from London, informing the Canadian government that it was perhaps wasteful to ignore the opinions and experience of the political refugees now relocated throughout the West. While Canadian policy remained that of avoiding bestowal of "official approval" on emigre groups here, it was suggested that efforts be made, as the Americans phrased it:

To preserve this human resource of potential leadership against the days of liberation.³⁸

The British had already implemented just such a policy. Early in 1949, their officials had begun discussing the political situation in Ukraine, and the relevance of such groups as the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). Their conclusion was that there could be no financial or other encouragement of such emigre formations, but they might be exploited for intelligence on Soviet affairs.³⁹ From the summer of 1949 onwards, especially as the Cold War heated up, attitudes changed. FO officials were instructed to make "unofficial contacts" with the ABN, if these could be arranged with "discretion." As one FO bureaucrat noted:

We have hitherto steered clear of ABN, because it is a frankly subversive organization. Until our policy rulings are relaxed, I do not think we can

adopt their suggestions or acknowledge their letters. They are too hot to touch. A pity.[emphasis added]⁴⁰

By early 1951, as the *UPA's* insurgency waned, so too did British interest. Some officials even questioned whether the disintegration of the Soviet Union along ethnic lines was "a proper objective" of British policy towards the USSR.⁴¹

Even with such reservations, however, the *FO* still considered Ukrainian nationalism a force worth reserving for possible future use. As Richard Faber noted in March, 1951:

The movement which *ABN* represents should not be underrated; and it may one day assume a practical importance for us, which at present it largely lacks.⁴²

With such considerations in mind, the Canadian government drafted its own policy guidelines. These would be of little direct interest to the present study if it were not for the insights they provide into some of the reasons the government agreed to the immigration of Ukrainian *DPS*, and the purposes it envisioned these particular refugees might have within and outside of Canada. These documents substantiate this work's contentions about the official manipulation of Ukrainians in Canada before, during and after WW II.

The critical document was simply titled *Emigre Organizations in Canada*. It began:

The Western democracies have, in recent months, become increasingly aware of the formation of organizations within their boundaries by emigre groups, whose principle aims are to render assistance to refugees from Communist-dominated countries, to undermine the present Communist regime in their homelands, and, in some cases, to sponsor liberation movements in territories long consolidated under Russian rule.

...the Department [DEA] has been approached by various organizations, with a view towards obtaining information on the Government's attitude toward their form of activity.⁴³

It was then noted that the Canadian government was generally opposed to giving any formal encouragement to emigre groups. The reasons for this were two-fold, namely:

The formation of European emigre organizations in this country could and probably would run counter to our citizenship policy of attempting to assimilate immigrants into our democratic life. It is considered that the leaders of these movements would tend to direct the energies of their fellow-citizens into channels which will to some extent keep them apart from normal Canadian activities.⁴⁴

There was also the matter of recognition. If such groups were established and formally sanctioned as

governments-in-exile they might place demands on the West before being able to themselves contribute to the war efforts of Canada and its allies, should such an eventuality arise:

Possibly even more fundamental was the fact that, it is difficult to ensure that any emigre organization if given official backing would act in a responsible manner and so prevent embarrassing the host government.⁴⁵

Consequently, the *DEA* ruled, political refugees in Canada would be told that here they were free to do whatever they wished, in terms of setting up their own organizations, so long as they did not contravene Canadian laws. However, at no time were they to be given even a hint "which might in the slightest way be interpreted as official approval."⁴⁶

Having so covered themselves, the policy-makers then added that their preceeding remarks did not mean that the Canadian government was not interested in the political refugees. A situation might arise where their "usefullness" could be demonstrated. When that time came, then their utility would have to be "directed into the appropriate channels." These would, presumably, be defined by the government as needs required. In the meantime, the emigres had two useful functions to perform for Canada. These were frankly stated as being:

1. Counter-acting communist influence among foreign-born Canadians or recent emigres, and

2. In rare cases, under the aegis of the Canadian Government, of conducting psychological warfare abroad.⁴⁷

That both types of activity were conducted by Ukrainian refugees in the immediate post-war period is clear. How successfully they fulfilled the mandates set out for them by the government is debatable.

While these deliberations on the utility of the *DPs*, inside and outside Canada went on, the government was also faced with having to cope with appeals made by Ukrainian Canadians to intervene on behalf of their compatriots in Eastern Europe. As a *DEA* official remarked, in a file titled, *Ukrainian Nationalism and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee* :

It would not be in character for the *UCC* to refrain from further attempts to get the Government to accept their "line" or at least some of it, and we should, therefore, be prepared to draft replies to future submissions...⁴⁸

Since it was clearly not Canadian policy to support any organizations which suggested that the USSR be dissolved, government officials had an easy task whenever Ukrainians in Canada petitioned them. Regardless of whether it was the *UCC* or supporters of the *OUNr*, *UHVR*, *UPA*, or *ABN* the government had readied definite replies. Ultimately it was determined to do nothing. Just as the British so too their Canadian counterparts in *DEA*, came to the following conclusion:

In the case of the Ukrainian emigration, we

particularly wish to avoid committing ourselves on the question of Ukrainian separatism. We also wish to avoid giving the impression that we give special support (let alone any form of official recognition) to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in preference to such bodies as the Ukrainian-dominated ABN.''

Whether subjected to the memoranda of the UCC, or the entreaties of the ABN's "peripatetic president," Yaroslav Stetsko, the Canadian government held firmly to this position of taking no action. It would not commit itself either indirectly or directly to the liberation of Ukraine as an objective of Canadian diplomacy. At best, Canadian officials were told that they might express sympathy with Ukrainian cultural survival and note that they hoped Ukrainians would not be swallowed in the communist tide. Empty phrases, easily spoken, signifying nothing. As for accepting memoranda like the one presented to the DEA in late 1957, titled *The Policy Of Liberation as an Aspect of Canadian Foreign Policy* there was absolutely no question of such petitions being taken seriously. Officers of the government would receive such representatives and memoranda, but they were to ignore their contents. Instead they should strive to ensure that their bearers were made to feel important, which one cynic suggested was all these petitioners were really after. It was clear, however, that the authorities were never really interested in Ukrainian aspirations. Posturing they were

prepared to undertake, since this avoided arguments and involved no promises of no definite action. If it could impress and mollify, keep Ukrainians in Canada pacified, while otherwise not entangling itself in potentially difficult international conflicts, the government was willing to waste a little of its bureaucrats' time on playing lip service to Ukrainian Canadian citizens concerns.

By the time LVU, and most other post-war Ukrainian organizations had joined the UCC, and developed a semblance of a working relationship with UCC's previous constituents, the government was already well practised in thwarting the political demands of an again-united Ukrainian population in Canada. As a new generation of Ukrainian parentage grew up in Canada, and began voicing Ukrainian aspirations, the government modified its policies, to begin considering aspects of the Ukrainian problem connected to human rights issues. This tended to placate the ethnic radicals of those years. What was poorly understood was that, despite their years of effort in Canada, the organized Ukrainian community remained a population to be used as required, and otherwise denigrated as an almost irrelevant segment of the Canadian body-politic. The pattern of this relationship between the Canadian state and Ukrainians, set in the early years of the 20th century, had persisted well beyond the immediate post-WW II period. To a great extent, the Ukrainians in Canada were responsible for their emasculation as a relevant force. Mapping out the spatial and social pattern of this

uneven interaction has been the task of this work.

Notes

1. *Memorandum by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Representing Canadian Citizens of Ukrainian Origin to Paris Peace Conference, (September, 1946).*

V.Kochan made it clear that when he first came to Winnipeg there had been discussions about whether UCC should continue to exist. His influence as a representative of UNRada was pivotal in convincing doubters about the need to perpetuate the UCC. Even so, he admitted, that 80% of the post-war immigrants did not support the UCC, giving their allegiance instead to the LVU.

2. Some of the other post-WW II Ukrainian organizations established in Canada were The Brotherhood of the Carpathian Sitch, the Brotherhood of Former War Veterans of the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army, the Association of Ukrainian Victims of Russian Communist Terror (SUZhERO), the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the Canadian Friends for the Liberation of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Youth Association - Plast.

3. *DEA 10268/40, (September, 1952), Ukrainian Nationalism and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee .*

4. Proceedings of the Third National LVU Congress, Toronto, 22-23 December, 1951.
5. Proceedings of the Second National LVU Congress, Toronto, 24 December, 1950.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Minutes of LVU National Executive Meeting, #5, (3.6.51).
9. Minutes of LVU National Executive Meeting, #3, (15.4.51).
10. Proceedings of the Third National LVU Congress, opt. cit.
11. Ibid.
12. Proceedings of the Second National LVU Congress, opt. cit.
13. Proceedings of the Third National LVU Congress, opt. cit.
14. Minutes of LVU National Executive Meeting, #7, (6.11.52).
15. Ibid.
16. Minutes of LVU National Executive Meeting, #8, (24.12.52) noted that the UCC had recognized UNRada at a meeting held in early December, 1951.

Actually, the UCC had written to Lester B. Pearson, (11.9.50) to inform the Canadian government that it recognized the Ukrainian National Council as:

The sole exponent of the political aspirations

of the Ukrainian people.

This letter added that not only the *UCC*, but also the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Pan-American Ukrainian Congress shared this position, (DEA 6980-GR-40).

In the *Winnipeg Free Press* the *UCC* also made it clear that it had nothing to do with the *ABN* or the *OUNr*, since both these groups "had no right to speak for Ukrainians, being...small, extremist political organizations," (DEA 10919-40, 26.2.51).

17. Proceedings of the Fourth National *LVU* Congress, July 18-19, 1953, Toronto.
18. Ibid.
19. For example, at the Fifth National *LVU* Congress, held in Toronto between July 17 and 18, 1954.
20. Ibid.
21. Proceedings of the Third National *LVU* Congress, opt. cit.,
22. Proceedings of the Fifth National *LVU* Congress, opt. cit.,
23. Minutes of an *LVU* National Executive Meeting, #13, (23.4.59).
24. V. Kochan mentions this date in correspondence with an American colleague, (27.7.59). He also felt that the admission of *LVU* into the *UCC* wouldn't automatically remove the problems the *UCC* had experienced with the *Banderivtsi* in the past.

25. Statistics provided by the National Executive of the UNF, (1982).
26. Ibid.
27. The records of the UNF remain closed until 1985. They are housed in the Archives of Ontario (Toronto).
28. Bulletin #2 of the UNF Defence Committee, (20.2.61), Winnipeg: 3.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. The first mimeographed bulletin was dated 21.8.60.
31. Professor (later Senator) Paul Yuzyk had been a founding member of UNYF, Michael Pohorecky was a founder and editor of *New Pathway*, Walter Klymkiw and Ivan Hewryk had both been on UNF's Dominion Executive, while Wasyl Topolnycky was a member of the UWVA's Dominion Executive.

For additional information on these individuals see page 4 of the 2nd UNF Defence Committee Bulletin.

The UNF's Dominion Executive responded from its HQ in Toronto on 12 February, 1960.

The Ukrainian War Veterans' Association also publicly commented on this "revolt" in a circular letter dated 19 February, 1960.

32. DEA 4174-40, (24.7.50).
33. See *The Windsor Daily Star*, (20.4.48). The editorial was titled, "Divided Loyalties Refutation of Good Canadian Citizenship."

34. The Senate of Canada, Official Report of Debates, No.12, Ottawa, (20.3.50). The remark is attributed to the Honourable R.B. Horner.
35. See PAC MG 31 D69, Kaye to Kirkconnell, (25.10.50). The two men also discussed *Homin Ukrainy*. PAC MG 31 D69 contains letters from Kirkconnell to Kaye, (29.12.50) and a response, (4.1.51).
36. DEA 11387-40, (1951). Denis Stairs, (1982:686), has written the following about DEA:

The most successful of the brokers seem therefore to lack breadth of vision and integrity of purpose. At their worst, when they are old and steeped too long in the practice of barter, they appear jaded and corrupt. At their worst, when they are young and governed too much by the lusts of ambition, they display the crude cynicisms of backroom fixers, their identities defined by experience of the joys of manipulation, and by their proximity to power. In none of this is there much to attract the admiration of those who believe in the primacy of the political profession and in the importance of ideas to its honourable conduct.

37. DEA 10919-40, (18.4.51). The US statement is found in ARGUS Telegram 1129, dated 16.3.51 (sent from London).
38. FO 371/77586, (22.4.49).
39. FO 371/77585, (13.8.49).

40. *FO* 371/94964, (16.1.51).
41. *FO* 371/77445, (21.3.51).
42. *DEA* 10919-40, (1951).
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. *DEA* 10268-40, (September, 1952).
48. *FO* 371/94938, (18.9.51).

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: ORAL HISTORY SOURCES

In-depth interviewing followed a semi-structured format. Generally, each participant was asked to provide information falling into the same categories as those outlined in the four sections of the survey questionnaire. Whenever an individual appeared to be able or willing to elucidate on some particular aspect of the refugee experience (e.g. political organization of the *DP* camps) then the interviewer allowed for a detailed reply. Consequently, while these interviews can be compared in terms of their basic data each respondents' individual experiences add their own dimension of uniqueness to the series. The publication of a collection of transcripts based on these interviews is planned.

Interviews conducted between May, 1981 and October, 1982 appear in List 1. These have been deposited with The Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 43 Queen's Park Crescent East, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 2C3.

Interviews held from November, 1982 to May, 1984 under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies' Oral History Project are on deposit with the *CIUS*, Room #352, Athabasca Hall, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2E8. An inventory of these is found in List 2.

List 1 - Multicultural History Society of Ontario

1. Anonymous, Ottawa (15.9.81).
2. Anonymous, Ottawa (16,9.81).
3. Anonymous, Ottawa (17,9,81.).
4. Anonymous, Toronto (14.4.82).

5. Babenko, L. Toronto (21.4.82).
6. Babiak, Stefan. Toronto (22.4.82).
7. Banach, Roman. Toronto (2.4.82).
8. Baryckyj, Roman. Sudbury (14.5.82).
9. Bezchlibnyk, Wolodymyr. Toronto (30.6.81 and 1.7.81).
10. Bojcun, Roman. Toronto (24.3.82).
11. Borowyk, M. Ottawa (14.9.81).
12. Boyko, Petro. Sault Ste. Marie (15.5.82).
13. Bulat, Yuriy. Toronto (8.4.82).
14. Burianyky, Wasyl. Winnipeg (30.5.82).
15. Charchalis, M. Toronto (29.4.82).
16. Cymbalisty, Petro. London, England (15.6.82).
17. Cymbaliuk, Fedir. Toronto (9.4.82).
18. Czich, Mykola. Ottawa (18.9.81).
19. Danyliw, Teodor. London, England (17.6.82).
20. Davidovich, Stephan. Toronto (8.3.82).
21. Dawydiak, W. Sudbury (14.5.82).
22. Didowycz, W. Munich, West Germany (22.7.82).
23. Dmytriw, Illya. London, England (16.6.82).
24. Dobriansky, Michael. London, England (21.6.82).
25. Duvalko, Ivan. Toronto (20.4.82).
26. Eliashevsky, Ivan. Toronto (11.2.82).
27. Eliashevsky, Olha. Toronto (28.4.82).
28. Fedak, M. Toronto (9.4.82).
29. Fedorowycz, Wasyl. Toronto (6.4.82).
30. Firman, Ivan. Toronto (30.5.82).
31. Frolick, Stanley W. Toronto (1.7.81/16.12.83 to

24.12.83/

4.1.84 to 6.1.84).

32. Fundak, O. London, England (4.8.82).

33. Fyshkevych, J. Toronto (9.4.82).

34. Gawa, M. Toronto (10.2.82).

35. Gembatiuk, Y. Toronto (5.4.82).

36. Hawrysch, M. Toronto (5.4.82).

37. Horishnyj, Ivan. (31.3.82 and 7.4.82).

38. Horlatsch, S. Toronto (1.5.82).

39. Hrabusevich, J. Thunder Bay, (16.5.82).

40. Hryn, Mykola. Toronto (19.4.82).

41. Humeniuk, Jerry. Sault Ste. Marie (15.5.82).

42. Iwaskiw, Leo. Thunder Bay (17.5.82).

43. Izyk, Semen. Winnipeg (21.5.82).

44. Jaworskyj, Volodymyr. Toronto (13.2.82).

45. Kachynycz, Wasyl. Thunder Bay (16.5.82).

46. Kapusta, Michael. Toronto (10.5.82).

47. Kis, Halyna. Ottawa (18.9.81).

48. Kis, Theofil. Ottawa (17.9.81).

49. Knysh, Zynowy. Toronto (10.3.82).

50. Kocijowsky, Mykola. Sudbury (14.5.82).

51. Kolos, Theodore. Toronto (3.5.82).

52. Korda, Ivan. Thunder Bay (18.5.82).

53. Kordiuk, Bohdan. Munich, West Germany (13.7.82).

54. Kosak, J. Munich, West Germany (21.7.82).

55. Kostyuk, Andrew. London, England (19.6.82).

56. Kostyuk, Roman. Toronto (27.4.82).

57. Kowalsky, Alexander. Toronto (22.4.82).
58. Kozyra, Ilko. Thunder Bay (18.5.82).
59. Kril, M. Toronto (12.2.82).
60. Kruzelecky, J. Toronto (24.4.82).
61. Krynycky, Bohdan. Ottawa (6.9.81).
62. Krysak, Wasyl. Toronto. (21.4.82).
63. Kryvoruchko, Anatol. Ottawa (17.9.81).
64. Kryzanowska, M. Toronto (26.4.82).
65. Kuryliw, Wasyl. Sudbury (15.5.82).
66. Kushmelyn, Wasyl. Toronto (7.4.82).
67. Kushnir, O. Toronto (5.4.82).
68. Lenyk, Volodymyr. Munich, West Germany (9.7.82).
69. Litwinow, Wikentij. Toronto (29.4.82).
70. Lucyk, Michael. Toronto (15.4.82).
71. Majstrenko, Ivan. Munich, West Germany (9.7.82).
72. Makar, Volodymyr. Toronto (23.3.82).
73. Makohon, Pavlo. Toronto (24.4.82).
74. Makoweckyj, Jakiw. Munich, West Germany (12.7.82).
75. Maksymluk, A. Barrie (12.5.82).
76. Malaschuk, Roman. Toronto (25.3.82).
77. Maletsky, Myroslav. Toronto (9.3.82).
78. Marunchak, M. Winnipeg (31.5.82).
79. Maruniak, W. Munich, West Germany (23.7.82).
80. Maryglad, Thomas. Toronto (1.4.82).
81. Maryglad, Victoria. Toronto (3.4.82).
82. Matla, Alexander. Toronto (24.3.82).
83. Melnyk, Petro. Toronto (23.4.82).

84. Melnyk-Kaluzynska, H. London, England (6.8.82).
85. Migus, M. Toronto (2.4.82).
86. Moros, H. Toronto (27.3.82).
87. Mucha, M. Toronto (26.3.82).
88. Mudryk, Stepan. Munich, West Germany (13.7.82).
89. Mychalchuk, Ivan. Ottawa (19.9.81).
90. Myhal, Boris. Ottawa (7.9.81).
91. Mykytczuk, Karpo. Toronto (15.4.82 and 23.4.82).
92. Naklowycz, Sergius. Vienna, Austria (6.7.82).
93. Nebeluk, M. Toronto (9.3.82).
94. Olah, Wasyl. Toronto (3.5.82).
95. Oranski, Boris. Toronto (7.4.82).
96. Paladiychuk, Roman. Toronto (22.3.82 and 4.4.82).
97. Panchuk, G.R.B. Montreal (5.5.81 and 24.7.81).
98. Pawluk, Stephan. Toronto (25.11.81).
99. Petryshyn, Alexander. Thunder Bay (17.5.82).
100. Pidlisny, Mykola. Toronto (25.4.82).
101. Pisocky, Stepan. Thunder Bay (18.5.82).
102. Prozak, Mykhailo. Sault Ste. Marie (15.5.82).
103. Rawluk, Ivan. London, England (16.6.82).
104. Romanow, Joseph. Ottawa (20.9.82).
105. Rosocha, Stefan. Toronto (4.5.82).
106. Salsky, George. Alymer, Quebec (16.9.81).
107. Samchuk, Ulas. Toronto (23.4.82).
108. Serbyn, Yaroslav. Toronto (30.6.81).
109. Shankowsky, Lev. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (3.9.81).
110. Shebech, M. Toronto (23.3.82).

111. Shiposh, M. Sudbury (13.5.82).
112. Shtendera, E. Ottawa (7.9.82).
113. Skorochid, Walter. Hamilton (21.3.82).
114. Skoropad, Wasyl. Sudbury (17.5.82).
115. Smith, (Crapleve) Ann. Winnipeg (20.5.82).
116. Smylski, Peter. Toronto (25.3.82).
117. Sokolsky, Ostap. Toronto (3.12.81).
118. Solonynka, Wasyl. Toronto (23.3.82).
119. Sosna, Aleksander. Oshawa (16.4.82).
120. Stanko, Yaroslav. Toronto (14.4.82).
121. Stasiuk, Stepan. Sudbury (14.5.82).
122. Stebelsky, Bohdan. Toronto (17.3.82).
123. Stepaniuk, A. Toronto (3.5.82).
124. Stetsko, Slava. Munich, West Germany (9.7.82).
125. Stetsko, Yaroslav. Munich, West Germany (14.7.82).
126. Straticchuk, John. Sault Ste. Marie (15.5.82).
127. Swyrydenko, Damian. Sudbury (14.5.82).
128. Swyrydenko, Peter. Thunder Bay (17.5.82).
129. Tesla, Ivan. Ottawa (7.9.82).
130. Waler, Mykola. Toronto (27.4.82).
131. Wasylenko, R. Ottawa (19.9.81).
132. Wasylyshen, Anne. Winnipeg (30.5.82).

List 2 - Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies

Oral History Project

1. Alexewich, Nick. Edmonton (18.11.82).
2. Andruschak, Fedir. Saskatoon (20.8.83).
3. Babiuk, John. Regina (6.10.83).

4. Bashuk, Petro. Winnipeg (24.1.83).
5. Bayrack, Mykhailo. Edmonton (10.11.82).
6. Bogdan, Forwen. Vancouver (28.3.84)
7. Bilecki, Anthony. Winnipeg (3.12.82).
8. Boykowich, Michael. Saskatoon (17.8.83).
9. Bratko, Dan. Vancouver (27.3.84).
10. Bukowsky, Nikander. Saskatoon (17.8.83).
11. Burianyk, Wasyl. Winnipeg (28.11.82).
12. Cap, Wasyl. Winnipeg (25.1.83).
13. Danyliuk, Petro. Winnipeg (29.1.83).
14. Davies, Raymond A. Montreal (6.6.83).
15. Fedorowich, Rudolph. Regina (2.10.83).
16. Frolick, Stanley W. Toronto (10.1.83).
17. Gayowsky, Irene. Winnipeg (26.1.83).
18. Gospodin, Andrew. Winnipeg (1.12.82 and 21.1.83).
19. Hawrysh, Nicholas. Saskatoon (17.8.83).
20. Kardash, William. Winnipeg (30.11.82).
21. Karasevich, Marie. Winnipeg (7.10.83).
22. Kaye, Ludwig. Saskatoon (16.8.83).
23. Kindrachuk, Fedir. Saskatoon (25.11.82).
24. Klish, Wolodymyr. Toronto (21.6.83).
25. Knehinicki, John. Winnipeg (29.11.82).
26. Kolasky, John. Edmonton (8.5.83).
27. Kolysher, Peter. Saskatoon (19.8.83).
28. Konopka, O. Saskatoon (18.8.83).
29. Konopka, W. Saskatoon (18.8.83).
30. Korchinski, Bronislav. Regina (3.10.83).

31. Korda, Wasyl. Saskatoon (17.8.83).
32. Kozicky, Helen. Calgary (5.7.83).
33. Kupchak, Alex. Victoria (1.4.84).
34. Kurdydyk, Anatol. Winnipeg (20.1.83).
35. Kuzma, Steve. Saskatoon (23.8.83).
36. Lapchuk, Ann. Regina (6.10.83).
37. Lashin, Sam. Vancouver (4.4.84).
38. Lisczynski, Wasyl. Victoria (2.4.84).
40. Lobay, Stepan. Vancouver (3.4.84).
41. Melnyk, Petro. Victoria (30.3.84).
42. Mykytiuk, Dmytro. Winnipeg (4.12.82 and 18.1.83).
43. Nemilowich, Myron. Winnipeg (29.11.82).
44. Olynyk, Roman. Montreal (14.6.83).
45. Panchuk, G.R.B. Montreal (4.1.83).
46. Pankiw, Joseph. Winnipeg (22.1.83).
47. Pawlik, Andrew. Winnipeg (1.12.82).
48. Petryshyn, Michael. Saskatoon (16.8.83).
49. Piniuta, Harry. Fort Frances (5.5.84).
50. Pizag, Peter. Victoria (30.3.84).
51. Primak, Walter. Vancouver (31.3.84).
52. Romanow, Maria. Saskatoon (17.8.83 and 23.8.83).
53. Romaniv, Semen. Winnipeg (27.1.83).
54. Rutich, Katherine. Victoria (31.3.84).
55. Sagacz, Wolodymyr. Regina (5.10.83).
56. Sawchuk, Semen. Winnipeg (5.12.82).
57. Semchuk, Stephan. Winnipeg (3.12.82).
58. Shatulsky, Myron. Vancouver (5.4.84).

59. Smith, (Crapleve) Ann. Winnipeg (29.11.82).
60. Solomon, John. Winnipeg (30.11.82).
61. Stetchishin, Savella. Saskatoon (16.8.83).
62. Stratychuk, R. Saskatoon (22.8.83).
63. Supynyk, George. Regina (4.10.83).
64. Tkachuk, Mary. Saskatoon (25.11.82).
65. Toupich, Artamon. Regina (4.10.83).
66. Wasylyshen, Anne. Winnipeg (30.11.82).
67. Worobetz, Peter. Saskatoon (21.8.83).
68. Wowk, Lev. Saskatoon (19.8.83).
69. Yaremovich, Anthony. Winnipeg (1.12.82).
70. Yuzyk, John. Winnipeg (28.11.82).
71. Yuzwa, Paul. Saskatoon (25.11.82).
72. Zenchyshyn, John. Regina (1.10.83).
73. Zvarych, Nykola. Kenora (3.5.84).

APPENDIX 2: The Survey Questionnaire.



Міграція українців до Канади після Другої Світової Війни: її причини та наслідки.

В історії людства все були воєнні втікачі. Однак, науковці присвятили мало уваги цьому явищу.

Якщо йдеться про українських політичних втікачів після Другої світової війни, то публікації про їхнє розсіяння є рідкісні. Наприклад, немає жодної студії про їхній вплив на зорганізовані українські громади, що вже існували в Канаді перед їх приїздом. Чим більше минає часу, тим менше залишається свідчення про цю ділянку українського поселення в Канаді.

Я звертаюся до Вас цією відозвою допомогти мені здійснити студію про поселення українців у Канаді після Другої світової війни. Дані з цих запитників будуть використані в моїй докторській дисертації для відділу географії при Албертському університеті в Едмонтоні, Канада.

Прошу не подавати Вашого прізвища у відповідях. Я звертаюся до Вас як до репрезентативного свідка цієї історичної фази і збережу повну конфіденційність Ваших заміток про Ваші переживання. Прошу виповнити цей запитник і відіслати перед

MAY 02 1981

, вживаючи долучений тут коверт, на мою нижчеподану адресу:

LUBOMYR Y. LUCIUK
Ph.D. Candidate



Department of Geography
The University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada
T6G 2H4

Заздалегідь дякую за Ваш час, труд і співпрацю. Надіюся що моя теза віддзеркалить ті моменти історії в яких Ви взяли активну участь.

Частина Перша: Біографічні дані

Прошу тут
не зазначувати!

1. Стать: чоловіча жіноча ☐
2. Місце народження:
(село/місто) (країна) ☐
3. Вік: ☐
4. Віровизнання: ☐
5. Цивільний стан: одружений (-а) самітний (-а) ☐
6. Місце народження дружини:
(село/місто) (країна) ☐
7. Вік дружини: ☐
8. Де Ви одружилися ?
(село/місто) (країна) ☐
9. Освіта (перед приїздом до Канади): ☐
10. Освіта (після приїзду до Канади): ☐
11. Праця або фах перед приїздом до Канади: ☐

Частина Друга: Життєві обставини перед 2-ою світовою війною та під час війни

12. Де Ви жили перед 2-ої світової війни ?
(село/місто) (країна) ☐
13. Чи Ви особисто брали активну участь в одній або більше нижчезгаданих українських організаціях? Якщо так, прошу подайте, побіч назви організації до якої Ви належали, рік і місце вказуючи коли і де Ви стали її членом.
 Просвіта ☐
 Українська Соціалістична Демократична Партія (УСДП)
 Українська Військова Організація (УВО)
 Кооператива (Маслосоюз, Центросоюз, і т.д.)
 Організація Українських Націоналістів (ОУН)
 Молодеча організація (яка?)
 Українська Робітнича Партія
 Гетьманський рух
 Сельроб
 Українське Національне Демократичне Об'єднання (УНДО)
 Українська Католицька Національна Партія
 Українська Соціалістична Радикальна Партія
 інші



14. На Вашу думку, як ставилися нижчезгадані нації до української справи (т. зн. до створення, перед 2-ої світової війни, української самостійної держави)?

	негативно	байдуже	позитивно
Американці			
Канадці			
Англіїці			
Литовці			
Французи			
Німці			
Мадяри			
Жиди			
Поляки			
Словаки			
Чехи			
Про-комуністичні росіяни			
Анти-комуністичні росіяни			

15. Українці належали до одної або більше нижчезгаданих груп під час війни. Якщо Ви належали до одної чи більше з них, прошу зачеркніть відповідну групу (✓). Подайте рік і місце коли і де Ви стали членом.



Українська Повстанська Армія (УПА)

Організація Українських Націоналістів (Бандера)

Організація Українських Націоналістів (Мельник)

Дивізія "Галичина"

Польська армія ген. Андерса

Українська Національна Армія (ген. Шандрук)

Формация Отамана Бульби-Боровця

Український Центральний Комітет

"Hilfswillige" — "Hiwi" (або "TOT")

Legion "Roland" або "Nachtigall"

"Ostlegion" (або Osttruppen німецька Wehrmacht)

"Ostarbeiter"

"RONA" — "Бригада Камінського"

"ROA" — Армія ген. Власова

Втікач з Червоної Армії

Воєнні полонені (де?)

Інші (Прошу вясніть)

16. Після 1938-го року, чи Ви були змушені покинути Ваш рідний дім, з нижчеподаних причин? Подайте місцевість куди Ви переїхали та дату Вашого переселення.



"Ostarbeiter"

переселення в наслідок міжнародних договорів

одруження з чужинцем (-кою)

"Volksdeutsch"

Лікування в шпиталі поза межами моєї країни

Добровільний робітник в іншій країні

Член партизанської групи

Студії за кордоном

Втеча від переслідування

Полонений (-а), де?

Вивезений (-а) до концентраційного табору (де?)

Інші

Прочітайте тут
не зазначувати!

☐

17. Чи Ви вірили що повстане українська самостійна держава після 2-ої світової війни?
так ні не знав

Частина Третя: Повоєнний період.

18. Де Ви жили коли закінчилася війна?
(село/місто) (країна)

☐

19. Якщо Ви жили в таборах **UNRRA** або **IRO** для "D.P." прошу подайте наступні інформації:

☐

назва табору місце дата прибуття до табору дата виїзду причини виїзду

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

20. Якщо Ви не були в таборах "D.P." прошу подайте місце перебування від кінця війни до Вашого приїзду до Канади.

☐

місце дата прибуття дата виїзду причини виїзду

21. Прочітайте уважно нижчеподані твердження і зазначіть (✓) Ваш погляд на кожне з них на даній лінії.

1. Примусове переселення вплинуло на розвій моєї національної свідомості.

☐

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-я)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

2. Індивідуальної приватності в "D.P." таборах де я жив не було.

☐

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-я)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

3. Основні щоденні потреби (їда, убрання і т.д.) були в достатній кількості в таборах перебування.

☐

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-я)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

4. Життя в "D.P." таборах було приємніше ніж те котре я зазнав перед війною в Україні.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

5. Життя в "D.P." таборах було приємніше ніж те котре я зазнав під час війни в Україні.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

6. Говорячи загально, таборова адміністрація була прихильно наставлена до української справи.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

7. Місцеве населення в околицях таборів ставилося прихильно до українців.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

8. Різні національні групи в "D.P." таборах жили в згоді з собою.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

9. Українці були гірше трактовані, ніж інші національні групи в таборах "D.P.".

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

10. Українці з різних частин України в таборах перебуття жили в спільній гармонії.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

11. Українці відокремлювали себе від таборовиків інших національностей.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

12. Українці в таборах оформилися в організаціях, які були подібні до тих, що снували в Україні перед війною.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

13. Урядовці таборової адміністрації не визнавали українців як окрему і визнану національність.

сильно
непогоджуюся

частинно
непогоджуюся

я не певний (-а)

частинно
погоджуюся

сильно
погоджуюся

☐

14. Українці хотіли повертатися до Совєтського Союзу зразу як тільки було можливо після війни.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

15. Ті українці котрі відмовлялися від повороту в Україну не були злочинцями.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

16. Дуже мало українців були насильно повернені до Совєтського Союзу.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

17. Повернення до Совєтського Союзу переслідувало б карою, ув'язненням або смертю.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

18. Люди добровільно залишалися в "D.P." таборах сподіваючися "Третьої" світової війни, яка дала б їм змогу повернутися в Україну.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

19. У таборах "D.P." з часом різниці між східними і західними українцями затирались і всі почували себе членами одної нації.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

20. Українські групи противних політичних переконань старалися заволодіти внутрішньою таборовою адміністрацією.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

21. Коли я приїхав (-ла) до Канади, то я хотів (-ла) забути всі мої воєнні і таборові переживання.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

22. Держави Заходу віддали Україну Совєтському Союзу.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

23. Мої таборові переживання посилили мої націоналістичні переконання.

сильно непогоджуюся	частинно непогоджуюся	я не певний (-а)	частинно погоджуюся	сильно погоджуюся
------------------------	--------------------------	------------------	------------------------	----------------------

☐

☐

22. Найбільш національно свідомі українці походять з: (прошу зазначити від 1-7 рівень свідомости на Вашу думку)

Велика (Східна) Україна
 Гуцульщина
 Галичина
 Буковина
 Закарпаття
 Волинь
 Лемківщина

Частина Четверта: Життя в Канаді.

23. Коли Ви прибули до Канади?

☐

24. Перегляньте нижчеподану листу. Зачеркніть причини на підставі яких Ви вирішили пересилитися до Канади **по черзі їх важливости** (від 1 до 9).

Я приїхав (-ла) до Канади тому що:

..... я мав (-ла) кривних/приятелів тут.
 мій "спонсор" мав для мене працю.
 я не мав (-ла) змоги виїхати деінде.
 Канада це одинока країна що мене цікавила.
 в Канаді було велике число українців.
 одна з інтернаціональних організацій що відповідали за втікачів мені допомогла поселитися тут.
 українці в Канаді допомогли мені пересилитися тут.
 я хотів (-ла) переїхати до країни якнайдалше віддаленої від советів.
 інші.

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

25. Де Ви спершу поселились в Канаді, працювали і куди Ви пізніше **перенеслись** на яку працю?

☐

місто, провінція дата праця

Перше місце замешкання

Друге місце замешкання

Третє місце замешкання

Четверте місце замешкання

Теперішнє місце замешкання

26. Коли і де Ви стали канадським (-ою) громадянином (-кою)?

☐

27. Зачеркніть (від 1 до 6), по черзі залежно від важливости, причини що спонукали Вас стати канадським громадянином.

..... я хотів (-ла) мати повні права громадянина (-кою).
 я хотів (-ла) зірвати всі контакти з Україною.
 я вважав (-ла) що я повинен (-на) бути відданим (-ою) громадянином (-кою) тої країни де я думав (-ла) провести решту мого життя.
 канадське громадянство гарантувало, на мою думку, захист від советів.
 всі інші українці ставали громадянами.
 інші.

☐☐☐☐☐☐

28. Якщо Ви стали членом (-киньою) українських організацій в Канаді, прошу зазначити нижче:

Назва організації	Місце	Дата	Чи Ви далі є членом?
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

29. Які читаєте або передплатуєте українські газети і журнали в Канаді?

Назва	Коли почали?	Чи Ви далі передплатуєте?
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

30. Приїзд українських скитальців по 2-ій світовій війні спричинив багато непорозуміння та сварок (прошу зазначити):

..... так
..... ні
..... трохи
..... не знаю про це

31. Більшість повоєнних українців поселилися в східній Канаді тому що: (зачеркніть по черзі важливості від 1-6)

..... там була праця.
..... вони мали родину/приятелів.
..... вони не хотіли працювати на фармах.
..... вони хотіли поселитися у великих містах.
..... вони хотіли триматися разом.
..... інші.

32. На Вашу думку, чи були українці в Канаді що противилися імміграції українських скитальців до Канади після Другої світової війни?

..... так
..... ні
..... не знаю

33. Новоприбулі українці зараз почали творити свої окремі організації. Як Ви на це задивлялись?

..... я був (-ла) проти творення нових організацій.
..... я підтримував (-ла) творення таких організацій.
..... мені було байдуже.

Дуже дякую за виконання цього запитника. Прошу не забувати відіслати

MAY 2 1981



перед _____ .

Якщо Ви маєте якінебудь зауваги відносно цього запитника, прошу їх подати
нижче.

Прошу вислати до:



LUBOMYR Y. LUCIUK
Ph.D. Candidate

*Department of Geography
The University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada
T6G 2H4*

Translation of Survey Questionnaire.

MIGRATION OF UKRAINIANS TO CANADA AFTER WORLD WAR II: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES.

In the history of mankind there have always been refugees. However, scholars have paid little attention to the refugee experience.

When it comes to Ukrainian political refugees after World War II there is very little published information. For example, there is no study of the impact of these refugees on the organized Ukrainian community which existed in Canada prior to the immigration of these refugees. As time passes fewer witnesses remain to describe the causes and consequences of this immigration.

I am turning to you to in the hope that you will help me complete a study about the settlement of Ukrainians in Canada after World War II. Information collected by this survey will be used in my doctoral dissertation for the Department of Geography at The University of Alberta, in Edmonton, Canada.

Please do not give your name with your answers. I am turning to you as a representative witness of this historical period and assure you that all your answers regarding your experiences will be treated confidentially. Please complete this questionnaire and return it by [DATE STAMP], using the enclosed envelope, to the following

address:

Lubomyr Y. Luciuk
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Geography
The University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada
T6G 2H4

Sincere thanks for your time, effort and co-operation. I hope that my thesis will adequately reflect the historical events of which you were a part.

Section One: Biographical Information.

1. Sex: Male Female
2. Birthplace: (village/town) (country)
3. Age:
4. Religious affiliation:
5. Marital status: Married Single
6. Birthplace of spouse: (village/town) (country)
7. Age of spouse:
8. Where were you married? (village/town) (country)
9. Education (before emigration to Canada)
10. Education (after arriving in Canada)
11. Occupation or trade before emigrating to Canada

Section Two: Conditions before and during World War II.

12. Where did you live before the war?
13. Were you personally active in one or more of the Ukrainian organizations listed below? If so, please indicate beside the name of the organization to which you belonged **when** and **where** you became a member.
Prosvita
Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party
Ukrainian Military Organization
Co-Operative
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
A youth organization (which one?)
Ukrainian Workers' Party

The Hetman movement_____

Selrob_____

Ukrainian National Democratic Association_____

Ukrainian National Catholic Party_____

Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party_____

Other_____

14. In your opinion, what attitude did the nationality group listed below have with respect to the Ukrainian question (that is to the formation, before World War II, of an independent Ukrainian state)?

[Negative/Indifferent/Positive]

Americans

Canadians

British

Lithuanians

French

Germans

Hungarians

Jews

Poles

Slovaks

Czechs

Pro-communist Russians

Anti-communist Russians

15. Many Ukrainians belonged to one or more of the following

groups during the war. If you belonged to one or more of them, please indicate those of which you were a member with a checkmark. Give the year and place, **when** and **where** you became a member.

Ukrainian Insurgent Army____
 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Bandera)____
 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Melnyk)____
 Division "Galicia"____
 Polish army of General Anders____
 Ukrainian National Army (General Shandruk)____
 Partisans of Otaman Bulba-Borovets____
 Ukrainian Central Committee____
 "Hilfswillige"-"Hiwi" or TODT worker____
Roland or *Nachtigall* Legions____
 "Ostlegion" (or "Ostruppen" attached to the German *Wehrmacht*)____
 "Ostarbeiter"____
 "RONA" - The Kaminsky Brigade____
 "ROA" - Army of General Vlasov____
 Red Army Deserter____
 Prisoner-of-War____
 Other (Please specify)____

16. After 1938, were you forced to leave your native home for any of the following reasons? *Please provide the name of the place you went to and the date when this occurred.*

"Ostarbeiter"____

Relocated by international treaty__
 Married a foreigner__
 "Volksdeutsche"____
 Hospitalized outside my native land__
 Voluntary worker abroad__
 Member of a partisan group__
 Student abroad__
 Escaped persecution by moving__
 Imprisoned__(where?)
 Incarcerated in a concentration camp__(where?)
 Other__

17. Did you believe that an independent Ukrainian state would be formed after World War II?

__Yes__No__Didn't Know__

Third Section: Post-War Period

18. Where did you live when the war ended?

_____(village/town)_____(country)

19. If you lived in a camp run by UNRRA or IRO for DPs please provide the following information: *Name of Camp, Place, Date of arrival in the camp, Date of departure from camp, Reasons for leaving.*

20. If you were not in a DP camp please provide information about where you lived from the end of the war to the time you emigrated to Canada.

Place, Date of arrival there, Date of departure, Reasons for leaving.

21. Please carefully read each of the following statements and indicate, with a checkmark, your attitude [Strongly Disagree/Partially Disagree/Not Certain/Partially Agree/Strongly Agree]

1. Enforced migration influenced my national consciousness.
2. Individual privacy was impossible in the *DP* camps.
3. Basic staples (food, clothing, shelter etc.) were available in the *DP* camps.
4. Life in the *DP* camps was more pleasant than life had been in Ukraine before the war.
5. Life in the *DP* camps was more pleasant than life had been in Ukraine during the war.
6. Generally speaking, the camp administration was favourably disposed towards Ukrainians.
7. The population living around the *DP* camps was favourably disposed towards Ukrainians.
8. The various nationality groups in the *DP* camps lived well together.
9. Ukrainians were treated worse than other nationality groups in the *DP* camps.
10. Ukrainians from the various regions of Ukraine lived together harmoniously in the *DP* camps.
11. Ukrainians segregated themselves from other inhabitants of the *DP* camps.

12. Ukrainians in the camps formed organizations similar to those which had existed in Ukraine prior to the war.

13. The camp administration did not recognize Ukrainians as a distinct nationality.

14. Ukrainians wanted to return to the Soviet Union as soon as they could after the war's end.

15. Ukrainians who refused to return to Ukraine were not criminals.

16. Very few Ukrainians were *forcibly* returned to the Soviet Union.

17. Returning to the homeland would result in either imprisonment or death.

18. People willingly stayed in the *DP* camps hoping that a "Third" World War would allow them to return to Ukraine.

19. In the *DP* camps Eastern and Western Ukrainians forgot about their differences and came to feel that they were all members of one nation.

20. Competing Ukrainian political groups attempted to gain control over the internal administration of the camps.

21. When I came to Canada I wanted to forget all about my wartime and camp experiences.

22. The West abandoned Ukraine to the Soviet Union.

23. My camp experience strengthened my nationalist convictions.

22. The most nationally conscious Ukrainians come from which

of the following regions of Ukraine? (Please rank order your reply, from 1-7).

Greater (Eastern) Ukraine_____

Hutsulschyna_____

Halychyna_____ (Western Ukraine)

Bukovyna_____

Carpatho-Ukraine_____

Volynia_____

Lemkyvschyna_____

Fourth Section: Life in Canada

23. When did you come to Canada?_____

24. Look over the following list. Rank order the reasons for which you decided to emigrate to Canada (from 1 to 9).

I came to Canada because:

-I had relatives/friends here__

-My sponsor had work for me here__

-I had no opportunity to go elsewhere__

-Canada was the only place that attracted me__

-Canada's large Ukrainian population attracted me__

-An international organization helped resettle me here__

-Ukrainians in Canada helped me re-settle here

-I wanted to move as far away from the Soviets
as possible.

25. Where did you first settle in Canada, what work did you

find, where did you later relocate and what work did you then find?

City, Province, Date, Occupation.

First, Second, Third, Fourth Place/ Current Place of Residence.

26. When and where did you become a citizen of Canada?_____

27. Rank order, from 1 to 6, the reasons you had for becoming a citizen of Canada.

-I wanted to enjoy the full privileges of citizenship____

-I wanted to sever my contacts with Ukraine____

-I felt I should be a citizen of the country in which I would be spending the rest of my life____

-Canadian citizenship guaranteed safety from the Soviets____

-Other Ukrainians became citizens____

-Other____

28. If you became a member of a Ukrainian organization in Canada please indicate the name of the organization, where you became a member, when, and whether or not you are still a member.

29. Which Ukrainian newspapers do you subscribe to in Canada? (Name of newspaper/Date began subscribing/Do you still subscribe?)

30. The arrival of Ukrainian refugees after WW II precipitated a great deal of misunderstanding and friction.

Yes No A little I don't Know

31. Most of the post-war Ukrainians settled in eastern Canada because (rank order from 1 to 6)

-Work could be found there__

-Relatives and friends were found there__

-They didn't want to work on farms__

-They wanted to settle in larger urban centres__

-They wanted to settle together__

-Other__

32. In your opinion, were there any Ukrainians in Canada who objected to the immigration of Ukrainian refugees here after World War II?

Yes No Don't Know

33. The newcomers soon established their own organizations. How did you feel about this?

-I was against the creation of new organizations__

-I supported the formation of new organizations__

-I was indifferent__

34. In Canada there are a large number of Ukrainian organizations because (rank order from 1 to 4)

-There are ideological or religious differences__

-Personal ambitions or differences__

-There are great differences between the Ukrainians
who came to Canada after WW II and those settled here
before the war__

-Other (please specify)__

35. In your opinion do non-Ukrainian Canadians understand
Ukrainian affairs?

__Yes__No

36. Would you have returned to an independent Ukraine if
such a state had been formed shortly after your arrival in
Canada?

__Yes__No__Don't Know

37. Would you now return to Ukraine if it were to become an
independent state?

__Yes__No__Don't Know

38. How can Ukraine become independent? (rank order your
reply, from 1 to 5).

-After a Third World War__

-When the West decides that such a state should exist__

When the Ukrainian liberation movement co-ordinates
its struggle inside Ukraine with those outside Ukraine__

Through the evolution of the Soviet system__

Other__

39. In your opinion, what makes a person a Ukrainian? (rank order your responses from 1 to 11)

A Ukrainian is someone:

- Who was born in Ukraine__
- Whose parents were Ukrainians__
- Who has been raised as a Ukrainian__
- Who marries a Ukrainian__
- Who belongs to a Ukrainian church__
- Who belongs to a Ukrainian community organization__
- Who belongs to a Ukrainian nationalist organization__
- Who feels that they are Ukrainian__
- Who can speak, read and communicate in the Ukrainian language__
- Who leads a Ukrainian cultural and social life__
- Other (please specify)__

Sincere thanks for completing this questionnaire. Please do not forget to return it before [DATE STAMP]. If you have any comments to make about this survey, please record them in the space provided below.

APPENDIX 3: DOCUMENTS

Document #1.

The following document is the translation of a letter sent by a member of the OUNs to his superiors. The original was dated June 28, 1948. Its owner requested anonymity.

To The National Command of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,

:Concerning My Request For Permission To Emigrate To Canada.

With this letter I formally request permission for me and my family to leave Austria and move to Canada. My reasons for making this request are as follows.

My parents are old and need my help. My brother is married and now raising his own family so he cannot help our parents. Since my father does not know English, he can only get manual labour in Canada, for which he is not physically suited. It is up to me to take care of our parents.

At my meeting with comrade Marko on the 17th of this month, I was asked if I would go back into Poland - and I agreed to do so. However I now feel that to leave my parents in the circumstances I have outlined would be immoral and not in keeping with the high ideals of Ukrainian nationalism or common humanity, which our leaders expound. Therefore, I must request that you reconsider whether I have to go back to Poland.

I assure you that, without the permission of the National Command of the *OUN* in Austria, I will not leave for Canada, even though the opportunity presents itself. If I do go, I pledge to remain a sincere, dedicated and willing supporter of the movement, as I have been up to the present.

Please settle this issue as soon as possible, for the transport to Canada on which I could depart will be leaving, I believe, later this week.

Glory to Ukraine!

Sviatoslav - Directorate of Military Affairs for Area "A".
Affairs for Area "A."

This appeal was supported by Bohdan, the Territorial Commander, Stepan, Personnel Directorate, and Karpo, Directorate of Security.

Document #2.

Two flyers distributed in DP camps in Germany which illustrate one method that was used to urge DPs from various regions of Ukraine to coalesce.

Flyer 1 reads,

Place National Questions above Party Interests. First be a Ukrainian and only afterwards a party member!

Flyer 2 reads, *Love your fellow countryman - Ukrainian - no matter where he comes from - like your own brother!*

Document #3.

An Easter card, printed in a *DP* camp in Germany. The inscription on the back reads, "Christ Has Risen!"

Sincere greetings - strong faith and perserverence will lead us back to our own native land [signature].

Other cards of this type, found in the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre "Oseredok" in Winnipeg, expressed sentiments such as "See you in our native land by this time next year!"

Document #4.

One of the most basic of *OUN* documents is the DECALOGUE, a list of ten commandments intended to serve as guidelines for the rank and file of the Organization.

This version is taken from A. Motyl, (1980:142):

1. Attain a Ukrainian State or die in battle for It.
2. Do not allow anyone to defame the glory or the honour of Your Nation.
3. Remember the Great Days of our efforts.
4. Be proud of the fact that you are an heir of the struggle for the glory of Volodymyr's Trident.
5. Avenge the death of Great Knights.
6. Do not speak of the cause with whomever possible but only with whomever necessary.
7. Do not hesitate to commit the greatest crime, if the good of the Cause demands it.
8. Regard the enemies of Your Nation with hate and perfidy.
9. Neither requests, not threats, nor torture, nor death can compel You to betray a secret.
10. Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners.

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